



Andreas T. Rieck

# The Shias of Pakistan

*An Assertive and  
Beleaguered Minority*



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ANDREAS RIECK

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*Andreas Rieck  
Berlin, August 2015*

## NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

A simplified transliteration of Indo-Pakistani proper names and places is used throughout the book, except for authors and titles of Urdu books and articles and for those Urdu terms (often derived from Persian or Arabic) which are put in italics. Within simplified transliteration length marks have only been used for some proper names to avoid mixing up of different names, such as Nâsir and Nasîr. The Arabic letter ع is transliterated ‘ (apostrophe) in most proper names also as the first letter, except for such well-known names as Ali, Abdallah and other names starting with the Arabic “Abd”.

Transliteration of Urdu terms in italics and titles of books and articles generally follows Urdu pronunciation. Thus the Arabic letter ط is in most cases transliterated as “s”, except for the following terms and names, where the “th” has been preferred, because this is more common in scholarly literature: *hadîth*, pl. *ahâdîth*; *Ahl-i hadîth*; *Shahîd-i Thâlih*; *Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thâni*; *ashâb-i thalâtha*; *ittihâd-i thalâtha*; *ithnâ‘asharîya*; *Shihâb-i Thâqib*; Tamar Husain; Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi. Likewise, the Arabic letter ذ is in most cases transliterated as “z”, except for the names of some months of the Islamic calendar, such as *Dhû al-Hijja*, where “dh” has been preferred. Urdu nasals are transliterated as *ân*, *ên*, *în*, *ôn* and *ûn*.



## PREFACE

Numbering today some 20–25 million, the Twelver Shia Muslims of Pakistan are the second largest Shia community in the world after that of Iran. However, as a minority of 15 per cent or a little more amongst a population of more than 180 million, scattered between a Sunni Muslim majority of some 150 million, their situation cannot be compared with that of the Shias in Iran, Iraq or Lebanon, where their demographic strength has translated into political power. And unlike the Shias of Lebanon, and more recently Iraq, most Shias of Pakistan have never been inclined to engage themselves politically in parties or other organisations particular to the Shia community. Shia parties and organisations have never played more than a marginal role in Pakistan's politics, and none of the many prominent political leaders in Pakistan who belonged to the Shia community has ever campaigned on a Shia communalist platform. Rather, one can observe a tendency among Pakistani Shias in politics and public service to downplay their Shia identity—without denying or hiding it—and to emphasise common ground with their Sunni compatriots. From Pakistan's foundation in 1947 until today, mainstream political parties have never made any distinction between Sunnis and Shias, whether at leadership or grassroots levels, and Shias have fully integrated into all sections of political, professional and social life in Pakistan without any discrimination. They have rather enjoyed a privileged position in many professions due to their social and educational background. It can even be argued that the Sunni-Shia divide generally—i.e. apart from terrorist violence against Shias—has never been a significant political issue in Pakistan, with the exception of 1980.

Yet there have always been individuals and groups among the Shias of Pakistan who have emphasised rather than downplayed their Shia identity,

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and who have been active in the political field with the objective of safeguarding equal rights for the Shia community wherever and whenever they perceived any threat to these rights. It is mainly these individuals and groups that are examined in this study. One important group is that of the Shia '*ulamâ*', who by the very nature of their chosen profession are compelled to appeal to the Shia community exclusively or in the first place, even if many of the prominent Shia '*ulamâ*' of Pakistan have also been eager to maintain the best possible relations with their Sunni colleagues. The other important group are the leading activists of Shia communal organisations, which existed already in early twentieth-century British India, and which regrouped and reorganised after the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. These Shia organisations have grown and declined from the late 1940s until the mid-1970s under different names and leaders, but they have never attracted scholarly attention until the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 and its repercussions in Pakistan. Since then some studies have been published on Shia organisations in Pakistan and their conflicts with Sunni organisations, which have dealt mainly with developments after 1978, such as articles from Munir D. Ahmed (1987), Saleem Qureshi (1989), Afak Haydar (1993), Nikki Keddie (1993), Mumtaz Ahmad (1998), Muhammad Qasim Zaman (1998) and Mariam Abou Zahab (1999). These have been my starting point of research, along with results of my own research in the Northern Areas of Pakistan in the early 1990s (Rieck 1995, 1997, 2002) and the publications (in Urdu) of Sayyid Husain 'Arif Naqvi (1982, 1990, 1997, 1999). Important other publications (mainly on the Shias of India) on which this study has relied include the monographs of John Norman Hollister (1953), Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi (1982, 1986), Juan R. I. Cole (1988), Nadeem Hasnain and Shaikh Abrar Husain (1988), David Pinault (1992) and Vernon Schubel (1993), as well as articles of Sarojini Ganju (1980), Imtiaz Ahmad (1983), Keith Hjortshøj (1987) and Mushirul Hasan (1990, 1997). But unfortunately I did not consult the book of Justin Jones on *Shia Islam in colonial India* (2011), because I became aware of it too late.

Original research on the topics of this book has relied mainly on Urdu literature and pamphlets from British India and Pakistan published by Shia organisations themselves, with my own interviews of Shia '*ulamâ*' and current or former activists of Shia organisations as an important additional source. Among the numerous Shia journals in Urdu examined, the weekly *Razâkâr* stands out, both because a complete collection of that weekly starting from its first issue in late 1938 and covering all years until 1981 has been preserved at the Punjab University Library in Lahore and was made

## PREFACE

available to me, and because of the extensive coverage of all events which were of importance for the Shia organisations throughout that period with only a few gaps. *Razâkâr* has also regularly reproduced articles from other Shia and even Sunni journals, of which I could find only partial collections from different sources (mainly from the private library of Sayyid Hussain 'Arif Naqvi, or through his help). A number of Urdu books written by Pakistani Shia authors have also been valuable, especially those of Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Husain (1958), Safdar Husain Dogar (1987), Muhammad Wasiy Khan (1982, 1983) and Taslim Riza Khan (1996, 1998).

Within a basically chronological framework this study covers mainly three different parallel developments, which have influenced each other to a large extent. Sections 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.4, 4.1, 4.4, 5.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, 6.2, 6.3, and 7.3 mainly deal with internal developments of the Shia communities, namely the communal organisations and their leadership quarrels, the development of a Shia '*ulamâ*' class and religious schools, and the rivalry between '*ulamâ*' and *zâkirs* (popular preachers), who enjoy a special status in Indo-Pakistani Shi'ism. To some extent, these sections also deal with the demands of Shia organisations from the respective governments and their success or failure, which is the core topic of the sections 3.2, 3.6, 4.3, 4.5, 5.2, 5.5, 6.1, 7.1, and 8.3. The third focus of this book is on Shia-Sunni conflicts, which are examined mainly in sections 1.2, 3.5, 4.2, 5.7, 6.4, 7.2, 8.1, and 8.2.

Most material for this book was collected during four stays (each of 3–5 weeks) in Pakistan between summer 1997 and early 2001, and by the end of 2001 much of the manuscript up to section 7.3 was ready. Unfortunately, and entirely through my own fault, I have never filled the remaining gaps and made the manuscript ready for publication until December 2013. I have added three sections (8.1, 8.2, 8.3) dealing with the years 2000–13, and I have updated the bibliography, as well as some footnotes. Meanwhile a number of new studies have been written on Shia communal mobilisation and Shia-Sunni conflicts in Pakistan since the 1980s. Most comprehensive is the book of Khaled Ahmad (2011), and there are articles of Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (2002), Azmat Abbas (2002), Mariam Abou Zahab (2002, 2007), Suroosh Irfani (2004), the *International Crisis Group* (2005), Alessandro Monsutti (2007), Georg Stöber (2007), Nosheen Ali (2008), Tahir Kamran (2009), Arif Jamal (2009), Mansur Khan Mahsud (2010), Hassan Abbas (2010), Muhammad Feyyaz (2011), and Alex Vatanka (2012), but I did not come across any new scholarly work dealing with the Shia minority during the first thirty years of Pakistan. Developments in those years (1947 to 1977), as

## PREFACE

well as Shia issues in pre-partition India, are covered extensively in this book, drawing mainly on original Shia sources in Urdu ([chapters 2–5](#)). I have also tried my best to give a fairly comprehensive picture of Shia communalism and the main issues faced by the Shia minority in Pakistan over a period of sixty-six years.

Thus, as much as I regret having delayed the publication of my research for so many years, I am still confident that this book will not be found to be outdated and will serve its purpose. My special thanks go to Christophe Jaffrelot and Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, as well as Michael Dwyer from Hurst for having pushed me to bring it to a conclusion, and to David Lunn for his careful editing.

*Andreas Rieck  
Berlin, August 2015*



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AISC	All-India Shia Conference
AISPC	All-India Shia Political Conference
AJK	Azad Jammmu and Kashmir
ANP	Awami National Party
APSC	All-Pakistan Shia Conference
ASWJ	<i>Ahlu Sunnat wal-Jamâ'at</i>
AWSM	<i>Anjuman-i Wazifat-i Sâdât-o-Mu'minîn</i>
B.A.	Bachelor of Arts
BPC	Basic Principles Committee
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
D.C.	Deputy Commissioner
D.I.G.	Deputy Inspector General
Dist.	District
D.S.P	Deputy Superintendent of Police
EBDO	Elective Bodies Disqualification Order
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
HDP	Hazara Democratic Party
I.G.P.	Inspector General Police
IJI	<i>Islâmî Jumhûrî Ittihâd</i>
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISO	Imamia Students Organisation
ITHS	<i>Idârat-i Tahaffuz-i Huqûq-i Shi'a</i>
JAH	<i>Jam'iyat-i Ahl-i Hadîth</i>
Ji	<i>Jamâ'at-i Islâmî</i>
JSAMES	Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JUH	<i>Ĵam'iyat al-'Ulamâ'-i Hind</i>
JUI	<i>Ĵam'iyat al-'Ulamâ'-i Islâm</i>
JUP	<i>Ĵam'iyat al-'Ulamâ'-i Pâkistân</i>
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeJ	<i>Lashkar-i Ĵhangvî</i>
MAUSP	<i>Majlis-i 'Amal-i 'Ulamâ'-i Shî'a-i Pâkistân</i>
MIP	<i>Millat-i Islâmîya-i Pâkistân</i>
MMA	<i>Muttahida Majlis-i 'Amal</i>
MNA	Member of National Assembly
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
MQM	Muhajir Qaumi Movement; Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
MWM	<i>Majlis-i Wahdat-i Muslimîn</i>
NA	National Assembly
NAP	National Awami Party
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
PA	Provincial Assembly
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PPC	Pakistan Penal Code
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	<i>Pâkistân Tahrîk-i Insâf</i>
PuSC	Punjab Shia Conference
PuSPC	Punjab Shia Political Conference
ret'd.	retired
Rs.	Rupees
S.	Sayyid
SMC	<i>Shî'a Mutâlabât Committee</i>
SMP	<i>Sipâh-i Muhammad-i Pâkistân</i>
SMUP	<i>Shî'a Majlis-i 'Ulamâ'-i Pâkistân</i>
SPP	Shia Political Party
SSP	<i>Sipâh-i Sahâba-i Pâkistân</i>
TAS	<i>Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Sunnat</i>
TIP	<i>Tahrîk-i Islâmîya-i Pâkistân</i>
TJP	<i>Tahrîk-i Ĵa'fariya-i Pâkistân</i>
TNFJ	<i>Tahrîk-i Nifâz-i Fiqh-i Ĵa'fariya</i>
TNSM	<i>Tahrîk-i Nifâz-i Sharî'at-i Muhammadiya</i>
U.P.	United Provinces (India)

## GLOSSARY

\* Urdu terms or words that are used with that meaning only in Urdu

<i>ahâdîth</i>	pl. of → <i>hadîth</i>
<i>ahl al-bait, ahl-i bait</i>	“people of the house” of the Prophet Muhammad, i.e. Fatima and the Shia Imams
<i>Ahl-i hadîth</i>	a sect claiming to derive injunctions of Islam only from the Koran and → <i>hadîth</i>
<i>ahl-i kitâb</i>	“people of the book”, i.e. Jews and Christians
<i>ahl-i sunnat</i>	Sunni Muslims
<i>akhlâqiyât*</i>	ethics (as a subject taught in schools)
<i>amr bi'l-ma'rûf</i>	“enjoining the good”, a term from the Koran
<i>anjuman</i>	association; society; (local) organisation
<i>Âl-i Muhammad</i>	the family of the Prophet Muhammad → <i>ahl al-bait</i>
<i>‘alam</i>	black flag symbolising the flag of Imam Husain
<i>‘âlim, ‘âlim-i dîn</i>	sg. of → <i>‘ulamâ’</i>
<i>‘Allâma</i>	“very learned man”, an honorary title
<i>Amîr</i>	“commander”; leader
<i>ashâb</i>	→ <i>sahâba</i>
<i>‘Âshûrâ’</i>	the 10 <sup>th</sup> of → Muharram
<i>auqâf</i>	pl. of → <i>waqf</i>
<i>‘awâm*</i>	the common people; the populace; the masses
<i>‘awâmî*</i>	popular, for the common people
<i>‘azâdârî*</i>	collective term for Shia mourning ceremonies for the Imam Husain and other members of the → <i>ahl al-bait</i>
<i>A‘zam</i>	the greatest (in some honorific titles)

## GLOSSARY

<i>azân</i>	Muslim call for prayers
Barelvis	followers of the school of thought of Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareili
<i>-bâzî</i>	“-playing”, a suffix to give a derogatory meaning to some activities
<i>bid‘a</i> , pl. <i>bid‘ât</i>	unlawful innovation in Islamic law or practice
<i>châdor</i>	veil
<i>chanda*</i>	donation for religious purposes; subscription
<i>Chihlum*</i>	the 40 <sup>th</sup> day after → ‘ <i>Āshûrâ</i> ’
<i>Dâr ul-‘Ulûm</i>	“house of learning”, a title of many → <i>dînî madâris</i>
<i>dars-i khârij</i>	the highest level of learning at Shia religious seminaries
Deobandis	followers of the school of thought of the <i>Dâr ul-‘Ulûm</i> Deoband
<i>dîn</i>	religion
<i>dînî madâris*</i>	religious schools
<i>dîniyât*</i>	religious instruction in schools
<i>fatwâ</i>	a judicial decree on a question of Islamic law
<i>fiqh</i>	religious jurisprudence
<i>fiqh-i ja‘farîya</i>	Twelver Shia religious jurisprudence, named after Ja‘far as-Sadiq, the 6th Imam
<i>ghâzî</i>	“conqueror”, Muslim military hero
<i>ghulûw</i>	“extremism”, holding heretical doctrines
<i>hadîth</i> , pl. <i>ahâdîth</i>	sayings and traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad or the Shia Imams
Hâfîz	one who has memorised the entire Koran
<i>hajj</i>	the pilgrimage to Mecca
Hanafi	one of the four orthodox schools of thought in Sunni religious jurisprudence
<i>harâm</i>	religiously forbidden
<i>Hauza ‘Ilmiya</i>	Shia religious seminary of the highest rank
<i>hijrî</i>	according to the Islamic calendar, starting with the <i>hijra</i> of the Prophet Muhammad (622 AD)
<i>hudûd</i> , sg. <i>hadd</i>	Islamic punishment as prescribed by the Koran
<i>Husainî mahâz*</i>	a term used by Indo-Pakistani Shias for civil disobedience campaigns
<i>‘îd al-Fitr</i>	the day of fast-breaking after the month of Ramadan
<i>‘îd Milâd an-Nabîy</i>	the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>idâra*</i>	organisation; institution

## GLOSSARY

<i>iftâr</i>	breaking of fast in Ramadan month
<i>ijâza</i> , pl. <i>ijâzât</i>	certificate for a Shia 'âlim attesting his qualification as a → <i>mujtahid</i> and/or his right to collect religious taxes
<i>ijmâ'</i>	consensus (of the 'ulamâ'), one source of Islamic law
<i>ijtihâd</i>	"exertion", the process of arriving at judgements on points of religious law using reason and the principles of jurisprudence (→ <i>usûl al-fiqh</i> )
<i>imâma</i>	Imamate, i.e. the status accorded to the Imams in Shi'ism
<i>imâmbârgâh*</i>	Shia house of worship, especially for → <i>majâlis</i>
<i>Islâmîyât*</i>	lessons on the history and religion of Islam in schools and colleges
<i>'ismat</i>	status of sinlessness of the Shia Imams
<i>jâgîr*</i>	the right to the revenue of a piece of land given by the government as a reward for services
<i>jâgîrdâr*</i>	holder of a <i>jâgîr</i>
<i>jalsa</i>	"session" → <i>majlis</i>
<i>Jamâ'at</i>	group, party
<i>Jâmi', Jâmi'at</i>	"university", a title used for many → <i>dînî madâris</i>
<i>Jam'iyat</i>	group; party
<i>jihâd</i>	holy war
<i>jirga</i>	assembly of tribal elders
<i>julûs*</i>	Shia mourning procession
<i>kâfir</i> , pl. <i>kuffâr</i>	infidel
<i>kalîma*</i>	the formula of confessing one's Islamic creed
<i>khânqâh</i>	a building for gatherings of a <i>sûfi</i> brotherhood; a place for spiritual retreat
<i>khatîb</i>	preacher, orator
<i>khawârij</i> , sg. <i>khârijî</i>	an early Muslim sect refusing to acknowledge either Ali Ibn Abi Talib or Mu'awiya as Caliph
<i>khilâfat</i>	caliphate
<i>khulafâ'-i râshidûn</i>	the "rightly guided" first four Caliphs of Islam
<i>khums</i>	"one fifth", a religious tax originally paid to the Prophet Muhammad and by Shias to their Imam
<i>Khwaja</i>	an aristocratic title
<i>kirâm</i> , sg. <i>karîm</i>	noble; in Urdu usually used together with → 'ulamâ'; by Sunnis also with → <i>sahâba</i>

## GLOSSARY

<i>kufr</i>	atheism; blasphemy
<i>lashkar</i>	tribal army, mobilised ad hoc
<i>madh-i sahâba</i>	praise of the → <i>sahâba</i>
<i>madrasa</i>	(religious) school
<i>mahâz*</i>	front
<i>mahfil</i> , pl. <i>mahâfil*</i>	Shia gathering on a happy occasion, like the birth-day of one of the Imams
<i>majlis</i> , pl. <i>majâlis*</i>	“session”, Shia gathering for mourning the martyrdom of the Imam Husain and other members of the → <i>ahl al-bait</i>
<i>majlis-khwânî*</i>	holding of sermons at <i>majâlis</i>
<i>malang*</i>	a dervish (usually in pejorative meaning)
<i>marja‘ al-taqlid</i>	“reference of emulation”, the highest religious authority for Twelver Shias
<i>markazî</i>	central
<i>marsiya</i> , pl. <i>marâsî*</i>	elegy for a Shia Imam
<i>mashâ‘ikh</i>	“elders”, religious dignitaries
<i>masjid</i>	mosque
<i>ma‘sum</i>	sinless; a quality ascribed to the Shia Imams
<i>mâtam*</i>	Shia mourning ceremony of self-flagellation or other forms of injuring oneself
Maulana*, Maulvi*	titles for ‘ <i>ulamâ</i> ’
<i>mazhab</i>	religion; in Urdu usually used to refer to the belief of a special religious denomination or sect
<i>Milâd an-Nabîy</i>	→ ‘ <i>Id Milâd an-Nabîy</i>
<i>millat</i>	“people”, “nation”; in Urdu also used to refer to one’s religious denomination
<i>mohalla*</i>	a quarter of a town
<i>muballigh</i> ,	preacher; → <i>tabligh</i>
pl. <i>muballighûn</i>	
Mufti	an Islamic jurisprudent authorised to give → <i>fatwâs</i>
<i>muhâjir</i>	“emigrant”; in Pakistan one who has emigrated from India after partition 1947
<i>muhaqqiq</i>	philosopher, thorough researcher (a title accorded to some ‘ <i>ulamâ</i> ’)
Muharram	the first month of the Islamic lunar calendar
<i>muhtamim*</i>	manager of a → <i>madrasa</i>
<i>mujâhid</i>	fighter in a → <i>jihâd</i>

## GLOSSARY

<i>mujtahid</i>	one who has studied sufficiently to achieve the level of → <i>ijtihād</i>
<i>munâzara</i> , pl. <i>munâzarât</i>	religious dispute, often polemical
<i>munâzir</i>	one who is trained to hold religious disputes
<i>muqassir</i> *	one who belittles the status of the Shia Imams
<i>murîd</i>	disciple or follower of a <i>sûfi</i>
<i>murdabâd</i> *	down with ...; opposite: → <i>zindabâd</i>
<i>mutâlâbât</i> (pl.)	demands
<i>mutawallî</i>	a person entrusted with the administration of a → <i>waqf</i>
<i>nazrâna</i> *	religious donation, given as a payment for preachers
<i>nahy 'an al-munkar</i>	"forbidding the evil", a term from the Koran
<i>namâz</i>	canonised prayer to be performed five times daily by Muslims
<i>nâmûs</i>	honour
<i>nauha</i> , pl. <i>nauhajât</i>	poem or song in praise of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>Naurôz</i>	Iranian New Year (21 March)
<i>Nawab</i>	Indian aristocratic title
<i>Nâzim-i A'lâ</i> *	"highest organisator", Secretary-General
<i>Nizâm-i Mustafâ</i> *	Islamic system, "the order of the Prophet Muhammad"
<i>pîr</i>	(hereditary) holy man
<i>pêsh-namâz</i> *	prayer leader
<i>qâzî</i>	judge; in Pakistan: a judge in matters pertaining to the <i>sharî'a</i>
<i>Qâ'id-i A'zam</i> *	"Greatest Leader", a title bestowed on Muhammad Ali Jinnah
<i>Qâ'id-i Millat-i Ja'fariya</i> *	"Leader of the Shia people", a title used in Pakistan since 1964
<i>qaum</i> *	"nation; people; sect; community"; (generally used by Pakistani Shias to refer to their co-religionists)
<i>qaumî</i> *	belonging to the <i>qaum</i> , i.e. often synonymous with "Shia" when used in Shia communalist contexts
Rabi' I. + II.	the third and fourth months of the Islamic lunar calendar
Raja	"king", an Indian aristocratic title

## GLOSSARY

Ramadan	the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar (month of fasting)
<i>rawâfiz</i> , sg. <i>râfizî</i>	"refusers", a derogatory term for Shias
<i>razâkâr</i> *	"volunteer", rank-and-file activist of an organisation
<i>ribâ</i>	(unlawful) interest on credit
<i>sadaqa</i>	"alms", a religious tax
<i>sâdât</i>	pl. of → <i>sayyid</i>
<i>sahâba</i> (pl.)	the companions of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>sâhib</i> *	gentleman
<i>sahm-i imâm</i>	"share of the Imam", half of the → <i>khums</i>
<i>sajjâda-nishîn</i> *	the descendant of a holy person who controls his shrine and its income
<i>sarparast</i> *	"patron" of an organisation or party
<i>sawâd-i a'zam</i> *	"the great majority"; a term used to refer to the Sunnis in Pakistan collectively
<i>sayyid</i>	a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>shari'a</i>	the Islamic religious law
<i>shirk</i>	polytheism
<i>shûrâ</i>	council
<i>sîrat</i>	biography of a holy person, especially the Prophet Muhammad
<i>sûfi</i>	a Muslim mystic; holy man
<i>ta'alluqdâr</i>	holder of property rights over an area for which he had previously collected the revenue (U.P. after 1858)
<i>tabarrâ</i>	profession of distancing oneself from the "enemies of the <i>ahl al-bait</i> "
<i>tabligh</i>	preaching; propagating one's religion; proselytising
<i>tablighî daura</i> *, pl. <i>daurât</i>	"preaching tour", a period of preaching in a certain area
<i>tafsîr</i>	commentary or exegesis of the whole or part of the Koran
<i>takfir</i>	declaring someone a → <i>kâfir</i>
<i>tâlib</i> , <i>tâlib-i 'ilm</i> ; pl. <i>tulabâ'</i>	student at a religious school
<i>tanzîm</i>	organisation
<i>taqîya</i>	dissimulation of one's religious beliefs



## GLOSSARY

<i>taqlîd</i>	“emulation”, following the instructions of a → <i>mujtahid</i> in questions of religious law
<i>taqsîr</i>	“degrading”, belittling of the status of the Imams
<i>tauḥîd</i>	belief in the singularity of God
<i>tawallâ</i>	profession of allegiance to the → <i>ahl al-bait</i>
<i>ta‘zîya</i>	an effigy representing the tomb of the Imam Husain
<i>ta‘zîya-dârî</i>	taking out <i>ta‘zîyas</i> at processions
Tehsil*	administrative unit below that of District
<i>tulabâ‘</i>	see tâlib
‘ulamâ’, sg. ‘âlim	learned men of Islamic jurisprudence
<i>umma</i>	the worldwide community of all Muslims
‘urs	“wedding”; annual ceremony at the shrine of a <i>sûfi</i> saint
‘ushr	“one tenth”; an Islamic tax on agricultural products
<i>usûl ad-dîn</i>	principles of religion
<i>usûl al-fiqh</i>	principles of (Islamic) jurisprudence
<i>wâ‘iz</i> , pl. <i>wâ‘izûn</i>	preacher
<i>wakîl</i>	representative of a high-ranking Shia ‘âlim who collects religious taxes on his behalf
<i>waqf</i> , pl. <i>auqâf</i>	endowment, charitable trust
<i>wikâla</i>	the office of a → <i>wakîl</i>
<i>wikâlat-nâma</i>	letter designating a → <i>wakîl</i>
<i>wilâyat-i faqîh</i>	“Guardianship of the Jurisconsult”, a doctrine developed by Ayatollah Khomeini
<i>yaum</i>	day (in Urdu: memorial day)
<i>Yaum al-Quds</i>	Jerusalem Day, an annual protest day against Israel introduced 1979 on orders of Ayatullah Khomeini
<i>zakât</i>	a religious tax on certain categories of property and wealth intended to assist the poor and needy
<i>zâkir</i>	“recitator”, one who holds sermons on the virtues and sufferings of the → <i>ahl al-bait</i> at Shia → <i>majâlis</i>
<i>zâkirî*</i>	the profession of a <i>zâkir</i>
<i>zûljinnâh</i>	a horse representing the Imam Husain led out at Shia → <i>julûs</i>
<i>zindabâd*</i>	long live ...; opposite → <i>murdabâd</i>



## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

### *The spread of Shi'ism in North-West India until 1947*

Shi'ism reached the Indian subcontinent almost as early as Islam itself. Its history in India of more than a thousand years is characterised by many ups and downs, which to some extent have paralleled the fate of Shi'ism in the Muslim world as a whole. Although the gradual Muslim conquest of India, starting with Muhammad bin Qasim's invasion of Sindh (711 A.D.) and reaching its heyday in the sixteenth century, was generally led by Sunni Arabs, Turks, Afghans and other Central Asians, Shias from the same countries of origin and from Iran have in most cases participated in their military campaigns and occupied administrative posts, and they became rulers over parts of India themselves for centuries. Moreover, most of the preachers who contributed to the mass conversion of Hindus to Islam in the conquered Indian countryside were *sûfis* and/or *sayyids* who accorded special veneration to Ali Ibn Abi Talib, and the *ahl al-bait*, thus paving the way for an outright Shia mission at a later stage.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, Shi'ism in its various forms was embraced only by a minority of Indian Muslims even when protected and patronised by Shia rulers.

Although the focus of this section is the spread of Shi'ism in regions that became part of West Pakistan in 1947, it seems appropriate to start with a brief historical account of Shia-led principalities and kingdoms in other parts of India. The first of these states, the Bahmani kingdom in the Deccan (1347–1526), was ruled from Gulbarga and later Bidar (both in the present-day Indian state of Karnataka) by a dynasty of Iranian origin. Although it

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attracted a steady flow of Shia *sûfis*, '*ulamâ*', merchants and adventurers from Iran during that long period, its population remained overwhelmingly Hindu and even the majority of its Muslim ruling class remained Sunni.<sup>2</sup> It split up into several smaller kingdoms, three of them ruled by Shias, in the late fifteenth century. The founder of one of these successor states, Yusuf 'Adil Shah of Ottoman Turk origin, made himself independent as the Bahmani Governor of the Bijapur District in 1489. After hearing of the victory of the Safavids in Iran he followed Shah Isma'il's example and proclaimed Shi'ism as the state religion in his realm in 1502, becoming the first Indian ruler to take such a step. The 'Adil Shahi dynasty lasted until 1686 when Bijapur was annexed to the Mughal Empire by Aurangzeb, but Sunnis had gained the upper hand in Bijapur already in 1583.<sup>3</sup> Another Shia dynasty in the Deccan, the Nizam Shahis of Ahmadnagar, was founded in 1490 by the son of a Hindu convert to Islam who had risen to highest office in the Bahmani kingdom. Attempts of some of the Nizam Shahs to impose the superiority of Shi'ism on other Muslims were not successful, and in 1633 their kingdom was finally annexed by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan.<sup>4</sup> The longest surviving Shia-ruled state in southern India was that of the Qutb Shahs (1512–1687) whose founder Sultan Quli Qutb ud-Din was born near Hamadan (Iran) and belonged to the Qara Qoyunlu federation of Turkoman tribes. Its capital Hyderabad, founded in 1591 near the old fortress of Golkonda, became the hub of Shia material and intellectual culture in India, later surpassed only by Lucknow.<sup>5</sup> Shia religious and intellectual culture in the Deccan lost state patronage after the merger of the said kingdoms with the Mughal Empire, but managed to preserve some of its former splendour until the twentieth century. After 1947 many members of the Shia intellectual elite of South India migrated to Pakistan.

After the Deccan, Kashmir was the second Indian region where Twelver Shi'ism gained political ascendancy, if only short-lived. The spreading of Islam in Kashmir has been attributed mainly to S. Ali Hamadani (1314–84) and other *sûfis* from the Kubrawiya order. Hamadani himself was not a Shia, but since the early fifteenth century Mir Shams ud-Din 'Iraqi (d. 1526) preached Shi'ism in Kashmir in the garb of Nurbakhshi sufism, a branch of the Kubrawiya which accords high veneration to Hamadani.<sup>6</sup> The followers of S. Muhammad Nurbakhsh (1392–1464) in the central valley of Kashmir later became outright Shias, but they still exist as a separate community in Baltistan, an adjoining region to the north, which fell under Pakistani control in the war of 1947–48.<sup>7</sup> Between 1528 and 1586 Kashmir was dominated by the Shia tribe of the Chaks, interrupted only by fourteen years of rule

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of the Central Asian invader Mirza Haidar Dughlat.<sup>8</sup> Shia-Sunni conflicts erupted in Kashmir during those years and have occurred frequently under the Mughals (1586–1752), the Afghans (1752–1819), the Sikhs (1819–45) and the Hindu Dogra dynasty (1846–1947), too.<sup>9</sup> While only a few per cent of Kashmiris have remained Shia, in Baltistan and some regions further to the north-west (Gilgit and Nager) both the ruling dynasties and the general population have been overwhelmingly Shia (or Nurbakhshi) ever since the early sixteenth century.<sup>10</sup>

From 1701 until the British conquest of 1757, Bengal was ruled by Shia governors appointed by the Mughals but de facto almost independent. Since that time huge *imâmbârgâhs* were built and estates designated as *auqâf* for the promotion of ‘*azâdârî*’ by Iranian merchants and their descendants in Bengal towns like Murshidabad and Hoogly, which also attracted many Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ from both India and Iran.<sup>11</sup>

The greatest impact on the development of Shi‘ism in the subcontinent was made by the 135 years of Shia rule in Awadh (Oudh) in the central Gangetic plain. The founder of the Awadh Shia dynasty, Mir Muhammad Amin “Burhan ul-Mulk”,<sup>12</sup> had migrated to the Mughal court of Delhi from Nishapur (Iran) in 1708 and was appointed governor of Awadh (then still a Mughal province) in 1722. Burhan ul-Mulk and his first two successors still served the disintegrating Mughal Empire, but in 1773 the Nawab Shuja‘ud-Daula signed a first treaty of protection with the rapidly expanding British East India Company. In 1819 an independent Kingdom of Awadh was proclaimed, which lasted until its annexation by the British in 1856.<sup>13</sup> All rulers of Awadh from 1722 to 1856 were devout Shias who spent huge sums for the construction of *imâmbârgâhs* and mosques and the ceremonies of Muharram. In their ambition to establish a “Shia state” modelled on the Safavid kingdom of Iran (which had been defunct since 1722) they were also great promoters of a new ‘*ulamâ*’ class following the rationalist *usûlî* school of Shia *fiqh* (jurisprudence). On their insistence Shia Friday congregational prayers were introduced in Lucknow—the capital of Awadh since 1775—and Faizabad in 1786, spreading from there to other towns.<sup>14</sup> The leading Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ of Lucknow grew immensely wealthy through official salaries and the collection and redistribution of *khums* and *zakât*.<sup>15</sup> They reached the peak of their influence under Amjad Ali Shah (r. 1842–47), who established a Shia judiciary and founded a large Shia seminary.<sup>16</sup> The ascendancy of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, land-holders and state officials in Awadh coincided with a decline of the fortunes of the Sunni former aristocracy and Sunni religious institutions.<sup>17</sup>

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Lucknow remained the religious and intellectual centre of Indian Shi'ism throughout the British era and beyond. Although many Shia notables and '*ulamâ*' of Awadh had participated in the 1857–58 anti-British revolt ("Mutiny"), they were quick to respond to British attempts at reconciliation after their defeat. A number of Shia *ta'alluqdârs* kept large land holdings in the former Awadh kingdom, and patronage to Shia '*ulamâ*' and institutions continued after 1858, albeit on a smaller scale.<sup>18</sup>

Even in the Deccan Twelver Shia principalities had been established only in the wake of Sunni Muslim conquest, which had also preceded Shia rule two centuries in Kashmir and six centuries in Awadh. By contrast, Isma'ili Shi'ism was spread in some western regions of the subcontinent mainly through missionaries. The earliest success of the Isma'ili *da'wa* (mission) in India was achieved in Sindh and southern Punjab in the tenth century AD. Around 958 an Isma'ili kingdom proclaiming allegiance to the Fatimid caliphs of Cairo was founded with Multan as its capital, which lasted until an invasion of Mahmud of Ghazna in 1005.<sup>19</sup> Isma'ilism survived in Sindh protected by the Sumra dynasty of Thatta (1051–1351)<sup>20</sup> and gained strong influence in neighbouring Gujarat and the Indian west coast down to Bombay. Two large Isma'ili communities have emerged in these coastal areas and have prospered as merchants despite times of persecution under Sunni rulers: the Bohras, mostly former Hindus converted by missionaries from Yemen (followers of the Musta'lian branch of Isma'ilism) since the eleventh century,<sup>21</sup> and the Khojas, who trace their origin to the *da'wa* of Nizari Isma'ili Pirs from Iran preaching in Gujarat, Sindh and the Punjab since the twelfth century.<sup>22</sup> Both the Bohras and the Khojas have split into several sub-branches. The spiritual leaders of the majority branch among the Khojas, the Qasim Shahi Imams, resided in Iran until 1841 when Hasan Ali Shah, known as Agha Khan I (1800–81), fled to India after a failed revolt against Shah Fath Ali Shah Qajar. The Agha Khan became a close ally of the British and took up residence in Bombay in 1846. He consolidated his authority over the Khoja community with a number of lawsuits fought in British-Indian courts between 1846 and 1866,<sup>23</sup> but many dissident Khojas have since converted to Twelver Shi'ism. The same has been the case with a small section of the Bohra community. Since the establishment of Pakistan, Bohra and Khoja (both Isma'ili and Twelver Shia) migrants to Karachi have played an important role in setting up a national industrial and banking system, apart from their continuous success in trade.<sup>24</sup>

Some details about the changing fortunes of Twelver Shias in the heart of the Mughal Empire—subsequently Agra, Lahore and Delhi—from the

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sixteenth to the late eighteenth century must be given here, too. The first Mughal rulers maintained friendly relations with the Safavids of Iran, and Shias of Iranian origin won many positions of influence at the Mughal court, in the army and administration. Babur, whose conquest of 1526 established the Mughal dynasty in India, had used some symbols of allegiance to Twelver Shi'ism when he needed military support from Shah Isma'il Safavi during an earlier campaign against Samarkand.<sup>25</sup> His son and successor Humayun came close to adopting Shi'ism during several years of exile in Iran to where he had fled from his rival Sher Shah Suri.<sup>26</sup> He reconquered Delhi in 1555 with an army comprising many Shia Iranians and Turkomans, and rivalry between "Irani" and "Turani" (Transoxanian) soldiers and officers remained a constant source of friction within the Mughal army during the following 150 years. Humayun's son Akbar grew up under the tutelage of the Shia Turkoman Bayram Khan who became regent during the first years of Akbar's rule (1556–60).<sup>27</sup> Although enmity and intrigues against influential Shias grew until the death of Akbar (1605), his long reign was marked by religious tolerance and Shia ascendancy. Akbar appointed some Shias to the highest administrative positions<sup>28</sup> and further alienated the orthodox Sunni '*ulamâ*' with the proclamation of his self-styled *dîn-i ilâhî* (divine religion) from 1582.<sup>29</sup>

Times became harder for Shias in the Mughal Empire under Akbar's successors. Exemplary was the fate of S. Nurullah Shushtari, revered by Indian Shias as the *Shahid-i Thâlith* (Third Martyr) and most outstanding Shia '*âlim* in the history of the subcontinent. Shushtari had migrated from Iran to Akbar's court in 1584 and was appointed *qâzî* of Lahore in 1586, although he engaged himself to give judgements according to the four schools of Sunni *fiqh*.<sup>30</sup> Shushtari's eloquent books in defence of Shia doctrines earned him many enemies who took revenge on him during the reign of Jahangir.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, a number of Shias reached top administrative and military positions under Jahangir and his successor Shah Jahan, too.<sup>32</sup>

The Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb ('Alamgir) held strict Sunni orthodox views and combated Shia religious practices. During his reign (1658–1707) Muharram processions were banned<sup>33</sup> and the Shia kingdoms in the Deccan were finally subjugated (see above). A compendium of Hanafi Islamic law prepared by Sunni '*ulamâ*' on his orders, the *Fatâwâ-i 'Alamgîrîya*, declared Shias who cursed the first two Caliphs heretics.<sup>34</sup> But even Aurangzeb could not dispense of the services of Iranians and other Shias for the ceaseless military campaigns through which he tried to consolidate and expand the empire.<sup>35</sup>

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Aurangzeb's successor Bahadur Shah (r. 1707–12) displayed pro-Shia inclinations that triggered sharp sectarian conflicts in Lahore.<sup>36</sup> Such conflicts multiplied in Lahore, Delhi and other north Indian towns throughout the eighteenth century, while the Mughal Empire declined steadily. The invasions of Nadir Shah Afshar (1739–40) and Ahmad Shah Durrani (six times between 1748 and 1762) in north-west India further contributed to exacerbating sectarian tensions, apart from the havoc played by plunder and massacres.<sup>37</sup> The situation of Shias improved when the Afghans lost control over their conquered Indian territories. They were encouraged to settle in Delhi once again after the Mughal Shah 'Alam II returned to the town in 1772 and appointed the Iranian-born Shia Mirza Najaf (d. 1781) as his regent.<sup>38</sup> By that time the Mughal "Emperor" was already dependent on the protection of the British who became *de facto* rulers in Delhi from 1803.<sup>39</sup>

Turning to those parts of India which became West Pakistan in 1947, many open questions remain with respect to the spreading of Shi'ism—and even regarding the present-day demographic distribution of Shias—in the said regions. Already in the mid-eighth century A.D. some partisans of the *ahl al-bait* reached Sindh fleeing from Umayyad persecution. Best known among them was Abdullah al-Shattar 'Alavi, who propagated the Zaidiya Shia doctrine protected by Sindh's governor 'Amr bin Hafs and later by a neighbouring Hindu Raja until 768 A.D., when he and his followers were routed by a military expedition.<sup>40</sup> Small groups of Zaidi Shias probably survived in Sindh until the beginning of an Isma'ili mission there and in southern Punjab in the ninth century.<sup>41</sup> After the destruction of the Isma'ili realm around Multan in 1005 (see above) a movement of quiet conversion from Isma'ili to Twelver Shi'ism may have started in that era which later also reached Sindh.

Historical evidence about Twelver Shia communities in the Indus plain prior to the sixteenth century is scarce, but it can be assumed that many of the *sūfis* and *sayyids* who had migrated from Iran, Arabia or Central Asia to the Punjab and Sindh since the eleventh century were Shias or have at least held beliefs close to Shi'ism.<sup>42</sup> Pakistan's heartland is replete with the mausoleums and shrines of *sūfi* saints, many of whom are highly revered locally or even throughout the country, and whose descendants continue to enjoy religious prestige, material benefits and political leverage as *sajjâda-nishîns* of such shrines. While most of these saints have never declared themselves Shias, they have shaped what can be termed "crypto-Shia" beliefs among a majority of rural Muslims in large parts of Sindh and the Punjab until recent times.<sup>43</sup> These were characterised both by veneration



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for Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the *ahl al-bait* and by “*pîrî-murîdî*”, i.e. obedience and strong emotional attachment to hereditary spiritual leaders.

Since the early sixteenth century, many *sayyids*, *pîrs* and *sajjâda-nishîns*, encouraged by the ascendancy of Shi'ism in Iran and the tolerant attitude of the early Mughal Emperors, have started to declare themselves Twelver Shias. Prominent among them were the descendants of S. Jamal ud-Din Yusuf Shah Gardezi (1057–1137)<sup>44</sup> of Multan, all of whom became Shias along with their *murîds*. Likewise, a large number of descendants of S. Jalal ud-Din Haidar Naqvi Bukhari<sup>45</sup> who died in Uchch in 1291, converted to Twelver Shi'ism in the Mughal era and later. Naqvi Bukhari *sayyids* from the line of Uchch can be found all over Pakistan and especially in the “Seraiki belt” of southern Punjab,<sup>46</sup> the majority among them being Shias. The Quraishis of Multan,<sup>47</sup> who have dominated the local politics of the town since the fourteenth century and later became one of the most influential land-owning families of the Punjab,<sup>48</sup> have had Sunni and Shia branches since the sixteenth century which have also frequently intermarried.

After Twelver Shi'ism had become the state religion of Safavid Iran, open preaching of its tenets became more common in adjoining parts of the Mughal Empire. An important early Shia *muballigh* was S. Mahbub-i 'Âlam known as Shah Jiwna (1490–1564) who settled in a village near Jhang during the last decade of his life.<sup>49</sup> His descendants obtained large estates around Jhang since the early nineteenth century and have ever since remained the most powerful family in the Jhang District, playing a prominent role in national politics as well.<sup>50</sup> Still more influential in the Punjab and Sindh was his contemporary S. Muhammad Raju Shah Bukhari of Rajanpur (d. 1544–91) whose shrine is located near Layyah. He opposed the practice of *taqiya* and is said to have impressed even the emperor Humayun, but the latter was prevented by Makhdum ul-Mulk<sup>51</sup> from granting an audience to the saint.<sup>52</sup> These two and many other Shia *sûfis* left a particularly strong impact in the westernmost part of the Punjab along the rivers Indus and Chenab, where the oldest centres of Twelver Shi'ism in present-day Pakistan are located. The largest number of Pakistan's Shias outside the major towns live in these areas, namely (from north to south) the districts of Attock, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Mianwali, Sargodha, Dera Ismail Khan,<sup>53</sup> Bhakkar, Jhang, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Muzaffargarh.<sup>54</sup> A large percentage of the Shias in the six last-mentioned districts are of Baloch origin even if their mother tongue is nowadays Seraiki. Baloch tribes had occupied the eastern bank of the Indus from Sitpur to Karor since the end of the fifteenth century.<sup>55</sup> They were later reinforced by the Baloch Kalhoras, who

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settled around Dera Ghazi Khan after they were driven out of Sindh by the Talpurs in 1772. Henceforth known as Serais, these invaders were mainly Shias.<sup>56</sup> Besides, a sizeable Shia community is supposed to have lived in Lahore since at least the late sixteenth century, even if many of them may have practised *taqîya* when the town was the capital of the Mughal Empire under Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb.<sup>57</sup>

Since the early eighteenth century Shi'ism was also introduced in the Kurram valley of the present-day province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the Turis, a Pashtu-speaking Afghan tribe, possibly of Turkish stock. The Turis vanquished the Pashtun Bangash, which had conquered the valley at the turn of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, and have since converted half of its members and some sub-sections of the Orakzai tribe to the Shia faith.<sup>58</sup> Until the early twentieth century some *sayyid* families, who had reached the era with the armies of Muslim invaders passing through the Kurram valley, had been most influential among these Shia tribes.<sup>59</sup> In 1892, after a prolonged revolt against the Emir Abd ur-Rahman of Afghanistan, the Turis appealed to the British for help, who in turn established the Kurram Agency as the first of seven "Tribal Agencies" which were later incorporated into the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).<sup>60</sup> The Kurram Agency, stretching from Thall via Parachinar to the Paiwar pass, has since remained an important stronghold of Shi'ism in British India and Pakistan, providing manpower to all countrywide Shia movements.<sup>61</sup>

The situation of Shias in the Punjab and Sindh improved when the Afghan empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani collapsed soon after his death in 1772. In Sindh Mir Fath Ali Talpur established a Shia Baloch dynasty that ruled most of the present-day province from 1783 until the British conquest 1839–43, although it split up into different branches residing in Mirpur, Hyderabad and Khairpur.<sup>62</sup> The Khairpur principality, whose Mir Ali Murad remained loyal to the British during an uprising in 1843, was preserved throughout the period of British rule and was dissolved only in 1955 along with the other princely states in West Pakistan.<sup>63</sup> The Talpur Mirs sponsored '*azâdârî* ceremonies and the construction of some Shia mosques and *imâmbârgâhs*, but Shias remained a small minority of the population during their reign. An important contribution to the popularisation of '*azâdârî* in Sindh was also made by the descendants of Mirza Faridun Beg, an immigrant from Saqqez (Kurdistan) who became influential at the court of Mir Karam Ali Talpur in Hyderabad (d. 1828).<sup>64</sup> One of his grandsons, Mirza Qilich Beg (1853–1929), became famous as the father of the novel and drama in Sindhi language, apart from his prolific writing on religious subjects.<sup>65</sup>

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In the Punjab the power vacuum left by the Afghans was filled mainly by the Sikhs. Political stability returned under the Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh (d. 1839) who conquered Lahore in 1799 and Multan in 1818. Under his rule Shias were gradually allowed to hold *ta'zîya* processions in the streets, while the number of their *majâlis* behind closed doors multiplied in Lahore and other towns.<sup>66</sup> A famous Shia *muballigh* of that era was Pir S. La'al Shah from Kasra who preached all over the western Punjab and Sindh, won thousands of *murîds*, and is said to have founded forty-six *imâmbârgâhs*.<sup>67</sup> Most important among the Shia families of notables who were promoting *'azâdârî* at that time were the Bukhari Faqirs of Lahore. Faqir 'Aziz ud-Din held high offices under Ranjit Singh, and the family obtained huge land holdings.<sup>68</sup> The descendants of Shah Jiwna allied themselves with the Sikhs, too, while the Sials, another family of mainly Shia *jâgîrdârs* in the Jhang era, were more recalcitrant and returned to power only as allies of the British after the latter's annexation of the Punjab in 1849.<sup>69</sup>

Not only the Sials, but most Muslim landed families of the Punjab, both Shia and Sunni, eventually joined hands with the British during their wars against the Sikhs in 1845–9 and became the main beneficiaries of a century of British rule in the province.<sup>70</sup> Their landed property was regularised through British land titles and multiplied the more services they rendered to their new masters. Their loyalty was most valuable during the suppression of the 1857 "Mutiny", when the British temporarily lost control over Delhi, Lucknow and large parts of Northern India, but the Punjab remained calm. The province became the most important recruiting ground for the British Indian army in which many of the said landlords served as officers, apart from their careers in the Indian Civil Service, in the judiciary, and in the gradually emerging institutions of self-rule starting with municipal councils.

Apparently the British made no distinction between Sunnis and Shias when strengthening the landed aristocracy in the Punjab. But Shias had even more reason to remain loyal to the British because their rule provided full religious freedom for the first time. The old leading Punjabi Shia families, such as the Faqirs of Lahore, the Sials, Raju'as and Shah Jiwna *sayyids* of Jhang and the Gardezis and Quraishis of Multan, used some of their wealth and influence to sponsor *ta'zîya* processions and construct *imâmbârgâhs* and Shia mosques. The most important contribution to the strengthening of Shi'ism in nineteenth-century Punjab, however, was made by the Qizilbash family which had settled in Lahore only in 1849.

The Lahore Qizilbashs are but one branch of the large number of Qizilbash troops brought by Nadir Shah from Iran to Afghanistan and

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Northern India during his 1738–40 campaigns, and whose ancestors had brought the Safavids to power in Iran more than two centuries earlier.<sup>71</sup> They are descendants of Sardar Ali Khan Qizilbash who had held high positions in the armies of both Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Durrani.<sup>72</sup> One of Ali Khan's grandsons, Ali Riza Khan Qizilbash (d. 1865), held a *jâgîr* in Kabul when the British established a garrison there in 1839 and rendered valuable services to them. When the British troops had to retreat from Afghanistan in 1842, he accompanied them and lost his entire estates, but was granted a monthly pension. He was later lavishly rewarded for his services during the British wars against the Sikhs and during the 1857–8 "Mutiny", when one of his brothers died and another was twice wounded fighting the rebels. After 1858 Ali Riza Khan was appointed *ta'alluqdâr* of 147 villages with an annual income of 150,000 Rupees (Rs.) in Awadh and Bahraich (U.P.) in addition to his estates acquired in the Punjab since 1849, and he was made Nawab in 1863.<sup>73</sup>

All descendants of Ali Riza Khan and his brothers remained equally staunch supporters of the British.<sup>74</sup> His huge estates were inherited first by his sons Nawazish Ali Khan (d. 1890)<sup>75</sup> and Nâsir Ali Khan (d. 1896)<sup>76</sup> and thereafter by his grandson Fateh Ali Khan (1862–1923).<sup>77</sup> From 1923 to 1936 leadership of the Qizilbash family and inheritance of its assets remained disputed between Muhammad Ali Khan, a son of Nâsir Ali Khan, and Fateh Ali Khan's son Nisar Ali Khan (1901–44) whose claim was finally acknowledged by the highest court of Britain.<sup>78</sup> Nisar Ali Khan was succeeded in 1944 by his brother Muzaffar Ali Khan (1908–82) who played a leading role in Shia communal affairs throughout four decades, as will be explained in subsequent chapters of this book.

Already Ali Riza Khan Qizilbash became the greatest sponsor of *majâlis* and *ta'zîya* processions in the Punjab after he took up residence in Lahore. He founded a mosque and *madrâsa* near Mochi Gate and brought S. Abu'l-Qasim al-Ha'iri (1833–1906) to Lahore, who was the leading Shia 'âlim of his time in the Punjab.<sup>79</sup> He also supported the efforts of S. Rajab Ali Shah Naqvi (1806–69), a modernist scholar from Tilawndi (Ludhiana) who had served the British in high positions since 1834 and was awarded the title *Aristûjâh* ("holding the rank of Aristotle") in 1858. S. Rajab Ali used all his political influence to promote Shi'ism in the Punjab, speaking out against *taqîya*, founding a Shia printing press (*Majma' ul-Bahrain* in Ludhiana), and persuading Nawab Ali Riza Khan to consecrate the income of some of his lands for the expenses of 'azâdârî.<sup>80</sup> The *Qizilbash Waqf* was greatly enlarged by Ali Riza's son Nâsir Ali Khan in 1892.<sup>81</sup> Since the late nine-

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teenth century, *ta'zîya* processions in Lahore have been among the most sumptuous in the subcontinent, surpassed only by those in Lucknow (and, after the foundation of Pakistan, in Karachi). The starting point of the main procession until the present-day has remained the Qizilbash Haveli near Mochi Gate. After moving through the alleys of Lahore's Old City for up to twenty hours, the *ta'zîyas* are deposited at *Karbalâ-i Gâme Shâh*, near a mosque and shrine built by Nawazish Ali Khan Qizilbash for an early nineteenth-century *malang*.<sup>82</sup>

A branch of the Lahore Qizilbash family also introduced '*azâdârî*' processions in Peshawar in the late nineteenth century. The small Shia community of this town was at that time mainly made up of traders and other migrants from Iran, Kashmir and Afghanistan, and was later strengthened by Turis and Bangash of the Kurram valley and Punjabi Shias, all of whom contributed their special religious traditions.<sup>83</sup> In Balochistan the only noteworthy Shia population can be found in Quetta, mostly Hazaras from central Afghanistan who have migrated to that town since the reign of the Afghan Emir Abd ur-Rahman in the late nineteenth century. Their numbers multiplied during the Afghan wars of the 1980s and 1990s and are nowadays estimated to have reached 3–400,000.<sup>84</sup> Since 1876, when the British established a permanent garrison in Quetta, some Shias from the Punjab have settled there, too.

The importance of '*azâdârî*' ceremonies for the spreading of Shi'ism in the Punjab and Sindh—as in other parts of India—can hardly be overestimated. The colourful *ta'zîya* processions have always attracted numerous Sunnis (and even Hindus and Sikhs) as well, who used to participate actively in such processions in most places until recent decades. Thus '*azâdârî*' ceremonies were gradually introduced at many *sûfî* shrines, including, for example, the famous shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan (Sindh).<sup>85</sup> Likewise, the highly emotional sermons delivered by *zâkirs* at Shia *majâlis* did not fail to impress many ordinary people, who were suffering lots of injustices in their own daily lives and could thus easily be moved by accounts of the sufferings of the Shia Imams. *Zâkirs* from the Seraiki belt, especially those speaking the dialect of Multan, became most popular all over the Punjab and later all over West Pakistan.<sup>86</sup> Another important medium for the spreading of Shia tenets have been the *marâsî*, i.e. elegies on the martyrs of Karbala, in Persian, Urdu or Sindhi. *Marâsî* are one of the oldest forms of Urdu poetry, first composed in the Deccan and later highly developed and refined in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Delhi and Lucknow.<sup>87</sup> Some very popular Sindhi poets like Shah Abd ul-Latif Bhita'i

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(d. 1752) and Abd ul-Wahhab Sachal Sarmast (d. 1826) have also written *marâsî*<sup>88</sup> and thus contributed to the creation of reverent feelings for the Imam Husain even among their Sunni compatriots.

Because folk Islam in the Indian subcontinent has adopted many Hindu customs and has generally been prone to syncretism, differences between Shias and Sunnis in the countryside have not been clear-cut until very recently. Even in recent decades Sunni '*ulamâ*' have regularly deplored the "ignorance" of their co-religionists, who let themselves be influenced by the Shia ceremonies and become "half-Shias".<sup>89</sup> It can therefore be assumed that the conversion of Sunni Muslims to Shi'ism in parts of rural Punjab and Sindh until the mid-nineteenth century was achieved gradually and in a subtle way, mostly by *sûfis*, *malangs* and other itinerant preachers who popularised Shia tenets about the *ahl al-bait* while at the same time avoiding to offend Sunni sensibilities. But this changed under British rule, when Shias became relieved from the danger of religious persecution. Starting with S. Rajab Ali Shah and S. Abu'l-Qasim al-Ha'iri, Shia preachers introduced *munâzarât*, i.e. public disputes on religious doctrines, which had been familiar in Delhi and Lucknow since the early nineteenth century,<sup>90</sup> to the Punjab and adjoining regions. Many *munâzarât* took place between Shia and Sunni '*ulamâ*', but those involving both Sunni and Shia '*ulamâ*' with Christian clergymen, Hindu priests, or the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (the founder of the Ahmadiya sect) were also frequent.<sup>91</sup> Usually a *munâzara* was carefully arranged to have a large number of listeners who would normally support the speakers of their own denomination, but might also be influenced by the arguments and charisma of their opponents. To be a successful *munâzir* required not only rhetorical talent, but also profound knowledge of religious source-books to refute the arguments of one's adversary with authoritative quotations.

The practice of *munâzara* became very wide-spread during the early decades of the twentieth century, along with the general spreading of a communal awareness among Indian Shias and Sunnis alike.<sup>92</sup> If we can believe Shia sources, thousands of Sunnis were converted to Shi'ism as a result of *munâzarât* in the Punjab alone until the late 1950s.<sup>93</sup> Together with the rhetoric contests of public *munâzarât*, the genre of *munâzara* literature also flourished in the early twentieth century, often using the most insulting language,<sup>94</sup> but it is doubtful whether such literature had much impact on the spreading of Shi'ism. In any case, the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn* that opened in Lucknow in 1919 specialised in training Shia preachers in the art of *munâzara*, who were then sent for *tablighî daurât* ("preaching tours")

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lasting from some months to several years to certain districts of British India, including those parts which later became West Pakistan.<sup>95</sup>

But although Shia communities in North-West India have certainly expanded from the era of the Sikhs and Talpurs until the mid-twentieth century, the total number of individuals confessing to be Shias during the 1921 Census of India—the last census which differentiated between Shia and Sunni Muslims<sup>96</sup>—was still very small in these provinces.<sup>97</sup> It has been suggested that many Shias, especially in rural areas, still practised *taqîya* when the said census was conducted.<sup>98</sup> An important factor raising the number of Shias—and probably also their share of the total population—simultaneously with the foundation of Pakistan was the influx of Shia *muhâjirs* from other parts of India.<sup>99</sup> Yet the actual numbers of Shias has never been documented in Pakistan and remains a matter of dispute until this day.<sup>100</sup>

### *Shia-Sunni issues from Mughal times to 1939*

As pointed out in the previous section, the spreading of Shi'ism in the Indian subcontinent has often been accompanied by Shia-Sunni conflicts. At least since the late sixteenth century, such clashes seem to have occurred frequently enough to consider them a constant feature of the history of Islam in India (just as in other parts of the Muslim world with a Shia presence). Out of necessity this study affords them due attention thanks to their significance in the development of Shia communalism from the early twentieth century until the time of writing. At the same time it does not suggest that Shia-Sunni relations in the subcontinent have generally been tense or that such conflicts have always affected a large portion of both communities.<sup>101</sup>

The first major conflict in the subcontinent with Shia-Sunni overtones was the destruction of the Isma'ili kingdom in the southern Punjab by Mahmud of Ghazna in the early eleventh century.<sup>102</sup> Hostilities between Sunnis and Twelver Shia immigrants from Iran had been mentioned first during the reign of Firuz Shah Tughluq (1351–88) in Delhi.<sup>103</sup> The rise of Twelver Shia dynasties to power in the Deccan from the same time onwards was also accompanied by occasional sectarian violence, but it was only the fast-growing influence of Shias in the Mughal Empire that provoked Sunni counter-reactions on a large scale.<sup>104</sup> Many issues of sectarian conflict, and even the lines of argument of both sides, have remained very much the same since the late sixteenth century. Shias took advantage of



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the liberal views of Akbar and were suspected of having contributed to the Emperor's gradual renunciation of Islamic tenets. The backlash of orthodox Sunni '*ulamâ*', who regained strength under Akbar's successors, was therefore directed as much against Shi'ism as it was against Akbar's perceived heresies.<sup>105</sup>

A major polemical treatise against Shia doctrines, which has influenced many generations of Sunni '*ulamâ*', was written by as famous a scholar as Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), revered by Muslims of the subcontinent as the *Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thâni*,<sup>106</sup> around 1587. In his *Radd al-rawâfiz* he clearly stated that Shias must be considered as *kuffâr* (infidels) because of their cursing of 'A'isha, a wife of the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>107</sup> Another anti-Shia book widely read in India at that time was *al-Nawâqiz fi'l-radd 'alâ 'l-rawâfiz* of Mirza Makhdumi, a former minister of the Iranian Shah Isma'il Safavi II who had converted to Sunni beliefs. In 1587 Qazi Nurullah Shushtari wrote a rejoinder titled *Masâ'ib un-nawâsib*.<sup>108</sup> Hostility towards Shias during Akbar's reign was not confined to verbal and written attacks on their beliefs. Between 1561 and 1579 Mullah Abdullah Ansari "Makhdum ul-Mulk" and Shaikh Abd un-Nabiy used their position as Akbar's central ministers (*sadr us-sudûr*) to have some prominent Shias executed under false pretexts,<sup>109</sup> and in 1585 Mullah Ahmad Thattavi, a renown Shia '*âlim*' in the service of Akbar, was assassinated in Lahore. Four years later his grave was dug up and his dead body burnt by fanatics.<sup>110</sup>

A central grievance of Sunnis against Shias already at that time—and remaining so ever since—was the Shia attitude towards the *ashâb* (companions) of the Prophet. In his *Masâ'ib un-nawâsib* Shushtari had defended the Shia practice of cursing (*la'n*) of those among the *ashâb* who had been enemies of the *ahl al-bait*.<sup>111</sup> In *Majâlis ul-mu'minîn*, a compendium of biographies of famous Shias from the beginning of Islam to the rise of the Safavid dynasty completed in 1602, Shushtari claimed that only those contemporaries of the Prophet who were "endowed with both faith and justice" could be referred to as *ashâb*. Cursing of *ashâb* was not permissible, but those who did so would still remain Muslims.<sup>112</sup> In his *magnum opus*, the book *Ihqâq ul-haqq wa-ibtâl ul-bâtîl*, Shushtari wrote that "the Prophet had asked Muslims to follow only those members of the *ashâb* who were perfect examples of nobility, learning and virtue, which would apply only to Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the *ahl al-bait*". He further argued that "the Koran did not contain a single verse praising the *sahâba*, which could be interpreted to mean that God had forgiven their earlier transgressions". The Shias would curse "only those *ashâb* who were enemies of the *ahl al-bait*,



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and they did so to gain favour from God, the Prophet and those who were the Prophet's near of kin".<sup>113</sup>

Shortly after Shushtari had completed *Ihqâq ul-haqq* in 1605 the Emperor Akbar died, and Sunni 'ulamâ' pressed for a return to orthodoxy. Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi in one of his letters sent to leading nobles demanded that "the company of innovators (Shias) should be avoided for they were worse than infidels, and to show them respect amounted to destroying Islam".<sup>114</sup> Akbar's successor Jahangir, although reluctant to revoke the policy of religious tolerance, gave in to the intrigues of Shushtari's enemies. On the basis of some translated passages from *Ihqâq ul-haqq* Shushtari was awarded a punishment of flogging, during which he died in 1610.<sup>115</sup> This traumatic end of their most outstanding 'âlim in India was a signal for many Shias who held influential positions under the Mughals to resume the practice of *taqîya*.<sup>116</sup> Yet others continued to profess their faith freely even under the rule of Aurangzeb, who was most opposed to Shi'ism among the Mughal Emperors.<sup>117</sup>

The resurgence of Shi'ism after the death of Aurangzeb and the decline of Mughal power gave a new boost to sectarian polemics and conflicts. While Awadh and Bengal emerged as new Shia strongholds in the first half of the eighteenth century, anti-Shi'ism was on the rise in Delhi and Lahore. Shah Waliyullah Dihlavi (1703–62), the most important Muslim religious thinker of his century in the subcontinent,<sup>118</sup> considered sectarian divisions a main cause behind the sinking fortunes of Muslims in India. In some of his writings he tried to bridge Shia-Sunni doctrinal differences by expressing admiration for Ali Ibn Abi Talib and all Shia Imams "for their spiritual greatness", and he also insisted that Shias were not outside the pale of Islam.<sup>119</sup> But Shah Waliyullah's prime concern was to strengthen Sunni belief in the superiority of the first two Caliphs, as demonstrated with his attacks against *Tafzîliya* Sunnis<sup>120</sup> in his books *Izâlat ul-khifâ 'an khilâfat ul-khulafâ'* and *Qurrat ul-'ain fî tafzîl ush-shaikhain*.<sup>121</sup> Already during his stay in Mecca in 1732 he had translated Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi's *Radd al-rawâfîz* into Arabic.<sup>122</sup> Although considered moderate towards Shias by some Sunni scholars, Shah Waliyullah was the pioneer of a revivalist movement in Indian Islam that became explicitly anti-Shia in several of its ramifications.

The most comprehensive refutation of Shia doctrines ever written in India was the *Tuhfat-i ithnâ'ashariya* of Shah Waliyullah's eldest son, Shah Abd ul-'Azîz (1746–1824), which was completed in 1789. Its twelve chapters dealt, among other things, with the genesis and historical development of the

“Shia religion”, with Shia “strategems” (*makâ'id*), with their beliefs about prophethood and *imâma*, with Shia indictments (*matâ'in*) against the first three Caliphs, and with *tawallâ* and *tabarrâ*.<sup>123</sup> Chapter XI discussed “characteristics of the Shia religion” such as “misconceptions” (*auhâm*) and “bigotry” (*ta'assub*).<sup>124</sup> The *Tuhfat-i ithnâ'ashariya* became famous immediately after its publication and drew a number of rejoinders, most noteworthy among them the *Nuzhat-i ithnâ'ashariya* of Hakim Mirza Muhammad Kamil Dihlavi<sup>125</sup> and several books of both S. Dildar Ali, the leading *mujtahid* of Lucknow,<sup>126</sup> and Mufti S. Muhammad Quli.<sup>127</sup> The upsurge in Sunni-Shia polemics at that time was influenced to some extent by the dissemination of the puritanical ideas of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab of Najd (1703–87) in India through pilgrims and other visitors,<sup>128</sup> but frustration about the loss of Sunni Muslim political power and a new Shia ascendancy in some parts of India seem to have been more important reasons. The gradual dismemberment of the Mughal Empire after the death of Aurangzeb by revolting governors and incursions of Hindu Marathas, Sikhs and the British reached its humiliating conclusion in 1803 when the Mughal “Emperor” in Delhi was reduced to a pensioner of the British East India Company. Many members of the former Sunni aristocracy lost their sources of income, and so did the ‘*ulamâ*’, who were also much affected by the replacement of Islamic with “Anglo-Muhammadian” law,<sup>129</sup> while at the same time the Shia-ruled principality of Awadh flourished under British protection.<sup>130</sup>

Shah Abd ul-'Aziz was a scholar who confined himself to teaching at his Delhi seminary, writing books and letters and issuing numerous *fatwâs*, but some of his disciples proceeded to more concrete action. S. Ahmad Bareilvi (1786–1831),<sup>131</sup> who later became famous as the leader of an aborted *jihâd* against the Sikhs,<sup>132</sup> toured north Indian towns from 1818 to 1821 with hundreds of followers preaching against Shia beliefs and practices. The main target of their attacks were *ta'ziya* processions, which had become popular among Sunnis as much as among Shias. S. Ahmad repeatedly resorted to the burning of *ta'ziyas*, provoking riots in some cases. In Lucknow he is said to have embarrassed S. Dildar Ali with a challenge to explain the difference between *taqiya* and hypocrisy (*nifâq*).<sup>133</sup> Apparently even the rulers of Awadh did not impose many restrictions on S. Ahmad and his party who could not find much support among the Sunnis of the principality anyhow.<sup>134</sup> The failure of his subsequent *jihâd*, launched in 1826 via Afghanistan and Peshawar, dashed dreams to create a power base for puritan Sunni Islam in India, but S. Ahmad's dynamism and martyrdom left a strong impression on his contemporaries. His lectures, condemning popular

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Indian Muslim practices such as “grave worshipping” and advocating a “cleansed” form of sufism instead, were preserved in the book *al-Sirât al-mustaqîm*, which became “the basic manual of the *mujâhidîn*”<sup>135</sup> and countless other admirers. The book was compiled in 1817–18 by his closest companion, Shah Muhammad Isma‘il (1779–1831),<sup>136</sup> a grandson of Shah Waliyullah who died along with S. Ahmad fighting the Sikhs in Balakot (located in the Mansehra District of present-day Pakistan). Shah Isma‘il was a fearless preacher like S. Ahmad and contributed decisively to the impact of his movement through his writings, most important among them *Taqwîyat ul-îmân*.<sup>137</sup>

The latter book, completed in 1824, aroused opposition from many Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’, and the followers of S. Ahmad and Shah Isma‘il have since been labelled as “Indian Wahhabis”.<sup>138</sup> Such allegations were only partially true. A new group emerging from their movement in the following decades, the *Ahl-i hadîth*,<sup>139</sup> shared the Wahhabis’ strong aversion against all manifestations of “polytheism” (*shirk*), including the veneration of saints and their tombs, but it has differed with other Wahhabi doctrines.<sup>140</sup> First only a school of thought among Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’, the *Ahl-i hadîth* had become a distinct Islamic sect by the end of the nineteenth century with tens of thousands of adherents in northern India, many of them hailing from the former Muslim aristocracy.<sup>141</sup> They have always been strongly opposed to Shia beliefs and practises, especially to ‘*azâdârî*’ processions, but their narrow social base (until recently) and preoccupation with criticism of some popular traditions of mainstream Sunni Islam have prevented the *Ahl-i hadîth* from indulging in larger conflicts with Shias.<sup>142</sup>

Another offshoot of Shah Waliyullah’s movement, the Deobandi school of thought, has produced numerous ardent opponents of Shi‘ism ever since the late nineteenth century. It is named after the small town of Deoband 90 miles north-east of Delhi where a *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm* (religious seminary) was founded in 1867, which became a model for dozens of *madrasas* working on similar lines in the following decades. The principal concern of the ‘*ulamâ*’ teaching at Deoband and the thousands of donors who sponsored the seminary was to keep up a standard of religious learning and observation of Islamic tenets that would enable Indian Muslims to withstand the challenges of British rule—which was firmly entrenched after the failed uprising of 1857—and Hindu revivalism.<sup>143</sup> But already Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi (1833–77), the founding director of the Deoband seminary, wrote a summary of the *Tuhfat-i ithnâ‘ashariya* entitled *Hidâyat ush-shi‘a*.<sup>144</sup> The co-founder Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829–1905) advised Sunnis to remain aloof from Muharram ceremonies and avoid prayer with Shias whom he

reproached for denying the singularity of God, the human nature of Muhammad, and the finality of his prophethood.<sup>145</sup>

Even the great reformer S. Ahmad Khan (1817–93)<sup>146</sup> was influenced by the puritanical Sunni revivalist movement, especially during his early decades. In 1844 he translated two chapters of the *Tuhfat-i ithnâ'ashariya* into Urdu,<sup>147</sup> followed by his *Risâlat-i râh-i sunnat dar radd-i bid'at* (1850) which criticised Shia traditions such as *marâsî*, *ta'zîya* and *'alam*.<sup>148</sup> Nevertheless S. Ahmad Khan's efforts to promote modern scientific education among Indian Muslims, crowned by the success of the Aligarh College, were strongly backed by Shias.<sup>149</sup> Aligarh's faculty of theology had separate sections for Sunni and Shia *fiqh*, the former being initially close to the Deoband seminary. Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi had been offered a post in the supervising committee, but had refused any cooperation with Shias. His son-in-law, Qari 'Abbas Husain, was appointed professor of Sunni theology in 1876.<sup>150</sup> S. Ahmad Khan's successor as the head of the Aligarh College, S. Mahdi Ali Khan "Muhsin ul-Mulk" (1837–1907),<sup>151</sup> had in 1870 published the reasons for his conversion from Shia to Sunni Islam in a widely-read book, *Âyât-i bayyanât*.<sup>152</sup>

Violent sectarian conflicts since the early nineteenth century were mainly triggered by Shia Muharram ceremonies which had become more widespread and assertive. This applied especially to Lucknow where the Shia *mujtahids*, enjoying protection by the Awadh rulers, insisted on public cursing of the first three Caliphs in the 1820s.<sup>153</sup> Whether meant to "mark the difference" between Shias and Sunnis<sup>154</sup> or simply reflecting a newly-found arrogance of power, Shia ceremonies in Lucknow have violated Sunni sensibilities on many occasions since that time, and the city has remained a unique trouble-spot for Shia-Sunni clashes in India until recent years.<sup>155</sup> In Delhi, too, *ta'zîya* processions had already been held throughout much of the eighteenth century in spite of the resistance of Shah Waliyullah and other Sunni '*ulamâ*', but few cases of sectarian violence were reported.<sup>156</sup> One well-remembered incident was the murder of Mirza Mazhar Jan-i Janan, a famous Naqshbandi *sûfi*, during Muharram in 1781 shortly after he had ridiculed the respect shown by Shias for *ta'zîyas*.<sup>157</sup> In Hyderabad (Deccan), where centuries-old Muharram traditions had been revived after the death of Aurangzeb under the Sunni Asaf-Jahi dynasty, these remained generally peaceful.<sup>158</sup> While minor incidents of sectarian violence occurred during Muharram at many different places in North India during the nineteenth century, most took place in the former Awadh principality.<sup>159</sup>

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Sectarian cleavages between Indian Muslims became sharper under British rule. One manifestation of that trend was the multiplication of *munâzarât* from the late nineteenth century,<sup>160</sup> another was the emergence of organisations belonging exclusively to one specific sect.<sup>161</sup> It has become a habit of many Muslims of the subcontinent, both Shias and Sunnis, who deplore the effects of sectarianism, to attribute the origins of that “plague” to a British policy of “divide and rule”. There are valuable arguments for blaming the British for reinforcing the Hindu-Muslim divide in India,<sup>162</sup> but the “divide and rule” argument is less convincing regarding Sunnis and Shias. British administrators in India, always much concerned with law and order and stability, generally used their coercive means to pre-empt sectarian trouble.<sup>163</sup> Although British policy became somewhat biased against Indian Muslims after the 1857–58 “Mutiny”, British rule in large parts of the subcontinent, especially in the strategically important north-western provinces, continued to rely heavily on the cooperation of Muslim notables and the recruitment of Muslim personnel for the Indian army and police. From the late nineteenth century, when the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress gradually emerged as a challenge to British authority, they became interested in propping up a Muslim political counterweight. Weakening the Indian Muslims by fanning sectarian conflicts would have served no purpose; rather it would have been in contradiction to British imperial interests.

Yet some side-effects of British rule accelerated the trend towards communal or “sectarian” identities, among Shias as well as among other Muslim and non-Muslim communities in India. To maintain law and order, British officials had intervened in disputes about religious sites and processions already in the first part of the nineteenth century, investigating the local “historical rights” of the said communities, and establishing such rights formally through their arbitration.<sup>164</sup> After 1857 a new policy of protecting the rights of religious observance for all, regardless of previous practice and regardless of locality, was proclaimed,<sup>165</sup> and religious freedom was increasingly taken for granted by minorities. Another important factor was the new means of communication and cheap publication of books, pamphlets, posters and the emergence of a press in Urdu and other Indian languages.<sup>166</sup> The educated classes not only gained much easier access to the religious literature of their respective denomination, but also greater awareness of problems affecting their co-religionists countrywide. That applied mainly to Muslims as a whole vis-a-vis the Hindus and other non-Muslim communities, but also to the different Muslim sects.

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Events in Lucknow had the greatest repercussions on Shia-Sunni relations in the early decades of the twentieth century. During Muharram in 1906 the Sunnis of the town, who still used to take out *ta'zîyas* in large numbers, were assigned a separate "Karbala" for burying them and a different procession route. The administration had thus reacted to Shia protests against the gradual transformation of Muharram into a "carnival" by the local Sunnis. However, the latter seized the opportunity to give a predominantly Sunni colour to their procession and recited *madh-i sahâba*, i.e. praises for the first four Caliphs as "equal comrades" (*châyâr*). Shias retaliated by publicly reciting *tabarrâ*, i.e. curses upon the first three Caliphs.<sup>167</sup> Serious riots broke out during Muharram in 1907 and 1908 when the same scenario was repeated in Lucknow. In late 1908 the U.P. Government appointed a committee headed by T. C. Piggot, which recommended to ban the recitation of *madh-i sahâba* on 'Ashûrâ', Chihlum and 21 Ramadan (the birthday of Ali Ibn Abi Talib) in public places, arguing that it was not a religious tradition of the Sunnis, but an innovation highly offensive to Shias.<sup>168</sup> It also recommended that Sunnis could obtain licences to recite *madh-i sahâba* on other days while Shias should be "restrained" from reciting *tabarrâ*.<sup>169</sup> The government endorsed the Piggot Committee's findings in January 1909, and several attempts by Sunnis to get its decisions reviewed failed in the following years.<sup>170</sup>

The *madh-i sahâba* controversy in Lucknow reflected a new awareness of the local Sunnis of their demographic and economic strength fifty years after the end of Shia rule in Awadh.<sup>171</sup> On the Shia side it served as a catalyst for the convening of the first *All-India Shia Conference* in 1907.<sup>172</sup> The situation was brought under control by strict enforcement of the ban on *madh-i sahâba* processions at Shia commemorative days from 1912 till 1935.<sup>173</sup> Shia-Sunni conflicts also cooled down as a result of growing anti-British sentiment among Indian Muslims from 1911 on, culminating in the *Khilâfat* Movement of 1919–23,<sup>174</sup> and thereafter because of the deterioration of Muslim-Hindu relations.

It was only in the early 1930s, when Muslim political organisations were in a state of disarray,<sup>175</sup> that Sunni sectarian forces regained enough strength to overturn the balance. In 1931 Maulana Abd ul-Shakur, who had already been the main instigator of the 1906–8 *madh-i sahâba* campaign, founded the *Dâr ul-Muballighîn* in Lucknow, a school entirely devoted to the training of anti-Shia *munâzirs*.<sup>176</sup> At the same time, the printing of polemical literature against 'azâdârî increased considerably.<sup>177</sup> In 1935 some Sunnis, incited by the *Majlis-i Ahrâr-i Islâm*,<sup>178</sup> defied the long-standing ban

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and publicly recited *madh-i sahâba* on *Chihlum*. In the following year Sunnis applied for permission to take out *madh-i sahâba* processions on the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (*Bârâwafât*), and on being refused started a civil disobedience movement.<sup>179</sup> In 1936–37 the situation further deteriorated, prompting the U.P. government to appoint another committee to review the recommendations of 1908. In its report submitted in June 1937, the Allsop Committee recognised the theoretical right of the Sunnis to recite *madh-i sahâba* but recommended to uphold the ban in Lucknow, because the intention was clearly to provoke the Shias.<sup>180</sup> When the report was made public in March 1938, Sunni indignation became more widespread. Maulana Abd ul-Shakur declared *madh-i sahâba* a religious duty (*wâjib*) wherever it was banned,<sup>181</sup> and Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, leader of the *Jam'iyat al-'Ulamâ'-i Hind* (JUH),<sup>182</sup> joined the calls for civil disobedience.<sup>183</sup>

The conflict came to a head in March 1939, when the *Majlis-i Ahrâr* brought thousands of its followers to Lucknow to start another round of agitation.<sup>184</sup> On 31 March the Congress-led U.P. Government issued a communiqué, stating that Sunnis would be allowed to recite *madh-i sahâba* in public meetings and processions every year on *Bârâwafât* day (which fell on 3 May that year).<sup>185</sup> The decision was made with a view to keep the JUH and the *Majlis-i Ahrâr* in the Congress camp, deepen intra-Muslim cleavages and thus weaken the Muslim League,<sup>186</sup> but the vehemence of Shia reactions took everybody by surprise. The *Tanzîm ul-Mu'minîn*, an organisation formed in the wake of the *madh-i sahâba* agitation in 1938, immediately dispatched volunteers to the great *Imâmbârgâh-i Asaf ud-Daula* who ostentatiously defied the ban on *tabarrâ*. The police had to open fire to prevent a clash with Sunnis gathering in the nearby Tila Mosque and imposed a curfew.<sup>187</sup>

This was only the beginning of what became known as the *Tabarrâ* Agitation, a civil disobedience movement kept up for six months with varying degrees of intensity. From April to September 1939 some 17–18,000 Shias, many of them coming to Lucknow from far-away places such as the Punjab, the NWFP, Bombay and Bengal, were arrested for defying the ban on assemblies and reciting *tabarrâ*.<sup>188</sup> Some Shia landlords financed the dispatch of volunteers to Lucknow and organised agitation in their constituencies.<sup>189</sup> The British Governor of the U.P. reported “conditions of intense emotional hysteria” triggered among Shias by the sanction of *madh-i sahâba*,<sup>190</sup> while Shia journals called for taking advantage of the unprecedented display of fervour for a communal cause.<sup>191</sup> Abd ul-Wahid Khan, then joint secretary



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of the U.P. Muslim League, observed “a contest of zeal and enthusiasm between the *Tanzîm ul-Mu’minîn* and the *mujtahids*”.<sup>192</sup> Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ were in the forefront of those calling for civil disobedience and courting arrest.<sup>193</sup> S. Nâsir Husain (1867–1942),<sup>194</sup> then one of the leading *mujtahids* of Lucknow, did not court arrest himself, but sent both his eldest son Muhammad Nâsir (1895–1922)<sup>195</sup> and his right-hand man and successor Muhammad Sa’îd (1914–1967)<sup>196</sup> to jail for three months. In mid-June, after a delegation of Shia leaders had travelled to Calcutta and agreed with the Congress leader Maulana Abu’l-Kalam Azad on a face-saving formula for ending the agitation, S. Nâsir Husain and other *mujtahids* vetoed it.<sup>197</sup> They were not ready to settle for anything short of a complete ban on *madh-i sahâba* until October 1939, when Abu’l-Kalam Azad himself came to Lucknow for seventeen days.<sup>198</sup> At his request, Shias finally called off the *Tabarrâ* Agitation without having gained full satisfaction of their cause. On 19 April 1940, shortly before *Bârâwafât* that year, Azad called the communiqué of 31 March 1939 “an error of judgement, based on inadequate appreciation of the situation”, and appealed to the Sunnis to refrain from taking out a *madh-i sahâba* procession.<sup>199</sup> His appeal was not heeded and serious riots broke out while Shias held a counter procession. Only thereafter was the ban on *madh-i sahâba* reinstated, and it remained in force until 1963.<sup>200</sup>

The *Tabarrâ* Agitation was the largest event of Shia communal mobilisation in the history of India so far, but its wisdom was questioned even by many Shias themselves. It caused severe strains in Shia-Sunni relations throughout India, culminating in the social boycott of Shias in many places.<sup>201</sup> Mahatma Gandhi, who had received a Shia delegation on 23 May 1939 after their request for his mediation, shortly after wrote to the President of the *Tanzîm ul-Mu’minîn* (excerpts):

... This much seems to stand out clearly that whereas *Madh-e-Sahaba* is praise of the elected Caliphs, *Tabarra* is curses pronounced upon the first three Caliphs. Whilst one can understand the right of publicly praising people, is there such a thing as the right of pronouncing curses upon dead men? Is it a part of religion? ... I should readily grant that there can be no religious duty of praising the Caliphs, not especially in public places and in the presence of those whom recital is known to offend. Therefore ... I would advise you for the sake of peace to withdraw civil resistance and stop the public recital of *Tabarra* unconditionally, leaving it to the good sense of the Sunnis so to act as not to wound the susceptibilities of their Shia brethren.<sup>202</sup>

Shias, however, would insist—and continue to do so in the following decades—that *tabarrâ* could not be equated with “cursing”. An article pub-



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lished in a Lucknow newspaper on 1 May had defended *tabarrâ* with these arguments (excerpts):

The present agitation has naturally led everyone to inquire what it is all about. A very simple reply would be to refer the inquirer to the Piggot Committee report and the Allsop Committee report. But unfortunately there are very few, even in the U.P. Cabinet, who seem to have taken the trouble to read either of the reports. They only rely on the version of the Sunni propagandists and have been led to believe that *Tabarra* means abuse. Lest ... the public at large continue to misunderstand the real significance of the present Shia agitation ... we should give a clear and dispassionate explanation of *Tabarra*.

*Tabarra* is ... meaning literally “to dissociate oneself or to hold oneself aloof so as to express disapproval of some one or some thing”. The meaning of the word will be still clearer if we keep in mind its antonym *tawalla*, which means “to attach oneself” or “to have affection and love and so to ally oneself to some one”. The attitude of the Shias towards Prophet Muhammad and his family is naturally one of *tawalla* and equally naturally their attitude towards those who, they believe, oppressed the Prophet or his family or descendants is one of *Tabarra*. ...

The Shias believe ... that certain companions of the Prophet not only were self-seekers and intriguers who robbed Islam of its pristine purity and shattered its unity but also troubled and oppressed the Prophet and his family in all kinds of ways. The culmination of this oppression of Prophet’s family ... was witnessed on the historic soil of Karbala ... This is the reason for the Shia’s *Tabarra* against the *Sahâba* and their associates and followers

Let us now examine the actual words which constitute the formula known as *Tabarrâ*. The formula consists but of three words “*Bar so-and-so la’nat*”. The words mean “May so-and-so not receive (literally, be away from) the blessing and mercy of God” ... It is this which is wilfully or in ignorance interpreted as abuse...

If there are still persons who object to the public recitation of the words “*la’nat* upon so-and-so” a abuse, they should logically ban all public recitation of the Holy Koran in which there are passages after passages of *la’nat—la’nat* upon those who utter falsehood, *la’nat* upon those who oppress the weak, *la’nat* upon those who create or spread mischief and so on. The Holy Koran also furnishes authority for the use of the expression *Tabarrâ*...<sup>203</sup>

### *The emergence of Shia communalism in British India*

Communalism has shaped the destiny of the Indian subcontinent in the twentieth century more than any other political force, including secularist nationalism. In independent India the term has gained a negative connotation and has been widely perceived as a legacy of British colonialism, cre-

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ated and nurtured with the aim of perpetuating British rule according to the principle of *divide et impera*.<sup>204</sup> It has led to a multiplication of bloody riots between Hindus and Muslims ever since the 1920s, which have become more severe and frequent in independent India in recent decades,<sup>205</sup> while the growth of a rabid Hindu communalism is gradually undermining the secularist foundations of India's political system.<sup>206</sup> Most resented until present times, however, is the fact that Muslim communalism has eventually resulted in the split-up of India together with the end of British rule, in spite of all attempts of the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress to keep it united.

In Pakistan the perspective is entirely different. Actually the term "Muslim communalism" is rarely ever used there. Instead a favourite term referring to that phenomenon in the context of Indian history is "Muslim nationalism", which is said to have ultimately found its expression and fulfilment in the Pakistan Movement, and which some historians have retraced to the very beginning of Islam in the subcontinent.<sup>207</sup> Another preferred term is "Muslim political awakening",<sup>208</sup> which has also been adopted in the following section of this book. In any case, most Pakistani authors have portrayed Muslim communalism in India with positive connotations or/and as a counter-reaction to the Hindu bid for dominance.

The understanding of the terms "Shia communalism", "Shia communalist" and "Shia communal organisations" in this book is neutral, without positive or negative connotations. They are referring to activities and organisations, which are aimed at promoting or safeguarding the interests of the Shia community exclusively or in the first place, even if they are often accompanied by professing goals such as "fostering unity between Muslims" or "serving the homeland". Since the term "Shia communal organisations" is almost never used in Pakistani books or media in English language,<sup>209</sup> it has not been mentioned in the title of this book. However, the Urdu terms *qaumî* and *qaumîyât*, which have always been used by the Shia organisations in India and Pakistan to refer to themselves and to their own activities, might well be translated as "communal" and "communal affairs", respectively.<sup>210</sup>

Shia communalism on the subcontinent emerged together with that of Indian Muslims as a whole, but it made almost no impact on the course of events until 1947. In independent India it became altogether insignificant,<sup>211</sup> while it took more than two decades to achieve some modest success in Pakistan.<sup>212</sup> It could never mobilise more than a small section of Indian Shias, and in the 1940s it became totally eclipsed politically by the Pakistan Movement, which drew strong support from Sunnis and Shias alike.<sup>213</sup>

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Nevertheless, Shia communalism had much in common with the ideology of the All-India Muslim League: Just as the latter stood for Muslim self-assertion and the safeguarding of the rights of the Muslim minority in predominantly Hindu India, Shia organisations tried to obtain safeguards for the Shia minority from the Sunni majority with similar arguments. Their dilemma, especially in the 1940s, was that defending the “Muslim cause” against the Hindu majority became much more important even for most Shias than upholding the “Shia cause” in the face of the Sunni majority.

Shia communal organisations first developed in Lucknow, which had remained the centre of Shia religious learning in India under direct British rule, too. The British already in 1856 abolished jurisdiction by Shia *‘ulamâ’* and the Shia seminary set up by Amjad Ali Shah,<sup>214</sup> but they continued to grant stipends and titles to individual *‘ulamâ’* even after some of them had supported the “Mutiny”.<sup>215</sup> They also strengthened the position of some Shia *ta‘alluqdârs* who in turn continued to sponsor *‘azâdârî* and Shia religious and other institutions.<sup>216</sup> The *‘ulamâ’* founded new seminaries like the *Madrasat Nâzimîya* (1892) and the *Sultân ul-Madâris* (1899) in Lucknow,<sup>217</sup> and *anjumans* for the organisation of *‘azâdârî* ceremonies and other local communal affairs, drawing financial contributions from urban traders as well as from landlords. Such local *anjumans* sprung up in all towns with a sizeable Shia population in northern India towards the end of the nineteenth century and have remained a feature of Shia religious life in the subcontinent ever since.<sup>218</sup> Typical elements were the organisation of annual sessions attended by *‘ulamâ’*, notables, and members of the emerging class of modern professionals educated in English medium schools (mainly barristers, civil servants and journalists). By that time, and until the first two decades of the twentieth century, the authority of the *mujtahids* was still very much prevalent among Indian Shias. But the conservatism of most of the *mujtahids* was no longer immune from criticism by the modern educated intellectuals. For example, when the *All-India Muslim Educational Conference*<sup>219</sup> held its annual session in Lucknow in 1904, the *‘ulamâ’* decreed that no Shia should enrol in the Aligarh College until it provided for complete Shia religious instruction according to the *sharî‘a*. Thereafter many harsh polemics against the *‘ulamâ’* were published in the press.<sup>220</sup>

Attempts to reconcile the old religious and aristocratic establishment with the new class of Shia professionals was one important factor behind the convocation of the first All-India Shia Conference (AISC) in 1907. Probably of equal importance were the examples set by the foundation of the All-India Muslim League in December 1906<sup>221</sup> and the new flare-up of

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Shia-Sunni conflict in Lucknow earlier in the same year.<sup>222</sup> The direct predecessor of the AISC was the *Anjuman-i Sadr us-Sudûr* set up by one of the Lucknow *mujtahids*, S. Agha Hasan (1865–1929)<sup>223</sup> in 1901. It had served as a model for similar Shia *anjumans* throughout India<sup>224</sup> but was opposed by modernist Shia leaders such as S. Husain Bilgrami and Badr ud-Din Tayyabji.<sup>225</sup> In response to such criticism, and with a view to bring the *Anjuman-i Sadr us-Sudûr* more in line with the style and aspirations of the time, it was decided to organise its annual session in 1907 as an All-India Shia Conference. Apart from S. Agha Hasan himself, Khwaja Ghulam us-Saqlain (d. 1915),<sup>226</sup> Dr Mirza Muhammad Hadi Ruswa (1858–1931)<sup>227</sup> and S. Ali Ghazanfar<sup>228</sup> and were the driving force behind that scheme, the latter two touring Shia centres in the U.P. to ensure maximum participation.<sup>229</sup> The founding session of the AISC on 6–8 October 1907 in Lucknow, presided over by S. Najm ul-Hasan (1863–1938),<sup>230</sup> was attended by nearly one thousand delegates, including leading Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, notables, barristers and advocates, journalists and chairmen of Shia *anjumans*. Most hailed from the U.P., but other Indian provinces such as the Punjab, Bombay,<sup>231</sup> Bihar and Bengal, and Princely States such as Hyderabad, Khairpur, Rampur a.o. were also represented.<sup>232</sup>

During that session, the *Anjuman-i Sadr us-Sudûr* was dissolved and replaced by the AISC, which has remained the most important organisation of Shias in India until present times. Its basic goals were defined as follows:

- 1) All possible efforts for assuring the moral, social (*tamaddunî*), economic and religious needs of the Shias by means which are not in contradiction with the *sharî‘a*.
- 2) Fostering unity among the Shias themselves and striving for harmony and cooperation with other Islamic sects and followers of other religions for the sake of common needs.
- 3) Efforts for safeguarding the civil, religious and educational rights of the Shias.
- 4) Reform and supervision of Shia *auqâf*.
- 5) Organising public or closed general sessions at different places and recommending adequate steps in the light of the local needs.<sup>233</sup>

Already the founding convention of the AISC was marred by conflicts between modernisers, whose foremost interest was the economic uplift of the Shia community,<sup>234</sup> and the ‘*ulamâ*’ and other conservatives. The sectarian conflict figured prominently in the speeches and “hard-liners had a field day”.<sup>235</sup> A resolution proposed by Dr Ruswa stating that the AISC had noth-

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ing to do with religious *munâzarat* and provocative literature was turned down after a lengthy controversial discussion, and Khwaja Ghulam us-Saqlain left the AISC in disgust.<sup>236</sup>

In spite of such misgivings and recurring conflicts between the ‘*ulamâ*’ and the modern professionals, the AISC was able to mobilise an increasing number of participants at its annual sessions during the first thirteen years of its existence and launch some communal projects, albeit on a rather modest scale. From 1907 to 1933 the AISC held twenty-five annual sessions in different Indian towns, which did a lot to create countrywide bonds and communal awareness among Indian Shias. At every session the President and Secretary-General of the AISC were elected anew, and its leadership alternated between ‘*ulamâ*’ and notables, as shown in the following overview:<sup>237</sup>

Table 1: Annual Sessions of the AISC, 1907–1933

<i>Session</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>President</i>	<i>Secretary-General</i>
1 <sup>st</sup>	10/1907	Lucknow	Najm ul-Hasan	S. Ali Ghazanfar
2 <sup>nd</sup>	12/1908	Lucknow	do	do
3 <sup>rd</sup>	12/1909	Lucknow	do	do
4 <sup>th</sup>	10/1910	Amroha	S. Nâsir Husain <sup>238</sup>	do
5 <sup>th</sup>	10/1911	Benares	S. Muhammad Husain <sup>239</sup>	do
6 <sup>th</sup>	10/1912	Patna	Nawab Hamid Ali Khan of Rampur(1875–1930) <sup>240</sup>	do
7 <sup>th</sup>	1913	Jaunpur	Nawab S. Muhammad <sup>241</sup>	do
8 <sup>th</sup>	10/1914	Lucknow	S. Ali al-Ha’iri <sup>242</sup>	do
9 <sup>th</sup>	1915	Allahabad	Raja S. Abu Ja‘far <sup>243</sup>	Fateh Ali Khan Qizilbash <sup>244</sup>
10 <sup>th</sup>	4/1917	Lucknow	Raja Tawakkul Husain <sup>245</sup>	do
11 <sup>th</sup>	12/1917	Lucknow	Raja S. Asghar Ali <sup>246</sup>	do
12 <sup>th</sup>	4/1919	Agra	S. Muhammad Hadi <sup>247</sup>	do
13 <sup>th</sup>	4/1920	Nagina	Raja Yasin Ali Khan, <sup>248</sup>	S. Muhsin Mirza <sup>249</sup>
14 <sup>th</sup>	12/1920	Lucknow	Nawab Shuja‘at Ali Khan <sup>250</sup>	Raja Yasin Ali Khan
15 <sup>th</sup>	12/1921	Multan	Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan of Muzaffarnagar	do
16 <sup>th</sup>	4/1923	Jhang	Hashmat Ali Khairallahpuri <sup>251</sup>	do
17 <sup>th</sup>	3/1924	Faizabad	S. Ibn ul-Hasan <sup>252</sup>	S. Kalb-i ‘Abbas <sup>253</sup>

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18 <sup>th</sup>	3/1925	Bombay	Nawab Sarfaraz Husain <sup>254</sup>	Mir Wajid Ali
19 <sup>th</sup>	1926	Patna	Agha Hashim Isfahani	Mirza 'Abid Husain <sup>255</sup>
20 <sup>th</sup>	1928	Calcutta	Mir Ali Nawaz Talpur <sup>256</sup>	do
21 <sup>st</sup>	1928	Sukkur	Nawab Fazl Ali Khan <sup>257</sup>	do
22 <sup>nd</sup>	12/1929	Allahabad	Mirza Ali Muhammad <sup>258</sup>	S. Mustafa Riza
23 <sup>rd</sup>	4/1931	Montgomery	Raja S. Riza Ali Khan of Rampur <sup>259</sup>	S. Mu'jiz Husain
24 <sup>th</sup>	3/1932	Lahore	Hashmat Ali Khairallahpuri	do
25 <sup>th</sup>	4/1933	Delhi	Mirza Muhammad Akram Husain <sup>260</sup>	do

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Source: *Sahifat ul-millat* (see Fn 220 to chapter 1, p. 348).

While the AISC was always dominated by Shias from the U.P. and especially from Lucknow, the Punjab also figured prominently in its activities. Apart from the annual sessions in Multan (1921), Jhang (1923), Montgomery (1931),<sup>261</sup> and Lahore (1932), the presidency of S. Ali al-Ha'iri, a leading Shia 'âlim of the Punjab, in 1914 was also noteworthy. Together with Sukkur (1928) five annual sessions of the AISC were thus held in what was later to become West Pakistan until 1932. From 1915 to 1920 Nawab Fateh Ali Khan Qizilbash, then Secretary-General of the AISC, played a particularly active role in the foundation of a Shia College, the most important achievement of the organisation in its first decades (see below). In 1921, when internal squabbles between Shia leaders in Lucknow reached a peak, it was even discussed whether the central office of the AISC should be transferred to the Punjab.<sup>262</sup> Probably in the same year a Punjab Shia Conference (PuSC) was founded as a provincial branch of the AISC, which later became an independent organisation.<sup>263</sup>

The *mujtahids* of Lucknow, who had initially been at the forefront of the AISC, gradually lost interest in that organisation, and after 1920 the participation of 'ulama' at AISC annual sessions declined.<sup>264</sup> At the 1910 session in Amroha the advocate S. Wazir Hasan had strongly pleaded against an article of the AISC statutes reserving its presidentship for *mujtahids*.<sup>265</sup> After a long discussion the matter was deferred to the 1911 session in Benares, where a compromise formula was adopted, namely that the *mujtahids* enjoyed preference but could recommend laymen for the AISC presidentship if they

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wished so.<sup>266</sup> In 1924 S. Agha Hasan, the founding father of the AISC, joined the majority of great *mujtahids* who had withdrawn their involvement with the organisation. In the same year a delegation was sent to Lucknow urging them to participate at the AISC annual session in Faizabad, but most of the *mujtahids* declined.<sup>267</sup> Even the decision at the 1924 Faizabad session to form a Supervising Committee (*Majlis-i Nazarat*) of '*ulamâ*' to check all AISC resolutions on their compatibility with the *shari'a* could not prevent the next session in Bombay (1925) from being shunned by the religious leaders.<sup>268</sup> In 1928 the Supervising Committee was dissolved by the '*ulamâ*' themselves after the death of Maulana S. Muhammad Baqir.<sup>269</sup>

Concrete achievements of the AISC were rather modest, as has been decried by many of its own members in later decades. A "Shia Sugar Factory", one of two projects approved at the second annual session (1908), failed after a few years.<sup>270</sup> A Shia Orphanage, also planned in 1908, was opened shortly after in Lucknow, but it remained the only orphanage of its kind in India.<sup>271</sup> Some projects never took off at all, like a Shia Directory, a Shia Bank or a Shia Census.<sup>272</sup> A press organ of the AISC finally came into being in 1925 with the weekly *Sarfarâz*, which appeared in shorter intervals in the 1930s and was still being published from Lucknow in early 2001.<sup>273</sup> It added its voice to a number of other Shia journals that had been founded since the late nineteenth century.<sup>274</sup>

Even the greatest project of the AISC, the Shia College in Lucknow, fell far from achieving its desired results. The idea of a Shia College had first been propagated at the AISC annual session in 1910, following Shia-Sunni conflicts at the Aligarh College.<sup>275</sup> In the following years complaints about the "violation of religious rights of Shias" in Aligarh multiplied, and the Shia College project was pushed with much determination by Nawab Fateh Ali Khan Qizilbash from 1914 onwards.<sup>276</sup> Collection of donations started in 1915, and in the following year all AISC activities were focussed on the Shia College.<sup>277</sup> Since the U.P. Government also contributed to its financing, it was left to Governor James Meston to arbitrate the dispute over its location. Meston himself laid the foundation stone in 1917.<sup>278</sup> The college started operating shortly after, but after the death of Fateh Ali Khan (1923) a bitter dispute broke out between its trustees over the appointment of his son Nisar Ali Khan as the new College Secretary. A number of trustees stopped their engagement, while the remaining ones decided to separate the Shia College from AISC tutelage in 1925.<sup>279</sup> Once intended as a counterpart of the prestigious Aligarh College, it could not even keep the standard of an intermediate college until independence.<sup>280</sup> More successful in promoting modern education among Indian Shias was the *Anjuman-i Wazifat-i Sâdât-*

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*o-Mu'minîn* (AWSM), a charitable foundation set up by S. Jalal ud-Din Haidar and Nawab S. Muhsin Mirza in Lahore in March 1912. The AWSM, which granted stipends to Shia students to be paid back after their graduation, has remained a well-managed and effective organisation ever since, drawing large donations and supporting tens of thousands of students according to well-defined criteria and priorities.<sup>281</sup>

Some other issues tackled by the AISC were conflicts about Shia *auqaf* and *'azadari* processions, restrictions of the latter starting in Kashmir and some parts of the Punjab since the late 1920s.<sup>282</sup> The AISC also reacted to some events abroad, such as the violation of Shia holy places in Mashhad in 1912,<sup>283</sup> the conflict between Shia *'ulamâ'* in Iraq and the British in 1920,<sup>284</sup> and the destruction of the tombs of Shia revered personalities in Medina in 1926.<sup>285</sup> But it otherwise shunned any political issues up to 1929, when the defeat of many Shia candidates in the elections for Municipal and District Councils led to widespread Shia demands for the abolishment of reserved seats for Muslims.<sup>286</sup> Even then the AISC, still dominated by conservative landowners and other notables, was far from adopting such a stance, which amounted to adopting the line of the Congress on an important matter and disowning the line propagated by the Muslim League since its foundation.<sup>287</sup> But at a time when the Muslim League was in disarray and anti-British nationalism was in high tide, parts of the modern-educated Shia intelligentsia did exactly that, founding an All-India Shia Political Conference (AISPC) in 1929.<sup>288</sup>

Throughout the following eighteen years until independence, the AISPC remained committed to Indian nationalism on the lines of the Congress and at the same time presented Shia communal demands more assertively.<sup>289</sup> Its closeness to the Congress earned the AISPC recognition as "the only representative organisation of Indian Shias" during an All-Parties Conference in Lucknow 1932 and during a session of the Muslim Unity Board on 14 July 1934,<sup>290</sup> but it made enemies among the traditional Shia establishment. In 1935 S. Ali Zahîr (1896–1970), a leading lawyer of Lucknow and member of the U.P. Legislative Council,<sup>291</sup> confronted the Ex-Royal Family of Awadh with a bill aimed at democratising the administration of various Shia trusts.<sup>292</sup> In 1937, when he became Secretary-General of an All-Parties Shia Conference, the AISPC openly allied itself with the Congress against the Muslim League.<sup>293</sup> It ended up almost isolated within the Shia community itself in the mid-1940s.<sup>294</sup> By contrast, a Punjab Shia Political Conference (PuSPC) set up during the PuSC 1936 session in Ludhiana was closely linked to the *Unionist Party*.<sup>295</sup> It proclaimed conditional cooperation with the Muslim League in 1938 and reconfirmed that line in 1943.<sup>296</sup>



## SHIAS AND THE PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

### *Shia contributions to Muslim political awakening until 1939*

While the centuries-old conflicts with Sunnis have played an important role in the development of Shia communalism in the Indian subcontinent and continue to do so at present time, it must be kept in mind that only a small minority of Indian Shias was seriously affected by such conflicts during the era of British rule. Since the late nineteenth century most members of the Shia intellectual and political elite were much more concerned with the great movements for Indian political self-determination and/or for Muslim self-assertion in the face of the Hindu majority than with Shia-Sunni problems.<sup>1</sup> But regardless of the attitude of prominent Indian Shias to Shia communalism, their achievements have later been “reclaimed” by all of their co-religionists. Ever since the foundation of Pakistan, Shias voicing communal grievances or demands have consistently reminded their countrymen of the great contributions of Shias to the success of the Pakistan Movement.<sup>2</sup>

The role of Shias in the development of “Muslim nationalism” in India has indeed been significant both in the framework of the All-India Muslim League, which ultimately led the struggle for Pakistan, and in those organisations and movements, which with hindsight can be considered as having paved the way for that goal (adopted formally only in 1940). Already some of the pioneers of Islamic modernism in India had been Shias. Tafazzul Husain Kashmiri (1727–1801), who served under several Nawabs of Awadh, wrote treatises on mathematics, physics and astronomy, apart from trans-

lating Western philosophical and scientific works into Arabic.<sup>3</sup> Mirza Abu Talib Khan (1752–1806) after a journey to England and other European countries from 1798 to 1803 wrote a travelogue, *Masîr-i Tâlibî fî bilâd-i Afranjî*, which has been lauded as “a monumental assessment of Anglo-Saxon civilisation” and “a landmark of the first phase of ... intercultural contact”.<sup>4</sup> Maulana Muhammad Baqir Dihlavi (d. 1857), a teacher at the Delhi College, in 1835 started the weekly *Dihlî Urdû Akhbâr*, one of the first high-standard Urdu newspapers.<sup>5</sup> S. Karamat Ali Jaunpuri (d. 1876) who served as representative of the British Indian government in Kabul and later as *mutawallî* of the Muhsiniya Waqf in Hoogly (Bengal) interpreted the Koran and *hadith* as “a guidance towards modern science” in his *magnum opus*, the *Risâla fî ma’âkhiḍh al-‘ulûm*.<sup>6</sup>

In the decades following the failed uprising of 1857–58 some Shias were closely associated with S. Ahmad Khan and his movement for Muslim educational reform. Maulvi Chiragh Ali (1844–95), who made a career in the Civil Service of the U.P. and later of the Hyderabad State (Deccan), impressed S. Ahmad Khan with his writings advocating a modernist re-interpretation of the Koran and *hadith* as sources of Islamic law. His apologetic interpretation of *jihâd* was much in line with S. Ahmad Khan’s arguments urging Muslims to come to terms with British rule.<sup>7</sup> In 1864, when S. Ahmad Khan founded a society for the introduction of Western sciences among Indian Muslims, the most enthusiastic response came from Maulana Siraj Husain, a son of the Shia *mujtahid* Muhammad Quli Kinturi.<sup>8</sup> Most influential among the Shia modernists who cooperated with S. Ahmad Khan was S. Amir Ali (1849–1928) from Calcutta who had a distinguished career in the judiciary and in politics.<sup>9</sup> His book *The Spirit of Islam*, published first in London 1891, became one of the most widely-read defences of the Prophet Muhammad against Christian criticism during his lifetime and beyond.<sup>10</sup> In his other major book, *A Short History of the Saracens* (1900), he tried to bridge the main controversial point between Shias and Sunnis by differentiating between an “apostolic” caliphate of Ali and the “pontifical” caliphate of his three predecessors.<sup>11</sup> He also showed readiness to set aside his Shia beliefs for the sake of Muslim unity during the *Khilâfat* Movement (see below). In 1877 he founded a National Mohammedan Association which was the first political organisation of Indian Muslims, although popular response to it remained modest.<sup>12</sup> In 1882 the Association submitted a memorial to the Viceroy Lord Ripon which received a reply from his successor Lord Dufferin, said to have been “the most important declaration of policy emanating from the head of the Indian Government

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in regard to Muslims ... prior to Lord Minto's reply to the Muhammadan deputation ... 1906".<sup>13</sup> S. Amir Ali, like S. Ahmad Khan, was also quick to denounce the programme of the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885) as detrimental to the interests of the Muslims. In 1887 he tried to call a conference of Indian Muslims as a counterweight to the Congress, but did not succeed.<sup>14</sup>

Shias had a great part in S. Ahmad Khan's most important legacy, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh (founded in 1877).<sup>15</sup> When fund-raising started for the college scheme in 1872, Shias were among those leading the campaign as well as among the subscribers.<sup>16</sup> One of the latter was Raja Amir Hasan Khan of Mahmudabad (d. 1903), heir of a large estate near Lucknow.<sup>17</sup> Although he withdrew his annual grant in 1888, compensation was immediately found from Shias in the Hyderabad State thanks to the efforts of S. Husain Bilgrami.<sup>18</sup> In 1904 and again in 1910 Raja Muhammad Ali Muhammad Khan of Mahmudabad (1879–1931), the eldest son and successor of Raja Amir Hasan Khan, made donations of Rs. 100,000 to the Aligarh College.<sup>19</sup> He also headed a committee set up for raising funds to elevate the college to university level in 1906 and toured Indian provinces for that purpose.<sup>20</sup> From 1920 to 1923 he became vice-chancellor of the newly created university.<sup>21</sup> The initial drive for a Muslim University in Aligarh had come from another Shia leader, the Agha Khan III (1877–1957), during a session of the All-India Muslim Educational Conference in Bombay in January 1903.<sup>22</sup> That institution set up in 1886 by S. Ahmad Khan complemented the goals of the Aligarh College with the establishment of modern Muslim schools throughout India.<sup>23</sup> Shias participated very actively in the efforts of the Muslim Educational Conference, often also presiding over its annual sessions in different Indian towns.<sup>24</sup>

The Aligarh College was not immune from sectarian disputes,<sup>25</sup> but its secularist orientation made it attractive for upper-class Shias as much as Sunnis. It turned out a nucleus of Muslim political awakening for the whole Indian subcontinent, producing many leaders of the Muslim League and later the Pakistan Movement. S. Ahmad Khan's radical modernist views on Islam had provoked much criticism from Shia as well as Sunni religious circles, but his strongest opponents belonged to Sunni revivalist schools of thought like the Deobandis and *Ahl-i hadith*. Incidentally many Sunni '*ulamâ*' of that same background would later oppose Jinnah and the demand for Pakistan.<sup>26</sup>

The Muslim political awakening was accelerated by a rise of Hindu communalism in the last decades of the nineteenth century. One important

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issue that united Shias and Sunnis against Hindus was the Hindi-Urdu controversy; kindled in 1867 when Hindus agitated for the replacement of Urdu by Hindi as the second official language besides English in the North-Western Provinces.<sup>27</sup> Having achieved only partial success, the advocates of Hindi started a new campaign in 1895, which resulted in its recognition as an official court language in 1900. That same year Nawab Muhsin ul-Mulk, the head of the Aligarh College since the death of S. Ahmad Khan, formed an Urdu Defence Association.<sup>28</sup> Shias participated prominently in the counter-campaign, among them the jurists S. Karamat Husain (1852–1917)<sup>29</sup> Hamid Ali Khan (d. 1923)<sup>30</sup> and Khwaja Ghulam us-Saqlain<sup>31</sup> in Allahabad and Lucknow.<sup>32</sup> Muslim protests could not prevent Urdu from losing its former pre-eminent status, but initiatives for Muslim political organisation gained momentum. Again some Shias played an important role, among them the three last-mentioned,<sup>33</sup> S. Husain Bilgrami,<sup>34</sup> S. Amir Ali, and the Agha Khan III.

The final incentive was given by the announcement of constitutional reforms by the British Secretary of State for India, John Morley, in August 1906. On 1 October 1906 the Agha Khan led a thirty-five-member Muslim delegation to the Viceroy Lord Minto in Simla which submitted a memorandum containing two main demands, namely separate electorates for Muslims in all local and provincial elections and “weightage” for them in all elected bodies, i.e. more seats than their ratio of the population warranted.<sup>35</sup> Having received a favourably reply from Lord Minto, the deputation was followed up with the foundation of the All-India Muslim League on 30 December 1906 in Dhaka on the sidelines of the annual session of the Muslim Educational Conference. S. Karamat Husain, Hamid Ali Khan, Khwaja Ghulam us-Saqlain, S. Husain Bilgrami and S. Ali Imam (1869–1932)<sup>36</sup> were among the Shia members of the League’s first Provisional Committee.<sup>37</sup> The Agha Khan, who did not attend the Dhaka meeting, was elected Honorary President and became permanent President of the Muslim League from its first regular session in 1907 (Karachi) until his resignation in 1913.<sup>38</sup> The Muslim League started as a thoroughly elitist organisation, and the Agha Khan was selected to head it because of his political acumen and influence with highest British authorities in London and Calcutta.

Shias played an important role in the League from the start and continued to do so right until the foundation of Pakistan. In the early years, most noteworthy apart from the Agha Khan—who, as an Isma‘ili leader, belonged to a category of his own—were S. Amir Ali, S. Wazir Hasan, Raja

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Muhammad Ali Muhammad of Mahmudabad and Nawab Fateh Ali Qizilbash. S. Amir Ali, who had settled in England after retirement from the Calcutta High Court bench in 1904, formed a London branch of the Muslim League in 1908.<sup>39</sup> Together with the Agha Khan he lobbied for Muslim interests in the British capital, ensuring that the 1906 promise of separate electorates for Muslims was transformed into law with the 1909 Indian Councils Act (Morley-Minto Reforms Act).<sup>40</sup> He presided *in absentia* over the third annual session of the League in Delhi (January 1910), urging loyal cooperation with the British and more efforts for solving the economic, social and educational problems of the Muslims.<sup>41</sup> In 1913 he resigned from the Muslim League because of the latter's growing criticism of the British Indian government.<sup>42</sup> Nawab Qizilbash, too, distanced himself from the League after an attempt to keep it on a staunchly pro-British line had failed in 1913–14.<sup>43</sup>

If the Agha Khan, S. Amir Ali and Qizilbash had exemplified the loyalist-conservative origins of the Muslim League, the Lucknow barrister S. Wazir Hasan (1872–1947)<sup>44</sup> did much to bring the League more in line with the nationalist aims of the Congress. He was elected Joint Secretary of the League in 1910 and Secretary-General from 1913 to 1917. In 1912 he drafted a revised constitution of the League, which now comprised the goal of “a form of self-government suitable for India”.<sup>45</sup> Since 1911 League-British relations had cooled down because of a reversal of the 1905 partition of Bengal and Muslim feelings of solidarity with Ottoman Turkey during the Tripoli and Balkan wars.<sup>46</sup> They became more strained after Turkey allied itself with Germany during the First World War and the British Indian government arrested some prominent pro-Turkish leaders like Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali.<sup>47</sup> This brought about the closest-ever rapprochement between the Muslim League and the Congress in the form of the Lucknow Pact of December 1916 to which S. Wazir Hasan had contributed, although its principal Muslim architects were Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Raja Muhammad Ali Muhammad of Mahmudabad.<sup>48</sup>

The Raja of Mahmudabad, a personal friend and supporter of S. Wazir Hasan, headed the Muslim League from 1915 to 1918 after having been one of its Vice-Presidents since 1907.<sup>49</sup> Since 1910, when the central office of the League was transferred from Aligarh to Lucknow, he had financed it with a fixed annual *chanda* of Rs. 3,000.<sup>50</sup> Basically loyal to the British, the Raja was more committed to Indian self-rule than the Agha Khan. In 1915 he supported the brothers Muhammad and Shaukat Ali after another Shia aristocrat of the U.P., Raja Hamid Ali Khan of Rampur, had confiscated

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their property.<sup>51</sup> But perhaps his most important service to the Muslim cause in India, together with S. Wazir Hasan, was to convince Jinnah to join the Muslim League in 1913.<sup>52</sup>

Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the later *Qâ'id-i A'zam* (“great leader”) and founder of Pakistan, has, of course, been the greatest source of pride for Pakistan’s Shia community ever since the establishment of the state. Yet never in his political life did Jinnah display anything even remotely resembling Shia communalist thinking. Born a Khoja Isma‘ili, he had converted to Twelver Shi‘ism around 1904 without ever bothering much about its religious tenets.<sup>53</sup> He started his political career as a member of the Indian National Congress in 1906, following the example of one of his most admired Bombay friends, Justice Badr ud-Din Tayyabji.<sup>54</sup> In 1910 he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council, winning his first laurels there with a bill, which reversed some British legislation on *auqâf* considered contrary to the *shari‘a*.<sup>55</sup> His achievements were lauded by leaders of the Muslim League, and Jinnah was invited to attend its sessions from December 1912. When he agreed to join the League in 1913, he did so as an “ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity”, a cause to which he remained committed against many odds until 1928.<sup>56</sup> Jinnah’s later transformation into a stern advocate of Muslim rights in the face of a “hostile” Hindu majority was entirely political and accompanied by genuine abhorrence at inter-Muslim sectarian controversies.<sup>57</sup> So consistently had Jinnah played down his Shia identity that after his death he was claimed by many Sunnis, too, as having been one of their own denomination.<sup>58</sup>

Muhammad Ali Muhammad Khan of Mahmudabad (conferred the title of Maharaja since 1925) was one of Jinnah’s wealthiest clients among the Indian Muslim aristocracy and a close friend, who offered hospitality to him regularly.<sup>59</sup> He also appointed Jinnah as the first of seven trustees of his estates during the minority of his son and successor Amir Ahmad Khan (see below).<sup>60</sup> He supported Shia communal causes like the foundation of a Shia College in Lucknow,<sup>61</sup> but the Aligarh College, the Muslim League, and non-communal institutions like the Lucknow University and Medical College profited even more from his generosity.<sup>62</sup>

The participation of many upper-class Shias in Indian Muslim joint endeavours such as the Aligarh College, the Muslim Educational Conference and the Muslim League was perhaps natural, since they themselves stood to gain much from the results. By contrast, Shia support for the *Khilâfat* Movement in the years following the First World War was somewhat artificial, although understandable given the political context. Pan-Islamism

and sentimental attachment to the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, the last Muslim ruler who was then still a power to reckon with internationally, had won influence in India since the last decades of the nineteenth century, helped by the activities of S. Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) in Hyderabad and Calcutta from 1879 to 1892.<sup>63</sup> A number of Shias shared sympathies for the beleaguered Ottoman Empire, most prominent among them S. Amir Ali and Badr ud-Din Tayyabji.<sup>64</sup> In 1919 Muslim resentment against the treatment of Turkey after its defeat in the First World War came to a head, coinciding with general indignation about how the British backtracked on their promises regarding Indian self-rule. From late 1919 to 1922 the Muslim League was eclipsed by the *Khilâfat* Movement led by radical nationalist and Deobandi Sunnis and by Gandhi's Non-Cooperation Movement launched in 1920.<sup>65</sup> The principal demands of the *Khilâfat* Movement were the preservation of the caliphate as a temporal as well as a spiritual institution and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, implying restoration of Turkish control over the holy places of Islam in the Hijaz.<sup>66</sup> As even Gandhi and other Hindu Congress leaders had tactically proclaimed solidarity with the *Khilâfat* Movement, it was difficult for Shia leaders to abstain. The Raja of Mahmudabad hosted and financed the first *Khilâfat Conference* held in Lucknow in September 1919,<sup>67</sup> and Jinnah—who was elected to preside over the Muslim League in September 1919—denounced “the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire and the *Khilâfat*” as an “attack on our faith”.<sup>68</sup> Both later distanced themselves from the *Khilâfat* Movement, but another Shia member of the League, S. Riza Ali (1882–1949),<sup>69</sup> in 1922 and 1923 headed delegations of the Indian Legislature to the Viceroy to plead for the Turkish cause.<sup>70</sup> As late as November 1923, one year after the Turkish National Assembly had abolished the temporal powers of Sultan Abd ul-Majid, the Agha Khan and S. Amir Ali wrote a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Pasha requesting the enhancement of his position. They were rebuffed with the argument that as Shias they could not be spokesmen of the Sunni Muslims of India, and their letter only hastened the Turkish decision to abolish the caliphate altogether in March 1924.<sup>71</sup>

In the 1920s the impact of Shias—including Jinnah—on Muslim politics in India was less than it had been during the first two decades of the century, owing much to the mess left behind by the *Khilâfat* Movement and other unsuccessful campaigns. Muslim leadership became ever more divided with the emergence of new organisations such as the *Jam'iyat al-'Ulamâ'-i Hind* (JUH),<sup>72</sup> the *Khilâfat* Conference, and later the *Majlis-i Ahrâr-i Islâm*.<sup>73</sup> In 1928 even the Muslim League split over the issues of separate electorates

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and proper response to a British commission charged with finding a solution to the constitutional problems of India.<sup>74</sup> At that juncture the Maharaja of Mahmudabad, who was once again elected President of the League for one year in December 1928, disagreed with Jinnah. He was ready to accept the Nehru Report (an alternative to the British proposals worked out by Motilal Nehru) which Jinnah had rejected because it did not include safeguards for Muslims.<sup>75</sup> S. Ali Imam, who had been a member of the drafting committee, was still more in favour of the report.<sup>76</sup> On 1 January 1929, the Agha Khan presided over an All-Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi, considered as the most representative gathering of Muslims in India so far.<sup>77</sup> In the following four years the Agha Khan once more occupied centre stage in Indian Muslim politics, especially during three Round Table Conferences held in London between November 1930 and December 1932.<sup>78</sup> They resulted in a reform package (Government of India Act of July 1935), which made the provinces separate legal entities and enlarged provincial franchise. Other concessions made to Muslim demands were the administrative separation of Sindh from Bombay and the granting of full provincial powers for the NWFP.<sup>79</sup>

Jinnah was left with only a faction of the Muslim League loyal to him in early 1929. He departed for London in November 1930 and stayed there for most of the following five years.<sup>80</sup> Thus he did not attend the 21<sup>st</sup> annual session of the League in Allahabad (29–30 December 1930) where Muhammad Iqbal made his famous statement that “the Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan, amalgamated into a single state ... appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India”.<sup>81</sup> Maharaja Muhammad Ali Muhammad of Mahmudabad, who had been keen to let Iqbal preside over that session, died in May 1931, depriving the moribund Muslim League of an important source of funds.<sup>82</sup> Financial support from the Mahmudabad estate was only resumed after his elder son and heir, Amir Ahmad Khan (1914–73),<sup>83</sup> had reached majority in November 1935.<sup>84</sup>

Amir Ahmad Khan had been very much acquainted with Jinnah since his boyhood and used to address him as his “dear uncle”.<sup>85</sup> From 1936, when he formally joined the Muslim League, until the foundation of Pakistan he was one of Jinnah’s most loyal and trusted supporters and in spite of his youth was entrusted with important tasks.<sup>86</sup> Brought up in utmost wealth and luxury, he acquired a reputation for personal modesty, generosity and deep religiosity from his early adulthood.<sup>87</sup> His religious fervour would cause frictions with Jinnah in the early 1940s, when Amir Ahmad Khan advocated a theocratic state Pakistan from the platform of the Muslim League,<sup>88</sup> but



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these were later ironed out. In 1933 he was among those urging Jinnah to return from England and resume leadership of the League, pledging to provide all material help required to infuse new life into the organisation.<sup>89</sup>

Jinnah was re-elected President of the Muslim League in 1934 but did not return to India permanently until October 1935. Within two more years he was able to make the League an effective instrument for pressing Muslim political demands, receiving crucial support from some Shia individuals at that juncture. S. Wazir Hasan presided over the 24<sup>th</sup> annual session of the Muslim League in Bombay (11–12 April 1936) that “initiated the slow process of transforming that small fragmented party into a mass movement”.<sup>90</sup> It was followed up with the first session of a Central Parliamentary Board appointed by Jinnah (Lahore, 8–11 June) of which Amir Ahmad Khan was made treasurer. Although Jinnah could not yet attract many prominent politicians from the Punjab to his fold, his rival Mian Fazl-i Husain, who had reorganised the *Punjab National Unionist Party* that year, was alarmed enough to complain in a letter to the Agha Khan dated 22 June 1936 (excerpts):

Jinnah has blundered into the arena very much to our prejudice ... Jinnah’s interference and all sorts of silly promises as to large funds being available from Bombay millionaires and from the Maharaja of Mahmudabad has made our task rather difficult, because the press in general and the vernacular press in particular is in a pecuniarius (sic) condition and always anxious to get some help...<sup>91</sup>

Among the “Bombay millionaires” referred to in that letter were some Isma‘ilis and Twelver Shias such as Da’ud Nasir and Seth Ibrahim Pirbhai.<sup>92</sup> A Shia lawyer and politician from Bombay, Isma‘il Ibrahim Chundrigar (1897–1960), accepted nomination into Jinnah’s Parliamentary Board at that time and later rose to head the Muslim League’s provincial branch.<sup>93</sup> In Bengal the Shia businessman Mirza Abu’l Hasan Ispahani (1902–75) was both an important financier of the Muslim League and one of Jinnah’s closest personal friends.<sup>94</sup>

In the January–February 1937 provincial elections the Muslim League captured only 109 of 1585 Muslim seats. It fared especially bad in the Punjab with only two out of 175 seats against eighty-eight seats for the Unionist Party.<sup>95</sup> Eight more MPAs defected to the Unionist Party shortly after, including the Shia Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (1895–1963) who had been elected on a Muslim League ticket in the Pind Dadan Khan constituency.<sup>96</sup> But in October that year Sikandar Hayat Khan, who had headed the Unionist Party since the death of Fazl-i Husain (July 1936), concluded an agreement with Jinnah under the terms of which his party “merged” with the Muslim League in national matters while retaining its independence in

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Punjab provincial matters.<sup>97</sup> The Sikandar-Jinnah Pact, which turned out to be a milestone on the path to Pakistan, was consecrated during the 25<sup>th</sup> annual session of the Muslim League in Lucknow (15–18 October 1937) hosted by Amir Ahmad Khan in the premises of the Mahmudabad House.<sup>98</sup> The young Maharaja had expended much energy and resources for the preparation of that crucial session,<sup>99</sup> besides paying all expenses for Muslim League candidates in by-elections to five U.P. Provincial Assembly seats.<sup>100</sup> During the session he moved a resolution focussing on socio-economic problems and their proposed solution.<sup>101</sup> On 30 December 1937, in conformity with the wishes of Jinnah, Amir Ahmad Khan was elected to head the Muslim Students' Federation, which provided plenty of energetic volunteers for the League throughout the following decade.<sup>102</sup> He remained its president until his resignation in 1946.<sup>103</sup>

While Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad rose to prominence within the Muslim League in 1937, S. Wazir Hasan parted ways with Jinnah and was expelled from the League that year.<sup>104</sup> His son S. Ali Zahîr, who had been a member of the U.P. Legislative Council since 1930, and one other Shia candidate of the Muslim League lost the 1937 provincial elections due to what the AISC organ *Sarfarâz* termed "venomous propaganda of the Sunnis".<sup>105</sup> Thereafter, S. Wazir Hasan and S. Ali Zahîr rallied their followers in the AISPC behind the Congress. In April 1937 the AISPC "took the lead in supporting Nehru's brainchild, the Muslim Mass Contact campaign"<sup>106</sup> and later that year resolved that "since the political aim of the Congress and the AISPC are the same, the Shias should join the Congress and wholeheartedly take part in the freedom struggle".<sup>107</sup> Jinnah's divorce from his long-time Shia associate had apparently resulted from the personal rivalry of S. Wazir Hasan's son with Jinnah's new Lucknow ally, Choudhry Khaliq uz-Zaman (1889–1973).<sup>108</sup> The latter in 1935 had defeated S. Ali Zahîr in a "tough fight" for the chairmanship of the Lucknow Municipal Board, then helped by his Congress friends.<sup>109</sup> In 1936 Khaliq uz-Zaman joined the Muslim League's Parliamentary Board (see above) along with his allies from the Muslim Unity Board, which included the Deobandi 'ulamâ' and JUH leaders Husain Ahmad Madani and Ahmad Sa'îd.<sup>110</sup> At the June 1936 session of the Parliamentary Board a clause was included in the League's election manifesto that "in all matters of purely religious character, due weight shall be given to the opinion of the JUH and the [Shia] *mujtahids*".<sup>111</sup> During the 1937 election campaign Khaliq uz-Zaman supported the JUH demand for *madh-i sahâba* processions,<sup>112</sup> although he took part in mediation efforts two years later when the *madh-i sahâba* controversy reached its climax.<sup>113</sup>

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Since 1936, when Jinnah had considered it necessary to make some concessions to the religious groups, sectarian conflicts crept into the Muslim League, becoming one of the numerous challenges he faced on his path to establish the League as the “sole representative organisation” of Indian Muslims. After the “defection” of S. Wazir Hasan and the AISPC a sub-committee of the League was formed to examine legitimate grievances of the Shias, but its findings were never made public.<sup>114</sup> The more the Muslim League gained strength in the following years, the less patient Jinnah became to listen to Shia “sectarian” demands.<sup>115</sup> Being himself a stranger to Shia communalist thinking, he nevertheless tried to maintain some balance between the appointment of Shia and Sunni individuals for important tasks within the League. Thus in March 1938 the Shia Raja S. Muhammad Mahdi of Pirpur (U.P.) was selected to head a commission to inquire into Muslim complaints about mistreatment in Indian provinces run by Congress ministries.<sup>116</sup>

In spite of some shortcomings of the Muslim League in curbing Sunni sectarians within its ranks, Jinnah’s task was made easier by the fact that the majority factions of the two largest organisations of Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’, the JUH and the *Majlis-i Ahrâr*, remained in the Congress camp even after the pro-Hindu bias of the Congress had become obvious in 1937. The *Ahrâr* leader Mazhar Ali Azhar (1895–1974),<sup>117</sup> ironically himself a Shia, coined the insult *Kâfir-i A’zam* (“Greatest Infidel”) for Jinnah shortly after the latter had been proclaimed *Qâ’id-i A’zam* by the League,<sup>118</sup> but later headed a faction of the *Ahrâr* that supported the Pakistan scheme.<sup>119</sup> The pro-Congress group of the *Ahrâr* was led by the Maulanas Habib ur-Rahman Ludhianvi (1892–1956)<sup>120</sup> and S. Da’ud Ghaznavi (1895–1963).<sup>121</sup> The JUH turned against the Muslim League shortly after the 1937 elections and strengthened its ties with the Congress which dated back to its foundation in 1919.<sup>122</sup> Some prominent ‘*ulamâ*’ split from the party in subsequent years,<sup>123</sup> but the majority of the Deobandi and *Ahl-i hadith* clergy remained opposed to Jinnah and the Pakistan Movement until 1947.<sup>124</sup>

### *From the Lahore Resolution to the establishment of Pakistan*

The experience of the 1939 *Tabarrâ* Agitation had disillusioned many Shias in the U.P. and other Indian provinces who had so far supported the Congress, but it had also caused Shia resentment against what was perceived as the Muslim League’s Sunni bias. Sharp divisions within the Indian Shia community regarding their political affiliation and course of action

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persisted in the remaining years of British rule, but significantly, the pro-Congress Shia leaders lost almost all their influence in the Punjab and other provinces that would become Pakistan in 1947. While Lucknow remained a stronghold of Shia allies of the Congress, most Shias in the crucial Punjab province gradually let themselves be carried away by the emerging mass support for the Muslim League. This development, natural as it may appear in retrospect, did not occur without serious strains. Strong criticism of the Muslim League because of its high-handed treatment of Shia demands and apprehensions continued until the eve of partition in mid-1947. But unlike the Shia leaders of the U.P. and other Indian provinces, whose political perspective was Hindu majority rule anyhow, those in the “Pakistan provinces” had no reason to accommodate the Congress and thus risk further alienation of the Sunni majority. They had no option but to follow the Muslim mainstream, some of them as unconditional supporters of the Muslim League, and others upholding their Shia identity and demands, trying consistently but with little success to obtain concessions from the Muslim League in return.

With the passing of the so-called “Pakistan-Resolution” at the 27<sup>th</sup> annual session of the Muslim League in Lahore on 22–23 March 1940, the League’s goal and further course of action had become clear. At that stage, the Shia community made its most serious effort so far to close ranks in order to have a proper say of its own in the emerging political structure of an independent India, whether divided or united. Preparations for an All-Parties Shia Conference, which was convened in Lucknow from 14–15 April 1940, had started already in late 1939 through combined efforts of the AISC and the AISPC. Its convenor was Maharajkumar Amir Haidar Khan of Mahmudabad (1917–91), who unlike his elder brother Amir Ahmad Khan was active mainly with affairs of the Shia community.<sup>125</sup> At the same time, differences between the “All-India” and the Punjab Shia organisations sharpened. For example, the latter had called for support of the Muslim League on Jinnah’s proclaimed “Day of Deliverance” (22 December 1939) to celebrate the resignation of Congress provincial ministries, whereas the AISPC came out with a statement of solidarity with the Congress.<sup>126</sup> A resolution of its 9<sup>th</sup> annual session at Chapra (Bihar) charged the Muslim League of “trampling the rights and sensitivities of the Shias”.<sup>127</sup>

The Lahore Resolution included a commitment to “adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards” for minorities in the constitution of the Muslim majority units “for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with

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them”.<sup>128</sup> Nevertheless, apprehensions among the Shias regarding their status in the projected state of Pakistan remained. They were summed up in a letter of Amir Haidar Khan of Mahmudabad to Jinnah from 29 March 1940, two weeks ahead of the Lucknow conference. In this he put forward the following demands of his community which the Muslim League should take care to provide safeguards for, so that Shias could whole-heartedly support the struggle for Pakistan: 1) Shias should have a say in elected bodies and governmental institutions, which should work according to the principles of justice (*insâf aur ‘adâlat*) instead of prevalence of the majority; 2) freedom for Shia beliefs and customs; 3) the governors of all provinces and the Governor General of India should have special powers to protect the Shias in case of injustice done to them by other groups; 4) all Shia *auqâf* must be under exclusive Shia control; 5) if any law was passed according to Hanafi *fiqh*, the special *fiqh* of the Shias must be observed in their cases.<sup>129</sup>

In his reply dated 8 April 1940 Jinnah expressed regret that Amir Haidar Khan’s mind was “still working in the direction which is not likely to benefit the Shias” and rejected the demand for special powers for the governors to be exercised in favour of the Shias. He closed his letter with the words:

I once more appeal to you that you, at any rate, should not mix yourself up with the proposed conference. The proper policy for the Shias is to join the League whole-heartedly. The League is now able to enforce justice and fair play between Mussalman and Mussalman whatever be his sect or section. The one thing alone that matters is that we are all Mussalmans.<sup>130</sup>

As for the other demands, Jinnah tried to dispel Shia apprehensions with the following statements:

I see no reason why the Shias should be debarred from having their voice in the elected bodies and governmental institutions in any matter which affect the Shias. We must so organise the Muslim League that justice is done to every sect and section inside it.

Then as regards the liberty of religious observances and beliefs for Shias, surely it is quite elementary that, if the Muslim League organisation is worth anything, it must see that no infringement of that liberty is allowed ... As regards the Shia Waqfs, I do not see what objection can there be to their being exclusively under control of the Shias. ... if law is passed in accordance with the Muslim Hanafi Law, the special principles of Shia Shariat must also be taken into consideration.<sup>131</sup>

The latter excerpts, which were published by Amir Haidar Khan in the press for the first time only six years later,<sup>132</sup> have been quoted again and again by Shia organisations and journals in Pakistan in the following

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decades to argue for their cause. In spite of the *Qâ'id-i A'zam*'s objection, the Maharajkumar of Mahmudabad and some prominent members of the Muslim League like Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan did attend the All-Parties Shia Conference, but the bulk of participants hailed from the U.P.<sup>133</sup> The presidential address was read by S. Sultan Ahmad (1880–1963),<sup>134</sup> who tried his best to reconcile both camps within the Shia community and also to build bridges towards Sunni detractors of the Shias.<sup>135</sup> The All-Parties Shia Conference proclaimed S. Sultan Ahmad “spokesman” and “leader” of all Indian Shias and passed a number of resolutions,<sup>136</sup> but it did not leave any significant impact. S. Sultan Ahmad, who in September 1941 was expelled from the Muslim League for a breach of party discipline,<sup>137</sup> was neither willing nor able to press for Shia demands and assume a countrywide Shia leadership role.

The lull of activities aimed at strengthening communal organisation of the Shias in the years following the Lucknow conference was striking, especially if compared with those of other Indian minorities like the Sikhs or the Hindu “Scheduled Castes”. Many articles written by Shia activists during those years deplored a lack of political awareness and a “defeatist” attitude of their co-religionists, who would fail to understand the significance of the political revolution taking place in India. With their “suicidal” passivity they would risk seeing the status of Shias reduced to that of “pariahs” in future.<sup>138</sup> Special blame was reserved for the ‘*ulamâ*’ for their reluctance to be involved in politics and the preoccupation of *zâkirs* and other preachers with money and “cheap popularity” instead of using their *majâlis* as platforms for mobilising Shia communal solidarity.<sup>139</sup> Even the numerous local *anjumans* that organised the annual Muharram processions and other religious ceremonies were seen as “spreading mischief” and wasting Shia wealth with their mutual rivalries and excessive begging for *chanda*.<sup>140</sup> As for the Shia large landowners involved in politics, most of them would be accused of working only for their personal benefit, with little interest in creating political awareness among the Shia ‘*awâm*’.<sup>141</sup> In the Punjab, Nawab Qizilbash and other Shia members of the Unionist Party were perceived as being loyal to the British rulers in the first place.<sup>142</sup> Those Shia notables who were strongly involved with the Muslim League, like Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, did so in their individual capacity and not as representatives of their sect. As a community, the Shias had thrown their lot neither with the Muslim League nor with the Congress in the early 1940s, with the result that Shia influence was regarded as “zero” within both major contesting camps of India.<sup>143</sup> During the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to India in

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March 1942 to discuss new British power-sharing proposals he met with representatives of all major Indian communities, but did not consider it necessary to receive any representative of the Shias.<sup>144</sup>

Stagnation was obvious with the Punjab Shia Conference (PuSC), which held its last annual session at Ferozpur in late 1940, electing Nawab Ihsan Ali Khan of Malir Kotla (Ludhiana Dist.) as its new President.<sup>145</sup> He and the PuSC Secretary-General, Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari, blamed the persistent passivity of their organisation in the following years on utter lack of interest and response to their calls from the side of the Shia community. Most members of the PuSC would not even pay their annual *chanda* of 5 rupees.<sup>146</sup> *Razâkâr*, the outspoken Shia weekly founded in October 1938 in Lahore, faced similar problems. It had to close down from late June 1940 to October 1941 because of unpaid subscription fees adding up to Rs. 2,000.<sup>147</sup> One resolution of the PuSC's Ferozpur session had called for the founding of a Shia daily newspaper, but since no other Shia leader helped him implement that project, Ihsan Ali Khan at last bought a printing press in Lucknow in late 1942 on its own initiative. When he brought the full amount of money required to Lucknow in March 1943, transport of the press to the Punjab was impossible because the government of British India had restricted the use of freight wagons for civilian purposes, and the scheme faltered.<sup>148</sup>

The Punjab Shia Political Conference (PuSPC), led by the ambitious Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash since 1938,<sup>149</sup> was only slightly more active from 1940 to mid-1943. By that time, however, it started preparations for an important annual session—the first since December 1938—to settle the question of political affiliation of the Punjabi Shias.<sup>150</sup> The Lahore Convention of the PuSPC on 9–10 October 1943 was successful both regarding its representative quality—with hundreds of delegates hailing from all districts and Princely States of the Punjab attending—and through the clear line of action it adopted. Resolutions in favour of both the Congress and the Muslim League were tabled and discussed, but at last a resolution was adopted unanimously, stating:

... the Shia community is an important minority within the “Muslim *qaum*”, and the thirteen centuries old traditions of the Shia community make it obligatory that they act hand-in-hand with all Muslims for common national interests while safeguarding their own religious interests. As the Muslim League is the greatest representative organisation of the 100 Million Muslims in India, and as it has declared Pakistan its goal, the Shias of the Punjab will preserve the unity of the Muslims and will work for this goal.



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If the Muslim League cannot assure us of the protection of our rights and sensitivities (*jadhbat*), then the Shias will not spare any possible step and effort for the sake of these rights.<sup>151</sup>

The resolution of conditional support (*mashrûṭ ta'âwun*) for the Muslim League was criticised in the Sunni press, with organs of the Muslim League like *Zamîndâr* (Lahore) accusing the Shias of narrow-mindedness: Since the *Qâ'id-i A'zam* himself was a Shia, how could he act against Shia interests?<sup>152</sup> Such an argument was likened in *Razâkâr* to propaganda of the Congress that Muslim interests would be safeguarded through the Congress President Abu'l-Kalam Azad.<sup>153</sup> The tenor of the Lahore resolution of the PuSPC was echoed by Amir Haidar Khan of Mahmudabad during his presidential address at the 31<sup>st</sup> annual session of the AISC in Faizabad (28–29 October 1943),<sup>154</sup> and it was approved by a majority of Shias in most Indian provinces, with the exception of Congress supporters who were concentrated in Lucknow. In the Punjab, however, the mood of some Shia political leaders was already tilting in favour of unconditional support for the Muslim League. A resolution in that sense was tabled, for example, at the annual session of the *Anjuman-i Ithnâ'ashariya* Sialkot in early November 1943, but modified on the advice of the '*ulamâ*' Mufti Ja'far Husain and Hafiz Kifayat Husain. S. Ali Naqi, a leading *mujtahid* of Lucknow who was invited to speak at that session, declined from taking any position regarding the Muslim League from the religious viewpoint.<sup>155</sup>

In March 1944 Qizilbash arranged for a meeting of a PuSPC delegation with Jinnah to discuss the question of safeguarding Shia rights in Pakistan. Shia leaders of other parts of India had also been invited to participate, but none of them bothered to make the journey to Lahore where the meeting took place in the house of the Nawab of Mamdot on 29 March. In the context of a comprehensive discussion, Jinnah promised that the constitution of Pakistan would be democratic and all sects would enjoy complete religious freedom. Since the same would be granted to Hindus, Sikhs and Christians, it would be inconceivable to deny it to Shias. Jinnah also stressed the need for "complete religious tolerance (*rawâdârî*)" to achieve the goal of Pakistan.<sup>156</sup>

Jinnah's statements were generally well received by Shias in those provinces, which were later to become part of Pakistan, but the chairmen of both the AISPC (S. Ali Zahîr) and the *Shi'a Majlis-i 'Ulamâ* in Lucknow (S. Muhammad Nasîr) tried to deny any right for the PuSPC to decide whether those statements were satisfactory or not.<sup>157</sup> Such attempts from leaders based in Lucknow to impose their "All-India" authority only helped



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to increase the estrangement of Punjabi Shias from their traditional communal focus. They were particularly resented since Shias from the Punjab had displayed much solidarity with Lucknow during the 1939 *Tabarrâ* Agitation. But there were dissenting voices in the Punjab, too. In an article in *Razâkâr* in April 1944, S. Nâsir Ali Shah Gardezi, while professing to be an admirer of Jinnah, alleged that the latter would be "naive as a Shia" and out of touch with the mutual religious fanaticism and narrow-mindedness among the Muslim sects. Besides, the Shias would not need guarantees from the *Qâ'id-i A'zam* individually, but rather from the Muslim League as a party. Even a collective pledge of Muslim League leaders to safeguard religious freedom in Pakistan would not be enough; rather the Muslim League would have to write guarantees of political, social and religious rights of the Shias into its party statutes.<sup>158</sup>

The principal grievances against the Muslim League concerned its indifference towards manifestations of intolerance against Shias even within its own ranks, which became more frequent the more the Muslim League developed into a mass movement. In order to mobilise the *'awâm* for the sacred goal of Pakistan, the help of religious preachers was essential, even if some of them would indulge in sectarian rhetoric.<sup>159</sup> The least thing which could be said about those Sunni *'ulamâ'* who supported the Pakistan Movement was that they became increasingly outspoken regarding their concept of the future Islamic state. They generally expected it to be bound by the tenets of Sunni Hanafi *fiqh* and the example of the first two Caliphs, and even Shia members of the Muslim League would not dare to challenge the views of such *'ulamâ'* publicly as long as their support was needed.

The most hard-line anti-Shia *'ulamâ'* were affiliated to parties that opposed the Muslim League, like the JUH and the *Majlis-i Ahrâr*.<sup>160</sup> But the Muslim League was reluctant to come out in defence of the Shias when members of these parties attacked them as *kuffâr* (infidels), *rawâfiz*,<sup>161</sup> *bid'atî*,<sup>162</sup> *tabarrâ'î* or *munâfiqûn*<sup>163</sup> (hypocrites), for example during elections for municipal councils in late 1944.<sup>164</sup> As the U.P. Governor had curtailed the freedoms of *madh-i sahâba* activists since the outbreak of the Second World War,<sup>165</sup> the latter turned their attention to the Punjab, where a *Markazî Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Sunnat* (TAS) was founded in April 1944 in Amritsar.<sup>166</sup> During its first annual session in Lahore in March 1945, presided over by Maulana Zafar ul-Mulk from Lucknow and Mufti Kifayatullah Dihlavi, Maulana Muhammad Ali Jullundhri and others held inflammatory speeches against Shias.<sup>167</sup> Assaults on Shia religious ceremonies and their ban by local authorities multiplied in the Punjab during the 1940s,<sup>168</sup> but

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neither the Muslim League nor, for that matter, Shia members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, paid much attention to continuous protests by the Shia organisations and media.

On 25 July 1944 S. Ali Zahir wrote a letter to Jinnah in which he complained, among other things, about repeated attempts of Sunni '*ulamā*' to propagate the rule of the first two Caliphs as a guideline for Pakistan from the Muslim League platform. Although admitting that he had no general mandate from the Shias, Zahir deemed it necessary to ask the Muslim League for safeguards regarding religious freedom in Pakistan, a ban on sectarian propaganda against Shias during elections and guarantees for sufficient representation of Shias in ministries, parliaments and other elected bodies, courts and all departments of the administration. Besides, he demanded that the Muslim League should pay as much attention to the freedom of the whole country as to its goal of Pakistan. Claiming that not only the AISPC, but most Shias, had kept their distance from the Muslim League so far, he invited Jinnah to give a satisfactory reply to the AISPC in order to "create harmony between both parties".<sup>169</sup>

In his answer dated 31 August 1944 Jinnah expressed his confidence that the majority of Shias would support the Muslim League and dismissed as "unwise" those who still remained aloof "only due to misunderstandings". He saw no reason at all for Shias to think that the Muslim League would not treat them justly, and warned of "improper" and "illogical" attempts to create divisions within the Muslim camp.<sup>170</sup> Jinnah could allow himself such a cold reply to Zahir's demands because the latter was speaking in the name of an organisation that had ceased to enjoy much countrywide influence. Jinnah rightly sensed the weakness of the AISPC, which had never taken care of establishing branches in provinces and districts outside the U.P.<sup>171</sup> The PuSPC had asserted its independent course from the AISPC since its Lahore session of October 1943, and S. Kalb-i 'Abbas, then Honorary Secretary-General of the AISC, distanced himself from Zahir's step. Supporting an idea of Amir Haidar Khan of Mahmudabad, he urged to hold a meeting of Shia provincial representatives at a central place—preferable not Lucknow—to make another attempt at finding a Shia common formula.<sup>172</sup>

In 1945 efforts for Shia communal mobilisation reached a climax unseen since 1939, albeit without achieving the desired results. In April that year Husainbhai Lalji (1886–1971), a Khoja Twelver Shia leader and merchant from Bombay,<sup>173</sup> submitted a memorandum to the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, which was also published in the press, demanding proportional representation of India's "20 million Shias" in all elected bodies and even in the civil

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service according to their demographic strength. He stressed the differences of culture, tradition and customs between Shias and Sunnis and claimed that the Shias would no longer trust the sense of justice of the Sunni majority “and their representative, the Muslim League”. Unlike the Congress, which had accepted to provide certain safeguards for the “Scheduled Castes”, the Muslim League was not ready to grant the same thing to the Shia minority.<sup>174</sup>

Since the initiative of Lalji was openly encouraged by the Congress, the Muslim League condemned it as just another attempt of “sabotaging the unity of Muslim ranks”. Lalji became more outspoken in an “open letter to all Shia leaders in India” in June 1945, in which he warned of the danger of “gradual annihilation” of Shias because of Sunni fanaticism in Pakistan, whereas there would remain some hope under the government of a united India.<sup>175</sup> By that time his April memorandum had met with wide-spread support among Shias. At a joint press-conference with Lalji on 26 May 1945 even the PuSC president Nawab Ihsan Ali Khan, who later became an unconditional supporter of the Muslim League, expressed his fear that there would be no protection of Shia rights in Pakistan and complained about the absence of even a single Shia minister in the Punjab government although Shias had many qualified persons and accounted for “20 per cent of the population” of the province.<sup>176</sup> The demand for separate electorates for Shias was also supported by *Razâkâr*, which deplored the inability of the fourteen Shia deputies in the Punjab Assembly to raise their voices for any Shia grievance out of fear to loose their seats in the coming elections.<sup>177</sup>

On 5 July 1945 the leading ‘*ulamâ*’ of Lucknow came out with their clearest political statement so far, urging Indian Shias to form their own separate organisation in order to safeguard their rights.<sup>178</sup> At the same time, the Muslim League came closer to official acknowledgement of its claim to be the “sole representative” of Indian Muslims during the Simla conference of Indian leaders presided by Lord Wavell (25 June–14 July 1945).<sup>179</sup> After the failure of that conference, the British decided to hold elections for the Central and Provincial Assemblies (December 1945 and February 1946, respectively), the outcome of which would prove decisive for the success of the Pakistan Movement.

In August 1945 the AISPC Central Council decided to hold another All-Parties Shia Conference in Lucknow on 14–15 October. Invitations were sent to 167 Shia *anjumans* all over India and to a number of prominent individuals, including even Jinnah.<sup>180</sup> In his reply (dated 1 October 1945) Jinnah repeated his well-known stance:

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The organisers of the Shia Conference, I regret to say, are misguided and misled by our enemies. My advice to every Shia is to join the Muslim League unreservedly at this critical juncture. Other course is harmful generally to the Muslims of India and even more to the Shia interest. The Muslim League and I have made it clear repeatedly that we stand for justice and fair-play towards every sect of Mussalmans and non-Muslim minorities ... The Muslim League will never interfere with faith or belief of any sect ... Overwhelming majority of Shias are with the League and legitimate grievances, if any, are a matter of our own concern and can be dealt within our fold by the All-India Muslim League.<sup>181</sup>

Amir Haidar Khan of Mahmudabad, who did not attend the All-Parties Conference, (excusing himself with illness), had convened a consulting session of Shia representatives of its own choice on 29–30 September. During that meeting the following demands were agreed upon and conveyed to the Muslim League: 1) an unambiguous statement from the Muslim League that a government following the example of the Prophet Muhammad (*minhâj-i nubuwwat*) and not that of the first two Caliphs (*sîrat-i shaikhain*) would be established in the Pakistan regions; 2) reserved seats for Shias at elections and in the executive as well as judicial departments of state; 3) guarantees of protection against attacks on the Shia *mazhab* during election campaigns; 4) no obligation for Shia children to learn Sunni history and *dîniyât*; 5) protection of Shia rights and social life (*tamaddun*) in the Pakistan regions.<sup>182</sup>

The PuSPC decided to support the All-Parties Shia Conference at a session of its Working Committee on 7 October, although some of its members, who were also active in the Muslim League, tried their best to brand the Lucknow conference as an initiative of the Congress.<sup>183</sup> Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan urged solving Shia-Sunni conflicts in certain Punjab constituencies “with sincerity and love” and described Shia-Sunni relations in the province generally as “excellent”.<sup>184</sup> None of the invited leaders of the Muslim League attended the All-Parties Conference, yet it was reasonably representative, with Shias from all parts of India taking part in lengthy and free debates.<sup>185</sup> No speeches in favour of the Congress were made, and the main resolution, which was tabled by S. Kalb-i ‘Abbas and later adopted almost unanimously, refrained from any explicit criticism of the Muslim League. But it stressed the need for “effective steps for protecting Shia rights” and called for the setting-up of a Working Committee with members from all provinces to be entrusted with that task. The latter should, among other things, work out new statutes of the AISPC and negotiate with other parties, especially with the Muslim League, to reach an agreement prior to the forthcoming elections.<sup>186</sup>

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However, this last and most serious attempt to create a country-wide Shia platform that would be able to exert some pressure on the Muslim League withered away like the previous ones even before the Central Legislative Assembly elections of December 1945. The mass-appeal of the Muslim League to the Indian Muslims, including those of the Punjab, had now gained momentum, and more and more Shia leaders became converted to unconditional support of the League. One example was Shaikh Karamat Ali from Sheikhpura, who had been President of the PuSC from 1938 to 1940 and Vice-President of the PuSPC since October 1943, and who had legally defended Shias arrested in the course of agitation in Qasur in 1938 and 1939 free of cost.<sup>187</sup> During his election campaign of late 1945 on a Muslim League ticket he took pains to make his Shia identity almost unrecognisable, denying even that "any Shia could feel ill-will against the *ashâb-i thalâtha*" (the first three Caliphs).<sup>188</sup> While Shia candidates, eager to please the Sunni voters, tried their best to obscure all doctrinal differences and acute conflicts between Shias and Sunnis,<sup>189</sup> Sunni '*ulamâ*' within the Muslim League became more outspoken. For example, Maulana Zafar Ahmad 'Usmani published a *fatwâ* in the League daily *al-Manshûr* (Delhi), justifying the inclusion of Shias in the League with the argument that Sunnis could cooperate with *khawârij* heretics during their confrontation with idolaters (i.e. the Hindus), because even *khawârij* would fight for Islam and against *kufr*.<sup>190</sup> His colleague Maulana S. Nasîr ul-Haqq was quoted in *Nawâ-i Waqt* on 3 November 1945 with the verdict that according to the Prophet only those who followed the path of the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn* were on the right path, whereas all other groups, parties or sects would be "a work of Satan".<sup>191</sup> Needless to say, no disciplinary action was taken by the Muslim League against such party members.

Although the Working Committee of the All-Parties Shia Conference failed to get any satisfactory commitment from the Muslim League, the overwhelming majority of Shias by now preferred to vote for the League rather than for any of its rivals, be it the Congress or its allied Muslim groups. This was true also in Bombay, where Husainbhai Lalji contested two seats of the Central Legislative Assembly: one against the Sunni Ahmad Harun Ja'far, who had been awarded a League ticket in spite of having been banned from political offices for five years for using sectarian propaganda during the 1936 provincial elections,<sup>192</sup> and the second against the *Qâ'id-i A'zam* Jinnah himself. Jinnah won with a huge margin, having mustered a *fatwâ* of S. Tahir Saif ud-Din, the spiritual head of the Twelver Shia Bohra community, in his favour a few days before the polling.<sup>193</sup>

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After the triumph of the Muslim League in the 1945 Central Legislative Assembly elections—it won all thirty Muslim seats, including three Shias<sup>194</sup>—political ambitious Shia leaders became even more zealous in exhorting their community to give unconditional support to the League in the provincial elections of February 1946. One notable exception was Nawab Qizilbash who was re-elected on the ticket of the Unionist Party, although the latter's share fell from eighty-eight to twenty-one seats, including Hindus and Sikhs.<sup>195</sup> Shia candidates (all parties combined) won at least eight out of eighty-six Muslim seats in the 175-member Punjab Legislative Assembly and five out of thirty-four Muslim seats in the Sindh Legislative Assembly.<sup>196</sup>

Shortly before the provincial election date, Amir Haidar Khan of Mahmudabad published excerpts from the April 1940 letter of Jinnah in the press, adding that he had received similar "guarantees" from the Nawabs Liaquat Ali Khan and Isma'il Khan, (both among the most influential leaders of the Muslim League).<sup>197</sup> At the same time, he accused the Congress of having always fanned sectarian tensions and of using the same method in the current election campaign. Generally speaking, candidates of the Muslim League seem to have indeed mostly preached harmony and unity of all Muslims, some "black sheep" notwithstanding. This was especially true for the Shia Leaguers, who distanced themselves as far as possible from communal activities. Those supporters of Lalji who contested the elections on a Shia communal platform were routed in the "Pakistan provinces".<sup>198</sup>

The Muslim League had passed an important test of strength with the 1945/46 elections, but the struggle for a separate Muslim state, which was fiercely rejected by the Congress, was not fully won until mid-1947. Thus some Shias continued with attempts to apply pressure on the Muslim League,<sup>199</sup> and even those elected on the League ticket agreed on defending Shia rights during an informal meeting on the sidelines of a session of the League's Working Committee in Delhi on 8–9 April 1946.<sup>200</sup> After the elections, the Congress tried to play the "Shia card" again by arranging for Lalji to express his views before the British "Cabinet Mission",<sup>201</sup> and in August 1946 S. Ali Zahîr was nominated by the Congress as a member of an Interim Government to prepare the transfer of power from British rule.<sup>202</sup> Both those Shia leaders from the Hindu majority provinces had already paved their way for a further political career in India and failed to make the slightest impression on the Muslim League.<sup>203</sup> Not even the faithful stalwart of the Muslim League, Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad, could get satisfaction of his persistent demand that the League should nominate at least

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one Shia *‘ālim* for the Constituent Assembly of India; he therefore tendered his resignation from that body in early August 1946.<sup>204</sup> When the League had agreed to cooperate in the Interim Government, the nomination of Zahir was withdrawn by the Congress before 15 October 1946.<sup>205</sup>

The Shia communal organisations in the Punjab remained ineffective in the remaining time from the 1946 provincial elections until the establishment of Pakistan on 14 August 1947. The PuSC was still unable to hold even a single session of its Working Committee. While its Secretary-General offered lame excuses in the Shia press,<sup>206</sup> the PuSC President had to defend himself against annoying questions as to why he had completely changed his political creed since late 1945.<sup>207</sup> The President of the PuSPC, Nawab Qizilbash, who became Minister of Revenue in a Punjab coalition government that excluded the Muslim League in February 1946, advised the Prime Minister Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana to use a strong hand against a civil disobedience movement of Muslim League supporters.<sup>208</sup> After Tiwana had to resign in the face of massive protests, Qizilbash's main concern seems to have become mending fences with the League, which he would later join without much difficulties. During a session of the PuSPC Working Committee on 8 September 1946 he intervened repeatedly to have most of such draft resolutions withdrawn which could be regarded as offensive by the Muslim League.<sup>209</sup> An annual session of the PuSPC—which would have been the first since 1943—was planned in Lahore in March 1947, but had to be cancelled after severe communal riots between Muslims and Sikhs in the Punjab in that month.<sup>210</sup>

After the British Government had finally yielded to the demand of a separate Muslim state on 3 June 1947 and a Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was formed,<sup>211</sup> the League appointed a seven-member subcommittee of specialists to advise the Assembly on matters concerning the implementation of the Islamic *sharī‘a*, all of whom were Sunnis.<sup>212</sup> Likewise, three Sunni *‘ulamā’* but no Shia *‘ālim* were appointed for the Constituent Assembly.<sup>213</sup> On the eve of the establishment of Pakistan, most of its Shia future citizens were probably as enthusiastic as their Sunni countrymen, but others continued to lament the unresolved question of safeguards for their rights in the emerging new state.<sup>214</sup>





## SHIAS IN PAKISTAN UNTIL 1958

### *Communal reorganisation and new internal divisions*

After the establishment of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, the Shia-Sunni question took some time to resurface. For some months, everything else was eclipsed by the great tragedy of mutual massacres and mass expulsions between Muslims on one side and Hindus and Sikhs on the other side of the newly drawn borderline. Since most of that violence took place in the Punjab province, which was divided between Pakistan and India according to the verdict of the Radcliff Commission, Shias were heavily affected, too. A number of long-time Shia settlements in East Punjab were completely emptied of their residents,<sup>1</sup> with many of the surviving refugees being resettled in special “*muhâjir* colonies” in the towns and countryside of West Punjab. These new villages or *mohallâs* would usually reunite people from the same village or town of origin in India, and also from the same sect.<sup>2</sup> In addition to the refugees from East Punjab, hundreds of thousands of Shias from other Indian provinces, especially from the U.P., Bihar, Hyderabad (Deccan), Delhi and Bombay, migrated to Pakistan in the first years following partition. Among them were numerous members of the Shia intellectual elite, including religious ‘*ulamâ*’, most of whom would settle down in Karachi, Lahore and other large towns of Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> Thus Pakistan not only became the single largest Muslim country (and remained so until the secession of Bangladesh in 1971), but also the country with the second largest Shia population after Iran.<sup>4</sup> The percentage of Shias among the total Muslim population apparently also increased in what became

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West Pakistan in 1947 because of the influx of *muhâjirs*.<sup>5</sup> In any case, the exchange of population that went along with the partition of India greatly increased the number of Shia settlements in the Punjab, in Karachi, Hyderabad and some parts of rural Sindh.

Little noticed in the rest of the country, another development with some significance for the future of Shi'ism in Pakistan took place in the northernmost part of the Kashmir Principality in 1947–48. No decision about the status and eventual partition of Kashmir had been taken in August 1947, but the Hindu Maharaja's government at that time had regained full control of the Gilgit Agency, which had hitherto been administered by a British Political Agent.<sup>6</sup> Shortly after the start of the Kashmir war between Pakistan and India in October 1947, a revolt of the mainly Shia and Isma'ili Gilgit Scouts ended the Maharaja's rule in that town.<sup>7</sup> Until mid-1948, local Muslims of the northern mountains had conquered the whole Gilgit Agency and attached areas, as well as the two districts of Baltistan (Skardu and Kargil), a large region inhabited mainly by Tibetan-speaking Shias.<sup>8</sup> Gilgit and Baltistan have since been administered by the Federal Government of Pakistan, with only a limited degree of self-rule granted to the local population in 1972, when the whole territory was renamed as the "Northern Areas". The political status of these areas has been a bone of contention between Sunnis and Shias for decades, with some Sunnis brandishing the spectre of a "Shia state" ever since the Gilgit uprising of November 1947.<sup>9</sup> Already in 1946, Shia-Sunni clashes had taken place in Baltistan,<sup>10</sup> which in later decades came closest to the notion of a "Shia model area" in Pakistan.<sup>11</sup>

Shia communal reorganisation in West-Pakistan started within a few months after the drama of partition and Hindu-Muslim-Sikh mutual atrocities. Its centre of gravity has always been the Punjab, where Shia leaders had already asserted their independence from Lucknow and its self-styled "All-India" Shia organisations in pre-partition years. After 1947, the Shia landlords and communal activists of West Punjab were backed up by '*ulamâ*' and intellectuals from other parts of India who settled in that province. Two '*ulamâ*' from the same town (Shikarpur) in the Bulandshahr District of U.P. played a particularly important role during the first years of Shia reorganisation, albeit in opposing camps: Hafiz Kifayat Husain (1898–1968), a graduate from the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn* in Lucknow, had been sent for *tabligh* to Peshawar in 1920 and later been appointed *qâzî* for Shias in the NWFP (1925–32). He had earned special fame in 1925 when he refuted the challenge of Maulana Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim Mir Sialkoti from the

*Ahl-i hadīth* sect that Shias would be unable to memorise the Koran. After having moved to Parachinar (1934), Rawalpindi (1937) and Rampur (1946) he finally settled in Lahore since 1947. Until 1964, when he suffered a stroke, he was probably the most popular preacher at Shia *majālis* in Pakistan, generally referred to with the honorific title *Ra'īs ul-Huffāz*.<sup>12</sup> While he became strongly involved in Shia communal affairs of Pakistan since 1948, he never displayed as much political ambition as his rival Maulana Muhammad Bashir Ansari (1901–83), whose career had developed along similar lines. Ansari had become famous as the *Fātih-i Têksilâ* (“Conqueror of Taxila”) after converting thousands of Sunnis to Shi'ism during highly attended *munâzarât* with Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ in that small town near Rawalpindi and in nearby Haripur (Hazara District of the NWFP) in 1934. Since the 1920s Ansari had made numerous *tablighî daurât* in the Punjab and the NWFP, apparently winning many further converts, and in 1947 he took up residence in Taxila.<sup>13</sup> Both Kifayat Husain and Ansari had given many speeches in support of the Pakistan Movement in the 1940s, but whereas the former had also advocated the defence of Shia rights, the latter had been one of the “unconditional” propagandists for the Muslim League.<sup>14</sup> After the goal of Pakistan had been achieved, Ansari was eager to reap due rewards for his loyalty to the League. Already in late 1947 he made his first attempt to form an organisation of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ in Pakistan, which he himself would preside. A meeting of ‘*ulamâ*’ was convened in Rawalpindi on his initiative, but the election of a chairman was postponed after S. Muhammad Dihlavi—who would rise to prominence as a leader of Shias in Pakistan only sixteen years later—was proposed as an alternative candidate.<sup>15</sup>

By early 1948, the need to revamp the old Shia organisations and adjust to new priorities in the independent Muslim state of Pakistan was acknowledged by everybody involved with Shia communal affairs. Nawab Qizilbash presided over a last session of the PuSPC in Lahore on 4–5 January, when it was renamed “West Punjab Shia Political Conference” and a “Central Shia Welfare Committee” was set up to take care for Shia refugees.<sup>16</sup> In the following weeks his influence was decisive for the organisation of the first All-Pakistan Shia Conference (convened in Lahore on 20–21 March 1948),<sup>17</sup> but, pending his “political rehabilitation” after his opposition against the Muslim League in 1946, he preferred to stay behind the scenes and left the centre stage for Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the long-time stalwart of the League who had become Minister of Refugees in the first Federal Government of Pakistan.<sup>18</sup> Another initiative came from Shia landlords and ‘*ulamâ*’ who founded a West Pakistan *Ja'fariya* Conference at a session in

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Lyallpur on 6–7 March presided over by Pir S. Naubahar Shah.<sup>19</sup> This organisation was short-lived, however, and most of those who attended the meeting would also take part in the All-Pakistan Shia Conference (APSC) in Lahore two weeks later.

The conference was initially welcomed by Shia activists all over Pakistan, with some high hopes pinned on it. The organisers, however, had an agenda of their own, quite different from that of the committed communalists. Muhammad Bashir Ansari, the official “founder” of the APSC, was most of all interested in the *Shi‘a Majlis-i ‘Ulamâ’-i Pākistân* (SMUP), which he had set up two weeks earlier together with his friend S. Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi (1918–82), another politically ambitious Shia *‘âlim* from the U.P. who had emigrated to Peshawar in 1947.<sup>20</sup> During the Lahore conference, the SMUP, which he envisaged as a “supervisor” of the APSC—following the example of the *Shi‘a Majlis-i ‘Ulamâ’* and the AISC in Lucknow—was formally launched, with Ansari elected its Chairman and Kararvi as Secretary-General.<sup>21</sup> Allegedly Ansari had been alarmed when a meeting of the “Central Shia Relief Committee”, attended by most Shia deputies, had suggested the appointment of two other Shia *‘ulamâ’* for a Shariat Committee of the Constituent Assembly.<sup>22</sup> In fact one of the resolutions of the APSC on 21 March demanded that the newly-formed SMUP should have the right to name these two representatives.<sup>23</sup>

According to the impression of its later detractors, the main objective in convening the APSC was to create a stage for Shia politicians of the Muslim League to advance their personal interest with the federal and provincial governments and to remind them of their services for the creation of Pakistan.<sup>24</sup> Those who were mainly concerned with safeguarding Shia rights had prepared a list of Shia demands and “peculiarities” after consulting some one hundred *‘ulamâ’* on the issue and distributed them to the reception committee ahead of the conference. Some of them were taken up in the resolutions of the APSC, but allegedly those who identified themselves with all of the demands were excluded from the sessions on 20–21 March.<sup>25</sup> During the plenary sessions controversial discussions were suppressed as far as possible.<sup>26</sup> In his keynote speech, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan claimed that all sacrifices and services from Shias during the struggle for Pakistan were offered “only for the sake of Islam”, and that they would now say goodbye to all sectarian ambitions, narrow-mindedness and fanaticism which had been “taught to us by the British”. He expressed full confidence in the promises given previously by the *Qâ'id-i A‘zam* and said it was the duty of the *‘ulamâ’* to dispel the apprehensions of the Shias.<sup>27</sup>

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Ghazanfar Ali Khan was later proclaimed President of the APSC without any election taking place, but there was lively contest for other posts.<sup>28</sup> Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari was elected the first Secretary-General of the APSC.<sup>29</sup>

One resolution, which was passed without much discussion on 20 March, was later bitterly opposed even by some of those who had attended the APSC, and it became the pivot of a new internal Shia controversy for several years. Resolution No. 6 of the first APSC stated:

... the remedy to prevent the demand for separate rights in Pakistan is that the Government of Pakistan would declare all Muslims of Pakistan one *qaum*<sup>30</sup> without any distinction regarding sect or descent and abolish such laws which were made for some special sect (*firqa*).<sup>31</sup>

In a statement broadcast by Radio Pakistan on the same day, Ghazanfar Ali Khan added that Shias would neither need separate seats in the assemblies, nor would they demand any special rights.<sup>32</sup> His downplaying of all differences between Shias and Sunnis was probably an honest reflection of his personal views, but certainly did not meet the expectations of those numerous Shias who were anxious to see their community reorganised to face the challenges of the new Muslim state. Within a few days, some of those activists met in the house of S. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi<sup>33</sup> in Lahore to discuss steps against what they considered a sell-out of Shia interests. It was decided to found an "Organisation for Safeguarding Shia Rights in Pakistan" (*Idârat-i Tahaffuz-i Huqûq-i Shî'a-i Pâkistân*, ITHS) with Mufti Ja'far Husain (1914–83),<sup>34</sup> the best qualified among the younger Shia '*ulamâ*' hailing from West Punjab, serving as its Chairman.<sup>35</sup> Hafiz Kifayat Husain, who was named Senior Vice-Chairman of the ITHS, went public with a statement against the APSC and its Resolution No. 6 in *Razâkâr* on 16 April 1948.<sup>36</sup> A series of similar statements from Shia '*ulamâ*', other individuals and local *anjumans* from all over Pakistan continued for months in the same journal, which became a veritable mouthpiece of the ITHS throughout the following years.<sup>37</sup> *Shî'a*, the other important Shia weekly published from Lahore, served as the official organ of the APSC,<sup>38</sup> seconded since 1951 by a new weekly, *Asad*.<sup>39</sup>

The ITHS held its first larger open session in Lahore on 19–20 June 1948.<sup>40</sup> While its founding leaders had not attended the APSC three months earlier, they were now joined by some Shia '*ulamâ*', notables and intellectuals who had taken part in that conference but had disagreed with its proceedings.<sup>41</sup> As a direct answer to Resolution No. 6 of the APSC, one of the resolutions passed at the ITHS convention stated:

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... Shias are an important minority of the Muslim *qaum* which cannot be ignored. They have also some rights and religious peculiarities, but, feeling the critical sensitivity of the present situation, they consider it inappropriate to ask for separate representation for the time being. Yet they demand strongly from the government to observe adequate representation of Shias in all of its departments.<sup>42</sup>

While most other resolutions where repeating demands already passed at the APSC in March 1948, the latter was branded as “unrepresentative of the Shias of Pakistan” in Resolution No. 9.<sup>43</sup> S. Azhar Hasan Zaidi (1914–86), another renowned Shia preacher from the U.P. who had been made Junior Vice-Chairman of the ITHS,<sup>44</sup> in his speech criticised the demand for abolishing distinction of descent (*naslī imtiyâz*) in Resolution No. 6 of the APSC as contrary to the injunctions of Islam. He reminded the audience that Islam would observe and safeguard distinction of descent by granting *khums* to the *sayyids* (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) and prohibiting *sadaqa* for them.<sup>45</sup> As for the demand of the APSC to abolish laws made for special sects, he asked his Shia brothers whether they wished Sunni Mullahs to decide about their cases of marriage, divorce and inheritance.<sup>46</sup>

Apparently the organisers of the APSC had underestimated the strength of communal feelings and apprehensions among a large section of their Shia countrymen. Their main line of argument, namely that the unity of Muslims must be preserved at all cost, had lost much of its urgency in the political sense after the goal of Pakistan had been achieved. Although the new state remained hard-pressed by the Kashmir conflict (the first Kashmir war against India lasted until December 1948) and economic and administrative problems,<sup>47</sup> gradual normalisation went along with a re-emergence of Shia-Sunni conflicts. It became then a matter of bitter dispute whether Shia demands for special rights and safeguards or Sunni pressure on the Shia minority were more dangerous for the survival and consolidation of the “God-given state of Pakistan”. But supporters of the APSC would also field the “unity of Muslims” argument in the religious sense. According to them, the Shias’ own interests would be best served by stressing common beliefs and values as much as possible and avoid exclusion by the Sunni majority. Sometimes they would even warn of the danger for Shias in Pakistan to end up as “pariahs” if they should overemphasise their doctrinal differences with Sunnis. The same spectre was later frequently brandished by Shia opponents of the APSC in the opposite sense: according to them, some Sunni fanatics were determined to reduce Shias in Pakistan to a pariah status, which could only be countered by a forceful organisation to defend Shia rights.

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This basic difference of approach was to continue in one form or other throughout six decades of Shia communalism in Pakistan. Generally such organisations which were outspoken and assertive in their demand for “Shia rights” had much more appeal with the masses, but their accommodating rival organisations were always able to preserve some influence due to their better relations to the pillars of state power and to the Sunni majority. The emergence of two rival Shia organisations in early 1948 had, of course, other aspects besides differences on principles. As explained above, the APSC was launched mainly for political reasons, and it remained an instrument of political clientelism throughout the coming decades, especially after Nawab Qizilbash became its President in mid-1951 (see below). The founding of the ITHS, for its part, came as a counter-reaction by men with strong communal or religious motivation, including some ‘*ulamâ*’ who wielded considerable influence in the beginning. Within a few years, however, the ITHS would also be dominated by large landowners, wealthy traders, members of the Civil Service and professional agitators, with ‘*ulamâ*’ playing only second fiddle to them.<sup>48</sup> Already in 1948, APSC and ITHS had a number of commonly professed goals and demands from the government,<sup>49</sup> and more and more the existence of two countrywide Shia organisations, which wasted a considerable amount of energy on mutual polemics, was explained by critics in terms of political and personal rivalries purely and simply. Muhammad Sultan Mirza (1889–1965), a respected Shia intellectual from Delhi who had moved to Karachi in 1948, wrote in early 1954:

This plague of disunity has come to Karachi from the Punjab. Many delegations came from Karachi to mediate between the Punjabi Shias but became infected themselves ... the new Shia parties founded in Karachi are these same Punjabi parties ... The history of these two parties is very interesting. The Punjabis are very enterprising and courageous ... they are fighting for personal status and power and for selfish objectives ... the conflict is not over questions of *fiqh* or social theories or the defence of principles or beliefs ... whatever suggestion one party brings forward, whether useful or not, the other party will surely oppose it. As a result, nothing can be achieved...<sup>50</sup>

During the first years after 1948, however, the ITHS seems to have been quite successful in asserting its claim of being “the only representative organisation of Shias in Pakistan”,<sup>51</sup> whereas the APSC had a lot of trouble in explaining away—and later gradual abandoning—the ominous Resolution No. 6 of its founding convention. One early opportunity for the ITHS to stage a countrywide mobilisation of Shias for a common cause, and

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at the same time marking its difference from the “defeatist” APSC, was provided by an editorial in the Lahore daily *Ihsân* on 10 Muharram 1368H (13 November 1948), which not only strongly attacked the key Shia tradition of ‘*azâdârî*, but also the “irrational” Shia belief in the right of the *ahl al-bait* to the caliphate after the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>52</sup> Huge protest meetings were held in Lahore and Karachi on 20–21 November with demands for immediate governmental action against the editor of *Ihsân*, Abu Sa‘îd Bazmi.<sup>53</sup> In the following weeks, protest demonstrations against the daily spread to Shia settlements all over the country, while ITHS delegations pleaded their cause before the prime minister and chief secretary of the Punjab. The APSC, for its part, tried to cool down Shia anger and dismissed the idea of punishment for the paper.<sup>54</sup> According to the ITHS, this encouraged Bazmi, who had at first apologised for violating Shia sensibilities, to follow up with a “good advice” published on 29 November, where he urged the Shias “to raise from the level of the *Faranjî* era” and to speak and behave only as Muslims in the new state of Pakistan.<sup>55</sup> The paper and its printing press were later sentenced to pay a bail of Rs. 3,000 each for stirring up sectarian tensions.<sup>56</sup>

Between November 1948 and January 1949, agitation against a ban on ‘*azâdârî* processions in Choti Zirin near Dera Ghazi Khan became a bone of contention between the two Shia organisations, with the ITHS sending many of its leading members to the spot and blaming the APSC for inaction.<sup>57</sup> On 15–17 April 1949 the ITHS, which had so far only organised meetings on district level, held its first countrywide convention in Rawalpindi. Although their rivals tried their best to obstruct the meeting, spreading also rumours about clashes and a curfew in that town, the ITHS succeeded in gathering the largest number of Shias since the foundation of Pakistan (15,000 according to *Razâkâr*), including many ‘*ulamâ*’ and prominent Shia personalities.<sup>58</sup> Mufti Ja‘far Husain and all leading office-bearers offered their resignation to have a new leadership of the ITHS elected, but all were confirmed in their positions. A *Shi‘a Jam‘iyat al-‘Ulamâ-i Pâkistân* chaired by Mufti S. Muhammad Ahmad Sonipati was formed to counter the claims of the SMUP, although neither of the two groupings would ever gain much significance.<sup>59</sup> Forty-six resolutions with numerous demands were passed at the Rawalpindi Convention, including several in favour of Shia *muhâjirs*.<sup>60</sup>

The organisers were delighted about a “revolutionary change” in the minds of Pakistans Shias within the past one year, apparently with some justification. There was now a Shia organisation with countrywide appeal—although it took the ITHS years to establish formal branches in Sindh and



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Balochistan<sup>61</sup>—which put forward Shia claims vigorously and comprehensively, while at the same time leaving no room for doubts about its loyalty to Pakistan and the common causes of all Muslims. Many speeches at ITHS conventions, as well as numerous articles in *Razâkâr* supportive of ITHS claims, would first recall the “unity of all Muslim sects” that had brought about the establishment of Pakistan and the sacrifices of Shias given for that cause. Professions of loyalty to the defence and “consolidation” of Pakistan would follow, before proceeding to specific Shia demands. Pan-Islamic loyalty was also regularly displayed with resolutions on issues like Kashmir, Palestine, and specific manifestations of Western imperialism in the Muslim world. In pre-partition times the AISPC had been very assertive, too, but it had been accused of “treason” for its links with the Congress and its influence in the “Pakistan provinces” had sharply declined after 1940.

Until the successful 1949 Rawalpindi Convention of the ITHS, supporters of the APSC had only tried to denigrate it and put obstacles in its way. From then on, efforts to unite the two large Shia organisations, or at least to find a common platform, became a regular feature, at times with some success, but never with permanent effect, until both organisations became obsolete decades later. Shortly after the ITHS convention, Hafiz Kifayat Husain and Muhammad Bashir Ansari tried to dispel the wide-spread impression that rivalry between them was the main reason behind the split within Shia ranks. After a meeting mediated by Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, both publicly denied any personal differences between them.<sup>62</sup> Two months later they met again in the house of the advocate S. Murid Husain Shah in Sialkot and agreed on a compromise formula.<sup>63</sup> In early August 1949 the ITHS Chairman Mufti Ja‘far Husain was named by the government to represent the Shias in the *Ta‘lîmât-i Islâmîya Board* with apparent consent of the APSC.<sup>64</sup> Then during a session in Bhakkar on 9–11 September Nawab Qizilbash, who had so far been a low-profile supporter of the APSC, was elected Chairman of the ITHS in the Punjab province.<sup>65</sup>

When on 10 March 1950 the APSC held its first general convention after 1948, it had once more alienated the ITHS enough to make the latter call for a boycott of the session by all Shias. Only 500–600 people, including some thirty-five ‘*ulamâ*’, attended, and open sessions were cut short from two days to one.<sup>66</sup> In the preceding weeks, the APSC had created confusion with a poster demanding separate representation for Shias in the assemblies published by S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, the chairman of the reception committee, which was later completely disowned by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan during a press conference.<sup>67</sup> The APSC was timed to coincide with a

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visit of Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi to Lahore to attract more interest of the Shias, but the programme of the latter was confined to official meetings.<sup>68</sup> When during the APSC convention one Shaikh Ghazanfar Ali Narowali seemed to gain majority approval for a speech against the Resolution No. 6 from 1948, further discussion on that resolution was suppressed.<sup>69</sup>

Three months later, the largest countrywide agitation of Shias in Pakistan so far took place for the sake of lifting the ban on a procession in Narowal, a small town in the Sialkot District near the border to India. In a case similar to numerous other Shia-Sunni conflicts all over Pakistan during its first decade, a *muhajir* religious leader had introduced processions on Shia commemoration days, which had previously not been observed in that town and were objected to by some local Sunnis. In early May 1950, the D.C. of the Sialkot District had yielded to their demands and ordered a ban of the new processions.<sup>70</sup> After negotiations between the local authorities and Shia notables had failed, Shias decided to take out processions in defiance of a prohibition under Section 144 PPC (ban on assemblies) on 31 May. The local police inspector ordered preventive arrests some hours before agitation started, including that of Hafiz Kifayat Husain who had arrived by train for further talks on that morning. In the coming two weeks, a total of 1,500 Shias, many of whom had travelled from far away places to Narowal, were arrested for defying Section 144. They were treated harshly and insulted by the police, who seem to have overreacted in several respects.<sup>71</sup> The *Husainî mahâz* of Narowal, which had caused repercussions all over the Punjab, was called off on 13 June after an agreement between Mian Abd ul-Bari, the provincial chief of the Muslim League, and Hafiz Kifayat Husain, who was then still in jail. It stipulated that in all further conflicts about Shia processions in the Punjab local committees of Shias and Sunnis would be formed to advise the government on the matter; the government would reappoint Shia civil servants who had been dismissed or transferred because of their participation in the protests and order investigations against the D.C. Sialkot and the I.G.P. of Narowal; the procession in Narowal would be held within twenty days, and Abd ul-Bari would have the final say on its exact route.<sup>72</sup>

As had been the case during previous sectarian conflicts, the ITHS was much more eager than the APSC to force the issue and had apparently organised most of the agitation. Members of the APSC had warned of the adverse effect of the agitation on Sunni voters during the coming elections, and one of them was even accused of having advised the local police offi-

cers to crush it.<sup>73</sup> On 17 June 1950 a meeting of Shia leaders was called in the house of S. Muratib Ali Shah (Lahore) at the request of the APSC. There it was suggested to form an All-Pakistan Shia Board which would decide in future cases like that of Narowal whether there would be a *Husaini mahâz* or not.<sup>74</sup> The intention was clearly to prevent the ITHS from causing trouble for all Shias through decisions of its own. The plan was rejected at a session of the ITHS Council on 22 July.<sup>75</sup>

In early 1951, when the ITHS held its second general session (Rawalpindi, 27–29 April), the new organisation seemed to have somewhat run out of steam. Mufti S. Muhammad Ahmad Sonipati (1901–58), who had been elected its new provincial chairman shortly before,<sup>76</sup> complained rather helplessly about blatant sectarian propaganda against Shia candidates during the Punjab Assembly elections one month earlier in spite of a new law prohibiting such propaganda.<sup>77</sup> One of the resolutions passed in Rawalpindi asked Amir Haidar Khan of Mahmudabad, who had stayed in India after partition, to provide a copy of Jinnah's letter to him from April 1940 regarding his "guarantees" for equal rights of Shias in Pakistan.<sup>78</sup> Another resolution once more called for their "adequate representation" in all institutions of the state.<sup>79</sup>

The APSC, in the meantime, was not making any headway either and had to adjust its line to that of the ITHS to some extent. On 8 April 1951 *Shi'a* published a "revised" version of its Resolution No. 6, which upheld the advice for the government to treat all Muslims as one *qaum*, but added: "... yet the APSC demands Shia personal law in religious matters and separate representation and complete protection for 'azâdârî and all religious matters, and it cannot tolerate any interference with them".<sup>80</sup> In September 1951 Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, now appointed Ambassador to Iran, resigned from his post as APSC President. Within a few months he won respect even from his former detractors for his contributions to the strengthening of Pakistan's relations with Iran. The abolishment of the need for Pakistani pilgrims to obtain visas for visiting the Shia holy places in Iran was especially appreciated.<sup>81</sup> On 22 December 1951 the Working Committee of the ITHS finally agreed to the eighteen-months-old demand of the APSC to form an All-Pakistan Shia Board with equal representation of both organisations.<sup>82</sup> During the preceding weeks, both groups had displayed a reasonable degree of unity in the course of another civil disobedience movement, launched in Lahore because of Sunni objections against the construction of a Shia Friday mosque in the Krishannagar quarter.<sup>83</sup>

The formal inauguration of the All-Pakistan Shia Board took place in a joint session of more than one hundred ITHS and APSC representatives in

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the Diyal Singh Library (Lahore) on 20 January 1952. All speakers agreed that the split within Shia ranks had been the main reason why the government had so far not taken seriously their rightful demands, and they expressed optimism regarding a “new era of unity”. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who presided over the session, and Malik Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani, the editor of *Shi‘a*, affirmed their high respect for Hafiz Kifayat Husain.<sup>84</sup> Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, one of the most influential ITHS leaders, had drafted statutes and common goals of the Board, including complete freedom for Shia religious ceremonies, *tabligh* and education and “satisfactory” (*itminân-bakhsh*) representation of Shias in all federal, provincial and district official bodies.<sup>85</sup> ITHS and APSC named twelve people each to the All-Pakistan Shia Board.<sup>86</sup>

The Board was able to formulate a common position on separate religious education and to have its nominees accepted by the government for negotiating the issue.<sup>87</sup> Apart from that achievement, only four subsequent sessions of the Board, all chaired by Muhammad Bashir Ansari, are recorded in *Razâkâr*, the last one on 12 May 1952. During a meeting on 3 March it was planned to convene a general assembly of the ITHS and APSC in Lahore in April to formally unite the two organisations.<sup>88</sup> This plan never materialised, and a session on 9 May was mostly devoted to appeals on Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash, the new APSC President, and Muzaffar Ali Shamsi and Azhar Hasan Zaidi from the ITHS, to stop their mutual polemics.<sup>89</sup> Among others, the minister S. Ali Husain Shah Gardezi mediated between them, but the effort failed.<sup>90</sup> For all practical purposes, the chapter of the All-Pakistan Shia Board was closed only a few months after its founding.<sup>91</sup>

### *The struggle for constitutional safeguards and other demands*

The preceding section has dealt mainly with organisational aspects and some leading individuals of Shia communal reorganisation during the first five years after the foundation of Pakistan. Both the APSC and the ITHS did occupy themselves with numerous minor Shia demands and grievances, including purely local problems and conflicts, but the main issues taken up by these organisations were principal questions regarding the status of the Shia minority in the country. The ITHS attached special importance to constitutional safeguards, to “adequate representation” of Shias in various departments and institutions of the state, and to the demand for separate religious instruction in schools and colleges. The APSC was much less apprehensive for “Shia rights” at the time of its foundation, but gradually

it had to adopt a more assertive communalist approach, too, in a bid to catch up with the popular appeal of the ITHS. Thus a certain unity of purpose on principal issues emerged between the two rival organisations until early 1952, when the short-lived All-Pakistan Shia Board was formed.<sup>92</sup>

The demands for constitutional safeguards came as a direct continuation of the frequent attempts to obtain guarantees and concessions for Shias from the Muslim League during the years from 1940 to 1947.<sup>93</sup> They were resumed immediately after the new state of Pakistan had overcome the chaos which went along with the partition of India,<sup>94</sup> and they seemed to gain urgency with increasing pressure of the Sunni religious lobby to establish a “genuine Islamic state”. On 13 January 1948 Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, who had been one of the most important supporters of the Muslim League among the Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’,<sup>95</sup> brought forward explicit demands in that sense during a meeting of the newly constituted Pakistan branch of his *Jam‘iyat al-‘Ulamâ’-i Islâm* (JUI) in Karachi.<sup>96</sup> At the same time, the founder and chairman of the *Jamâ‘at-i Islâmî* (JI), Abu’l-A‘la Maududi, started advocating Islamisation of the system of government and legislation of Pakistan with public speeches in Lahore.<sup>97</sup> JUI and JI were soon to be joined by other religious parties, like the *Jam‘iyat al-‘Ulamâ’-i Pâkistân* (JUP),<sup>98</sup> the *Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat*<sup>99</sup> and other organisations of the Sunni clergy, which remained active or were newly founded during the early years of Pakistan.<sup>100</sup> An early concession to “Islamisation” was made by the Punjab Legislative Assembly, which revived an eleven-year-old bill that enacted the right of women to inherit agricultural land—as prescribed by the *sharî‘a*—into law on 29 January 1948.<sup>101</sup> Four days earlier, the *Qâ‘id-i A‘zam* himself (since August 1947 Governor General of Pakistan) had felt compelled to make a statement in favour of *sharî‘a* law as the basis of the future constitution, albeit in somewhat vague terms.<sup>102</sup>

Notwithstanding the weak representation of the “Islamist” lobby in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, which was dominated by landlords and members of the Civil Service,<sup>103</sup> there were genuine apprehensions among Shias—and secular-minded Pakistani citizens of all religious denominations—that religious hard-liners would somehow gain overdue influence on the constitution-making and legislative process. The secularist and westernised elite, which had led the Pakistan Movement in the name of “defending Islam”, had needed the ‘*ulamâ*’ to mobilise the masses for their goal, and these were now pressing for their share of power. Their biggest trump-cards were their ability to arouse religious passions of “the street”—as was

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well demonstrated during the violent campaign against the Ahmadi sect in early 1953<sup>104</sup>—and the opportunism of many political leaders who would readily pay lip-services to Islam and the *shari'a* whenever it served their purpose. Thus a “creeping Islamisation” even against the wishes of the ruling elite was a serious possibility, and continuous pressure of the religious parties for a greater role for themselves was one of the reasons why the first constitution of Pakistan was enacted only in 1956, almost nine years after the foundation of the state.<sup>105</sup>

Throughout these years, the Shia organisations—and notably the ITHS—were anxious to fend off anything that would enshrine the superiority of Hanafi Sunni *fiqh* in the constitution and prejudice the legal status of Shias. On the other hand, ITHS leaders like Mufti Ja'far Husain and Hafiz Kifayat Husain were joining hands with Sunni '*ulamâ*' in their demand for an Islamic constitution and implementation of the *shari'a*, provided that Shias would be subjected only to the injunctions of their own *fiqh*. Both were also active supporters of the anti-Ahmadiya movement in 1952–53, as was the case with Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, who had long-time relations with the *Majlis-i Ahrâr-i Islâm*, the original instigator of that campaign.<sup>106</sup>

As a first concession to the religious parties, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who had become the leader of the Muslim League following the death of Jinnah (September 1948), moved the so-called “Objectives Resolution” in the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1949. It contained the following clauses:

Whereas the sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limit prescribed by Him as a sacred trust;

This Constituent Assembly ... resolves to frame a constitution ... wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives ... in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna<sup>107</sup> ... wherein adequate provisions shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures ... wherein shall be guaranteed ... freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality ... wherein adequate provisions shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes ...<sup>108</sup>

While the clauses in favour of minorities were meant to concern the non-Muslims in the first place, they could also be interpreted as a safeguard for the Shias. The “Objectives Resolution”, which was passed on 12 March 1949, later became the preamble of the constitution. Taken alone, it could

by no means satisfy the religious leaders. Yet a further concession to them was made in mid-April 1949, when the Basic Principles Committee (BPC),<sup>109</sup> charged with working out details of the constitution in accordance with the "Objectives Resolution", decided to set up a board of experts to advise it on religious matters.<sup>110</sup> As an important vindication of Shia demands, Mufti Ja'far Husain was appointed as one of the six members of this *Ta'limât-i Islâmîya* Board in August 1949.<sup>111</sup>

The Board conveyed its "views" on the proceedings of the BPC to the latter from February 1950 onwards, consisting mainly of recommendations related to the head of state, the executive in general, and the legislature.<sup>112</sup> On 28 September 1950, the BPC presented its first Interim Report to the Constituent Assembly, which ignored most recommendations of the *Ta'limât-i Islâmîya* Board.<sup>113</sup> The only "Islamic" provisions in that draft constitution were those already mentioned in the "Objectives Resolution" and the recommendation to make teaching of the Koran compulsory for the Muslims.<sup>114</sup>

The religious leaders, who protested against the Interim Report, were faced with the challenge from the secularists that the '*ulamâ*' from different schools of thought could never agree on any group of proposals for an Islamic constitution.<sup>115</sup> As a response, Maulana Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi organised a meeting of thirty-one '*ulamâ*' of different denominations in Karachi headed by S. Sulaiman Nadvi in January 1951.<sup>116</sup> They formulated a catalogue of twenty-two points, which were conveyed to the Constituent Assembly as the "irreducible minimum for an Islamic state".<sup>117</sup> Shias were represented by Mufti Ja'far Husain and Hafiz Kifayat Husain, who scored a victory by having the following clause included in the "22 Principles":

The recognised Muslim schools of thought shall have, within the limits of the law, complete religious freedom, the right to impart religious instruction to their followers, and shall have the freedom to propagate their views. Matters relating to their personal status shall be administered in accordance with their respective codes of jurisprudence. It will be desirable to make provisions for the administration of such matters by their respective *qâzîs*.<sup>118</sup>

This conference, the proceedings of which were dominated by the personality of the JI leader Maududi,<sup>119</sup> turned out to be a landmark of unity among Sunni and Shia '*ulamâ*'. Although it could not prevent the growth of militant anti-Shi'ism among a certain section of Sunnis,<sup>120</sup> it set an example for cooperation between the higher echelon of religious leaders from both sects for decades to come.

It took the BPC more than two years to present its second "report" (in fact a draft constitution) to the Constituent Assembly on 22 December

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1952.<sup>121</sup> In the meantime, tensions had increased between the western and eastern wings of Pakistan after the assassination of the “arbiter” Liaqat Ali Khan (October 1951), as well as between the secularists and the religious classes, especially after the *khatm-i nubuwwat* movement against the Ahmadis had been launched in June 1952.<sup>122</sup> The new draft constitution, which had been modified during the final sessions of the BPC in response to some suggestions of the *Ta’lîmât-i Islâmîya* Board, went much further than the 1950 report in a bid to appease the religious parties. The “Directive Principles of State Policy” were made more explicit and detailed, including the recommendation of specific steps that should be taken by the State “to enable the Muslims to order their lives ... in accordance with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah”.<sup>123</sup> Its clause No. 4 stated:

Suitable steps should be taken for bringing the existing laws into conformity with the Islamic principles, and for the codification of such injunctions of the Quran and the Sunnah as can be given legislative effect.<sup>124</sup>

Clause No. 10 of the “Directive Principles” read:

The State should endeavour to discourage amongst the Muslims of Pakistan parochial, tribal, racial and other similar un-Islamic feelings and inculcate in them the spirit to keep foremost in their minds the fundamental unity and solidarity of the *millat* and the requirements of the ideology and the mission for the implementation of which Pakistan came into being.<sup>125</sup>

The draft constitution presented in December 1952 also contained a lengthy chapter on the “Procedure for preventing legislation repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah”.<sup>126</sup> It could not be rejected out of hand by the religious leaders, who instead called for another ‘*ulamâ*’ convention to discuss it in detail. This convention was held from 11–18 January 1953 in Karachi, coinciding with an “All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention” (16–18 January) devoted to the Ahmadiya issue.<sup>127</sup> The latter decided to launch “direct action” since the government was not prepared to declare the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority and elected an eight-member “Action Committee”, including Hafiz Kifayat Husain.<sup>128</sup>

The ‘*ulamâ*’ invited to the Karachi convention apparently were the same who had already participated in the formulation of the “22 Principles” in January 1951, including the two Shia representatives.<sup>129</sup> Given the importance of what was thought to be the final stage on the way to an “Islamic constitution” of Pakistan, the first “All-Pakistan Shia Convention” was called immediately ahead of the ‘*ulamâ*’ convention of January 1953 in order to discuss specific Shia reservations regarding the report of the



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BPC.<sup>130</sup> This convention, held at an open space in the Rizvia Colony (Nazimabad) and attended by more than 5,000 people, was organised by local Shia *anjumans* of Karachi,<sup>131</sup> and presided over by S. Ibn Hasan Rizvi Jarchavi (1904–73), a Shia scholar who had been in the service of the Raja of Mahmudabad and had moved from Lucknow to Karachi only in 1951.<sup>132</sup> In his keynote address, after the usual reminders of how Pakistan came into being through combined efforts and sacrifices of Shias and Sunnis, he complained about the fact that Shias were neither represented in the Constituent Assembly nor in the Federal Government although they had more than enough qualified persons.<sup>133</sup> The list of Shia demands presented by Jarchavi was similar to those of the ITHS since 1948, with some specific additions regarding the draft constitution. These were laid down in greater detail in Resolution No. 1, passed at the convention on 11 January 1953 which declared:

Since Shias are an important part of the Muslim *umma* and have given splendid services for the establishment of Pakistan, they wish heartily the permanence, independence and consolidation of the new country. They are fully convinced that for the independence of Pakistan peace and harmony (*sulh-o-âshti*) between the different Islamic sects has to be maintained. Any constitution which does not strive to create the ground for this peace and harmony and leaves space for sectarian disputes and conflicts bears the great danger of harm to the independence and consolidation of Pakistan.

This session of the All-Pakistan Shia Convention, which fully represents the more than 10 million Shias of Pakistan,<sup>134</sup> has studied the report of the BPC, and it is regarding those parts with great anxiety that refer to Koran and Sunna. It is no secret that there are important differences of interpretation between the sects of Islam on some important parts of the Koran and the Sunna. Each sect is honestly fully convinced of the soundness of its own interpretation and could never tolerate obligation to believe in the interpretation of another sect. This convention has full confidence in the present government of Pakistan that it would never enforce an interpretation of the term “Koran and Sunna” on any sect which would contradict its own interpretation. But it is necessary that the same will be expressed with clear words within the Constitution of Pakistan, to prevent the possibility of such a situation coming about at any time in the future. Any constitution that does not guarantee this will not be acceptable for the Shias of Pakistan.<sup>135</sup>

The same resolution proceeded with a list of twelve clauses of the draft constitution that would have to be changed or completed with special provisions concerning the Shias. In five cases reference was made to their own interpretation of Koran and Sunna which would have to be applied on them.<sup>136</sup> Also demanded was the omission of the term “public morality” in

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the clause from the preamble which guaranteed “freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality”.<sup>137</sup> Other demands concerned specific Islamic provisions in the “Directive Principles of State Policy”.<sup>138</sup> Resolution No. 7 welcomed the speech of Prime Minister Khwaja Nazim ud-Din in front of the Constitutional Assembly on the day when the BPC’s “second report” had been presented. On that occasion he had said, among other things:

I want to make clear in this connection that the definition and interpretation of “Koran and Sunna” of one sect cannot have the upper hand over that of another sect and [one sect] cannot try to organise [religious] instruction in a way that would be contrary to the belief and traditions of some other sect. In these matters the thoughts (*khayâlât*) of each sect will be fully protected.<sup>139</sup>

It was demanded that this promise would be made part of the constitution. But when a Shia delegation led by Ibn Hasan Jarchavi was received by the prime minister on 12 February 1953, the latter said that he had only expressed his personal opinion in his 22 December speech.<sup>140</sup>

The resolutions of the All-Pakistan Shia Conference were denounced in the Sunni press for “weakening the stability and unity of Pakistan”. The daily *Nawâ-i Waqt* (Lahore) warned from a great and dangerous sedition (*fitna*), because other Muslim sects would soon follow suit with demands of their own.<sup>141</sup> *Da‘wat*, the organ of the TAS, bluntly advised the Shias to proclaim themselves a non-Muslim minority if they wanted to have their rights protected. According to that paper, only such people could be called Muslims who agreed on the definition of “Koran and Sunna”, whereas sectarianism and party-building (*tashayyu‘*) in religion were completely wrong.<sup>142</sup>

In April 1953, following the climax of the anti-Ahmadi agitation,<sup>143</sup> Prime Minister Khwaja Nizam ud-Din was dismissed by the Governor General, three weeks after he himself had forced the Punjab Chief Minister Daultana to resign.<sup>144</sup> Whereas the Sunni religious parties were temporarily weakened by the sequels of the “Punjab disturbances” that were put down by force,<sup>145</sup> Shias tried to keep alive some of the momentum of the Karachi All-Pakistan Shia Convention. A Working Committee set up at that convention and headed by Ibn Hasan Jarchavi decreed a protest “Day of Demands” (*Yaum-i Mutâlabât*) on 21 Ramadan (5 June 1953) and tried to collect money for “organising the Shias for the constitutional struggle”.<sup>146</sup> But apparently the attempt to build up a countrywide Shia leadership based in Karachi failed, and Jarchavi soon stepped back from centre-stage. Instead the ITHS, which had founded a branch in Karachi only in January 1953, held a first “annual session” there from 3–4 September that same year.<sup>147</sup> Pir

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S. Naubahar Shah, member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly since 1951, was elected new Chairman of the ITHS at that occasion<sup>148</sup> and led an ITHS delegation to Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra immediately afterwards.<sup>149</sup> The APSC, too, established a branch in Karachi, and the rivalry between the two major Shia organisations spilled over from the Punjab to the capital.<sup>150</sup>

The Shia campaign for constitutional safeguards, which was pursued with a somewhat lower profile during the following two years, nevertheless met with considerable success until early 1956. While constitution-making was further delayed due to bitter conflicts about the distribution of power between the western and eastern wings of Pakistan,<sup>151</sup> the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly and the formation of a new federal cabinet in October 1954 brought about representation of Shias in both institutions. The second Constituent Assembly, with its eighty members chosen by the provincial assemblies and electoral colleges for Karachi and Balochistan in June 1955, included the Shias Isma‘il I. Chundrigar and General (retd.) Iskandar Mirza.<sup>152</sup> Iskandar Mirza was also considered the strongman of the second cabinet of Muhammad Ali Bogra (October 1954–August 1955) in which he served as Minister of Interior.<sup>153</sup> In August 1955 he became acting Governor General and dismissed Bogra who was succeeded by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali as Prime Minister.<sup>154</sup> The latter’s government, which included two Shias,<sup>155</sup> then proceeded to prepare its own draft constitution.<sup>156</sup> It was approved by the Constituent Assembly on 29 February 1956 and endorsed by the Governor General Iskandar Mirza two days later.<sup>157</sup> On 4 March Iskandar Mirza became the first President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.<sup>158</sup>

The first Constitution of Pakistan—which was abrogated in October 1958 by General Ayub Khan before it could be implemented through parliamentary elections—has been considered by one author as “a landmark document in the history of Pakistan, because it was the product of nine years of prolonged and protracted constitutional and theoretical debate between the *‘ulamâ’* and the modernists”.<sup>159</sup> It contained the “Objectives Resolution” as a preamble and a chapter on “Fundamental Rights” (Articles 3–22). Among the latter, the following were of special relevance for minorities such as the Shias:

Article 13 (2): No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any educational institution maintained wholly by that community or denomination.

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Article 13 (5); Every religious community or denomination shall have the right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its own choice, and the State shall not deny recognition to any such institution on the ground only that the management of such institution vests in that community or denomination.

Article 18: Subject to law, public order and morality—(a) every citizen has the right to profess, practise and propagate any religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof has the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.<sup>160</sup>

The “Directive Principles of State Policy” (Articles 23–31) included:

Article 26: The State shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices among its citizens.

Article 27: The State shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and provincial Services.<sup>161</sup>

Two Articles were titled “Islamic Provisions”. Article 197 provided for the setting up of an organisation for Islamic research, whereas Article 198 read:

No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah ... and existing law shall be brought into conformity with such Injunctions.<sup>162</sup>

Within one year, the President was to appoint a commission for that purpose which would submit its report within five more years. Thereafter, the National Assembly would enact laws in the light of the commission’s recommendations. Article 198 closed with the following explanation:

In the application of this Article to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression “Quran and Sunnah” shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.<sup>163</sup>

The 1956 constitution won approval from the *Jamâ‘at-i Islâmî* and some other religious-political organisations of the Sunnis who found it reasonably Islamic in its contents.<sup>164</sup> The Shia organisations had even more reason to be satisfied, since the articles mentioned above vindicated most of their long-time constitutional demands.<sup>165</sup> From 23–25 March 1956 the ITHS held its first country-wide session since September 1953, apparently with great success.<sup>166</sup> According to a report about ITHS activities of the last three years read there, the rival APSC had in October 1955 completely annulled its Resolution No. 6 of 1948 and thus “de facto yielded to the goals of the ITHS”.<sup>167</sup> Resolution No. 2 of the 1956 ITHS convention duly congratulated the President and Prime Minister for the new constitution, but plenty of

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unsolved problems and unfulfilled demands were reflected in the thirty-two other resolutions.<sup>168</sup> Topping the list of remaining grievances were growing interference with Shia religious ceremonies<sup>169</sup> and the failure to obtain a separate *dinîyât*<sup>170</sup> syllabus for Shia pupils at public schools and colleges.

### *The syllabus question, 1947–1954*

If the 1956 constitution could be regarded as a success from the Shias' point of view—albeit only “morally”, because of a lack of proper implementation of the clauses concerning the rights of minorities—Shia demands regarding the curricula in schools remained largely unfulfilled by that year. This state of affairs would more or less continue until 1974, although principal acceptance of Shia demands regarding separate *dinîyât* came in 1968.<sup>171</sup> Thus decisions taken by federal and provincial governments regarding *dinîyât* and the related history syllabus between 1948 and 1954 would mostly remain effective for two decades.

Whereas in British India religious instruction at government schools and colleges had been voluntary, *dinîyât* was declared a compulsory subject by the Federal Government shortly after the establishment of Pakistan. It was left to the provincial governments to prepare new curricula. The demand for separate *dinîyât* for Shia pupils, made by both the APSC and the ITHS since their first conventions in 1948,<sup>172</sup> was initially completely disregarded by the respective Education Departments. Before any new *dinîyât* syllabus was introduced, the Shia organisations found fault with the new curricula and textbooks for history. They not only missed proper mentioning of the Shia Imams and other sacred figures like Fatima and Zainab,<sup>173</sup> but also protested that accounts of the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs in schoolbooks would be full of controversial issues.<sup>174</sup> At the first annual convention of the ITHS in Rawalpindi (April 1949) it was welcomed that the Punjab government had withdrawn some of the controversial textbooks, but Shia dissatisfaction with the history curricula and textbooks would continue for decades to come. One resolution called for adequate representation of Shias in the Central Curricula Board,<sup>175</sup> another for the procurement of books on Shia *hadîth* and *fiqh* for “Maulvi ‘Âlim” and “Maulvi Fâzil” courses at universities.<sup>176</sup> When the demand for separate *dinîyât* in all schools and colleges was reconfirmed in a draft resolution, the delegate Hakim Muhammad Hasan Ja‘fari (an advocate from Gujranwala and brother of Mufti Ja‘far Husain) asked how the Shias could provide all the ‘*ulamâ*’ and teachers needed in case the demand would be accepted.

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His objection caused uproar and he was not allowed to conclude his speech.<sup>177</sup> Although his argument would prove still valid even twenty-five years later,<sup>178</sup> the question of separate *dīniyât* has been presented as a matter of life or death for the Shias in Pakistan by numerous Shia leaders and writers throughout the first decades of the country.

On 24 April 1950 the Federal Government decreed complete freedom for each citizen to receive religious instruction according to his own religion, and that nobody could be obliged to learn the tenets of any faith other than his own.<sup>179</sup> The decree came in application of a pact signed by the Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru in Delhi on 8 April 1950, which provided an international guarantee that minorities in both countries should enjoy equal civil rights.<sup>180</sup> As had been the case with some clauses of the March 1949 "Objectives Resolution", the term "minorities" in Pakistan was meant to refer to non-Muslims in the first place, and there were no direct consequences for the Shias. But the Punjab Ministry of Education did appoint two Shias for a mixed commission charged with working out the *dīniyât* syllabus in 1950.<sup>181</sup> When it was ready for introduction in Punjab schools in early 1951, widespread Shia protests prevented its implementation. An ITHS delegation, demanding separate *dīniyât*, presented a syllabus prepared by Nasim Amrohavi to the Punjab Education Department.<sup>182</sup> On 17 March 1951 its director, Muhammad Jahangir Khan, wrote to the ITHS chairman Mufti Ja'far Husain, asking whether he considered a separate Shia syllabus really necessary when comparing that of the government with the ITHS draft.<sup>183</sup> In his reply, the Mufti argued that the same words often had different meanings for Sunnis and Shias, and that the two Shia members of the syllabus commission were unable to understand the details. If the intention was to satisfy all Muslims without discrimination, there would be no alternative to separate *dīniyât*.<sup>184</sup> Whatever little weight Mufti Ja'far Husain's objections might have carried with the administration, they were weakened further when Muhammad Bashir Ansari sent a draft syllabus of its own to the Education Department, claiming that the ITHS syllabus would be "unacceptable for Shias".<sup>185</sup>

The new Punjab government of Mumtaz Daultana (March 1951–March 1953) made *dīniyât* voluntary for Shias until a final decision were to be reached. S. Ali Husain Shah Gardezi, then Minister of Transport in the Daultana cabinet,<sup>186</sup> allegedly promised that a Shia *dīniyât* syllabus would be accepted if only the ITHS and the APSC could agree on a common formula.<sup>187</sup> The manifest failure of both organisations to make any headway with their common demand for separate Shia *dīniyât* was one of the rea-

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sons for the formation of the *All-Pakistan Shia Board* in January 1952.<sup>188</sup> A subcommittee of that Board met on 27 March 1952, with Muhammad Bashir Ansari, Mirza Ahmad Ali and Sadiq Ali 'Irfani representing the APSC and Hafiz Kifayat Husain, Justice S. Jamil Husain Rizvi and Nawab Ihsan Ali Khan the ITHS. They agreed on the following resolutions:

- 1) The present syllabus in *dīnīyât* should be discarded and in its place the teaching of Holy Quran substituted, *nâziran*<sup>189</sup> for the primary classes and with translation for the middle classes; 2) the translation to be taught in schools will be approved by representatives of Sunnis and Shias; 3) the life of the Holy Prophet, which is no part of the *dīnīyât* syllabus, should be included in the history syllabus; 4) small books based on Quranic morals should be prepared for primary classes; 5) the Education Department should prepare a syllabus on these lines and send it to ... Shia and Sunni representative '*ulamâ*' for suggestions before its publication.<sup>190</sup>

According to the source of these resolutions, the *All-Pakistan Shia Board* accepted joint *dīnīyât* in classes 1–8 under the said conditions while sticking to the demand for separate *dīnīyât* in classes 9–10.<sup>191</sup> But according to an official communique of the Punjab government from 17 February 1954, a commission including the said six Shia representatives and six Sunni '*ulamâ*' was formed in early 1952 and held some joint sessions chaired by the Minister of Education, Abd ul-Hamid Khan Dasti. During the discussions agreement was reached that separate *dīnīyât* would be against the national interests.<sup>192</sup> Thereafter both Shia and Sunni '*ulamâ*' were invited to write textbooks and sent them for examination. Within one year, at least fifty books were prepared, only nine of which were approved by the Education Department.<sup>193</sup> The Sunni-Shia commission was called for three sessions in August and September 1953 to comment on them, but Mirza Ahmad Ali was the only Shia who attended all these meetings.<sup>194</sup> The final approval of the textbooks for joint *dīnīyât* by the said commission took place on 28 January 1954, authorising their introduction in Punjab schools from 1 April that year.<sup>195</sup>

Apparently none of the Shia members of the joint commission had informed the public properly about their backtracking on the *dīnīyât* issue before the joint syllabus was officially announced. In the face of renewed wide-spread Shia protests, Hafiz Kifayat Husain and Muhammad Bashir Ansari blamed each other, besides from making Ahmad Ali a scapegoat.<sup>196</sup> They were reconciled superficially when both attended a religious ceremony in Parachinar on 19 March 1954,<sup>197</sup> but even well-wishers would not absolve any of the six Shia members of the commission from responsibility

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of having missed the chance for obtaining separate *dinîyât* for Shia pupils.<sup>198</sup> In September 1954, however, the Punjab government returned to voluntary *dinîyât* for Shias, with notes given in that subject not being taken into account in exams. This concession was reached through the good offices of the APSC President Nawab Qizilbash, who served as Minister of Finance under the Chief Minister Feroz Khan Noon (April 1953–May 1955).<sup>199</sup> While the *dinîyât* issue was more or less settled in the Punjab in 1954, only a minor additional concession was made to Shias in Karachi that same year, providing for separate instruction of “religious practices” like prayers in primary classes.<sup>200</sup> In 1953, the ITHS succeeded to have two Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ appointed to a commission, which set up curricula for *Islâmiyât* at the Karachi University.<sup>201</sup> No attention was given to Shia demands regarding curricula in the NWFP and in the Bahawalpur State. In the NWFP *dinîyât* remained compulsory for Shias<sup>202</sup> even after it was merged with Punjab and the remaining provinces of West Pakistan in the “One Unit” scheme of 1955. Serious attempts of the Shia organisations to resurrect the demand for separate *dinîyât* were not made until 1963.<sup>203</sup>

### *Shia ‘ulamâ’ and dinî madâris in the 1950s*

With the foundation of Pakistan, Shias in West Punjab and other parts of the new state became cut off from Lucknow, which had so far wielded a dominant influence on their religious life.<sup>204</sup> By 1947 only two Shia *dinî madâris* were existent in Pakistan, *Bâb ul-‘Ulûm* in Multan—which had declined since the death of its founder in 1938<sup>205</sup>—and a small *Madrasat Muhammadiya* in Jalalpur Nangiana (Sargodha Dist.).<sup>206</sup> Pioneers of religious education in West Punjab had included S. Muhammad Baqir Naqvi Chakralvi (1881–1964),<sup>207</sup> teacher of a number of renowned ‘*ulamâ*’ since 1916, and one of his disciples, S. Mahbub Ali Shah (1901–54),<sup>208</sup> but they had not founded regular *dinî madâris*. Mufti Ja‘far Husain had opened a *Madrasat Mubâraka Ja‘fariya* in Gujranwala in 1942,<sup>209</sup> but this was no longer operating by 1947.

At that time there were only a handful of native Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ with countrywide reputation in West Pakistan apart from those mentioned above. Among them were S. ‘Inayat Ali Shah Naqvi (1870–1969) from Lodhri (Sialkot Dist.), the founder of the weekly *Durr-i Najaf*;<sup>210</sup> Pir S. Fazl Shah Naqvi (1877–1966)<sup>211</sup> from Malyar and Malik Faiz Muhammad (1880–1949) from Makhial (both in Jhelum Dist.),<sup>212</sup> S. Khadim Husain Naqvi (1895–



1995)<sup>213</sup> from Behal (Bhakkar Dist.) and S. 'Inayat Ali Shah Naqvi (1902–2003)<sup>214</sup> from Karor (Layyah Dist.), who both served consecutively as Shia Grand Muftis of the Khairpur State; S. Muhammad Yar Shah (1915–90) from Alipur (Muzaffargarh Dist.), a teacher in different Shia *dīnī madāris* until he founded a *Dār al-Hudā Muhammadiya* in his hometown in 1961.<sup>215</sup> Other native '*ulamā*' earned reputation throughout Pakistan only in the coming decade or later, like S. Gulab Ali Shah Naqvi (1912–92)<sup>216</sup> from Pindi Gheb (Attock Dist.), Husain Bakhsh (1920–90)<sup>217</sup> from Jara (D.I. Khan Dist.), Akhtar 'Abbas (1925–99)<sup>218</sup> from Kot Addu and S. Safdar Husain Najafi (1933–89)<sup>219</sup> from Alipur (both Muzaffargarh Dist.), and Muhammad Husain Dhakko (b.1932)<sup>220</sup> from Jahanian Shah (Sargodha Dist.).

Already in pre-partition years, the paucity of Shia '*ulamā*' in the Punjab and a general lack of interest among the Shias there to fill that gap had been lamented in the Shia press occasionally.<sup>221</sup> In September 1947 Karim Bakhsh Haidari wrote about the need to divide all Shia institutions and "assets" between India and Pakistan, including the '*ulamā*' of Lucknow, although he worried that not many of the latter would come voluntarily to Pakistan, because "they might harbour the illusion that the Awadh Kingdom will be resurrected".<sup>222</sup> This fear was misplaced, however. In fact a considerable number of Shia '*ulamā*' from India, especially from the U.P., joined the millions of other *muhājirs* to Pakistan soon after partition. They were quick to discover the opportunities offered to their class by the "vacuum" of Shia religious learning in the new state.

Most of these newcomers were already acquainted with the centres of Shia religious life in Pakistan through their *tablighī daurāt* in former decades. They had travelled all over British India for delivering sermons at *majālis* during Muharram and other Shia commemorative days or had been sent for years to certain areas for preaching and performing other religious functions.<sup>223</sup> They would maintain this kind of mobility and lifestyle after taking up residence in Karachi, Lahore or other towns of Pakistan after 1947.

Naturally, the capital Karachi with its quickly expanding Shia population—up to several hundred thousand already in the 1950s<sup>224</sup>—attracted the largest number of *muhājir* Shia '*ulamā*'. Most noteworthy among them were S. Zafar Hasan Naqvi Amrohavi (1890–1989),<sup>225</sup> S. Muhammad Dihlavi (1899–1971),<sup>226</sup> Mirza Mahdi Pooya (1900–73),<sup>227</sup> S. Ibn Hasan Jarchavi (1902–73),<sup>228</sup> Riza Husain Khan Rashid Turabi (1908–73)<sup>229</sup> and S. Muhammad Razi (1913–99).<sup>230</sup> Likewise, all prominent Shia '*ulamā*' in Lahore in the 1950s had migrated there from East Punjab and other parts of India, among

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them Mirza Ahmad Ali (1884–1970),<sup>231</sup> Hafiz Kifayat Husain (1898–1968),<sup>232</sup> S. Azhar Hasan Zaidi (1914–86)<sup>233</sup> and S. Murtaza Husain (1923–87).<sup>234</sup> Among the first rank of Pakistani ‘*ulamâ*’ of those years hailing from the “Indian provinces” were also Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari (1887–1979),<sup>235</sup> S. Mirza Safdar Husain Mashhadi (1901–75),<sup>236</sup> Muhammad Isma‘il (1901–76),<sup>237</sup> Muhammad Bashir Ansari (1901–83),<sup>238</sup> Mirza Yusuf Husain (1901–88),<sup>239</sup> Jawad Husain (1903–99),<sup>240</sup> S. Zamîr ul-Hasan Najafi (1916–95),<sup>241</sup> S. Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi (1918–82)<sup>242</sup> and Hashmat Ali (b.1922).<sup>243</sup>

The above list includes only the ‘*ulamâ*’ most frequently mentioned in Pakistan’s Shia press of the 1950s and 1960s, whereas the total number of graduates from the renowned Shia *dînî madâris* in India who migrated to Pakistan after 1947 may have been several hundreds.<sup>244</sup> Many of them would compete with the thousands of native *zâkirs*, who mostly hailed from the Seraiki belt of southern Punjab, touring Shia communities for delivering sermons at *majâlis* on Shia commemorative days throughout the year.<sup>245</sup> Except for the *zâkirs*, natives of West Punjab, Sindh and other parts of Pakistan were much underrepresented among Shia religious leaders during the new country’s first decade, and the dominant position of the *muhâjir* ‘*ulamâ*’ in most Shia organisations—if compared with the native ‘*ulamâ*’, not with landlords, jurists and other activists—would continue right until the foundation of the TNFJ in 1979.<sup>246</sup>

The urgency to establish Shia *dînî madâris* in Pakistan and recruit a class of native preachers and experts in Shia *fiqh* was felt since 1947 by many ‘*ulamâ*’, notables and others concerned with “a drift of the modern generation from morality towards materialism”<sup>247</sup> or even worrying about the “survival of the Shias as a religious entity”.<sup>248</sup> In the first decade of Pakistan most Shia communities, especially in the rural areas, did not even have Maulvis of their own sect to perform everyday functions such as marriage, divorce, solving of inheritance disputes and burial ceremonies. Thus already the *Shi‘a Majlis-i ‘Ulamâ*’ set up at the APSC convention of 1948 declared the foundation of *dînî madâris* as one of its goals.<sup>249</sup> At the first annual convention of the ITHS in April 1949 a commission was entrusted with the campaign for the establishment of a large *Jâmi‘at Imâmiya*, which would fill the gap left by the separation from Lucknow.<sup>250</sup> The first successful initiative in this sense, however, came from landlords and ‘*ulamâ*’ in the Sargodha District who at a public gathering in October 1949 decided to set up the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Muhammadiya* in an abandoned Hindu building in Sargodha town.<sup>251</sup> This institution, which by 1954 had five instructors, sixty students and an annual budget of Rs. 12,000,<sup>252</sup> would lay claim to the status

of Pakistan's "central Shia seminary" until the late 1960s, although it was never formally recognised as such by the personnel and sponsors of a number of further Shia *dînî madâris* established in the following years. Foremost among these were—in chronological order of their foundation years—*Sultân ul-Madâris* in Khairpur (1950),<sup>253</sup> *Makhzan ul-'Ulûm* in Multan (1951),<sup>254</sup> one *Jâmi'at Imâmîya* in Lahore (1952)<sup>255</sup> and one *madrasa* with the same name in Karachi (1953),<sup>256</sup> the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* in Lahore (1954),<sup>257</sup> the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm Ja'fariya* in Khushab (1954)<sup>258</sup> and the *Jâmi'at 'Ilmiya Bâb al-Najaf* in Jara (1955).<sup>259</sup> Other Shia *dînî madâris* founded before 1960 included a *Jâmi'at Husainiyya* near Alipur (1948),<sup>260</sup> a *Madrasat Sâdiqîya* in Khanpur (1949),<sup>261</sup> a *Dâr ul-'Ulûm Haidariyya* in Nowshera Virkan (1953),<sup>262</sup> a *Jâmi'at 'Abbasîya* in Kamalia (1954)<sup>263</sup> and a *Madrasat Sâdiqîya* in East Ahmadpur (1957).<sup>264</sup>

All these *dînî madâris* were dependent on the generosity of landlords and other rich Shia sponsors, their expenses being met by the income of special *auqâf* (generally agricultural lands) as well as by irregular donations (*chanda*).<sup>265</sup> Besides, those working for the *madâris* tried their best to induce the Shias of their area of influence to pay "religious taxes" such as *khums*,<sup>266</sup> *zakât*,<sup>267</sup> *fitra*,<sup>268</sup> and *sahm-i imâm*<sup>269</sup> with posters, pamphlets and appeals in the Shia press.<sup>270</sup> Most ambitious in this respect was the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* Lahore, which already in 1955 intended to meet its entire annual budget of Rs. 16,920 through such taxes.<sup>271</sup> In reality, however, Shias in Pakistan were ready to spend lavishly on luxurious *majâlis-i 'azâdârî* and *ta'ziya* or *zûljinnâh* processions organised by countless local *anjumans*, but at the same time they were generally very reluctant to pay any "religious dues" (*huqûq-i shar'îya*) to the '*ulamâ*' and their schools. Already in the 1950s, this state of affairs was much lamented by the orthodox '*ulamâ*', who would accuse their main rivals for financial resources, the professional *zâkirs*, not only of greediness and "trading with the blood of the Imam Husain", but also of spoiling the morals and tastes of the Shia ordinary believers and detracting them from their religious obligations. For example, Maulana 'Ata Muhammad, manager of the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm Muhammadiyya* Sargodha, wrote in March 1957:

... in the present time, the Shias [in Pakistan] are quite numerous, but few when regarding their [true] Shi'ism, and the reason is the current way of *tabligh*. Today it has become normal that Shia preachers raise heaven and earth for extolling the virtues of the *ahl-i bait* and show us the way to paradise without following their example ... we follow the *hadîth*: "Whoever weeps for Husain or makes someone weep or pretends to weep for him must enter paradise".<sup>272</sup> All

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professional preachers except for the pious ‘*ulamâ*’ are following this road in order to be successful with their mission. They are always showing a straight way to paradise without following the pillars of religion, telling the people: “You don’t have to perform fasting and prayers or to pay *khums*, *zakât* and other religious dues (*huqûq al-‘ibâd*), but only profess love for the *ahl-i bait* verbally” ... for that reason the mosques of the Shias are dilapidated and they consider *namâz* shameful, do not observe fasting, do not know about *zakât* and *khums* and do not pay other dues...<sup>273</sup>

An editorial of *al-Muballigh*—a monthly published by the same *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm* since February 1957<sup>274</sup>—shortly after quoted from the letter of one *tâlib* who had been sent to some unnamed place for performing the duties of *pesh-namâz* during the month of Ramadan:

The situation of the Shias here is such that four to five people come to the morning prayers; if you come to the mosque at the time of noon prayers you will not see a single person; at the time of sunset prayers there will be 15–16, and on Fridays some 20–25 people ... Yet some 1,000 Shias are living here, and there should be at least 100 participants at each of the prayers...<sup>275</sup>

The editor continued with the comment:

We have plenty of *majâlis*, perform *mâtam* day and night and observe ‘*azâdârî* in Muharram in a splendid way. Our religious stage is adorned with the chairmanship of renowned worldly figures; all kinds of commemorative days are held with luxurious meetings. But the genuine foundation of religion has become empty. Our marriage and burial ceremonies are held by others [non-Shias]; religious instruction in mosques, Friday congregational prayers and recitation of the Koran are unknown. The Maulvi or *zâkir* reads his *majlis*, takes his fees and departs ... the pillars of religion like *namâz*, fasting, *hajj*, *zakât*, *khums* and *jihâd* are absent [from his sermon] and there is not even a trace of *fiqh-i ja‘fariya* ...<sup>276</sup>

Exaggerated as such complaints may have been, they reflect very well the attitude and ambitions of those Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ in Pakistan who have been primarily concerned with enhancing religious observance of their community through the production of “guardians of the *shari‘a*” in religious schools. Their conflict of interest with the *zâkirs* would become sharper in the coming decades.<sup>277</sup> Yet there were also many ‘*ulamâ*’, including some of the most respected, who would use their energies and talents both for the strengthening of orthodoxy and the growth of *dînî madâris* and for delivering the typically popular sermons at *majâlis* in Muharram and on other occasions.<sup>278</sup> Besides, even adamant critics of the *zâkirs* would not deny that the highly emotional ‘*azâdârî* traditions had been the most powerful instrument for the spreading of Shi‘ism in the Indian subcontinent and

were still irreplaceable as a means to uphold and strengthen Shia communal bonds.<sup>279</sup> What they desired was a “proper use” of these ceremonies and sermons, which would bring about a “revolutionary change” in the lives of the participants,<sup>280</sup> instead of just serving as an exercise in self-elevation (*dimâghî ‘ayyâshi kâim*).<sup>281</sup> They were also aware of other shortcomings of the customary way of preaching, as was clearly expressed in an article of Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari from March 1956 (excerpts):

During the last half century, the spreading of Shi‘ism was encouraging ... in this respect we are grateful to the services of the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ ... who have spared no efforts in serving as unpaid preachers.<sup>282</sup> But now the times have changed and we have to use an organised missionary system<sup>283</sup> on the example of other religious groups for preaching our *mazhab*, namely the efforts of salaried *muballighûn*.

For *tabligh* we are still using our old *nazrâna* system, therefore we do not have an organised and regular system to preach our *mazhab*. When we have a closer look at that system, we see the following shortcomings: 1) By this way, even our high-ranking preachers face big difficulties to make their living and do not have a regular salary ... if they fall ill, they cannot read *majâlis* ... 2) The *nazrâna* system creates differences among the Shias, whereas a missionary system will end the rivalry between the preachers ... 3) ... with a missionary system poor Shias will enjoy the services of preachers in the same way as our better-off brothers ... also far-away places where Shias are only a very small minority will be able to take advantage from ‘*ulamâ*’; 4) the existent system is profitable for some famous ‘*ulamâ*’, while others, who dedicate their lives to teaching of ‘*ulûm-i dîniya*’ do not find the opportunity for sermons; thus ill-will is created between the ‘*ulamâ*’ ... 5) ... it keeps the ‘*ulamâ*’ dependent on the wealthy and powerful people, and they have to make them happy most of the times; sometimes they are even obliged to become the wealthy people’s instruments ... the missionary system will free them from this dependency ... 6) There are many countries of the world to which the message of the *mazhab-i ahl-i bait* has not yet arrived and where there is no hope of *nazrâna*; with a missionary system we will be able to fulfil our holy duty to spread the message of the Prophet Muhammad and his *ahl-i bait* to foreign countries ...<sup>284</sup>

The writer, who some years later would fulfil his desire of spreading Shi‘ism abroad by organising the dispatch of Pakistani Shia preachers to East African countries,<sup>285</sup> continued with a call for the establishment of a “missionary college”, which would also provide training for “honorary missionaries”. While such a college never came into being and the hunt for *nazrâna* would remain a permanent occupation of many Pakistani ‘*ulamâ*’—let alone the *zâkirs*—until present times,<sup>286</sup> the idea of organising Shia preaching in a way that it would reach even remote areas was put into practice to some extent already in the 1950s. Following the example of the

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*Madrasat ul-Wā'izîn* Lucknow, the larger *dīnī madāris* of Pakistan started special courses for preaching from 1955 onwards and sent their students to *tablighī daurāt* into specified places during the months of Muharram and Ramadan.<sup>287</sup> This would become a common practice of most *dīnī madāris* in later decades and was made fairly effective in the course of time. Also in 1955 an *Imamia Mission Pakistan* was set up in Lahore on the initiative of S. Ali Naqi, one of the leading *mujtahids* of Lucknow and founder of a similar organisation in pre-partition India.<sup>288</sup> Although the main activity of the *Imamia Mission* was to print Shia religious literature,<sup>289</sup> it organised special annual “*muballigh-classes*” from late 1956 to 1959, paralleling the efforts of the *dīnī madāris*.<sup>290</sup>

If those who worked for the strengthening of Shia orthodoxy through *dīnī madāris* in Pakistan had much reason to complain about the lack of support from their Shia countrymen—especially if compared with the speed by which the different Sunni communities established their networks of mosques and *dīnī madāris* throughout the country<sup>291</sup>—they were themselves blamed for deviating from their own professed goals by other Shias within a few years. Thus already in November 1954, after some members of the organising committee of the *Dār ul-‘Ulūm Muhammadiya* Sargodha had resigned in protest, an ITHS delegation from Lahore which had come to the spot for mediating had to admit:

As far as we could find out, the *madrasa* could not find good students. Therefore the organisers have not set any special standard for enrolment, and they only take great efforts to prepare the students for entry exams of universities.<sup>292</sup> But this should not be given priority, because the original goal was to prepare ‘*ulamā*’ and preachers.<sup>293</sup>

In the following years it became obvious that even among those few hundreds of students who enrolled in the newly founded Shia *dīnī madāris*, many had only worldly ambitions. In November 1956 the Secretary-General of the local ITHS section of Sargodha gave the following sobering account:

All over Pakistan a number of *dīnī madāris* have been established, the aim of which is to produce good *muballighūn* and preachers ... but it is astonishing that until today not one single *tālib-i ‘ilm* could graduate from any *madrasa* to be added to the number of existing ‘*ulamā*’ ... It is a pity that a student who has studied hard some three to four years and has won the ability to teach himself leaves the *madrasa* and runs away to his home or enrolls in some other school. This plague has spread far and wide in our *dīnī madāris* ... in some of them students even pass exams of “Maulvi Fāzil”<sup>294</sup> but then they choose to become Arabic teachers in government schools and forget their original aim. It costs a

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*dînî madrasa* at least Rs. 1,700 to qualify one student to the grade of “Maulvi Fâzil”. If our *dînî madâris* can only produce teachers and clerks with a monthly salary of 50–80 rupees, it would be better to give the money to the AWSM,<sup>295</sup> which is helping thousands of poor Shia students to get higher education and become doctors, engineers and professors. Until now hundreds of thousands of rupees have been spent on the *dînî madâris*, but the result has been zero. Not one of them can claim that her preacher so-and-so is busy with *tabligh* in that or that district...<sup>296</sup>

Even as late as 1965, Maulana Muhammad Isma‘il—who then founded his own *madrasa* near Lyallpur—would claim that Pakistan’s Shia *dînî madâris* had “not produced one single *muballigh*, *munâzir*, orator, historiographer, interpreter of the Koran or eloquent *zâkir* in 17 years”.<sup>297</sup> Exaggerated as such a statement was, the editor of *Razâkâr* agreed insofar as none of the graduates of Pakistani Shia religious schools had earned fame until that time.<sup>298</sup> Those native Pakistani ‘*ulamâ*’ with countrywide reputation referred to above had all studied in Lucknow or Najaf or in both places. The great Shia theological schools of Iraq and Iran remained well accessible for Pakistani students in the 1950s, but only a few dozens of them, in addition to some ‘*ulamâ*’ in their thirties and forties, found their way to Najaf or Qom in these years. According to one account, there were only some twenty-five Pakistani students in Najaf in 1955, as compared to 3,000 from Iran and 200–300 from Lebanon.<sup>299</sup> Their situation was described as miserable in reports from 1951 and 1952, depending on meagre stipends from the Ayatollahs S. Muhammad Husain Borujerdi and S. Muhsin al-Hakim.<sup>300</sup> However, the situation apparently improved later, and several hundreds of Pakistani Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ would graduate from the theological centres of Iraq and Iran in the 1960s and 1970s after having received their initial training at *dînî madâris* in their homeland.<sup>301</sup> On the other hand, plans to raise the standard of Pakistani *dînî madâris* to that of the centres of Lucknow, Najaf or Qom, as had been proclaimed since the early 1950s,<sup>302</sup> were far from implemented even decades later.

Since at least 1954 those who were dissatisfied with the performance of the *dînî madâris* suggested to have them integrated into a countrywide organisation, which would unify their syllabi and exams, supervise their activities and introduce some kind of division of labour between them. Among the first to publish such demands were Karim Bakhsh Haidari,<sup>303</sup> Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari<sup>304</sup> and S. Bashir Husain Bukhari.<sup>305</sup> Both the sponsors of *dînî madâris* and the ‘*ulamâ*’ teaching there were unhappy with such intrusions into their affairs initially, but they ended up accepting the



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suggestions at least partially. For example, in March 1957 Maulana 'Ata Muhammad (see above) would still dismiss most complaints against the *dînî madâris* as being made by "people who have no interest in the 'ulûm-i 'arabîya and do not consider the observance of the pillars of religion necessary" but were "only good in writing articles and misleading simple people".<sup>306</sup> He claimed that preachers and *pesh-namâz* trained at the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm* Sargodha and dispatched to different Shia communities had already brought about "a revolutionary change" in the habits of the people. 'Ata Muhammad especially objected to the demand to put the income and expenses of all *dînî madâris* under some central control, because each *madrassa* had different sources of income, and he reminded of the example of the smaller Shia *madâris* of U.P., which had never been subordinate to those of Lucknow.<sup>307</sup> Three months later, however, the editor of *al-Muballigh* conceded that he accepted some suggestions made by Karim Bakhsh Haidari in December 1956, among them a convention of 'ulamâ' and other responsible individuals to establish a central organisation for the *dînî madâris*,<sup>308</sup> and that they had been discussed at the last annual session of the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm* Sargodha in March 1957. As a first step he suggested the formulation of a unified syllabus that would be applied on a voluntary basis.<sup>309</sup>

In fact a first countrywide convention aiming at unifying the syllabi, annual holidays and exams of the Shia *dînî madâris* was held in March 1958 in the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* Lahore.<sup>310</sup> S. Nasîr Husain Naqvi,<sup>311</sup> then principal of the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm* Sargodha, was elected to head a central supervisory board, but it took another four years for a *Majlis-i Nazârat-i Shî'a Madâris-i 'Arabîya* to be formally established and much more to make it effective.<sup>312</sup> Shia *madâris* in Pakistan were to lag ever more behind those of the Sunnis in the following decades regarding quantity and financial means at their disposal, but they could gradually achieve a fair degree of unity and organisation until the late 1970s.<sup>313</sup>

### *Growing resistance against Shia religious ceremonies*

Conflicts about Shia 'azâdârî processions and Shia-Sunni clashes during the month of Muharram had been frequent events on the Indian subcontinent already under British rule, including those parts which in 1947 became West Pakistan.<sup>314</sup> Yet the problem assumed a larger dimension there than in the rest of the subcontinent, mainly for two reasons: one was the influx of Shia *muhâjirs* into many towns and villages of the Punjab and Sindh, either strengthening existing Shia communities or creating new ones. This went



along with a marked increase of 'azâdârî ceremonies and other manifestations of Shia religious life that were not always well received by the Sunni majority of these places. The second and probably more important factor for the growth of the sectarian problem was the high expectations raised among large sections of the Sunni 'ulamâ' through the creation of Pakistan. Regardless of whether they had supported the Muslim League during the Pakistan Movement or not, many Sunni 'ulamâ' felt their class entitled to have an important say in the political, legislative and judicial affairs of the new Islamic state.<sup>315</sup> When meeting with a cold shoulder from the secularist establishment, they looked for ways and means to rally the 'awâm behind their leadership. "Creating issues" has been a constant preoccupation for the politically ambitious 'ulamâ' in Pakistan ever since its foundation, and stirring up popular resentment against minorities was always one of the easiest means to achieve quick results. Thus already in the first decade of Pakistan, a considerable amount of energy was spent on propaganda against Shia beliefs and religious practices by a section of the Sunni 'ulamâ' who were driven both by personal ambitions and genuine religious zeal.

As explained in a previous chapter, the major religious movements antagonistic to Shias in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India have been the *Ahl-i hadîth* and the Deobandis.<sup>316</sup> The latter has extended its influence to the North-West of British India and beyond to Afghanistan already since the second half of the nineteenth century through numerous graduates from the *Dâr ul- 'Ulûm* Deoband and later through the founding of religious schools on its model.<sup>317</sup> In Pakistan, Deobandis had become the majority religious denomination in the NWFP and Balochistan already in the 1950s, and they have gradually established a strong presence in all towns of the Punjab and Sindh provinces, too.<sup>318</sup> The *Ahl-i hadîth* was mainly an urban phenomenon in Pakistan until the 1960s, but its influence has since steadily grown due to lavish funding from Saudi Arabia and other factors.<sup>319</sup>

Both the *Ahl-i hadîth* and the Deobandi school of thought are preaching an austere, scripturalist version of Sunni Islam and are opposed to most manifestations of "folk Islam", which they associate with syncretist Hindu influences. For example, they liken the cult of saints, which is very popular in rural Punjab and Sindh—as among Muslims of the subcontinent generally—to "idolatry", as well as the excessive veneration of the Prophet Muhammad and the attribution of miraculous deeds to him. This puts the Deobandis and *Ahl-i hadîth* into principal theological conflict with the Bareilvi school of thought, the majority religious denomination in the Punjab and Sindh that fully endorses these and other elements of Sunni

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folk Islam in India and Pakistan,<sup>320</sup> but also with Shias, who attribute even more superhuman qualities and acts to the Prophet Muhammad and his *ahl al-bait*, i.e. his daughter Fatima and the twelve Imams. However, the main controversial issue between all Sunni denominations (including the Barelvīs) and the Shias has remained the latter's attitude towards the *sahāba*, and especially the first two Caliphs.<sup>321</sup>

This is not to say that most '*ulamā*' of the Deobandi or *Ahl-i hadith* school of thought in Pakistan have been permanently involved in conflicts with Shias. There have been many examples of tolerance and goodwill towards the Shia minority from these '*ulamā*', one of them being the adoption of the "22 Principles" in January 1951.<sup>322</sup> But a zealous section among them has always pursued the "mission" to have Shias in Pakistan socially isolated, have their freedom of religious observance restricted (at least in public) and ultimately have them excluded from the pale of Islam. Their activities have been an almost constant source of trouble—and often of physical threats—for Shias throughout the last more than six decades, with the magnitude of the problem depending largely on the attitudes of subsequent governments, civil servants and police officers entrusted with law and order.

In the 1950s the *Tanzīm-i Ahl-i Sunnat* (TAS)<sup>323</sup> was the organisation most heavily involved in anti-Shia propaganda. The TAS, headed since its foundation by Maulana S. Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari, served as a common platform for those Sunni '*ulamā*', school- and college-teachers, journalists and other activists for whom confronting the Shia "heresy" was the most important "religious mission" required to be performed in Pakistan. All members of the TAS were affiliated to the Deobandi school of thought. The TAS also offered a convenient platform for those members of the *Majlis-i Ahrār-i Islām* who had opposed the Muslim League tooth-and-nail until 1947 and thereafter were in need of new issues to find a role for themselves in Pakistan.<sup>324</sup> The first places where the TAS seems to have gained a popular foothold were some districts of the Punjab with a strong demographic and political presence of Shias, like Sargodha, Mianwali, Jhang, Multan and Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan.<sup>325</sup> Its professional preachers were touring these districts to stir up resentments and mobilise the Sunni population for the "defence of their rights and sanctities". In April 1951, the newly elected ITHS chairman for the Punjab, Mufti Sonipati, gave the following account of the situation (excerpts):

During the recent elections for the Punjab Assembly one group among the Islamic majority which is making organised efforts against us ... has tried to raise

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the Shia-Sunni question in each constituency with Shia candidates. Especially in the Jhang District these sectarian elements of the majority have displayed this narrow-mindedness and fanaticism ... because Jhang has been known as the centre of Shias since old times, the enemies of unity have made organised strong efforts to poison the sectarian atmosphere first of all there. Fanatical mullahs and seditious preachers have openly declared us outside of the pale of Islam and infidel (*kâfir*) in their election speeches. Those who do not object to eating with non-Muslims have exhorted the Muslims that eating and drinking with Shias is forbidden and *harâm*...<sup>326</sup>

In August 1952, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari, protesting against a six-month-old ban for himself to enter the Mianwali District, wrote in the TAS organ *Da'wat*:

... the Mianwali District<sup>327</sup> is the most backward in all Punjab regarding the standard of education and has the first place in the standard of ignorance. The reason is that it is the house (sic) of Shi'ism in all Punjab. Nowhere else in Pakistan the Shias are as strong as there. *Zâkirs* as numerous as the grains of sand of the Thall desert are indulging night and day in shameful abuse of the *sahâba* of the Prophet ... not one tenth of the storm of abuse and insulting (*sabb-o-shatm*) going on here throughout the year can be found anywhere else; especially the Bhakkar Subdivision is the centre of this curse...

Naturally the TAS is popular in this district. There is probably not one village around Bhakkar where the TAS has not established a branch. The TAS is holding dozens of congregations in the Bhakkar Tehsil, and it is present on every railway station from the southern district borders to Kalabagh...

There are no bans against the *tabarrâ'*is throughout Pakistan ... but those who put a check on *rafz*<sup>328</sup> and Shi'ism with arguments and proofs from the Koran are forbidden to speak in the Mianwali District ... The government has ruled under the Punjab Safety Act that the person of Bukhari and his reciting of the Koran are representing a danger ... Has even the nose of any Shia bled because of my continuous Koranic lectures throughout the Mianwali District since eight years?<sup>329</sup>

From May 1952 to March 1953, the attention of all radical Sunni '*ulamâ*', including those affiliated to the TAS, was focussed on the campaign against the Ahmadis. Participants of an "All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention" of the *tahaffuz-i khatm-i nubuwwat* movement in Lahore in July 1952 included both Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari and the ITHS Secretary Muzaffar Ali Shamsi.<sup>330</sup> Yet there was only temporary relief for the Shias. For example, bans on '*azâdârî* processions because of Sunni opposition against them continued in some villages of the Sargodha District. When a delegation of the *Majlis-i Ahrâr*, which played a leading role in the anti-Ahmadi agitation, was asked to mediate on the issue during a visit to Sargodha, one of

its members (Maulvi Abd ur-Rahman Mianvi) said that the very word "Shia" was offensive to them.<sup>331</sup> *Da'wat* continued its polemics against Shias throughout the anti-Ahmadi movement,<sup>332</sup> making a mockery of the Sunni-Shia common front for the "protection of the finality of the prophethood" that some Shia '*ulamâ*' might have imagined.

After the clamp-down on the anti-Ahmadi agitation in March 1953, religious extremists had to scale down their activities for some time. On 18 September 1953 a new clause of the "Government Servants Conduct Rules" was published, forbidding members of the Civil Service propaganda for their own sect or any interference with sectarian conflicts.<sup>333</sup> There were no noteworthy incidents in the month of Muharram 1373H (10 September–9 October 1953) and only a few in Muharram 1374H (30 August–29 September 1954).<sup>334</sup> It was only in 1955 that agitation against Shia '*azâdârî*' resurfaced in earnest. The leaders of the new anti-Shia movement, which was to gain momentum in the following two years, included many of the same persons who had met with failure in their campaign against the Ahmadis in 1953. In Muharram 1375H (20 August–19 September 1955) '*azâdârî*' processions were banned or attacked in at least twenty-five places in the Punjab,<sup>335</sup> while the assault on an *imâmbârgâh* of migrants from Baltistan in Karachi left twelve people seriously injured.<sup>336</sup> The government, faced with growing objections against '*azâdârî*' in public places, was contemplating to make licences for Shia processions subject to agreement from the local people, namely the Sunni majority at each place.<sup>337</sup> An "All-Pakistan '*Azâdârî*' Convention" was planned in Lahore on 22–23 October 1955 to deal with that challenge, but had to be postponed due to the rivalry between the two large Shia organisations, ITHS and APSC.<sup>338</sup> Instead, the first and only All-Pakistan Shia Convention in East Pakistan was held on 27 November 1955 in Dhaka, but it dealt mainly with problems of Shias in Bengal.<sup>339</sup>

The first constitution of Pakistan enacted in March 1956 included some important safeguards for minorities,<sup>340</sup> but Shia activists were not satisfied with Article 18, which made "the right to profess, practice, and propagate any religion" subject to "law, public order and morality". One resolution of the ITHS convention held in Lahore from 23–25 March 1956 demanded the lifting of all bans and obstacles for '*azâdârî*' and called on the government to make clear its policy on the matter until Muharram that year, otherwise the ITHS would be forced to take "efficient concrete action".<sup>341</sup> Such appeals were of no avail, and the TAS *muballighûn* stepped up their campaign against the "unlawful" (according to their interpretation of the *sharî'a*) and

“offensive” Shia practices of ‘*azâdârî*, apparently unchecked by the authorities. For example, Professor Khalid Mahmud, then serving as lecturer in a college in Sialkot, and Maulana Manzur Ahmad from Narowal made highly provocative speeches against Shias in the Krishannagar quarter of Lahore in May 1956, ridiculing the Shia Imams and challenging the local Sunnis to prevent ‘*azâdârî* processions once and for all “if they had the guts to do so”.<sup>342</sup> During the first ten days of Muharram 1376H (8–17 August 1956), the TAS organised oratory meetings in Sunni mosques of many towns in a deliberate attempt to provoke sectarian clashes.<sup>343</sup> In the small town of Shahr Sultan (Muzaffargarh Dist.), thousands of armed villagers gathered to attack the Shia procession, which was then banned by the administration.<sup>344</sup>

Apparently, the TAS strategy of portraying ‘*azâdârî* processions a “danger for law and order” worked. On 29 August 1956, shortly after ‘*Âshûrâ* that year, the TAS succeeded to rally support of other Sunni organisations, including the JUP of the Bareilly, during a meeting in Lahore devoted to the issue of “protection of the honour of the *sahâba*”.<sup>345</sup> Draft statutes of a “Pakistan Sunni Board” were presented by the TAS, and four resolutions were passed unanimously there (excerpts):

- 1) This representative meeting of Sunni Muslims looks with great apprehension at the pro-Shia bias and open partiality of the Government of West Pakistan during the 10<sup>th</sup> of Muharram and other Shia ceremonies ... this short-sighted policy will widen the gulf between Shias and Sunnis ... and will cause a great danger to the consolidation and integrity of Pakistan ... the deplorable policy of the government has disregarded the former status quo of Shia ceremonies and allowed open abuse and insulting and *tabarrâ-bâzî*<sup>346</sup> ...
- 2) The abuse and insulting of the *khulafâ’-i râshidûn*, the *azwâj-i mutahharât*<sup>347</sup> and the *sahâba-i kirâm* during Shia ceremonies on the last 10<sup>th</sup> of Muharram has been very provocative and disgusting and has hurt the feelings of the Muslims ... we appeal to Sunni Muslims to stay far from such ceremonies in future to avoid the danger of clashes.
- 3) ... the present political and religious activities of the Shias are not only a danger for public order, but the ridiculing of the beliefs of Sunnis and abuses against the *khulafâ’-i râshidûn*, the *azwâj-i mutahharât* and the *sahâba-i kirâm* are denigrating the status of the prophecy [of Muhammad] ...
- 4) It is said that the freedom granted to the offensive and provocative ceremonies and meetings of the Shia sect is based on the articles in the constitution of Pakistan regarding freedom of speech and religious freedom ... it was an unwise step to grant such freedoms without making them subject to public order, moral and honour.<sup>348</sup>

The principal accusation made here—and on countless other occasions—that Shias were abusing and insulting the first three Caliphs and other

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*sahâba* during their religious ceremonies, has been emphatically and consistently denied by Shia leaders and the Shia press in Pakistan ever since the 1950s. It has been repeated again and again that abusing and insulting was religiously forbidden (*harâm*) for Shias, and that all they were doing was criticising the comportment of certain companions of the Prophet towards the *ahl al-bait* and distancing themselves from their acts.<sup>349</sup> Although the fact that Shias pronounce curses on the first three Caliphs has been admitted, for example, during the 1939 *Tabarrâ* Agitation,<sup>350</sup> it is neither intended nor possible for a study like this to verify or falsify claims and counter-claims regarding “abuse and insulting” (*sabb-o-shatm*). Instead, I will explain below some major lines of argument of both the apologists and the detractors of ‘*azâdârî*’.

Reacting to the rising level of sectarian tensions, which had become obvious in that year’s Muharram, the Chief Minister of West Pakistan, Muhammad Khan Sahib (October 1955–March 1957), formed a Shia-Sunni “Reconciliation Board” in November 1956. This *Majlis-i Ittihad-i Islâmî* (MII), presided by Home Secretary Sufi Muhammad Husain, included the leaders of all major Sunni organisations as well as nine prominent Shias.<sup>351</sup> It took three sessions of the MII in the following months just to agree on a resolution calling on both sides to avoid vexing and provocative speeches, but the problem remained how to define “vexing” (*dil-âzâr*) and “provocative” (*ishti‘âl-angîz*).<sup>352</sup> When Maulana Muhammad Isma‘il reserved for himself the right to speak out anything that was written in the books of Islamic history, the Sunni Maulana ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi replied that all such history, which was offensive to the *sahâba*, should be burnt.<sup>353</sup> On 11 February 1957 the TAS organ *Da‘wat* reported that all members of the MII had admitted that cursing of the *sahâba* was indeed taking place during Shia *majâlis*. When this was repeated without comment in Muhammad Isma‘il’s journal *Sadâqat*, it caused an uproar among the Shia public which led the APSC members to resign temporarily from the MII.<sup>354</sup>

In June 1957 the Sunni members of the MII tabled a resolution, which was taken by the editor of *Razâkâr* as a proof of his claim that the issue was not “abuse and insulting”, but rather mere “criticism” of the *sahâba*, which some Sunni hard-liners wished to be banned in Pakistan.<sup>355</sup> The draft resolution read:

For the high goals of Shia-Sunni unity, the protection of the religious rights of each sect and the integrity of Pakistan ... the responsible representatives of Shias and Sunnis agree on the following:

- 1) The Shias ... are giving a clear declaration that in future the character and the conduct (*zât aur sîrat*) of the *sahâba* will not be attacked in any way in the

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press, from the pulpit, in meetings and processions, and that there will be no objection to the caliphate and politics of the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn* in writing or speech. If anywhere such an act is committed, the Shias will denounce it forcefully and distance themselves from the responsible persons. This resolution of the Shia and Sunni leaders will be announced at a great public meeting in the presence of representatives from the government and the press.

- 2) Once this resolution has been fully implemented and vexing and provocative propaganda against the *sahâba-i kirâm* has come to an end, then Sunnis will not make any objections against the religious ceremonies of the Shias and will not disturb their '*azâdârî* processions'.<sup>356</sup>

Not surprisingly, such a "tit-for-tat" was rejected as unacceptable for Shias during a session of the ITHS Working Committee (Lahore, 14 June).<sup>357</sup> In the meantime, both the TAS and the Shia organisations had reaffirmed their positions at large public gatherings. A "*Tablighî* Conference" of the TAS in Multan in February 1957 passed a number of resolutions that aimed, according to the commentary of *Razâkâr*, at "prohibiting all Shia *tabligh* in Pakistan" by making '*azâdârî* processions subject to agreement of the local Sunnis'.<sup>358</sup> Resolution No. 1 of that conference complained that the authorities were granting licences for processions to "irresponsible individuals" and that the Sunnis would be informed too late about them, thus creating the danger of clashes. It was urged to form representative committees of local Sunnis at every place, which would have to be consulted beforehand.<sup>359</sup> Another resolution accused the Shias of having staged many processions without licences or on other than the agreed routes and thereby provoked clashes.<sup>360</sup> One speaker at the TAS conference, Taj Muhammad Khan Durrani, infuriated Shias with the remark that they could make their "mule processions" throughout the year in their *imâmbârgâhs*, but it would be unbearable for Sunnis that such "mule driving" had to take place in the bazaars.<sup>361</sup>

The Shia organisations, for their part, joined hands to convene a first "All-Pakistan '*Azâdârî* Conference" in Ahmadpur East on 17–19 May 1957. Its Resolution No. 1 declared '*azâdârî* as the "life-blood of the Shia *qaum*",<sup>362</sup> a beloved and special religious obligation, which would reflect all their beliefs and accepted truths (*musallamât*), but would nevertheless be a "symbol of Muslim unity". It was deeply regretted that elements opposed to the unity of Muslims were doing harm to the national unity by mobilising a front against '*azâdârî*, and that the government was a silent spectator to their mischief.<sup>363</sup> Other resolutions included mainly Shia self-criticism: it was advised to maintain tolerance and unity of the Muslims in Muharram, to organise only one procession at each place, and not to miss the obligatory prayers during the processions. The *zâkirs* and '*ulamâ*' were asked "to



show a little spirit of sacrifice considering the economic situation of the sponsors of *majâlis*” while the latter were exhorted to keep their promises of payment to the preachers faithfully. The preachers were also asked to speak about the historical events of Muharram “only based on trustworthy traditions”.<sup>364</sup> A twenty-four-member “‘Azâdârî-Council” chaired by Muhammad Isma‘il was formed in which ITHS and APSC were represented equally.<sup>365</sup> The Council was supposed to “find a solution” for the growing resistance against ‘azâdârî processions before the coming Muharram (29 July–27 August 1957), but had not even started working by mid-June that year.<sup>366</sup>

At the same time, the TAS brought forward a new kind of objection against the Shias’ “life-blood”. In an editorial of *Da‘wat* titled “The only solution for the ‘azâdârî question” (17 May 1957) it was argued that:

... in Islam there is no place for mourning even the death of an ordinary Muslim, let alone to hold organised ‘azâdârî for living martyrs. The Islamic *shari‘a* is strongly prohibiting individual loud and visible mourning (*sôg siyâpa*) for men. Sunnis have two kinds of objections against ‘azâdârî: Principally and theoretically it is contradicting their beliefs, and in practical terms it is usurping their religious right. Sunnis regard organised *mâtam* in the streets and markets as the biggest sin against the pure person of our Lord Husain...

Just as you Shias consider the killing of Imam Husain and other martyrs of Karbala by Ibn Ziyad and Shimr a great sin, we Sunnis consider it a great sin, an insult to the status of Husain, and a disgrace to the status of martyrdom, to perform such a regular display of loud and visible mourning in the streets and bazaars for him.<sup>367</sup>

Shias complained that whenever they criticised beliefs of the Sunnis they would be immediately accused of “abusing and insulting”, whereas the preachers of the TAS, viewing themselves as “representing the majority”, would feel free at any time to use harsh and insulting words against Shias and make a mockery of their sanctities.<sup>368</sup> During the first ten days of Muharram 1377H (1957), vitriolic propaganda by the TAS with speeches and posters reached a new climax. As predicted by the Shia organisations, violent assaults on ‘azâdârî processions took place on different places in the Punjab on that year’s ‘*Âshûrâ*’ (7 August).<sup>369</sup> Three Shias were killed during an armed attack on their procession in the small town of Sitpur (Muzaffargarh Dist.).<sup>370</sup> In Ahmadpur East, where the ground had been prepared by speeches of Taj Muhammad Khan Durrani, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari and Khalid Mahmud, one was killed and three were seriously injured when stones were thrown at a Shia procession and Shias hit back



with the chains they carried for self-flagellation.<sup>371</sup> The government ordered a judicial inquiry in these two places, which led to death sentences for five accused in the Sitpur case in December 1958.<sup>372</sup> The ITHS and APSC held the TAS responsible at a joint protest meeting at *Karbalâ-i Gâme Shâh* (Lahore) on 18 August, but also blamed the government for its failure to protect the religious rights of each sect as granted by the constitution.<sup>373</sup> S. Muhammad Ali Shamsi, who had just returned from a trip to Ahmadpur East, predicted even that Shias might start to raise the slogan of “Shi‘istan” if the majority would continue to put pressure on them to such an extent.<sup>374</sup>

Apart from the two said judicial inquiries, the Government of West Pakistan (led by Chief Minister Abd ur-Rashid from July 1957 to March 1958) confined itself to the usual pious appeals for the “unity of Muslims”.<sup>375</sup> This encouraged the TAS to go one step further and publish the following “Unanimous demand of the *Sawâd-i A‘zam*<sup>376</sup> of Pakistan from the Government of West Pakistan”:

The painful and bloody events of Muharram and the serious present situation have given proof to the claim of the Sunnis that *mâtamî julûs* are the cause of rioting, unrest, plunder and bloodshed, the reason for sectarian tensions and bitterness, and the ground for Shia-Sunni clashes. They are disturbing the calm of the country and destroying the unity of the nation. In the face of this permanent danger for the integrity of the homeland and the unity of the people, the *Sawâd-i A‘zam* is demanding unanimously from its government, considering the best interest of the beloved homeland, to impose a strict ban on these *mâtamî julûs* in all public places.<sup>377</sup>

This point of view was not confined to the radicals. The Sunni press generally had little sympathy for the insistence of the Shias to take out their ‘*azâdârî*’ processions regardless of the feelings of the majority. Commenting on the ‘*Âshûrâ*’ riots a few days after, the daily *Hilâl-i Pâkistân* (Lahore) wrote on 13 August 1957:

... if the problem was only to deal with some mischievous elements, then police bullets and exemplary punishments by the courts would be enough. But the real question is concerning the situation and background which opens a door for the mischief-makers.

According to a general impression, the *mâtamî julûs* of the Shias are reflecting an idolatrous (*mushrikâna*) mentality. Chest-beating, injuring oneself with knives and chains and passing in front of the houses with adorned processions can never give an example for the Islamic society.<sup>378</sup> This is giving ridicule instead of honour to the great men [of religion]...

We do not know whether the Shia *mazhab* gives room for such ceremonies. Surely the Shia *mujtahids* will oppose such superstitions.<sup>379</sup> But if they consider

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them the essence of their religion, then for maintaining public order the government must impose a strict ban on them in public places. For practising the tenets of one's religion, is it necessary to display them on public roads, or cannot all this be done in the Shia places of worship? And if the influential Shias consider these *bid'atî* processions the essence of their religion, why must the government prevent all Muslims from leaving their houses during Muharram ...?<sup>380</sup>

Such all-out assaults on their '*azâdârî*' traditions called for a strong response from Shias, many of whom perceived these ceremonies as the most powerful means to preserve and strengthen their communal identity. Thus the ITHS and the APSC closed ranks for some time, forming a "Shia Defence Committee" and organising jointly an All-Pakistan Shia Convention in Lahore in December 1957.<sup>381</sup> A more lasting effect was achieved by efforts of many Shia '*ulamâ*' and intellectuals to prove that '*azâdârî*' had a centuries-long tradition in the subcontinent and could by no means been dubbed as an "un-Islamic innovation" (*bid'a*). Pakistani and Indian Shia authors wrote a number of books and articles on the history of '*azâdârî*' in the following years.<sup>382</sup> The Shia media would argue—apparently with much justification—that for decades, or even centuries, their '*azâdârî*' processions had not been regarded offensive by Sunnis in most places; rather Sunnis would have enthusiastically taken part in the Muharram rituals until the preachers of the TAS had stirred up anti-Shia passions among them.<sup>383</sup>

Such arguments proved fruitful to some extent in the long run, but had little effect immediately. In September 1957, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari staged a new ploy by proclaiming the 9 Rabi' I. (falling on 4 October that year) the birthday of the Caliph 'Umar.<sup>384</sup> This created problems, because Shias were commemorating the death of the murderers of their Imam Husain, 'Umar Ibn Sa'd and Shimr, on that same day. In one village of the Jhang District, Hassu Bulail, there was a tradition of burning effigies of these two historic villains on 9 Rabi' I. Promptly the rumour was spread, that Shias had burnt effigies of the Caliph 'Umar in Hassu Bulail, and the TAS organised protest demonstrations in Lahore and other towns of the Punjab.<sup>385</sup> The affair was amply exploited throughout the following months with a view to ruin the chances of Shia candidates in general elections which were scheduled to take place in 1958.<sup>386</sup> In this connection, Khwaja Muhammad Qamar ud-Din Sialvi, *sajjâda-nishîn* of Sial Sharif (Jhang Dist.) and an influential member of the JUP,<sup>387</sup> issued the following *fatwâ* against Shias in December 1957:

You will know that the Shia sect is not believing (*kâfir hai*) in the Koran, the *hadîth* and the holy consensus (*ijmâ'*) of the *umma*. It is absolutely forbidden to sit together or eat and drink with them. Therefore, prevent as far as possible this

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wicked sect from entering your towns and areas, otherwise you will invite the wrath of God. Mind my advice.<sup>388</sup>

Such a blatant *fatwâ* from a prominent Barelvi religious leader pronouncing *takfir* on Shias was quite extraordinary, but brought no legal consequences for its author. Meanwhile, sectarian tensions between Barelvis and Deobandis had also reached a climax in 1957–8, leading to violence and occasional murders between these two Sunni groups.<sup>389</sup> When the alleged date of the “birthday of the Caliph ‘Umar” approached in 1958, Barelvi ‘*ulamâ*’ were asking their Deobandi colleagues why they were supporting such a day of commemoration while at the same time they were strongly opposed to the festivities on the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (*Milâd an-Nabîy*) and the ‘*urs*’ celebration days for Muslim saints.<sup>390</sup>

In March 1958 the APSC President Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash became Chief Minister of West Pakistan.<sup>391</sup> While he had always sought moderation and consensus with Sunnis when promoting Shia interests, Qizilbash was also the sponsor of the largest ‘*azâdârî*’ procession in Pakistan, keeping alive a hundred-year-old tradition of his family.<sup>392</sup> But, his steps being closely watched by radical Sunnis, he could not allow himself to concede any change of the status quo regarding ‘*azâdârî*’. During a meeting with D.C.s and high-ranking police officers in April 1958, he announced that no new licences for Muharram processions would be issued that year.<sup>393</sup> This was interpreted as “an admission that ‘*azâdârî*’ processions are the cause of riots” by the TAS, which repeated its demand for a general ban on them.<sup>394</sup> Qizilbash also announced “strict measures” against people spreading sectarian hatred at the same April meeting, and shortly after ordered the arrest of the Shia preacher Khadim Husain from Gojra (Lyallpur Dist.) for alleged abuses against the first Caliph.<sup>395</sup> Yet no steps against the TAS demagogues were taken. For example, Khalid Mahmud called on the Shias with impunity either to give up their *mazhab* or leave the country for Iran at the annual session of the Deobandi *Jâmi‘at Ashrafiya* in Lahore on 29 April.<sup>396</sup> During a TAS convention in Bhakkar on 23–25 May, Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari exhorted the audience to become *ghâzîs* and *mujâhids* in defence of Sunni sanctities. Shortly after in the same town a Shia preacher (S. Agha Muhsin) was stabbed to death on the road by a Sunni zealot because he had quoted a *hadîth* from the Prophet exalting the status of Ali Ibn Abi Talib among the *sahâba*. The killer had then surrendered himself to the police and offered a prayer of thanksgiving.<sup>397</sup>

However, the Qizilbash government did take sufficient precautions against a new wave of violence during Muharram 1378H (18 July–16 August

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1958). A meeting of Shia and Sunni '*ulamâ*' and leaders was convened in the Civil Secretariat Lahore on 16 May to discuss the main controversial issues, including the alleged abuse and insulting of the *sahâba* by Shias.<sup>398</sup> Additional sessions were chaired by Qizilbash himself on 9 and 16 July,<sup>399</sup> and the month of Muharram passed without major incidents.<sup>400</sup> After that relative success, Qizilbash appointed a new "Muslim Unity Board", which held its first meeting on 18 August and formed three subcommittees.<sup>401</sup> Before another session scheduled on 9 October could be held, the proclamation of martial law on 7 October 1958 created a completely new situation, including an effective clamp-down on sectarian propaganda for some time.<sup>402</sup> Five years later, however, the Shia-Sunni conflict about '*azâdârî*' would resurface more violently than before.<sup>403</sup>

### *The demand for "reserved seats"*

The climax of the campaign against '*azâdârî*' in Muharram 1377H (August 1957) had somewhat increased government attention to the sectarian problem, but it could not intimidate most activists of the Shia organisations. The ITHS leaders responded to the challenge with a hardening of their own positions and new political demands, joined by a number of individual members of the APSC. Thus for the first time since the failure of the All-Pakistan Shia Board in 1952 the two large Shia organisations came close to forming a common front or even merging with each other in the winter of 1957–58.

The new upsurge of Shia communal mobilisation was helped by preparations for what should have become the first countrywide parliamentary elections in Pakistan (in application of the 1956 constitution), scheduled to be held in 1958.<sup>404</sup> As had been the case during the Punjab provincial elections of March 1951, blatant sectarian propaganda against Shia candidates started already in the fall of 1957 in spite of an official ban.<sup>405</sup> Thus not only Shia religious ceremonies were facing strong pressure, but also Shia political representation in Pakistan seemed to be at stake. Under these circumstances an "All-Parties Shia Convention" was held in Lahore on 14–15 December 1957 and attended by many leading members of both the ITHS and the APSC.<sup>406</sup>

During the two sessions of the first day of the convention, plans to merge ITHS and APSC were supported by all speakers, including APSC stalwarts like Sha'iq Ambalvi and Sadiq Ali 'Irfani, and a twenty-member commission chaired by Malik Fath Sher of Jhamat was formed for that purpose.<sup>407</sup>

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‘Irfani complained about “many useless meetings with hundreds of resolutions passed” during the last ten years, and that Shia ministers and members of assemblies had never represented their *qaum*; what was needed were “true spokesmen for the Shias”.<sup>408</sup> On the second day of the convention (15 December), both S. Muhammad Ali Shamsi (ITHS) and S. Nâdir Ali Rizvi (APSC) tabled resolutions demanding “reservation of seats” for Shias at parliamentary elections. Although a number of delegates spoke out against that demand,<sup>409</sup> the supporters had no difficulty arousing the passions of a large majority in favour of the resolution. Major (retd.) S. Mubarak Ali Shah—who would be elected chairman of the ITHS four years later—pleaded for the postponement of a decision on the matter because leaders like Qizilbash, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Col. (retd.) S. ‘Abid Husain were absent. He was reminded by S. Nâdir Ali that all Shias had been invited to the convention, “but our notables and powerful people are in no need of the *qaum* and do not consider any Shia meeting necessary”. When Malik Fath Sher warned that only very few Shias would make it to the parliament if such a resolution was adopted, Sha’iq Ambalvi argued that Shias could win twenty to twenty-two seats in the National Assembly theoretically, but since they were faced with poisonous sectarian propaganda throughout the country, hardly two to four Shia candidates stood a chance to get elected.<sup>410</sup> Finally a resolution was passed which, after giving a lengthy account of injustices done to Shias and indifference of the government to their plight, stated:

... the neglect of duty on the side of the government has obliged the Shia sect to define its position for the sake of protection of its life and property and its religious slogans. Moreover, mischievous elements have made all preparations for suppressing our religious slogans and for completely defeating Shia candidates in the forthcoming elections. Thus there is no other remedy for the religious and political protection of the Shias but demanding reservation of seats.<sup>411</sup>

With this new demand, the said Shia leaders had departed from a line pursued since the foundation of Pakistan. During all previous meetings of the ITHS and the APSC, only “adequate” and “effective” representation of Shias in parliaments and other institutions of the state had been demanded.<sup>412</sup> Such reluctance of Pakistani Shia activists to struggle for any form of “political confessionism” on the Lebanese model could partly be explained by the strong negative reactions of the Sunni majority to the demand for “separate representation” tabled by Husainbhai Lalji in 1945.<sup>413</sup> Another important reason had been the negative attitude of the Shia political elite (mainly the landlords) towards such a demand.

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Already in the pre-partition years, the Shia notables—then fairly well represented in the parliament of the Punjab—had been criticised for lacking interest in the defence of Shia rights and for always seeking to please their Sunni voters instead.<sup>414</sup> This state of affairs remained much the same after 1947, when it became more difficult for Shia candidates to get elected. Shias won only a few of the eighty-five seats in the December 1951 provincial elections of the NWFP and of the 111 seats in Sindh in May 1953.<sup>415</sup> They had only three representatives in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (dissolved in 1954)<sup>416</sup> and only one representative in the twenty-five-member “Basic Principles Committee”.<sup>417</sup> Shias had still won twenty-two of the 197 Punjab provincial seats in 1951,<sup>418</sup> but when a West Pakistan Assembly was formed in January 1956 through a procedure of selection from the existing provincial assemblies, only twenty of its 227 members were Shias.<sup>419</sup>

The demand for “reserved seats” reflected many Shias’ loss of patience with the traditional political leadership of their sect as much as with the attitude of subsequent governments towards the sectarian problem. Criticism of the “opportunistic Shia leaders” had been fairly common in *Razākār* since the 1940s, but now even *Asad*, the organ of the conservative APSC, joined in such complaints. In an editorial of that weekly on 18 January 1958 titled “Our ten-year-long failures and their reason” it was stated:

During the ten-year-long era of Pakistan the TAS and its allied groups have so much poisoned the atmosphere against Shias that today their lives, property and honour are no longer safe. Shia journals and poor Shia activists<sup>420</sup> have many times brought the destructive activities of these mischievous elements to the attention of the Shia men in power, but [action upon] our warnings was made sacrifice to political interests ... if any Shia activist comes to the court of leadership (sic) of a powerful Shia person to present any Shia matter, he will be granted an audience only after waiting three hours. Then he will be sent off after one minute with the promise: “Very well, we will talk about it” or “we will study it”. But if a third-class political worker or anyone who can bring some votes comes to him, our Shia leader will receive him at the doorstep and will sit and laugh with him for hours. On most occasions a Shia minister who sees a Shia activist approaching him from far will say: “this plague is coming”, or, if he is in a bad mood: “I did not win through Shia votes, therefore I am not a Shia minister”...<sup>421</sup>

By late 1957 many activists of both the ITHS and the APSC had come to the conclusion that only reserved seats for Shias in the assemblies could bring about genuine Shia representatives who would make a stand for the defence of Shia rights if needed. It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 1 of

the 1957 Lahore Convention did not demand “separate representation” for Shias throughout the country (as Husainbhai Lalji had done in 1945), but the designation of certain constituencies where only Shia candidates would be allowed to run. The same had been granted to *muhâjirs* during the provincial elections of the Punjab and Sindh in 1951 and 1953. The demand did not yet include any specification of the number and location of such “Shia constituencies”.

Nevertheless, it was considered premature and inopportune even by some ITHS members present at the Lahore Convention. In the following weeks, more statements from prominent Shias against the demand for “reserved seats” followed, most of which were published in the Sunni press. Among the opponents were Justice S. Jamil Husain Rizvi, Secretary-General of the ITHS since 1956,<sup>422</sup> and S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, Vice-Chairman of the APSC.<sup>423</sup> The arguments brought forward against the demand by Shias themselves were summed up in *Razâkâr* as follows: 1) It would be a “deathly poison” for the Shias; 2) it was unconstitutional and against the national interest; 3) it would ignite sectarian hatred; 4) it was unjust and detrimental to all Muslims; 5) if that demand of the Shias was accepted, other Muslim sects would follow suit with similar demands; 6) it would not win approval by the APSC.<sup>424</sup>

Needless to say, no voice in favour of reserved seats for Shias in the assemblies was heard from any Sunni government official or political leader. The TAS, for its part, by early 1958 had invented a new election stunt, exhorting Sunnis not to vote for any Shia candidate unless he would give a written promise to back a bill for the “protection of the honour of the *sahâba*” in parliament.<sup>425</sup> Even the Shia supporters of reserved seats had no illusions that it would take “unity, organisation, hard work and sacrifices” to get such a demand accepted by any government,<sup>426</sup> but for the first time in six years serious attempts were made to bring about the needed unity of the Shia organisations.

On 16 March 1958 simultaneous sessions of the Working Committees of the ITHS and the APSC were held in Lahore. The former, chaired by Hafiz Kifayat Husain and held in the house of S. Jamil Husain Rizvi, arrived at a majority decision to support both important resolutions of the All-Pakistan Shia Convention of December 1957, namely the merger of ITHS and APSC and the demand for reserved seats. The fifty delegates present then proceeded to *Karbalâ’-i Gâme Shâh* for a scheduled joint meeting with the APSC representatives, but the latter did not show up that afternoon.<sup>427</sup> At the session of the APSC Working Committee on the same day Sha’iq

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Ambalvi had not only spoken strongly in favour of the December 1957 resolutions, but had also for the first time vented his frustration about the APSC President Qizilbash, whom he accused of having lost interest in Shia communal affairs since some time.<sup>428</sup> Qizilbash, who had become minister in the Federal Government some months before, partially admitted the charge, excusing himself with his numerous other obligations.<sup>429</sup> He also admitted that sectarian tensions in Pakistan had reached a level, which would make it difficult for Shia candidates to win elections and did not exclude the possibility that he himself would have to support the demand for reserved seats, too. For the time being, however, he did not want to take a decision on the matter, because "he did not yet have time to study the two resolutions".<sup>430</sup> Since opinions within the APSC Working Committee were also almost equally divided between supporters and opponents of reserved seats, no decision could be reached on that day and the joint meeting with the ITHS was cancelled.<sup>431</sup>

Qizilbash had offered to discuss the question with APSC Council members in the following days, but his appointment to the position of Chief Minister of West Pakistan two days later (18 March 1958), changed the situation. Naturally, he could no longer be expected to act as a spokesman of special Shia demands.<sup>432</sup> Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, then acting Secretary-General of the ITHS, even saw greater dangers for the Shias with one of their sect serving as chief minister, because fanatical mullahs would brand the spectre of a "Shia state" in Pakistan.<sup>433</sup> In any case, both the demand for reserved seats and projects for merging the ITHS and the APSC withered away in the following months, long before the political scene in Pakistan changed completely in October 1958.

In the following decade of martial law and Ayub Khan's "guided democracy", the demand for reserved seats was completely discarded by the Shia organisations in favour of the former slogan of "adequate representation". Even the latter demand was only rarely articulated by the new Shia movement of S. Muhammad Dihlavi from 1964 to 1968, which took great pains to portray Shia demands as "entirely religious".<sup>434</sup> Attempts to create a genuine Shia political representation in Pakistan were resumed only in 1969.<sup>435</sup>



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### *The impact of martial law and secularism*

One effect of the October 1958 events was to remove some Shia individuals from the highest positions of power. President Iskandar Mirza, whose political manoeuvring had heavily contributed to the failure of parliamentary democracy in the years after the enactment of Pakistan's first constitution,<sup>1</sup> had abrogated that constitution and imposed martial law on 7 October. This ended both the term of Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash as Chief Minister of West Pakistan and of the federal cabinet of the latter's ally Feroz Khan Noon with its two Shia ministers.<sup>2</sup> No Shias would be appointed to the federal and provincial cabinets for the coming six years.<sup>3</sup> On 27 October 1958, Iskandar Mirza was himself forced to resign and exiled by General Ayub Khan.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, the coup of Ayub Khan was generally greeted with relief by the Shias, as by most of their Pakistani countrymen. Neither President Mirza nor Qizilbash nor, for that matter, any other Shia minister or deputy since 1947 had done much for promoting Shia interests when in office.<sup>5</sup> By contrast, one immediate positive effect of the 1958 “revolution”—apart from Pakistan's recovery from a severe economic crisis—was a lull in the activities of anti-Shia extremists. Martial law rules prohibited the distribution of pamphlets and posters against any sect and ordered citizens to report such incidents to the next police station; the authors of propaganda inciting hatred on sectarian, provincial and linguistic grounds were threatened with up to fourteen years of prison, and those found printing or distributing

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such propaganda with up to ten years.<sup>6</sup> Although martial law, which remained in force until June 1962, could not intimidate the zealots for long,<sup>7</sup> there was enough deterrence to prevent all incidents of sectarian violence until March 1961.<sup>8</sup> There were a few such incidents during Muharram in 1961 and 1962, too,<sup>9</sup> but by-and-large the sectarian situation remained well under control until the spring of 1963.<sup>10</sup>

There were a number of other changes affecting the Shias. One early measure of Ayub Khan's government was the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) from August 1959, providing former political leaders with the option of being tried for "misconduct" or disqualifying themselves from engaging in political activity.<sup>11</sup> Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash was the most prominent Shia who opted for political retreat under EBDO until 31 December 1966.<sup>12</sup> His younger brother Major (retd.) Zulfiqar Ali Qizilbash (1911–90), however, was elected to the National Assembly as a member of the Convention Muslim League allied to Ayub Khan in 1962,<sup>13</sup> and Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan found more time to occupy himself with Shia communal affairs. By 1964 he was again very active in this field, apparently still enjoying privileged access to the ruling circles.<sup>14</sup> Among those disqualified through EBDO were also his distant relative Mumtaz Husain Qizilbash (1897–1964), who had been Chief Minister of the Khairpur State from 1948 until its dissolution in 1955 and later a minister of the West Pakistan government,<sup>15</sup> and Col. (retd.) S. 'Abid Husain, a leading landlord of Jhang.<sup>16</sup> The Secretary-General of the ITHS, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, for his part, was an enthusiastic supporter—not to say a flatterer—of Ayub Khan's regime right from the start.<sup>17</sup> In his report on the organisation's activities during the preceding years read at an ITHS convention in Lahore (7–9 April 1961) he said, among other things:

The era of martial law has become a blessing for the ITHS, and it has forced those who had conspired against it to retreat from politics.<sup>18</sup> The government of ... Ayub Khan has destroyed their dream in a humiliating way ... Now this group of conspirators are passing their days in retirement, while the ITHS is still alive by the grace of God and is performing the task of a spokesman of the Shias very well like before ...

God be praised, our present ruler is following a neutral policy in religious affairs and is giving complete freedom to all Pakistani citizens of different faiths ... the sectarian atmosphere in the country has become quite calm, and the situation is improving rapidly. The time is fast approaching when all religious groups will perform their religious ceremonies in complete freedom...<sup>19</sup>

Such eulogies on the martial law government were also common in editorials of *Razâkâr* in the years from 1959 to 1962. The latter were full of

references to “the new era of progress” in the economic and scientific fields, to which the Shias would need to adjust. Even allowing for a certain degree of opportunism, the gratitude for relief from sectarian strife, corrupt politicians and economic hardship seems to have been genuine.<sup>20</sup>

That was only one side of the coin, however. On the other side, many articles in the Shia press from the late 1950s onwards deplored a “rampant materialism” and fast decline of interest in religion in their society, especially among the higher educated young generation, and appealed to the ‘*ulamâ*’ to change their old-fashioned style of preaching in order to meet that challenge. Once more the very existence of the Shia minority in Pakistan was pictured as being at stake, this time because of a general decline of religious belief.<sup>21</sup> But unlike some Sunni religious parties, which confronted the Ayub Khan regime because of its allegedly anti-Islamic policies,<sup>22</sup> Shia organisations never put any such blame on the new regime.

Ayub Khan himself had made clear his aversion against any political role for “the Mullahs” from the start of his rule,<sup>23</sup> and he did not shrink back from antagonising the religious lobby in order to implement some secularist reforms. One of the first measures to clip the wings of the clergy was the Waqf Properties Ordinance from April 1959, when a “Chief Administrator Auqaf” was appointed to register and control their assets.<sup>24</sup> Although the state did not appropriate the income of the *auqâf*, a series of further laws implemented from 1960 onwards put the Auqaf Department in charge of the administration of hundreds of the most profitable *auqâf* in Pakistan, the income of which was henceforth used according to bureaucratic instructions.<sup>25</sup> The new regulations were justified with alleged mismanagement of the *auqâf* and misappropriation of their assets by the *sajjâda-nishîns* and *mutawallis*, as similar steps by the Punjab government taken already in 1952 had been.<sup>26</sup> In both cases the ITHS and its mouth-piece *Razâkâr* had applauded to the principle of supervision of the *auqâf* by the state, but demanded that the administration of Sunni and Shia *auqâf* should be separated and only Shias be put in charge of the latter.<sup>27</sup> This demand was repeated at the ITHS convention in Lahore of April 1961, and it became one of the three central demands of the new Shia movement from 1964 onwards.<sup>28</sup> The position of the APSC was different, because its President Qizilbash was himself controlling one of the largest Shia *auqâf* in Pakistan. Although not openly opposing state supervision, Qizilbash was always trying to retain influence in the Auqaf Board through different tactics in order to maintain *de facto* control of the assets of his family *waqf*.<sup>29</sup>

While the *sajjâda-nishîns* of the numerous shrines of holy men in Pakistan included some renowned religious figures, most had become like ordinary

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big landowners, drawing benefits from the religious prestige of some more or less distant ancestor. Among them were a number of Shia notables in the Punjab, especially in the districts of Sargodha, Jhang and Multan.<sup>30</sup> The Ayub Khan regime presented its new laws on *auqâf* as complementary to a land reform started in 1961, although the latter would remain without much impact.<sup>31</sup> Another side-effect of them was to bring a number of *dînî madâris* under government control, but apparently none of the few Shia schools was included.<sup>32</sup> Both Sunni and Shia *madâris* responded to the challenge with the formation of countrywide umbrella organisations.<sup>33</sup>

The most controversial issue tackled by the martial law regime was the Muslim Family Law Ordinance promulgated in 1961. It was fiercely opposed by Sunni religious parties as well as some Shia '*ulamâ*' for allegedly violating Koranic principles of marriage.<sup>34</sup> Shia protests against new legislation in this field became more widespread in July 1964, when the West Pakistan Assembly passed a bill changing some regulations regarding the rights of inheritance of widows.<sup>35</sup> It was denounced as "interference in religion" (*mudâkhalat fi'd-dîn*) because it contradicted the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*, and the Shia MPAs were blamed for negligence.<sup>36</sup>

In February 1960 elections for 80,000 so-called "Basic Democrats", each representing from 800 to 1,500 citizens, took place, which then elected Ayub Khan President of Pakistan for a five-year term.<sup>37</sup> Immediately thereafter, the President appointed a commission to submit constitutional proposals in the form of a report.<sup>38</sup> Starting its work in April 1960, it distributed some 28,000 copies of a detailed questionnaire in English, Urdu and Bengali language to "various organisations and prominent members of the public", upon which a total number of 6,269 replies were received and studied, in addition to personal interviews conducted by the members of the commission all over Pakistan.<sup>39</sup> On 5–6 May 1960, a meeting of forty Sunni '*ulamâ*' at the *Jâmi'at Ashrafiya* Lahore discussed the questionnaire and formulated its answers.<sup>40</sup> Although those recommendations containing blatant anti-Shia bias did not influence the later constitution in any way, they indicate how little attitudes had changed since the imposition of martial law (excerpts):

- 2) The official state religion of Pakistan is Islam according to the way of the *ahl-i sunnat wa'l-jamâ'at*, and its head of state has to be an orthodox (*sahîh ul-'aqida*) Muslim. The same applies to all ministers and officials.
- 23) Article 129 of the previous constitution<sup>41</sup> granting each citizen the right to follow and propagate any religion is completely un-Islamic. There is no greater crime in Islam than apostasy, and an Islamic government can neither allow the preaching of *kuf*r nor apostasy from Islam. Therefore it must be

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added to the said Article: “... but in Pakistan *tabligh* will be allowed only for the Islam based on *mâ anâ ‘alaihi wa-ashâbi’*,”<sup>42</sup> and no Muslim will be allowed to leave the Islam of *mâ anâ ‘alaihi wa-ashâbi’*.<sup>43</sup>

- 40) During the history of Pakistan the small sects have always displayed narrow-mindedness and fanaticism and caused distress for the great majority ... therefore, to remove apprehensions of the masses and their mistrust of the government, it is necessary that such persons will not be kept in ministries and other responsible positions...<sup>44</sup>

Shia organisations, for their part, repeated the constitutional demands which had been made already in 1953.<sup>45</sup> The ITHS discussed the questionnaire at meetings in the house of the advocate S. Muhammad Ali Zaidi in Lahore on 15 and 29 May 1960.<sup>46</sup>

The commission completed its report in April 1961, but it took until 1 March 1962, for the new constitution to be enacted. It incorporated Ayub Khan’s “Basic Democrats”—who elected a new National Assembly in April 1962—and introduced a presidential system, but upheld all safeguards for minorities included in the 1956 constitution in almost identical wording.<sup>47</sup> One of its new elements was the creation of the Islamic Advisory Council (*Majlis-i Mushâwarat-i Islâmî*), later renamed the (Advisory) Council of Islamic Ideology (CII).<sup>48</sup> The Council represented an attempt to integrate the reform-minded elements of the religious elite in order to provide Islamic legitimacy to basically secularist and nationalist policies.<sup>49</sup> Assisted by a newly established “Islamic Research Institute”,<sup>50</sup> it was to work out recommendations on the proper application of injunctions of Islam in legislation and general policies, but was not given any veto powers.<sup>51</sup> Among its eight members appointed in August 1962 was Hafiz Kifayat Husain,<sup>52</sup> who could contribute to its proceedings only until March 1964 when he suffered a stroke.<sup>53</sup> In November 1965 he was finally replaced by Mufti Ja’far Husain.<sup>54</sup> It was only during the latter’s term that recommendations of the CII were of some significance for the Shias.<sup>55</sup>

The years between 1959 and 1962 marked a period of crisis and gradual reorientation of Shia communal activities. After attempts to merge the ITHS and APSC had failed in early 1958<sup>56</sup> and the sectarian conflict had cooled down, the interest of Shias to work for these two organisations reached low ebb. Petty internal quarrels like the controversies about *khums*<sup>57</sup> or about Friday prayers in Multan<sup>58</sup> were fought out with stubbornness, further eroding the reputation of the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ among the intellectuals. Other issues raised by the Shia press in these years included renewed criticism of the local *anjumans*, which were accused of squandering Shia capital for *majâlis* and *mahâfil* instead of doing constructive work for the welfare of their

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respective communities,<sup>59</sup> and of the excessive habit of collecting donations (*chanda*) which had created “a class of *chanda*-eaters”.<sup>60</sup>

On 7–9 April 1961 the ITHS held its first “annual session” since 1956 when Hafiz Kifayat Husain had been elected chairman.<sup>61</sup> The latter had almost withdrawn from his leadership functions already one year later after a personal quarrel with the acting Secretary-General, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi,<sup>62</sup> but had been replaced only in early 1961.<sup>63</sup> His successor Major (retd.) S. Mubarak Ali Shah (1900–75), a landlord and descendant of Shah Jiwna (Jhang District), was one of the few former Shia deputies and ministers who had frequently spoken out on Shia interests and demands.<sup>64</sup> He would later become a loyal supporter of S. Muhammad Dihlavi,<sup>65</sup> whereas Shamsi, who was formally elected Secretary-General of the ITHS at the April 1961 convention,<sup>66</sup> already in that year criticised initiatives to found a new organisation to replace both the ITHS and APSC.<sup>67</sup> At a session of the ITHS Council in October 1962 he submitted his resignation “due to chronic illness and too much private occupation” but was urged by all Council members to stay in his post.<sup>68</sup> Apparently he had been against the 1964 Karachi ‘*ulamâ*’ convention and the new leadership role of S. Muhammad Dihlavi from the start, although he came out openly in opposition to him only two years thereafter.<sup>69</sup>

In any case, the ITHS was neither able to overcome its rivalry with the APSC, nor to revive Shia enthusiasm for communal goals. Two key resolutions of the April 1961 convention had announced the foundation of a Shia daily newspaper and of a “Shia Ltd. Company” engaged in industrial activities in order to provide more qualified employment for the youth, but these projects never took off.<sup>70</sup> The third key resolution was the decision to build a new Shia Hostel in Lahore, which would take another eleven years to be implemented.<sup>71</sup> The only noteworthy initiative launched by the ITHS in the following two years was a convention on 20 January 1963 chaired by Mufti Ja‘far Husain, which was devoted to the issue of a separate Shia syllabus for *dîniyât*.<sup>72</sup> It revived the same demands that had already been made with little success in the early 1950s, but three months later not even a projected Working Committee had been elected because of jealousies from the side of the APSC.<sup>73</sup> Soon after, the 1963 Muharram violence and its sequels would overshadow everything else for the Shia organisations.

### *The 1963 riots and their aftermath*

The relative calm on the sectarian front in the years from 1959 to 1962 had gone along with some curtailing of Shia religious life, too. Since 1959 only

one official holiday was left in Muharram, which was generally considered insufficient to observe ‘*azâdârî* in the customary way.<sup>74</sup> In Lahore, where the largest ‘*azâdârî* processions of the country were led out traditionally, these were banned in 1961 and permitted in the following year only after some new restrictions had been imposed.<sup>75</sup> In Narowal a number of Shias were arrested in August 1961 for defying a ban on *Chihlum* processions.<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless Shias were by and large satisfied with the policy of the martial law government regarding the sectarian problem.

But after the lifting of martial law in June 1962, it did not take long until anti-Shia propaganda in word and in writing was resumed with vigour. “Pioneering” in this sense was the weekly *Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Hadîth* (Lahore), which already during Muharram in 1961 had compared the Shias’ recitation of elegies (*marâsî* and *nauhajât*) with the “howling of dogs”.<sup>77</sup> But the editor of that journal was just as adamantly denouncing his Sunni countrymen for “*pîr*-worshipping” and “grave-worshipping” as he accused the Shias of “*ta’ziya*-worshipping”,<sup>78</sup> thus isolating himself among the majority sect, too. The most serious challenge for Shias, as in the late 1950s, came from the TAS and its numerous preachers who were able to ignite the passions of the Sunni ‘*awâm*.

The pet object of their diatribes remained ‘*azâdârî* processions. Thus in early 1963 the TAS leader Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari took an ITHS convention in Lahore devoted to the demand for separate *dînîyât* as the starting point for a renewed attack on Shia ‘*azâdârî* traditions.<sup>79</sup> His editorial in the TAS organ *Da’wat* on 1 February 1963 articulated an interesting new argument against the Shia practices (excerpts):

The TAS ... has been struggling for 12 years that no sectarian *majlis*, meeting (*jalsa*) or procession can be held in the settlement of a section of the population if it contradicts its beliefs. If the peculiar ceremonies of each sect would remain confined to their special places of worship or to the private houses of its followers, then the strife between two sects which we witness every year in different forms would disappear forever ...

We are noticing that Shia *ta’ziya-dârî* and their special sectarian *mâtamî julûs* in our areas and quarters and in front of our youth are influencing their beliefs in an unconscious way, and those of our people and school children who are ignorant about their *mazhab* are accepting it as part of their belief. Even if they do not become Shias entirely, they are surely becoming half-Shias gradually. This is causing considerable heartache for us, because we are seeing the future of our *qaum* in black colours.<sup>80</sup>

The text quoted above contains perhaps the most honest explanation ever given by the TAS for its fierce opposition against Shia public religious

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ceremonies. Regarding its reference to Sunni “settlements” or “quarters” (*âbâdî*), it must be kept in mind that most Shias of Pakistan lived scattered in Sunni majority areas.<sup>81</sup> The admission that many “ignorant” Sunnis had got used to the Shia ceremonies—which was obvious from the active participation of numerous Sunnis in Muharram processions until some decades ago<sup>82</sup>—was also revealing: it was precisely that normalcy in sharing religious traditions with the Shias which some Sunni zealots wanted to destroy at all cost in order to revive what they considered the purity of their faith.

In April 1963, some weeks before Muharram 1383H (25 May–23 June), sectarian tensions in Lahore were building up, starting with Shia protests against an article of the daily *Kôhistân* which had claimed that the Imam Ali had drunken alcohol on some occasion.<sup>83</sup> On 12 April the TAS in the Krishannagar quarter came out with a new ploy, proclaiming a memorial day for Mu‘awiya (who had contested the caliphate of Ali) to be observed with recitations from the Koran.<sup>84</sup> Provocative posters were distributed, praising the Caliph Mu‘awiya with all honorific names and eulogies that Shias normally reserve for their Imam Ali.<sup>85</sup> The authorities reacted by banning any celebrations on “*Yaum-i Mu‘âwîya*”, and the Sunni press was as critical as it had been in 1957–58 concerning the TAS campaign for a “*Yaum-i ‘Umar*”.<sup>86</sup> The administration also convened a reconciliation committee of Sunni and Shia notables in Lahore in order to pre-empt violence during Muharram. The agreements reached were apparently broken both by Sunni preachers and by Shias who tried to take out some unlicensed additional processions on 9 Muharram.<sup>87</sup> On 10 Muharram (3 June), the main ‘*azâdârî*’ procession was attacked with stones, sticks and knives when passing in front of the *Unchî Masjid* near the Bhatti Gate of the Old City. The assaults continued from all sides for at least half an hour, leaving two dead and over 100 injured.<sup>88</sup> The police opened fire, but were unable to stop the rioting until the procession had reached *Karbalâ’-i Gâme Shâh*.<sup>89</sup>

On the same day, sectarian clashes occurred in a number of other Pakistani towns and villages.<sup>90</sup> Worst affected was Theri in the Khairpur District, where an *imâmbârgâh* was set on fire killing dozens of Shia worshippers.<sup>91</sup> The overall death toll on 10 Muharram reached 120 according to official reports.<sup>92</sup> The new upsurge of violence came as a shock for many Shias who had believed that an era of religious tolerance and law and order had started in 1958. Some Shia leaders like Nawab Qizilbash had sensed the danger well ahead and had warned the authorities,<sup>93</sup> but in the aftermath of the riots none of them would put the blame on the government.<sup>94</sup> The Shia press, for its part, demanded that the government would conduct in-



depth investigations that would clearly prove the responsibility of the TAS and other anti-Shia fanatics.<sup>95</sup> Its attitude was well reflected in an article of Raja Lehasb Ali Khan in *Razâkâr* some weeks later (excerpts):

One sect of the Muslims wants to prevent the customary observation of the religious ceremonies of another sect, namely the *mâtamî julûs* of the Shias. For achieving that goal it has chosen the method of violence. The clear objective was to make the Shias afraid, so that they will refrain from performing these ceremonies. Thus the procession [in Lahore] was attacked by people who had ganged up with that intention, and who comprised dozens of people from other quarters apart from those affected by the rioting. They used stones, bottles and unlicensed weapons without restraint and did not shrink back from arson. Such incidents happened not only in Lahore, Khairpur and Narowal, but in some other places too, even if it was not mentioned in the press. Were it not for the peace-loving of the Shias and the farsightedness of other patriots, the damage would have been much greater...

If someone does not agree with the beliefs of another person or group and considers their ceremonies to be wrong, then he should not take part in them. But he has no right to put himself above the law and try to correct them by force. Besides, what yardstick do those Maulvis who were implicated in the recent riots have to judge others' beliefs? Is it not possible that they are wrong themselves? ...

Pakistan is a democratic country where the rights of all citizens are equal and where it is a fundamental right to make use of public places for gatherings etc. The first injustice done to Shias is that they are not allowed to take out their processions to public places unless they have obtained licences in advance, whereas all other Muslim sects can hold processions wherever they like in complete freedom without any licence...<sup>96</sup>

President Ayub Khan in a declaration one day after the riots had termed them a shame for Pakistan and for all Muslims and warned that no sect could enforce its beliefs on other sects.<sup>97</sup> Yet the leaders of some Sunni religious parties, who at the same time campaigned against the new Muslim Family Law and for the reinstatement of some Islamic provisions in the constitution,<sup>98</sup> were in a defiant mood. Apart from accusations that armed Shias themselves had provoked the clashes in Lahore,<sup>99</sup> the demand to ban all Shia '*azâdârî*' processions was repeated forcefully at a meeting of six Sunni groups in Lahore on 16 June.<sup>100</sup> A common board was formed comprising the JUI leaders Mufti Mahmud and Ghulam Ghauth Hazarvi as well as Shaikh Husam ud-Din, Master Taj ud-Din Ansari and Shuresh Kashmiri.<sup>101</sup> Hazarvi went as far as accusing fanatic Shia police officers and other civil servants of responsibility for the violence in Muharram.<sup>102</sup> Three weeks later, at a public meeting near the Mochi Gate of Lahore's Old City chaired by the D.C. and meant to reconcile local Sunnis and Shias, Hafiz Kifayat Husain

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and Muzaffar Ali Shamsi repeated the claim that abusing and insulting of any religious authority was absolutely forbidden for Shias. They were challenged by Kausar Niyazi, (then still a member of the *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî*), to say words in praise for the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn* there and then in order to convince the Sunnis in the audience of their good intentions.<sup>103</sup>

In mid-July a commission appointed by the Government of West-Pakistan to inquire into the responsibilities for the Lahore riots started its interrogations, protocols of which were published partially in the press.<sup>104</sup> One of the first witnesses interviewed was Mian Ghulam Qadir, a retired officer and patron (*sarparast*) of the JUP.<sup>105</sup> Even the representative of this relatively moderate party accused the government of blatant bias in favour of the Shias. He complained, among other things, about the obligation for Sunnis to keep their shops open during the Muharram processions, about their greatly increased number since 1947,<sup>106</sup> and that Shias were allegedly abusing the *sahâba* with impunity at their *majâlis* "throughout the year".<sup>107</sup> In reply to some questions from the Shia advocate Khaqan Babar, Ghulam Qadir said:

Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam. In the resolutions [of the Muslim League] there was no mentioning of Shias and Sunnis; neither it was mentioned that Shias will have the right to take out their processions even if these violate the feelings of the Sunnis...

... [religious] freedom does not exclude some prohibitions. If some people were supporters of Yazid and wanted to take out processions, would they be free to do so?<sup>108</sup>

The ITHS Secretary-General Muzaffar Ali Shamsi was interrogated by the commission on 27 July and 16 August 1963.<sup>109</sup> He and other Shia witnesses were subjected to probing questions about details of their faith.<sup>110</sup> In reply to one of such questions he termed the first three Caliphs usurpers (*ghâsib*), while once more denying that Shias would ever abuse these or other *sahâba*. Asked whether the first three Caliphs could be termed believers (*mu'minûn*) or Muslims, Shamsi argued that the matter would require a lengthy discussion by the '*ulamâ*'.<sup>111</sup> He also rejected any changing of the traditional route for the main '*azâdârî*' procession in Lahore as "interference in religion" (*mudâkhala fi'd-dîn*), and said it would be unacceptable and a "grave insult" to have its participants checked for arms by the police.<sup>112</sup>

One demand brought forward repeatedly by the Sunni parties at that time was the confiscation of "objectionable literature" by the government.<sup>113</sup> An editorial of *Razâkâr* on 1 September 1963 admitted the existence of very provocative *munâzara* literature from both Shia and Sunni writers dating

from the first decades of the century, but blamed “destructive elements” for unearthing and reprinting it in order to arouse sectarian passions. Besides, Shia journals would be able to quote many insulting remarks against their Imams and ‘*ulamâ*’ from Sunni pamphlets of that time, but would refrain from doing so for not pouring oil into the fire.<sup>114</sup> The editor of *Razâkâr* also rejected appeals by “self-styled flag-bearers of Muslim unity” that Shias should talk only respectfully about the first three Caliphs with the following unambiguous arguments:

... they know very well that these persons [the first three Caliphs] are controversial between Sunnis and Shias. For Shias both *tawallâ* and *tabarrâ* are part of their faith. *Tawallâ* means friendship with the friends of Muhammad and his family, whereas *tabarrâ* means to show that one has nothing to do (*lâ-ta‘alluqî kâ izhâr karnâ*) with the enemies of Muhammad and his family...

The way of the Sunnis is not to interfere with the “mutual rivalries” of the great religious figures, but rather to remain silent about these ... quite to the opposite, the way of the Shias is not to consider those persons or parties which have opposed Muhammad and his family as having been right, and hence to show that they have nothing to do with them...

Nobody can change historical facts. The history of Islam is telling us that after the death of the Prophet the question of the caliphate has been contested among the Muslims ... and that Ali and his followers (*shî‘ôn*) have chosen to become the “opposition party”. The Sunni brothers claim that Islam is supporting a democratic order, and that after the death of the Prophet the majority of Muslims have elected Abu Bakr Caliph ... therefore they must ... accept the Shias as an opposition party...

Shias accept that after the death of the Prophet the first three Caliphs were the commanders of the Islamic kingdom and that they are called successors of the Prophet. But Sunnis will never have the right to oblige Shias to have the same belief about the first three Caliphs as the Sunnis themselves have ... just as the Shias would have no right to demand from Sunnis to acknowledge the Imams of the *ahl-i bait* as *ma‘sum* and as their religious leaders...<sup>115</sup>

The ITHS was allowed to hold an oratory meeting in Lahore (*Karbalâ’-i Gâme Shâh*) to protest the Muharram events only more than four months later (18 October 1963).<sup>116</sup> By that time, preparations to organise an alternative platform for the defence of Shia rights had already reached their final stage in Karachi.<sup>117</sup> In December 1963 the Inquiry Committee published excerpts of its report on Lahore; (other parts were withheld “in order not to obstruct the ongoing efforts for reconciliation”).<sup>118</sup> It mentioned “propaganda and counter-propaganda” which had stirred up sectarian tensions during the last years, but refrained from putting the blame on the TAS or

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on any specific individuals. Instead, the inconvenience caused for local Sunnis by the lengthy ‘*azâdârî*’ processions through the narrow lanes of the Old City was highlighted in some detail.<sup>119</sup> Apparently more important than the identity of the instigators of sectarian violence were questions as to whether security precautions taken by the local administration had been sufficient, and whether the comportment of the police was adequate after rioting had started.<sup>120</sup>

The report closed with ten recommendations from the chairman of the Inquiry Committee which had been accepted in principle by the government: 1) the establishment of a reconciliation committee; 2) no new licences for processions and cancelling of licences for those who had not abided to the conditions; 3) no change of traditional procession routes except in case of dangers for security or in amicable agreement with the organisers; 4) additional conditions regarding security of the processions for licence-holders; 5) if possible, the duration of the main *zûljinnâh* procession should be reduced; and there should be no *mâtam* in front of mosques at the time of prayers or *azân*; 6) severe punishment for disrespectful references to the leaders of another sect; 7) a ban on carrying arms in Muharram; 8) private volunteers should not be employed on traffic duty or other duties normally performed by the police; 9) punishment for the spreading of rumours; 10) strengthening of the Lahore police force.<sup>121</sup>

As it turned out, no culprits of the 1963 sectarian violence were ever punished, whether in Lahore or in Theri.<sup>122</sup> The basic dilemma of any government in Pakistan, namely the need not to be perceived as biased in favour of the Shia minority, led to relative laxity towards Sunni extremists during the second half of the Ayub Khan era, despite the events of 1963. Similar outbreaks of violence could be prevented in the following years by stricter security precautions in Muharram, but for the sake of “symmetry” Shias had to live with more restrictions than before.<sup>123</sup>

### *Sayyid Muhammad Dihlavi and his new Shia movement*

The events of 1963 served as a catalyst for a new start in Shia communal organisation, which had been in the air for some years. Dissatisfaction with both the ITHS and the APSC had increased after a promising attempt to merge them had failed in early 1958.<sup>124</sup> New attempts and initiatives were resumed in the following years,<sup>125</sup> but it became clear that the leading members of both organisations were not ready to relinquish anything of their status as “spokesmen of the Shias”. This applied especially to the APSC

President Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash, who became more interested in Shia affairs after having lost executive power,<sup>126</sup> and to Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, who remained the real strongman of the ITHS even after the election of a new chairman in 1961 and his token resignation in 1962.<sup>127</sup> But there were a number of other office-holders in both organisations who had no interest in their dissolution or merger either.

Under these circumstances, there was little hope that the split of the organised Shias into two camps, which weakened their bargaining clout on all issues raised with the government or with local authorities, could be overcome. Since 1959 suggestions for a new organisation that would be headed by '*ulamâ*' had been launched,<sup>128</sup> and apparently they had gained some acceptance by 1961.<sup>129</sup> The '*ulamâ*' still enjoyed respect and popularity among the Shia '*awam*', but some Shia intellectuals had published scathing criticism of their '*ulamâ*' long since.<sup>130</sup> Karim Bakhsh Haidari, with his usual bluntness, wrote in February 1961 on the occasion of the election of a new ITHS Chairman replacing Hafiz Kifayat Husain:

... in spite of all the hand-kissing for '*abâ-o-qabâ*'<sup>131</sup> and the noisy slogans of *salawât* and *salâm*, we have repeatedly made the experience that the leadership of an '*âlim-i dîn*' has benefited Shia (*qaumî*) organisations very little ... the personal influence and respect he enjoys with the traders and notables is used very rarely for the good of the Shias and always much more for promoting his professional interests. An '*âlim-i dîn*' never makes revolutionary efforts ... even if he is a *mujtahid*, he thinks it is best for him to stay always far from striving and labour (*jadd-o-jehad*) and confine his leadership to guidance regarding some questions of *fiqh*. According to him, life does not mean striving and efforts, but inactivity, calm, safety, comfort, personal interest, prestige and respect.

He deems it a splendid sign of leadership to accept titles such as *Nâ'ib-i Imâm*,<sup>132</sup> *Âyatullâh fi'l-'Alamain*,<sup>133</sup> *Hujjat ul-Islâm wa'l-Muslimîn*,<sup>134</sup> orator (*khatib*) or preacher (*wâ'iz*). Striving and efforts in the service of his *qaum* and *millat* and for its progress are outside the scope of his '*ijtihad*' ... Our bitter experiences with an '*âlim-i dîn*' as leader of the ITHS<sup>135</sup> are a warning example for us ....<sup>136</sup>

Three years later, commenting on the '*ulamâ*' convention which was to be held in Karachi within some days (see below), the same author had become even more critical of the Shia '*ulamâ*'. In an article, starting with references to the respect for the '*ulamâ*' in Pakistan's society and an account of the valuable services they would be able to perform in principle, he continued in a very different vein:

But alas! In Pakistan our '*ulamâ*' have become professional *zâkirs*. They have said good-bye to the unity of the [Shia] people and faith. Most of them have

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become *qasîda-khwânân*<sup>137</sup> for notables and powerful people. The ITHS and APSC have taken pity on them ... but their presence in both organisations has been confined to serve as stage decoration or to hold confused speeches. They have neither their own position nor a rule of conduct nor respect and are content to serve just as “loudspeakers”, intoxicating themselves with their *zâkirî*-business. [Their] leadership of the *qaum*: abolished; representing the *qaum*: non-existent; progress of religious knowledge: finished; work for reform and organisation together with preaching: zero; [they are] staying away from efforts for the Shia demands. Today *ijtihâd* means ‘*abâ-o-qabâ*’, *mujtahid* means *pîr* and *murshid*,<sup>138</sup> ‘*âlim* means speaker (*muqarrir*), and preacher (*wâ‘iz-o-muballigh*) means *zâkir*.

At the same time the western habit of unveiling [of women] (*be-pardagî*) has spread like a plague in our society. The respect for religion is vanishing. *Majâlis* for show and prestige and ‘*azâdârî* for payment (*nadhr-o-niyâz*) have become common. *Ghulûw* and self-exhibiting have made our faith and [religious] acts hollow.<sup>139</sup> There is film-*zâkirî* instead of Friday prayers; we have beautiful *imâm-bârgâhs* instead of progress of our [religious] schools, and our mosques are deprived of lessons on the Koran and congregational prayers...

The issue of separate *dinîyât* has been entrusted to the ‘*ulamâ*’, and we have seen the result.<sup>140</sup> The protection of ‘*azâdârî* is related to the professional interest of the ‘*ulamâ*’, but efforts for the protection of ‘*azâdârî* hardly ever appear on their working agenda; they leave them to the ITHS and the APSC ... Caring for pilgrim passports<sup>141</sup> is incompatible with the exalted position of the ‘*ulamâ*’. A country-wide campaign for safeguarding Shia *fiqh* and rights in the *auqâf* according to the four [canonical] books<sup>142</sup> is out of their reach. They cannot agree with each other on the organisation of the *dinî madâris* because it would be detrimental to their *zâkirî*-business ... They take fees of 100 Rupees for a *majlis* and make themselves *ghâzîs* of the word with expensive ‘*abâ-o-qabâ*, sumptuous pulpits and the art of rhetoric, but leave work and efforts for the people and prefer serenity for themselves ...<sup>143</sup>

These were notably the views of a man who had some years earlier been referred to as “the most sincere person of our *qaum*” by the editor of *al-Muballigh*, the mouthpiece of the orthodox ‘*ulamâ*’.<sup>144</sup> In fact many of the latter fully shared his misgivings about the *zâkirs*,<sup>145</sup> although they would probably not have agreed with the way he was putting ‘*ulamâ*’ and *zâkirs* into one basket. Karim Bakhsh Haidari was surely overdoing his diatribe against alleged passivity and idleness of the ‘*ulamâ*’, but the general line of his criticism was echoed by many other Shia intellectuals in those years.<sup>146</sup>

Thus it came as great and pleasant surprise for many observers that in early 1964 Pakistan’s Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ for the first time since the foundation of the country suddenly took the lead in Shia communal mobilisation. An “All-Pakistan Shia ‘*Ulamâ*’ Convention” in Karachi presided over by

S. Muhammad Dihlavi from 5–7 January 1964 turned out to be very successful, both through the large attendance of some 200–250 ‘*ulamâ*’<sup>147</sup> and through a remarkable display of unity.

According to Mirza Yusuf Husain, who was to become S. Muhammad Dihlavi’s right-hand man over the following seven years,<sup>148</sup> the idea to hold the convention had initially come from some ‘*ulamâ*’ in Hyderabad.<sup>149</sup> He himself and Shaikh Jawad Husain (Hangu), S. Safdar Husain Mashhadi (Peshawar) and Habib al-Hasan (Hyderabad) had been called to Karachi prepare the convention together with Dihlavi who paid its expenses on his own.<sup>150</sup> Mirza Yusuf Husain also claimed to have authored the letter of invitation, which was published in the Shia press in December 1963. It reminded the ‘*ulamâ*’ of their duty to assume a leadership role “to stem the world-wide tide of materialism” and called for an effective programme of action to unify and organise the Shias and “protect them from moral and religious decline”. At the same time the need to strengthen the unity of the Muslim people of Pakistan was emphasised.<sup>151</sup>

The convention was held at the *Imâmbârgâh-i Shâh-i Karbalâ*’ of the Rizvia Colony in Nazimabad (Karachi).<sup>152</sup> An inaugural speech of S. Ibn Hasan Najafi<sup>153</sup> recalled the role of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ in the Freedom Movement since 1857 and as founders of Shia communal organisations in British India since 1897.<sup>154</sup> S. Muhammad Dihlavi in his speech stressed the services of Shias for the Pakistan Movement and for the consolidation of the new state since 1947 and then gave a resumé of their unsolved problems, focussing on the long-time demands of separate *dîniyât*, exclusive Shia control over Shia *auqâf*, and the freedom and protection of ‘*azâdâri*’.<sup>155</sup> These three issues were made the core of a five-point “program of action” proclaimed at the convention, which also included “the defence and consolidation of Pakistan through the unity of the Muslims” (point 1) and “solidarity with the government policy on Kashmir” (point 5).<sup>156</sup> An “Action Committee” (*Majlis-i ‘Amal-i ‘Ulamâ-i Shi‘a-i Pâkistân*, MAUSP) was formed on the closing day of the convention “to implement the program of action”, and S. Muhammad Dihlavi was unanimously elected as its Chairman.<sup>157</sup> Henceforth he was referred to as *Qâ'id-i Millat-i Ja'fariya* by his supporters.<sup>158</sup>

Dihlavi was clearly the driving force behind the Karachi Convention, and although he pretended not to seek any leadership role for himself at its inauguration, he was to perform such a role very effectively and with great stamina and sincerity throughout the remaining seven-and-half years of his life. Born in 1899 in the village of Paytan Herhi (Bijnor Dist., U.P.) he had earned fame among Indian Shias as the *Khatib-i A'zam* (“Greatest Preacher”)



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long before the foundation of Pakistan.<sup>159</sup> Like his father he had taught at the Delhi Arabic School since the early 1920s. At the same time he had started to preach at *majâlis* and attracted the attention of wealthy sponsors like Nawab Riza Ali Khan of Rampur and Hajji Da'ud Nâsir, a leading member of the Khoja Twelver Shia community of Bombay.<sup>160</sup> In 1937 some enemies in Delhi tried to ruin his reputation by accusing him of rape, but he was cleared of all charges after a lawsuit in which S. Wazir Hasan of Lucknow had taken up his defence and the Nizam of Hyderabad (Deccan) had paid the expenses.<sup>161</sup> In 1939 he toured the Punjab and NWFP to mobilise support for the *Tabarrâ Agitation* in Lucknow.<sup>162</sup> When parts of his huge private library were burnt down in Rampur in August 1947 because of his sympathies for Pakistan, he moved to Bombay and started to transfer the remains of his library to Karachi, to where he finally migrated in 1952.<sup>163</sup> He continued to enjoy the patronage of Khoja traders like Hajji Da'ud Nâsir and Ibrahim Pirbhai and was invited to numerous preaching tours in East Africa,<sup>164</sup> Burma, and Middle Eastern countries.<sup>165</sup> Dihlavi also attended some ITHS conventions, but apparently never in a leading position,<sup>166</sup> devoting most of his spare time to studying and writing.<sup>167</sup>

In the early 1960s, however, Dihlavi shared the feeling of many other Shias in Pakistan that something had to be done to overcome the stagnation and inferiority complex of their community, which was then also losing interest in religious matters. While his intellectual calibre and religious devotion were held in high esteem, his low profile in the ITHS was favourable for playing a unifying role in Shia communal affairs. Both the ITHS and the APSC sent representatives to the Karachi Convention who duly proclaimed solidarity with Dihlavi.<sup>168</sup> According to Muhammad Bashir Ansari, who also participated, there were long discussions whether the ITHS and APSC should be dissolved in favour of a new organisation, but in the end it was decided that they should rest in place. The newly formed "Action Committee" (MAUSP) was only to be charged with compelling the government to accept the "three demands" mentioned above.<sup>169</sup>

The newly proclaimed "leader of all Shias" in Pakistan, although approaching his sixty-sixth birthday, was able to maintain and increase the momentum created by the successful Karachi Convention. His most effective way of mobilising support was frequent tours to centres of Shia presence throughout Pakistan, which he kept up almost until his death in 1971. From 20 February to 1 March 1964 he visited Lahore, meeting with local Shia '*ulamâ*', advocates, and notables and with the Governor General of West-Pakistan, Amir Muhammad Khan. His stay closed with a large public



gathering at *Karbalâ'-i Gâme Shâh*.<sup>170</sup> At a press conference on 29 February, S. Muhammad Dihlavi gave a comprehensive account of the “three demands” and their implications (excerpts):

After the foundation of Pakistan the Muslims had merely understood that their goal had been achieved and they would be free to do what they liked. The Muslims departed from religion, materialism spread fast, and morals declined. Our youth became very far from their Islamic culture (*tahzib*). To counter all these challenges, it would have been necessary that the ‘*ulamâ*’ of all sects would unite to preserve Islam in the Islamic country. One important objective of the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ convention in Karachi was to search for ways and means to unite all ‘*ulamâ*’ of the country, in order to overcome the curse of sectarianism and to create a good atmosphere between the Muslims.

Pakistan is not the country of one *qaum* or one *mazhab*, but all Muslim sects united have helped for its creation ... Shias became members of the Muslim League thinking that ... in Pakistan there would be full freedom for their religious rights (sic), that all sects would have a chance at elections, and that in government institutions there would be no sectarian discrimination ... but now our country is faced with a storm of sectarianism...

The first issue is that of joint religious instruction. In schools and colleges our children are given such a form of religious instruction that they do not understand their own *mazhab* at all. Therefore we want that both Shia and Sunni children receive religious instruction of their own ... so that the pupils can become fully acquainted with their *mazhab* and its requirements<sup>171</sup> and become true Muslims in that way ... For example, at the Aligarh University there are separate branches for Shia and Sunni *diniyât* and separate congregational prayers for both sects ...<sup>172</sup>

The second issue is concerning the Shia *auqâf* ... The government has passed laws to prevent their misuse by *mutawallis* and administrators. We are congratulating ... for that benevolent step; but at the same time we demand that the Auqaf Department must supervise them as intended by the law instead of becoming itself the *mutawalli*. The income of a *waqf* can only be used according to its purpose<sup>173</sup> ... How is that to be achieved? ... In India under the British rule and now under Hindu rule both Shias and Sunnis have been supervising their own *auqâf* within the Auqaf Department ... we demand that likewise Shia *auqâf* will be put under Shia control ...

The third demand is concerning ‘*azâdârî*. Sectarian elements are trying to create so much enmity between Shias and Sunnis that they go at each other’s throats, and Pakistan will get finished ... they are following the policy of the British and the Hindus. These enemies of Pakistan are spreading false information about ‘*azâdârî* among the ‘*awâm*, for example that the *sahâba* of the Prophet are abused during Shia *majâlis* and *julûs*, that Shias are no Muslims, that Shias spit into water and let others drink it, that Shias are idolaters, and who knows what else ... Shias have become an impure minority in their eyes of the other sects.

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They have become obliged to think that their life, property and religious slogans and ceremonies are no longer safe in this country...

It can never happen that a minority sect will give up its old religious beliefs and ceremonies on the orders of the majority sect. The memory of thirteen centuries cannot be erased. 'Azâdârî is a part of the faith of the Shias, and a right for which every Shia is ready to give any sacrifice at any time. Let the enemies of Pakistan come forward and tell us, when and where have the Shias abused the *sahâba*? When have they detested the Sunnis? These are all machinations (*rêsha-dawâniyân*) of the sectarian elements ... I am appealing to the Sunni 'ulamâ' in the name of the Shia 'ulamâ' to become united and get rid of such hostile elements and support the government. We Shia 'ulamâ' have decided to unite the Shias of Pakistan and help the government to keep Pakistan firm and stable...<sup>174</sup>

Professions of loyalty to the government and the country as expressed above would be repeated regularly by S. Muhammad Dihlavi and his supporters during the coming years together with the Shia demands. In March 1964 a delegation led by Dihlavi was received by President Ayub Khan for the first time and given some vague promises.<sup>175</sup> A second meeting took place on 14 May, focussing on the *dîniyât* issue.<sup>176</sup> The President then ordered the Secretary of Education, S. Muhammad Sharif, to discuss the matter with a Shia delegation. The only result of that meeting on 13 August in the presence of eight educational experts was the promise to form a commission of Shia and Sunni 'ulamâ' to eliminate objectionable passages from schoolbooks and to prepare new textbooks for history.<sup>177</sup> This fell short of the demand for separate religious instructions. Since no significant headway had been made through all meetings with representatives of the state within seven months, an All-Pakistan Shia Convention was called for in Rawalpindi on 28–30 August 1964 to discuss further steps.

Some 250 'ulamâ' and other Shia delegates gathered at Liaqat Bagh chaired by S. Muhammad Dihlavi, whose leadership received a boost by the event.<sup>178</sup> The meeting was organised by Dr S. Ajmal Husain Rizvi (d. 1997), a philanthropist who was to become an important supporter of the new movement in Rawalpindi.<sup>179</sup> The eight plenary sessions were presided over by renowned notables,<sup>180</sup> and a separate meeting of advocates and other jurists authorised Dihlavi to form an Advisory Board of the MAUSP.<sup>181</sup> One resolution tabled by Mufti Ja'far Husain rejected a recent legislative bill of the West Pakistan Assembly concerning the inheritance of widows as an interference with Shia personal law, thus contradicting Article 10 of the 1962 constitution;<sup>182</sup> others repeated the demands of the Karachi Convention.<sup>183</sup> It was also decided that S. Muhammad Dihlavi would once more seek an audience with the President together with the Chairmen of

the ITHS and the APSC and submit a memorandum, in order to make clear that these were the demands of all Shias in Pakistan.<sup>184</sup>

Until that time, Nawab Qizilbash and Muzaffar Ali Shamsi had not yet taken any steps disclosing their jealousy of the newly emerged *Qâ'id-i Millat*. Dihlavi himself had tried his best—and would continue to do so during the coming years—not to challenge the leadership of the “old guard”, but rather to get them on board for a joint effort. Thus he was anxious to give the ITHS and APSC due representation in delegations and commissions and paid all respect to their leaders.<sup>185</sup> For example, at the sidelines of the Rawalpindi Convention he intervened during a session of the ITHS Council and “ordered” Muzaffar Ali Shamsi to withdraw once more his resignation from the post of Secretary-General.<sup>186</sup>

In October 1964, however, the semblance of cooperation of the other Shia leaders received a first blow. S. Muhammad Dihlavi, who had toured some districts of Pakistan in the aftermath of the Rawalpindi Convention, had called for a peaceful protest day against the government’s delaying tactics to be held on 25 October.<sup>187</sup> On that very day, reports were appearing in the press that Qizilbash had met with President Ayub Khan and Governor Amir Muhammad Khan on 19 October and presented some Shia demands. The President had agreed in principle and declared his readiness to form a mixed board with adequate Shia representation to revise syllabi and make recommendations for the removal of such contents which would be objectionable for Shias. He had further promised that there would be no general ban on ‘*azâdârî*’ processions, but it was up to the local authorities to decide about provisions for public security wherever licences would be applied for.<sup>188</sup>

There was an immediate outcry from the supporters of Dihlavi that Qizilbash had “violated communal discipline” and that only the *Qâ'id-i Millat* had the right to discuss Shia demands with the President or the Governor.<sup>189</sup> Dihlavi himself in a statement on 28 October made it clear that the three main Shia demands had not been accepted so far. He insisted that merely correcting some textbooks would be no substitute for separate *dîniyât*, and that ‘*azâdârî*’ would not only concern the local authorities, but rather the government would have to make a clear statement in favour of freedom of religious practice as guaranteed by the constitution. Dihlavi also dismissed as insufficient an announcement from the Governor that a Shia representative would soon be included in the Waqf Administration Board.<sup>190</sup> Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, for his part, had lauded that announcement, and on 12 November it was his turn to be received by Ayub Khan with a delegation of “Shia leaders”.<sup>191</sup> These were only the first in a series of

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attempts by both Qizilbash and Shamsi to circumvent the emerging new Shia leadership and take credit themselves for any concessions offered by the government. Such manoeuvres were to continue and to become more obstinate throughout the following years.

On 30 November 1964 Dihlavi was again received by Ayub Khan along with a fifty-member delegation of '*ulamâ*', advocates and notables in the Government House of Lahore. He submitted a written memorandum,<sup>192</sup> reminding the president of the "very reasonable" demands of the Karachi Convention and of former meetings of Shia representatives with himself, the Governor of West-Pakistan and the Secretary of Education. Since pleas and protests of the Shias had not been paid attention so far, they had resorted to a protest day, which had been observed "exemplary peaceful". The memorandum contained the following admonition:

It is a need of the time that you intervene personally and confirm without further delay that we are entitled to our guaranteed religious freedom and fundamental civil rights according to the constitution which you yourself have promulgated, and the enforcement of which is your responsibility as the Head of State.<sup>193</sup>

Ayub Khan, who was at that time approaching the final stage of his contest for re-election as President against Fatima Jinnah,<sup>194</sup> replied in a conciliatory vein: since his government wished the well-being of the entire people without discrimination and fully supported religious freedom, he regretted that some complaints remained from the side of the Shias. He professed sympathy for the Shia demands and his readiness to solve their problems but maintained that, rather than issuing a decree, it would be better to form a joint commission of some members of the government and delegates named by Dihlavi to find a consensual solution.<sup>195</sup>

On the following day, *Nawâ-i Waqt* and some other newspapers reported that the leader of the Shias had proclaimed political support for Ayub Khan. This was denied emphatically by Mirza Yusuf Husain and by S. Muhammad Dihlavi himself,<sup>196</sup> who issued an immediate clarification in the Shia press: first, presidential elections were a political question, and the rules of a *fatwâ* would not apply to them; every Shia had complete freedom in that matter. Secondly, neither did he consider himself a *mujtahid* entitled to give *fatwâs* nor did he have anything to do with politics, but only with the religious demands of his *qaum*. Yet in that respect, he claimed to enjoy support from all Shia organisations and *anjumans*. He also distanced himself from those Shia delegations which had met the president before him.<sup>197</sup>

The new split within the ranks of Shia communal leaders had now become manifest. Since the autumn of 1964, some supporters of Dihlavi started dubbing those who did not submit to his supreme leadership as “traitors of the *qaum*” and became increasingly aggressive in their demands of “reckoning” with them. On top of such hot-heads was S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi (1913–2000), a *muhâjir* from Gurgaon District near Delhi who had settled in Multan after 1947 and earned fame as a popular orator, whose support was sought from candidates during elections.<sup>198</sup> Mushtaq Husain became a relentless campaigner for S. Muhammad Dihlavi’s movement and against the so-called “traitors of Lahore”—mainly Qizilbash, the APSC Secretary-General Sha’iq Ambalvi, and Muzaffar Ali Shamsi—in the years after 1964. Resentment against them was strong in Karachi, too, where local office-holders of the ITHS would soon distance themselves from Shamsi.<sup>199</sup> But Dihlavi himself was still willing to co-operate with other Shia leaders as much as possible for the higher goal of getting the “three demands” accepted. Resisting pressure from the radicals, he named Qizilbash among the five Shia delegates for the joint commission suggested by Ayub Khan, the others being the ITHS chairman S. Mubarak Ali Shah, Mufti Ja’far Husain, Ali Ahmad Khan Ja’fari<sup>200</sup> and Dihlavi himself.<sup>201</sup>

Governor Amir Muhammad Khan, who was to chair the said commission appointed four other high-ranking officials in February 1965.<sup>202</sup> As it turned out, however, not a single meeting of the commission was called during the following seven months, allegedly because Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, the governor’s “favourite” among the Shia leaders, was not included.<sup>203</sup> Instead, new restrictions were imposed on religious ceremonies in the form of a “Loudspeaker Ordinance” in March 1965. Although the ordinance affected Sunnis as well as Shias, the latter saw it as a new obstacle for their *‘azâdârî* processions, because the use of loudspeakers was henceforth banned in case “the people of the area were disturbed” and under a number of other circumstances.<sup>204</sup>

The government, instead of discussing the Shia demands within the joint commission, went ahead with its plan to appoint two Shias for a Joint Waqf Administration Board. A meeting of the *Shia Mutâlabât Committee* (SMC)—i.e. the five representatives named by Dihlavi in January<sup>205</sup>—on 24 July 1965 in Karachi rejected the proposal, insisting on the demand for a separate board for Shia *auqâf*.<sup>206</sup> Yet a clause was added to a SMC resolution on this matter, apparently on behest of Qizilbash, stating that “if the government appoints a qualified Shia to the board on individual basis and he does not act against Shia interests, the SMC will not object.”<sup>207</sup> On 24 August the

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Chief Administrator Auqaf invited the SMC members for consultation on the proposed appointments. Although no agreement was reached then, S. Hadi Ali Shah from the APSC and Fayyaz Husain Hamadani from the ITHS accepted their nomination as Shia representatives within the Joint Board.<sup>208</sup> Both were later accused of having consented to the transformation of a number of Shia *auqâf* into Sunni endowments during their term.<sup>209</sup>

The joint commission of Shia and government representatives formed in early 1965 was called for a first session on 7 September 1965—incidentally almost coinciding with the start of that year's war with India<sup>210</sup>—by the home secretary. But without giving any reason, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi was included among the five invited Shias instead of Mubarak Ali Shah, provoking a boycott of the meeting by the other four.<sup>211</sup> During the last months of 1965 the movement of S. Muhammad Dihlavi reached a low point, not only because of the war and its aftermath, but also due to increasing Shia infighting. Dihlavi was on the verge of losing patience with his rivals in Lahore and giving up the leadership of his campaign at that stage.<sup>212</sup> But the strong support he received from other Shia centres in Pakistan, especially from Multan, encouraged him to free himself from both the ITHS and the APSC and set up a new countrywide organisation in the following year.<sup>213</sup>

### *Conflicts between orthodox 'ulamâ' and popular preachers*

The movement led by S. Muhammad Dihlavi, which quite successfully asserted Shia demands vis-a-vis the government and the Sunni majority in the three years after 1965,<sup>214</sup> coincided with the first climax of a purely internal conflict within Pakistan's Shia community. Curiously enough, in the same years when almost all Shia '*ulamâ*' rallied behind Dihlavi for the sake of the "three demands", the same '*ulamâ*' split into two camps propagating different religious doctrines and practices with increasing obstinacy. The catalyst for this development were the writings of Maulana Muhammad Husain Dhakko from Sargodha, who contributed more than any other person to a sharp polarisation between orthodox Shi'ism of the *dînî madâris* and the still dominant popular Shi'ism of the professional preachers and *zâkirs*.

The conflict as such had surfaced in Pakistan already in the 1950s, with some '*ulamâ*' from the *dînî madâris* complaining about how the *zâkirs* and preachers would be "misleading" the Shia '*awâm*' and distracting them from their religious obligations.<sup>215</sup> In 1959 one of the most successful preachers and *munâzîrs*, Maulana Muhammad Isma'il (1901–76),<sup>216</sup> struck back. Starting in October that year, he published a series of articles in his journal

*Sadâqat* in which he accused those ‘*ulamâ*’ who run the *dînî madâris* with harsh and insulting words of misusing funds given to them as *khums*. He argued that this religious tax—theoretically one fifth of the net annual savings of the Shia believers<sup>217</sup>—could only be spent for the support of needy *sayyids*.<sup>218</sup> But this had never been the case in Shia religious practice anywhere. The “share of the Imam” (*sahm-i imâm*), i.e. half of the *khums*, had been used by Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ for various religious and charitable purposes for centuries in Iran, Iraq and Northern India.<sup>219</sup> The same had been the case in Pakistan, but very few Shias there had been paying *khums* to the ‘*ulamâ*’ at all until the late 1950s.<sup>220</sup> At least half of it had been used along with other donations for purposes such as the construction and maintenance of mosques, *imâmbârgâhs* and *dînî madâris*, stipends for students, and salaries of instructors.

Muhammad Isma‘il’s polemic was quite misplaced considering the small amount of *khums* which had been put at the disposal of the *dînî madâris* so far, but it was not without logic. Since many ‘*ulamâ*’ had made great efforts to induce the Shias to pay their “religious dues” while at the same time denouncing wasteful spending for *majâlis* and *mahâfil*, including the fees for preachers paid at such occasions, the latter were bound to counterattack sooner or later. With the Shia-Sunni problem on the backburner and public *munâzarât* banned since the imposition of martial law, the combative Maulana was apparently eager to open up a new front. He drew immediate angry reactions from meetings at the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* Lahore and the *Madrasat Makhzan ul-‘Ulûm* Multan. The founding director of the latter, S. Gulab Ali Shah Naqvi, took the lead in replying to Muhammad Isma‘il in the same vein. He and other representatives of the *dînî madâris* argued that they had *ijâzât* from the highest Shia dignitaries in Iraq authorising them to use religious taxes the way they did.<sup>221</sup> While polemics and mud-slinging among the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ in Pakistan were by no means unusual, this was the first major controversy about a purely religious matter carried out in full public, a foretaste of worse to come in the next two decades.

Those who worried about the unity of the Shias and the reputation of the ‘*ulamâ*’ tried their best to contain the affair. The journal *al-Muballigh* almost refrained from commenting on it, printing only a small article on the necessity of *khums*.<sup>222</sup> It claimed that the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Muhammadiya* Sargodha had so far used *khums* only for the *sayyids* among its students.<sup>223</sup> The editor of *Razâkâr* appealed for a discrete meeting of the ‘*ulamâ*’ or referring the dispute to the *marja‘ al-taqlid* in Najaf.<sup>224</sup> Muhammad Isma‘il claimed that he had tried to discuss the matter with other ‘*ulamâ*’ behind



closed doors before, but he did not consider it necessary to carry the dispute to Najaf.<sup>225</sup>

In fact the position of both Ayatollah S. Muhammad Husain Borujerdi, who died in March 1961, and his successor S. Muhsin al-Hakim remained ambivalent. On one hand, the *dinî madâris* and organisations like the Imamia Mission Pakistan would regularly publish facsimiles of their *ijâzât* authorising the use of *khums* for their expenses. On the other hand, in October 1961 one S. Hasan Ali Shah Kazimi quoted *fatwâs* from both Grand Ayatollahs which seemed to contradict: Borujerdi had considered it more safe (*ahwat*) to use even the *sahm-i imâm* for the poor *sayyids* if their part of the *khums* was not sufficient. Muhsin al-Hakim had authorised the use of the *sahm-i imâm* for mosques, *imâmbârgâhs* or *dinî madâris*, but “only if donations and *zakât* are not sufficient”.<sup>226</sup> Kazimi commented that Shias in Pakistan would spend dozens of millions of rupees annually for *majâlis* etc. and could easily run *dinî madâris* without *khums*.<sup>227</sup> This led Muhsin al-Hakim to write to the editor of *Razâkâr*, asking him not to print articles on “subjects which create disunity among Shias, like the religious dues (*huqûq-i shar‘iyya*)”.<sup>228</sup> Apparently the controversy was far from over even in late 1961. Muhammad Isma‘il, for his part, stuck to his hard-line stance against the “*khums*-eating” ‘*ulamâ*’ until the end of his life,<sup>229</sup> whereas the latter wrote a number of books in defence of their position.<sup>230</sup>

If the *khums* controversy was a set-back for the efforts of the orthodox ‘*ulamâ*’ to enhance the observance of the *fiqh-i ja‘farîya* among Pakistan’s Shias, some progress was made with regard to the organisation of *dinî madâris* in the years after 1959. As a follow-up to the May 1958 convention at the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar*,<sup>231</sup> a meeting of the directors of most Shia *madâris* took place during the 12<sup>th</sup> annual session of the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm* Sargodha on 1–3 April 1960, apparently achieving a breakthrough for the unification of syllabi.<sup>232</sup> A third meeting of this kind took place in the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* on 5 January 1962, mainly to protest against the non-inclusion of Shias into a sub-committee of the Auqaf Department entrusted with the reform of syllabi of the *dinî madâris*.<sup>233</sup> A central supervising body (*Majlis-i Nazârât-i Shî‘a Madâris-i ‘Arabîya*) was formed at another 1962 meeting in the *Jâmi‘at Imâmîya* Lahore, but satisfactory results were achieved only after the formation of the *Wafâq ul-Madâris ash-Shî‘a* in 1979.<sup>234</sup>

The Ayub Khan government at that time tried to enforce priority of the secular syllabus, which had been taught along with the religious syllabus already in the 1950s, on the *dinî madâris* and bring their teaching staff under state supervision. Neither of these two goals was achieved. The effect of the government’s initiative was rather to accelerate the self-organisation



of the *dînî madâris* of all Muslim denominations, including the Shias.<sup>235</sup> After the bad experiences with students who were only interested in certificates,<sup>236</sup> the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm* Sargodha and some other Shia *dînî madâris* in 1959 made it obligatory for all students who wanted to pass exams of the Secondary Schools Board to finish the religious syllabus first.<sup>237</sup> After a lapse of three years, when the *dînî madâris* were prohibited from issuing “Maulvi Fâzil” certificates (the equivalent of B.A.),<sup>238</sup> they were able to dispense with the Secondary Board altogether starting from 1962 and organise all kinds of exams themselves.<sup>239</sup>

Although the Shia *dînî madâris* still lagged far behind those of Sunnis in the production of new ‘*ulamâ*’, they had solved their most urgent problems in the years between 1958 and 1962. Those Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ who had been the driving force behind the founding of *madâris* since 1949 became now more assertive and ambitious. S. Safdar Husain Najafi (1933–89),<sup>240</sup> who had taught at the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* since 1956 and became its principal in 1965,<sup>241</sup> soon rallied support of some wealthy traders from Lahore for the foundation of a trust, which set itself the goal to elevate that *madrassa* to the status of a *Hauza ‘Ilmiya* on par with the great Shia centres of Najaf and Qom.<sup>242</sup> Although such a lofty goal could not be achieved even decades later, the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* expanded quickly, moving to a huge new building in Lahore’s Model Town in 1971.<sup>243</sup> A number of smaller Shia *madâris* were founded in other places in the 1960s, among them Rawalpindi,<sup>244</sup> Jhang,<sup>245</sup> Lyallpur,<sup>246</sup> Ahmadpur Sial (*Jâmi‘at al-Ghadîr*), Hyderabad (*Mashâri‘ ul-‘Ulûm*), and Bahawalpur.

While the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* rose to the first rank among the Shia *madâris* in Pakistan in 1971, the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Muhammadiya* Sargodha maintained its leading position until at least the mid-1960s. Its principal from 1961 to 1971, Muhammad Husain Dhakko (b.1932),<sup>247</sup> was regarded by some as the most learned native Pakistani Shia *mujtahid*, superior even to Mufti Ja‘far Husain.<sup>248</sup> Whatever the value of such statements by his supporters, none of the many like-minded ‘*ulamâ*’ was to equal Dhakko’s missionary zeal in combating what he considered erroneous beliefs and aberrations in religious practice among his Shia countrymen.

A number of polemics against the greediness of the *zâkirs* and their mishandling of the *majâlis* had been published in the Shia press already since the mid-1950s, especially in *al-Muballigh*.<sup>249</sup> An editorial of that journal from September 1961 was peculiarly outspoken (excerpts):

Has Husain been martyred just for the purpose that some people would sit together and weep for him? Never! Whatever the Lord of the Martyrs has

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endured was only for the sake of reviving Islam. So if we have nothing to do with Islam, if we flee from acting on the orders of God, then we are certainly enemies of the goals of Husain and lovers of the acts of Yazid. In that case we have no right to call ourselves Husainis...

Most preachers and *zâkirs* have made *majlis-khwânî* entirely a profession and they say with great impudence (I myself have heard it): "I am neither an Imam nor a prophet nor a *muballigh*, nor are those who listen to the *majâlis* believers. My job is to make the audience happy telling anecdotes and self-fabricated nonsense stories". Thus the preacher makes the *majlis* senseless from the outset. After the anecdotes comes the art of telling about the *masâ'ib*<sup>250</sup> (where matters of five minutes are stretched to fifteen minutes) and the people are made weep well (sic); then the sponsor of the *majlis* is openly browbeaten to pay the recompense, and the money is counted in front of him ... it is not called a benefaction, but the wage for two hours of hard work.

It is a pity and even inhuman that such people have the right to call themselves *zâkir-i ahl-i bait*. Was it the purpose of the martyrdom of Husain that *majlis-khwânî* would become a trade? ...

Some *zâkirs* are telling false traditions<sup>251</sup> with great insolence. They corrupt their own beliefs and those of the audience with traditions [full] of *ghulûw*<sup>252</sup> and *tafwîz*.<sup>253</sup> ... Such people have spoiled the tastes of the listeners to such an extent ... that if some preacher or *'âlim-i dîn* talks of prayers, fasting or other obligations of religion they stand up and start to leave the *majlis* ... Nowadays the success or popularity of a preacher is no longer based on knowledge, virtue, asceticism and piety, but on his ability to make the audience laugh with anecdotes and make them cry as long as possible by telling self-fabricated traditions about the *masâ'ib* ...<sup>254</sup>

The text quoted above contained a new element of criticism of the professional preachers, namely the accusation that they were corrupting Shia doctrines with *ghulûw* and *tafwîz*. For the orthodox Shia '*ulamâ*' the issue was no longer just the waste of energies and money through *majâlis* and the negligence of basic religious duties, but the deformation of the Shia *mazhab* with the intrusion of doctrines, which had been rejected by mainstream Twelver Shi'ism as "extremist" and superstitious long since. Such doctrines centred around a number of superhuman qualities attributed to the *ahl al-bait*, such as their creation from light instead of earth, their omnipresence and omniscience and the delegation of some of God's powers to them (*tafwîz*), as well as some forms of reverence for them in religious practice, like the inclusion of '*Âlî waliyu'llâh*' in the call for prayer, the expression *Yâ 'Âlî madad* for greeting and seeking the help of the Imams in prayers (*istimdâd*).<sup>255</sup> The professional preachers were accused of spreading such doctrines among the Shia '*awâm*' for the sake of popularity,

because it flattered the self-esteem of the ordinary Shia believers to have the highest possible notions of their Imams' powers.

Those who had graduated from the religious seminaries in Iraq and Iran, by contrast, were mainly interested in questions of *fiqh* and correct observance of religious duties as taught in these seminaries. Since the early 1950s there had been ambitions to translate the old canonical books of Shia *hadīth*, *fiqh* and doctrines into Urdu and have them published in Pakistan.<sup>256</sup> This was deemed all the more necessary because of what was perceived as false perceptions of Shia doctrines spread by the *zākirs* and professional preachers. A milestone in this respect was the translation of Shaikh Ibn Babuya as-Sadduq's '*Aqā'id mazhab al-shī'a*' by S. Manzur Husain Bukhari (Sargodha) with lengthy commentaries from Muhammad Husain Dhakko, which was published in 1964 under the title *Ahsan ul-fawā'id fī sharhi 'l-'aqā'id*.<sup>257</sup> With this book Dhakko laid the ground for a controversy that was still going on more than three decades later. He presented his own views on "correct beliefs" about the Shia Imams and other subjects in a categorical manner, while at the same time mincing no words in his refutation of what he considered *ghulūw* and *tafwīz* propagated by most preachers in Pakistan at that time.<sup>258</sup>

Dhakko's book was well received by many orthodox '*ulamā*' and instructors of *dīnī madāris*, but it was naturally rejected by those who were the objects of his polemics. A number of rejoinders were written against it, notably from two leading '*ulamā*' of Jhang, S. Zamīr ul-Hasan Najafi<sup>259</sup> and S. Muhammad 'Arif Naqvi.<sup>260</sup> The main accusation made against Dhakko was that he was belittling the status of the Imams, and the derogatory terms *muqassir*<sup>261</sup> and *qashrī 'ulamā*<sup>262</sup> were coined for Dhakko and his supporters. It did not take long until he was even accused of preaching "Wahhabi" doctrines. The ridiculous term of "Wahhabi Shias" for the so-called "Dhakko group" of '*ulamā*' remained in use throughout the following decades, showing the low level to which the internal dispute among a section of Pakistani Shias had sunk.<sup>263</sup>

Starting from October 1965, Dhakko's next step was to launch a systematic all-out attack against the *zākirs* and those '*ulamā*' who had adopted their style of preaching. In a series of articles published in *al-Muballigh* under the title *Islāh ul-majālis wa'l-mahāfil* over one year he elaborated on the benefits of *majālis* which were conducted properly, but denied most of the *majālis* which were regularly held by Shia communities all over Pakistan any status of religious worship ('*ibādat*').<sup>264</sup> His principal argument was that...

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No act ... can be termed worship as long as it is not performed with purity of intention (*khulûs-i nîyat*), i.e. the act of worship must be clean of any corrupted worldly aims ... Sincerity (*ikhlâs*) is that spirit of worship in the presence of which an act can become so valuable that there is no measure for it, and in the absence of which an act becomes so mean that it is rendered completely worthless...

Therefore *sawâb*<sup>265</sup> for weeping and making others weep at *majâlis* and *mahâfil* and reward for the expenditure of wealth for them in the hereafter will only be obtained if such an act is free from the pollution of any corrupted (*fâsida*) personal motives and is done only for obtaining the pleasure of God, the Prophet and the pure Imams. Otherwise this act will be like a paper-flower without a perfume, like a body without a soul, and like a life-less skeleton...

I am obliged to speak out with heart-felt pain the bitter truth that in the present time ... most of those who speak at *majâlis* and listen to them (including their sponsors) are lacking this sincerity. No arguments or proofs are needed to verify this bitter truth because it is clearly visible, but since some obstinate people do not even admit a plain truth without arguments and proofs, I will bring a number of explanations so that they may be reassured...<sup>266</sup>

Dhakko's arguments for denying the precondition of sincerity (*ihklâs*) to most of the said religious ceremonies in Pakistan were the following:

- 1) The fact that payments were accepted for *majlis-khwânî*; he considered that someone who held *majâlis* for payment could have "anything, but no *ikhlâs*"; even if such payments were legitimate, as some '*ulamâ*' claimed, that would not mean that there would be any *sawâb* in addition to the fees received.<sup>267</sup>
- 2) Singing during the *majâlis* like in popular cinema films.<sup>268</sup>
- 3) The rivalry between local *anjumans* for the most sumptuous *majâlis*; as a result, too many *majâlis* were held at the same place, causing wastage and preventing the fulfilment of other religious obligations.<sup>269</sup>
- 4) The fact that *majâlis* were held for showing off and humiliating others; exaggerated adornment of the stage and splendid garment of the *zâkirs* would make *majâlis* look like *mahâfil* and fail to reflect the meaning of '*azâdârî*'.<sup>270</sup>
- 5) The sponsors of *majâlis* were not making any difference between sincere preachers and such who were not following the precepts of Islam; the *zâkirs*, for their part, included demonstrative praise for the sponsors in their sermons.<sup>271</sup>
- 6) Such preachers and *zâkirs* who were telling true but simple stories were not invited for *majlis-khwânî*; the audience was always looking for entertaining rhetoric and exaggerations.<sup>272</sup>
- 7) Preachers and *zâkirs* were promising a "ticket to paradise" without the proper religious conditions.<sup>273</sup>

Not surprisingly, Dhakko's diatribes met with resistance from those concerned. Already in March 1966 he referred to reactions to his series *Islâh ul-majâlis wa'l mahâfil* with the words:

Some people are closing their eyes in the face of the truth and have started propaganda against me; some are levelling baseless accusation against me without fearing God; others are busy preparing rejoinders ... some friends are advising me to stop the series of articles ... If these people are thinking that I would be afraid of their foolish manoeuvres and stop my reforming mission and abandon my goal influenced by their false propaganda, then they have misunderstood me. These things are not coming unexpected for me; rather I have started this work expecting such difficulties and sufferings...<sup>274</sup>

On the other hand, Dhakko once more denied that he was opposed to the *zâkirs* generally, insisting that he was their well-wisher and only wanted to rectify some of their current faults.<sup>275</sup> However, this could not make his attacks on the status quo of *majâlis* and the “*zâkirî*-business” in Pakistan less objectionable in the eyes of his opponents. The campaign against him was led by Muhammad Bashir Ansari, Muhammad Isma‘il, Mirza Yusuf Husain and Zamir ul-Hasan Najafi.<sup>276</sup> Dhakko would accuse these ‘*ulamâ*’ and others who had migrated to Pakistan from India after 1947 of having always opposed the founding of *dînî madâris* in the country because they wanted to safeguard their monopoly of religious learning. According to him, they had considered the Shias of Pakistan “a gold-mine, from which they served themselves with both hands”, but they had done nothing for promoting the training of much-needed *pesh-namâz* and ‘*ulamâ*’ for performing other religious functions.<sup>277</sup> Such a claim was surely exaggerated, considering that the said ‘*ulamâ*’ and some other opponents of Dhakko had themselves contributed to the founding of *dînî madâris*,<sup>278</sup> but it was not altogether wrong. In fact, those who opposed Dhakko’s crusade against *ghulûw* would refer to the “teachers” (*mu‘allimîn*) in a derogatory way.<sup>279</sup>

In early 1967 Dhakko went one step further with the publication of his most important book, *Usûl al-sharî‘a fî ‘aqâ'id al-shî‘a*. This book was not only a rejoinder to the detractors of his *Ahsan ul-fawâ'id* (see above), but a compendium of the doctrines of orthodox Twelver Shi‘ism on the Imams and prophets, their miracles and their special qualities, as laid down by its leading authorities one thousand years ago.<sup>280</sup> Its third chapter dealt with the rejection of *tafwîz*,<sup>281</sup> while its ninth chapter was devoted exclusively to refuting the accusation of “Wahhabism” levelled against him and his supporters, by explaining the difference between the Wahhabiya and Shi‘ism.<sup>282</sup> But most controversial was the last chapter of the book, which started with the following statement (excerpts):

After having refuted ... the accusation of Wahhabism against some Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ ... it is now appropriate to disclose ... a bitter and hidden truth, namely that those

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professional orators who are denouncing the Shia '*ulamâ*' and *muhaqqiqîn*<sup>283</sup> as *muqassir* or "Wahhabi", and those (outwardly) believers who are caught in their net of falsification, are holding and propagating the false (*bâtîl*) doctrines of the *mufawwiza*<sup>284</sup> and the Shaikhiya.<sup>285</sup> With other words, those whose doctrines and beliefs are nowadays understood and accepted as the Shia *mazhab* are not following the *mazhab* of the *ahl al-bait*, but that of the *mufawwiza* which was led by Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i.<sup>286</sup> Numerous great Shia '*ulamâ*' have proclaimed *fatwâs* against the Shaikhiya accusing it of *kufr*...

How did these corrupted beliefs reach our country, and how did they influence our simple '*awâm*'? ... this is a long and painful story ... some 50–60 years ago some famous preachers have spread these doctrines from the pulpit,<sup>287</sup> although some famous responsible '*ulamâ*' from Lahore and Lucknow have ... tried to resist them as good as they could ... but most of the '*awâm*' did not pay attention to the timely voice of these '*ulamâ*' ... then in the life-time of these preachers or after their deaths some of their gifted disciples have spread their doctrines over a long period with speeches and articles; some famous books coloured by these doctrines were also published and were readily accepted by the preachers and *zâkirs* and the '*awâm*'<sup>288</sup> ... seeking to please the '*awâm*', most so-called preachers gave such beliefs more colour (sic). In this way these doctrines and beliefs became gradually accepted, and the genuine doctrines of the Shia *mazhab* became hidden from sight...<sup>289</sup>

The book closed with a short account of the doctrines of the Shaikhiya on matters such as *tafwîz*, omnipresence and omniscience of the Imams, etc.<sup>290</sup> With his new accusation, Dhakko had once more raised the stakes in the conflict between Shia orthodoxy and populism in Pakistan, pursuing his "mission" with stubborn self-righteousness.<sup>291</sup> Until the time of the second edition of *Usûl al-sharî'a* in 1972, rejoinders to the book had been written by Muhammad Hasnain Sabiqi,<sup>292</sup> Muhammad Bashir Ansari,<sup>293</sup> Mirza Yusuf Husain,<sup>294</sup> S. Muhammad 'Arif Naqvi,<sup>295</sup> and some other '*ulamâ*'.<sup>296</sup> Most radical in the rejection of Dhakko's views was Maulana Ansari. In his book *Haqâ'iq ul-wasâ'it* he went as far as denouncing Dhakko and his followers as *nawâsib*<sup>297</sup> and enemies of the *ahl al-bait*, declaring it *harâm* to accept their evidence, to pray behind them, to pay *zakât* for their disposal, or to eat the meat of animals slaughtered by them.<sup>298</sup>

Dhakko's conviction that Shi'ism in Pakistan needed to be purified from heretic and superstitions elements was shared by many '*ulamâ*', among them Mufti Ja'far Husain and most directors of Shia *dînî madâris*, in the 1960s.<sup>299</sup> Some of them would later write books in defence of orthodox Shia doctrines, too, but no '*âlim*' of comparable standing was nearly as zealous as Dhakko and ready to challenge the powerful preachers head-on. The dispute was by no means only academic, with '*ulamâ*' of the "Dhakko

group” risking being evicted from mosques and having their sermons boycotted or even being physically attacked. It would reach a climax in the early 1970s, when some prominent ‘*ulamâ*’ became more or less openly affiliated to the Shaikhia school of thought.<sup>300</sup> Although the latter would then lose ground among the Shia ‘*awâm*’, the orthodox ‘*ulamâ*’ have not been able to overcome the hegemony of the *zâkirs* and popular preachers until present times. Dhakko basically remained a lone crusader, who in later years would alienate even many of his former supporters.<sup>301</sup>

Astonishingly, the bitter conflicts among Pakistan’s Shias on questions of religious doctrines and practice, which came to the fore in the years from 1965 to 1968, did not affect much the movement for Shia communal demands during those same years.<sup>302</sup> S. Muhammad Dihlavi apparently never took sides in the dispute. On one hand, he was closely associated with Mirza Yusuf Husain, one of Dhakko’s main detractors, and even such hard-line opponents of Dhakko as Muhammad Bashir Ansari and Muhammad Isma‘il joined Dihlavi’s bandwagon in time.<sup>303</sup> On the other hand, Dhakko himself actively participated in the *mutâlabât* movement,<sup>304</sup> and some of Dihlavi’s closest collaborators like S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi and S. Jamil Husain Rizvi were supporters of Dhakko.<sup>305</sup> The *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm* Sargodha, for its part, was still supporting Nawab Qizilbash when the latter had parted ways with Dihlavi almost completely.<sup>306</sup>

Apparently those preachers and *zâkirs* who propagated exaggerated notions about the *ahl al-bait* had also a large share in widening the gulf between Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan. Although this was not a new development, it gained momentum with the numerous books and pamphlets written since the mid-1960s in response to the challenge from Dhakko and other orthodox Shia ‘*ulamâ*’. Dubbing Dhakko and his supporters as “Wahhabi Shias” was a gross overreaction, but it was in line with other attempts to safeguard Shia religious identity in Pakistan at all cost.

### *Towards official acceptance of Shia demands*

In the years from 1966 to 1968 Shia communal mobilisation in Pakistan reached a climax, which was not to be repeated until the decade following the 1979 Iranian revolution. This wave of mobilisation was entirely indigenous and more successful than all former or later campaigns for the sake of Shia equal rights during more than six decades of Pakistan’s history, although the concessions gained in late 1968 took some more years to be implemented and were later gradually revoked. The 1966–68 Shia move-



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ment occurred against the background of intense political ferment during the last years of the Ayub Khan regime, but it remained confined to purely religious and communal issues.

Already in the second half of 1965, the supporters of S. Muhammad Dihlavi had set up *Shia Mutâlabât* Committees (SMCs) in a number of towns and districts.<sup>307</sup> Faced with the permanent rivalry between the APSC and the ITHS, and the obstacles which some leading figures of both organisations put in the way of his movement out of sheer jealousy, Dihlavi in early 1966 decided to elevate the SMC to a new countrywide organisation of its own, completely sidelining the APSC and ITHS. From January 1966 onwards a number of appeals appeared in Shia journals calling for the formation of SMCs in every town, district and village with a noteworthy Shia presence, which should then establish contact with S. Muhammad Dihlavi in Karachi.<sup>308</sup> One especially sentimental appeal was published by the SMC Lahore in *Razâkâr*. After having explained the services of the Shias for Pakistan and the unity of Muslims as well as the “three demands”, it continued (excerpts):

Great [Shia] people! These demands are a matter of life or death for us. If today we show only a grain of negligence we will deserve countless curses from God and his Prophet and the Imams and the coming generations...

The quarter of Karkh,<sup>309</sup> the walls of Baghdad, the bazaar of Kufa and the court of Damascus are witness that we have not been afraid of any power when raising the voice of truth. Najaf, Kazimain, Samarra, Mashhad and Karbala are witness that we can be killed but we cannot be obliterated. Not a single *qaum* in the world has offered as many sacrifices for safeguarding its beliefs and convictions as the *millat-i ja'fariya*. The blood of our Imams, the blood of our ‘*ulamâ*’, the blood of our *qaum* was shed for what? For the sake of letting us live according to our beliefs and convictions.

Today, too, we stick to the conviction that we must have full religious freedom. We have to give our young generation religious instruction according to our beliefs. Our legal (*shar'î*) and religious matters have to be decided according to the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*. There must not be any ban on ‘*azâdârî*’ for the Lord of Martyrs.

Great [Shia] people! This time our *qaum* is in urgent need of unity, organisation and centralisation. Dispersion and disunity are a deadly poison for our demands and an unforgivable crime. The entire *qaum* must stand in support like an immovable rock with firm foundations, crush all dissent and disunity and be prepared for any sacrifice...<sup>310</sup>

Apparently such appeals met with remarkable immediate success, comparable to the initial success of the ITHS in 1948–49.<sup>311</sup> While a number of



activists of the old organisations still discussed ways and means of merging the APSC with the ITHS, most ITHS members just switched their loyalty to S. Muhammad Dihlavi and founded branches of the SMC in their hometowns. The ITHS chairman S. Mubarak Ali Shah himself declared on 10 March 1966 that he considered both the APSC and the ITHS obsolete with the new organisation of Dihlavi, claiming that he would be proud to “serve his *qaum* as the humblest *razâkâr*”.<sup>312</sup>

The attitude of the ITHS Secretary-General Shamsi was quite different. By mid-1966 he had become outright opposed to the SMCs because they threatened his self-styled leadership role.<sup>313</sup> The APSC President Qizilbash, himself still a member of the Central SMC, refrained from challenging Dihlavi directly, but kept on bolstering his own role as a Shia communal leader, assisted by his Secretary-General Sha’iq Ambalvi and his journal *Asad*.<sup>314</sup>

In May 1966 *al-Muballigh* published a preliminary list of tasks and duties of the SMCs, which were to be followed until the passing of regular statutes. The SMCs were supposed to give publicity to decisions and appeals of the centre, but also take initiatives of their own on the local level, for example against any obstruction of ‘*azâdârî*. They were also asked to organise at least one hour weekly of religious instruction for Shia pupils at their place, to found *dînî madâris* if possible, and to teach the small children at least ten minutes daily about religion in their homes. Membership fees for the SMCs should be fixed locally with two thirds of the funds raised to be used for local requirements and travel expenses to countrywide meetings. One third was to be sent to an account in Lahore administered by the editors of *Razâkâr* and *Shî’a* and by Ali Ahmad Khan Ja’fari.<sup>315</sup>

In the meantime some new problems for Shia religious life had arisen. Prior to Muharram 1386H (22 April–21 May 1966), bans on the entry of a number of Shia and Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ into certain districts of West Pakistan during Muharram were pronounced by the administration. This new practice, which has been applied ever since in Pakistan,<sup>316</sup> was ostensibly a balanced precautionary measure against sectarian strife. But Shias felt to be the main losers, because their *majâlis* had to be planned long ahead and substitute for renowned speakers at these events was usually difficult to find. In many cases *majâlis* had to be cancelled if prominent speakers happened to be banned. Besides, the logic of forbidding some ‘*ulamâ*’ to speak in certain districts because of alleged “fanaticism” or “lack of knowledge”, while the same persons were not considered objectionable in other parts of the country, was rightfully questioned.<sup>317</sup> Another complaint concerned growing obstacles for the construction of Shia mosques. By 1966 it had

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become a habit that wherever Shias started building mosques of their own, some local Sunnis would “launch a movement” against such plans, and in many cases the administration withheld construction permits in order to “safeguard public order”.<sup>318</sup>

An “All-Pakistan Shia *Mutâlabât* Convention” in Multan on 27–28 August 1966 turned out an important milestone of the SMC Movement. Some 1,000 delegates from the SMCs founded so far gathered to formalise the new organisation and consult about the future programme of action.<sup>319</sup> The opening speech was held by S. Abd ul-Jalil Shah Gardezi, confirming the full support given by most members of the Gardezi family to the SMC Movement.<sup>320</sup> S. Muhammad Dihlavi, who had six weeks earlier admitted his “mental suffering” from countless objections that had been raised against him,<sup>321</sup> once more recalled the aims of his movement in his keynote address. Noteworthy were his arguments in favour of separate *dīniyât*:

Our three demands ... are so innocuous that no balanced and sensitive person can doubt their reasonableness (*ma'qûliyat*), and if someone disagrees, then only because he is not well informed. These demands have nothing to do with the politics of the country nor do they bear the danger of conflict between the Muslims. Sometimes I hear the argument that if separate *dīniyât* are introduced there will be a greater barrier between both sects [Sunnis and Shias] and it will have a negative influence on the minds of the children. This contradicts experience and is very far from truth ... conflicts and clashes of convictions arise when children are taught one thing in their houses and something else in the schools ... because everybody is very attached to his own *mazhab* and is not ready to hear anything against his belief. A living example were the protests, which a were raised against the Christian missionary schools when they were still giving lessons on the Bible ... certainly Pakistani Muslims did not accept that their children learn Christian beliefs ... since questions of belief are so sensitive, decide by yourselves how long a sect can tolerate that its children are taught something that is against its doctrines, and that their minds, which are like a white sheet of paper, are imprinted with the beliefs and teaching of others. Therefore conflict always comes from mixed *dīniyât* and not from separate instruction. I know that if the Shias are given the opportunity to learn their *dīniyât* separately with sincerity and devotion, a great service will be done for religion and the nation for which the people of Pakistan will always remain grateful. Its biggest advantage will be that no more sectarian passions can be aroused between Sunnis and Shias, because each Pakistani will understand that we have one God, one Prophet, and one Koran...<sup>322</sup>

The last part of his argument may not look entirely convincing, but Dihlavi's views on *dīniyât* were shared in principle even by the Deobandi scholar Mufti Muhammad Shafi' (see below). At the end of his speech

Dihlavi reminded Ayub Khan that he himself had termed the Shia demands “reasonable”, and he warned from giving Shias the impression that Pakistan was “only demanding sacrifices and taxes” from them without giving anything in return.<sup>323</sup>

A remarkable greeting address was sent to Multan from S. Ibn Hasan Jarchavi, who could not attend the convention due to illness. Welcoming the awakening of the Shias through the SMCs he stated:

The innocent and simple [Shia] people have long since been the prey of Pirs, Faqirs, Wazirs (ministers), Amirs (chieftains), ‘*ulamâ*’ and *zâkirs*, and are now so much oppressed (*mazlûm*) that the whole country looks like a great *imâmbârgâh* where we all perform *mâtam* for the sake of our calamities.<sup>324</sup>

The advocate Shaikh Muhammad Abd ul-‘Aziz Akhtar from Rahimyar Khan had prepared draft statutes for all SMCs, and a twenty-four-member commission headed by S. Ali Husain Shah Gardezi was formed to revise them.<sup>325</sup> Three subcommittees to deal with the “three demands” were also formed, headed by Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi (*dîniyât*), S. Israr Husain (*auqâf*) and S. Ali Shah Bukhari (‘*azâdârî*’).<sup>326</sup> S. Muhammad Dihlavi himself chaired a fourteen-member “liaison committee” for contacting government officials that notably excluded Nawab Qizilbash.<sup>327</sup> A five-member commission was also formed for managing the finances of the central SMC.<sup>328</sup> Twelve resolutions were passed at the Multan Convention; Resolution No. 1 read:

... S. Muhammad Dihlavi was elected leader by the ‘*ulamâ*’, and all Shia organisations and individuals have accepted him as their leader; so did this only representative meeting of the Shias ... this meeting regards those few persons who are censuring such a sound (*musallam*) leader directly or indirectly because of their personal interests, and those journals who are still following the old line,<sup>329</sup> with disgust and considers them enemies and traitors not only of the Shia demands, but of the [whole] Shia *qaum*. It assures the government that their statements are only private opinions, and that they do not represent the Shias.<sup>330</sup>

Resolutions No. 3 and 4 read:

... this meeting appeals to the Shias of Pakistan to completely boycott such religious journals which criticise the *Qâ'id-i Millat* and do harm to the *Mutâlâbât* Movement. Such *zâkirs* which deviate from that movement must not be given the opportunity to share the Shia platform, i.e. [to speak at] *majâlis* and religious gatherings, so that the ‘*ulamâ*’ and *zâkirs* understand the feelings of the people.

... the Shias must not invite such ‘*ulamâ*’ and *zâkirs* to their *majâlis* and *mahâfil* who oppose the [three] demands or do not support them or declare their neutrality ...<sup>331</sup>

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Other resolutions concerned some specific demands and complaints from the authorities.<sup>332</sup> The call for “immediate acceptance” of the “three demands” (Resolution No. 6), as usual, did not impress the government too much. Two months later, however, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII)<sup>333</sup> made some recommendations regarding the *dinîyât* syllabus which were portrayed as a great concession to Shias by the newspaper *Nawâ-i Waqt*: there should be a common syllabus for the subjects Koran, the life of the Prophet (*sîrat*) and ethics (*akhlâqîyât*) up to the matric grade, but different points of view of Sunnis and Shias on ethics should be included in the last two of five chapters of a common textbook. Such textbooks had already been in use in the Punjab from 1954 to 1958.<sup>334</sup> At a special session of the SMC Council in Jhang on 6 November 1966, the proposals of the CII were discussed and rejected as insufficient.<sup>335</sup> On that occasion members of the Council even denounced Mufti Ja‘far Husain, the only Shia member of the CII,<sup>336</sup> who thereafter moved closer to the APSC. The latter, during a meeting of its Council in Lahore on 17 February 1967, lauded the CII proposals because they had accepted separate *dinîyât* “in principle”, and appealed to the government to implement them.<sup>337</sup> The Ministry of Education shortly after started to act according to the CII recommendations.<sup>338</sup>

While the APSC President Qizilbash stood his ground as an undeclared rival of S. Muhammad Dihlavi during the following years—facilitated by the end of his political disqualification period under EBDO on 31 December 1966<sup>339</sup>—the ITHS further disintegrated after the SMC’s Multan Convention. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi had only increased his isolation when trying to belittle that convention in his weekly *Shahîd*.<sup>340</sup> Thereafter the ITHS Chairman Mubarak Ali Shah wanted to discuss the statements of his Secretary-General at a meeting of the ITHS Council. Shamsi reacted by calling himself for a meeting of the Council on 23 October in the house of S. Muhammad Ali Zaidi in Lahore, sending invitations to Council members without even informing the Chairman. Some leading ITHS office holders from Karachi then published devastating polemics against Shamsi,<sup>341</sup> whereas the editor of *Razâkâr*, who had generally supported the ITHS until early 1964, now opined that the organisation had “ceased to exist since seven years”.<sup>342</sup> In Lahore, too, the ITHS split into supporters and opponents of Shamsi, whose influence among Shias reached a low point during the coming years.<sup>343</sup>

On 11–12 February 1967 more than 6,000 Shias gathered around the *Imâmbârgâh-i Shâh-i Karbalâ’* of the Rizvia Colony (Karachi) for an “All-Pakistan Shia *Mutâlâbât* Workers’ Convention”.<sup>344</sup> By that time, more than

200 SMCs of different size had been established all over Pakistan.<sup>345</sup> S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, who had become Central Organising Secretary of the SMC since the 1966 Multan Convention,<sup>346</sup> won support for a resolution containing the following ultimatum:

... during the last three years, the Shias of Pakistan have presented their demands to the government through all kinds of constitutional, peaceful and legal ways, but they have not been paid any attention and [new] obstacles were created. Therefore we request for a last time from the government to accept our unpolitical, religious and constitutional demands within three months. Otherwise after three months the Shias of Pakistan will be free to take any appropriate steps to secure the acceptance of their demands, and the responsibility for that will fall on the government.<sup>347</sup>

Resolution No. 1, tabled by Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, called on all Shia '*ulamâ*' not to participate in working out any syllabus that would not provide for separate *dîniyât* for Shia pupils. Remarkable was also one resolution threatening the daily newspapers of Karachi with boycott, because they had never given proper coverage to the SMC Movement.<sup>348</sup>

Some delegates of the APSC also participated in the February 1967 convention. One of them, the advocate Khaqan Babar from Lahore, even held a speech against the "traitors" and named Muzaffar Ali Shamsi when pressed by the audience.<sup>349</sup> But the APSC was not ready to recall its Vice-Chairman, S. Hadi Ali Shah, from the mixed Waqf Board, let alone to exclude him from the organisation as demanded by the SMC.<sup>350</sup> The acceptance of the CII recommendations regarding syllabi by the APSC in the same month (see above) further alienated it from the SMC.

Nevertheless, the APSC President succeeded in mid-1967 to reap political gains from Dihlavi's movement, which he had never wholeheartedly supported. On 11 May the three-months ultimatum had run out without any satisfactory reply from the government, and the SMC faced the dilemma how to make good its threat. Agitation started at numerous places, and a session of the SMC Working Committee was scheduled in Lahore on 3–4 June to discuss further steps. At that stage, Nawab Qizilbash flew to Karachi to consult with Dihlavi on how to defuse the situation.<sup>351</sup> On the eve of the SMC gathering Qizilbash met with the Governor of West Pakistan, General Muhammad Musa, a Shia Hazara from Quetta and former Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army who had replaced Amir Muhammad Khan in September 1966.<sup>352</sup> The result was an offer to appoint a board of five Shia and five Sunni experts that would study the Shia demands and submit its recommendations to the government. Dihlavi, who

feared that agitation in Lahore and elsewhere might turn violent and jeopardise the achievements of three years of Shia communal mobilisation, agreed to these conditions and called off the Lahore Convention.<sup>353</sup> He even allowed Qizilbash to portray himself as "having taken over the command" of the campaign for the Shia demands. One of Qizilbash's first acts after the agreement was to call a public meeting at *Karbalâ'-i Gâme Shâh* which passed resolutions thanking the Governor for appointing the ten-member board, proclaiming confidence in its members and thanking Qizilbash for his services.<sup>354</sup>

Both Qizilbash and Dihlavi were among the Shia members of the Joint Board, the others being Mufti Ja'far Husain, S. Murid Husain Shah<sup>355</sup> and Raja Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad.<sup>356</sup> Its Sunni members were all religious scholars, namely Mufti Muhammad Shafi,<sup>357</sup> 'Ala ud-Din Siddiqi,<sup>358</sup> Abd ul-Hamid Badayuni,<sup>359</sup> Kausar Niyazi,<sup>360</sup> and Dr Fazl ur-Rahman.<sup>361</sup> The Board held one single meeting in the Civil Secretariat of Lahore on 29 June 1967, chaired by Malik Abd ul-Latif, Secretary of the Ministry of Education.<sup>362</sup> Nevertheless, it arrived at unanimous decisions that were surprisingly favourable to the Shia demands. According to Dihlavi the Board's recommendations were as follows: 1) There will be one textbook for *dîniyât* with three parts: a) *Akhlâqîyât*, which will be prepared by Shia and Sunni '*ulamâ*' jointly and must be acceptable to both sects; b) Sunni *dîniyât*; c) Shia *dîniyât*. 2) Objectionable contents of textbooks on history and *Islâmîyât* will be removed by a board comprising Shia and Sunni '*ulamâ*'. No textbook on these subjects will be used in schools without approval of the said board. 3) The police and the authorities concerned will provide all possible facilities for '*azâdârî*' while keeping in mind the requirements of law and order; bans on Shia and Sunni '*ulamâ*' are inappropriate. 4) Separate sections will be established for Shia and Sunni *auqâf* in the Auqaf Department, which will not interfere with each other's affairs.<sup>363</sup>

However, neither Dihlavi nor any other member of the Board made public these recommendations for the time being. They were submitted to the government for further "studying", and Dihlavi in a message of late August confined himself to assuring that the board had met in a good atmosphere and details about its recommendations would be published after their approval by the government. In the meantime the Shias should form more SMCs, recruit more members and *razâkârs*, and collect funds.<sup>364</sup> Trouble was far from over, as could also be seen from a lengthy and relentless polemic of Mushtaq Husain Naqvi against Qizilbash and Sha'iq Ambalvi published on 24 July and 1 August. It made clear that the Central

Organising Secretary of the SMC had never consented to cooperation with the APSC.<sup>365</sup>

In a message to the Shias prior to the session of the ten-member Board, Dihlavi had portrayed his acceptance of five Sunnis in that board as a sign of goodwill, because, as he put it, “we have neither a conflict with the Sunnis, nor are they concerned by our demands”.<sup>366</sup> This was little more than wishful thinking. The radical Sunni groups, who had so far not taken Dihlavi’s movement too seriously, were alarmed by what leaked through from the recommendations of the Board and warned the government from introducing separate *dîniyât* or dividing the Auqaf Department.<sup>367</sup> On 6 August 1967 a “Sunni Conference” was held in Multan to discuss how to counter the “divisive” Shia demands.<sup>368</sup> Although only a few dozens of some 400 invited Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ showed up (among them no Bareilvi ‘*âlim*’ of any standing),<sup>369</sup> speakers included Maulana Mufti Mahmud<sup>370</sup> and even Kausar Niyazi.<sup>371</sup> Resolutions against all “three demands” of the Shias were passed. One repeated the known hard-line positions against ‘*azâdârî*’,<sup>372</sup> another emphasised the need of including the life of the *sahâba* in the *dîniyât* syllabus, although hinting at the possibility to make it non-compulsory for Shias to attend. Separate administration of Shia *auqâf* was rejected on the ground that all kinds of separate arrangements for them would be “a grave danger for the integrity of the country”.<sup>373</sup>

In the same month, however, Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ came out with a public statement in favour of separate *dîniyât*, which was thereafter frequently referred to in the Shia press. His opinion was that

... since Shia and Sunni *hadîth* and *fiqh* are very different from each other, students of both sects will be deprived of a large part of it and their [religious] education will be incomplete if only those parts are taught on which both Sunnis and Shias agree. And if controversial matters are treated as such, the students will be confused and split among each other ... Shia *hadîth* and *fiqh* should be taught separately and exams should be separate, too. As a member of the syllabus committee of Karachi University I have said this many times, and now the two syllabi have also been separated at that university. Experience has shown that this method has not done harm to the unity of Muslims, but has rather been useful for it. Neither has such a separation caused so much extra expenses or work that it would have been impractical.<sup>374</sup>

According to General Muhammad Musa, Ayub Khan himself held similar views and had instructed him to have the problem solved as soon as possible.<sup>375</sup> However, faced with increasing pressure from the opposition parties in that year,<sup>376</sup> the government was not ready to offer radical Sunnis another issue for attacks on itself, and it continued to temporise. The SMC Working



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Committee met in Multan on 5 November and decided that another countrywide convention should be held in Hyderabad in February 1968 to report on the movement's achievements within four years and approve further steps. In the meantime, a SMC delegation should again meet the President and the Governor and report on the results in Hyderabad.<sup>377</sup>

At that junction, the government for the first time resorted to repressive measures against the Shia movement. On 14 December 1967 a three-month ban on public speeches was imposed on Dihlavi and Mushtaq Husain Naqvi.<sup>378</sup> On 4 February 1968 a ban on assemblies (Section 144 PPC) in Hyderabad followed. By that time, thousands of Shias from other parts of Pakistan had already arrived in the town for the convention scheduled for 10–11 February. When a ban on the entry of seventy Shia *'ulamâ'* and leaders was ordered with retroactive effect, none of those already present complied. On 10 February the West Pakistan Minister of Interior, Qazi Fazlallah, was dispatched to Hyderabad to negotiate with the SMC Working Committee. Once more the acceptance of Shia demands was promised "within a short time", and once more Dihlavi proved his desire to avoid violence at all cost. Braving strong pressure from thousands of frenzied Shias who were incited by Mushtaq Husain and others, he decided to call off the convention.<sup>379</sup> He later argued that he did not want to give credibility to those who had told the government that its objective had been fomenting trouble against it with a civil disobedience campaign.<sup>380</sup>

One week later the APSC organ *Asad* reported that Qizilbash had been informed officially about the acceptance of the Shia "three demands".<sup>381</sup> This turned out to have been baseless, and the divorce between Dihlavi and Qizilbash became now complete. Already in November 1967 Dihlavi had complained how Qizilbash had cheated him three times.<sup>382</sup> On 10 May *Asad* once more reported that the demands had been accepted, but this was denied by the Federal Minister of Education in the parliament two weeks later: the government was still "studying" the recommendations of the Joint Board.<sup>383</sup> In early July the journal repeated its claim for a third time, now explaining that it was in the interest of the government not to make the acceptance public, probably because of the approaching elections.<sup>384</sup>

S. Muhammad Dihlavi, who had travelled to East Pakistan in May 1968,<sup>385</sup> called a meeting of the SMC Council in Hyderabad on 6–7 July. On that occasion, Mushtaq Husain pressed fervently for more radical steps to achieve the objectives of the movement, and it was decided to start country-wide agitation from 1 November if the government would not yield to the Shia demands by 1 October, including the appointment of commissions necessary for implementation.<sup>386</sup>



In the following four months a fierce propaganda campaign was waged by the SMCs, directed against the “traitors of Lahore” as much as against the temporising of the government. A number of public meetings were held during a stay of Dihlavi in Lahore from 19–28 September and afterwards, while Qizilbash and Shamsi preferred to keep a low profile.<sup>387</sup> They tried to counter the SMC movement with some religious figures interposed,<sup>388</sup> but almost all prominent Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ had meanwhile rallied behind S. Muhammad Dihlavi.<sup>389</sup> Dihlavi and his entourage followed up their stay in Lahore with a trip to Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu and the Kurram Agency (29 September–7 October), i.e. the areas which had since twenty years supplied the most hardy and enthusiastic volunteers for Shia communal movements.<sup>390</sup> At the same time the ultimatum for the government run out without any progress being achieved. It was decided to start a civil disobedience campaign in Rawalpindi, where another SMC convention would be held from 2–3 November 1968.<sup>391</sup>

Preparations for the *Husainî mahâz* in Rawalpindi included a country-wide day of protest on 25 October. At a huge gathering near Lahore’s Mochi Gate chaired by the former AJK President Col. (retd.) S. Ahmad Ali Shah vitriolic speeches against Qizilbash and Shamsi reached a climax. For the first time *murdabâd* slogans were raised against both leaders in the heart of Lahore, which had been their stronghold for decades.<sup>392</sup> They were accused of only worrying about their leadership position, trying to keep the Shias ignorant “like goats and sheep”, and going to any extent in order to please the rulers. Both Qizilbash and Shamsi had repeatedly portrayed the Shia protest movement as a mere tool of the political opposition and allegedly even had advised the government to crush it.<sup>393</sup> In the last week of October Shia notables in many towns and districts were approached by the local authorities and asked to discourage Shia *razâkâr*s from travelling to Rawalpindi.<sup>394</sup> On 29 October the minister Qazi Fazlallah called a meeting of Shia leaders in his house in a final bid to foil the SMC convention. S. Muhammad Dihlavi and Mushtaq Husain refused to show up, sending the former minister S. ‘Abid Husain of Jhang and Muhammad Bashir Ansari instead. Qizilbash, who was still resentful of the Minister of Interior because he was the one who had first denied his announcements about the acceptance of Shia demands earlier that year, sent S. Hadi Ali Shah and S. Murid Husain Shah, while Shamsi came himself. The latter three were ready to sign a declaration of support for the government but were prevented from doing so by the SMC delegates.<sup>395</sup>

When all pre-emptive measures had failed and some 15,000 Shias from many parts of Pakistan had gathered in Rawalpindi to start agitation, the

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government finally decided to give in. On the evening of 1 November 1968, the following official statement was released, which also appeared in all daily newspapers the next morning:

With the approval of the Central Government, the Government of West Pakistan has decided to revise the syllabi of Islamiyat in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Board of Shia and Sunni Ulema which was set up by the Central Government some time ago. It has been further decided that if a student does not desire to take the subject of Islamiyat he shall have the option not to do so. As regards the demand for unrestricted freedom of Azadari, the Government would like to make it clear that every such request has necessarily to be considered in the light of the law and order situation of the area to which it pertains. The Provincial Government has also accepted the recommendation of the Ulema's Board that under the Auqaf Board there should be two separate sections for Shia and Sunni Auqaf.<sup>396</sup>

The Rawalpindi Convention with thousands of volunteers, who had come with the firm intention to let themselves be arrested or face any other repression, thus turned into a festivity.<sup>397</sup> Since the authorities had not allowed a public meeting at Liaquat Bagh, all gathered in the house and garden of Dr S. Ajmal Husain Rizvi on Murree Road on 2–3 November. S. Muhammad Dihlavi in his speech said that five years of organised and steady efforts had achieved what “the known traitors of the Shia people” could not achieve within twenty years in spite of their good relations to the highest government circles. The SMC Council had thoroughly studied the statement of the government and found it credible, but was demanding further clarifications, which would be sought in a meeting with the Governor Muhammad Musa on 4 November. If the recommendations of the ten-member Board were not found to be approved fully, he would again call the Shias for a convention.<sup>398</sup>

The mood at the oratory sessions of these two days was one of utmost excitement and vindictiveness towards those who had not supported Dihlavi's movement, as some anecdotes may illustrate: Muhammad Bashir Ansari told how Muzaffar Ali Shamsi had assured the Interior Minister that there would be no civil disobedience movement in Rawalpindi, disclosing that those who had courted arrest during the 1950 Narowal agitation had been bought for Rs. 20 each.<sup>399</sup> When he said that S. Azhar Hasan Zaidi, who had replaced S. Mubarak Ali Shah as the ITHS Chairman in 1967, had confirmed that “nonsense”, slogans cursing this once highly respected preacher were raised.<sup>400</sup> Likewise, when Maulana Muzammil Husain from Dera Ghazi Khan wanted to say something about Mufti Ja'far Husain, he was shouted down: “Sit down, sit down, we don't want to hear that

name!”<sup>401</sup> When Maulana Muhammad Isma‘il mentioned “Shamsi *sâhib*” during his speech he was forced to retract the word *sâhib* and, hard-pressed by some 300 hecklers from Lahore, removed a shoe from the foot of Dihlavi, crying out that he would “sacrifice one thousand Muzaffar Ali Shamsis” for this one shoe of the *Qâ'id-i Millat*.<sup>402</sup>

Dihlavi made a triumphant return home to Karachi some days later, including a stopover in Lahore with another gathering at the Mochi Gate.<sup>403</sup> The exaltation of his supporters had only briefly been cooled down when Mushtaq Husain was arrested in Rawalpindi on 4 November.<sup>404</sup> It was now time to draw conclusions from the events. Sha'iq Ambalvi during a reception of Qizilbash on 8 November regretted that the government had not made its announcements some months earlier, which would have spared the APSC leaders a lot of trouble. He complained that they had been punished for their readiness to cooperate and for their principle of always seeking consensual solutions, whereas the SMC had sought uproar at any cost.<sup>405</sup> Mushtaq Husain, for his part, pointed to three essentials of the SMC that had been lacking both with the ITHS and the APSC during the twenty years of their existence, namely the ability to organise the strength of the *qaum*, to awaken the public and to imbue the *'awâm* with a spirit of sacrifice. Thus Dihlavi, who had no connections to government circles and had even been their *persona non grata*, had succeeded where others had failed.<sup>406</sup>

In a message to his followers in early December 1968 Dihlavi ordered that all SMCs must rest in place until full implementation of the government's promises and that more SMCs should be formed where they did not yet exist. He laid special emphasis on the collection of funds, which could be kept in store locally but should not be spent until no more problems for Shia religious practice were to be feared. All SMCs should prepare a list of their most active members to form a countrywide Council which should meet annually.<sup>407</sup>

The sudden acceptance of the main Shia demands after almost five years of temporising was probably more than anything else a result of the political impasse which the Ayub Khan regime had reached by late 1968. Thus it was no mere coincidence that almost immediately after the Shias' convention in Rawalpindi student riots broke out in the same town, which quickly spread to other parts of Pakistan and were joined by violent agitations of various opposition parties.<sup>408</sup> During the last four months until Ayub Khan's resignation on 25 March 1969, dealing with the deteriorating law and order situation absorbed all the energies of the government. Naturally, nothing was done in these months to implement the promises given to the Shias.



## THE YAHYA KHAN AND BHUTTO ERA, 1969–1977

### *New issues and partial successes in the interim era*

None of the Shia organisations had any share in the protest movement from November 1968 onwards, which brought about the fall of Ayub Khan in March 1969. The SMC had always emphasised the purely religious nature of its demands, and its leaders were mainly worried about the ability of the government to make good its promises. Thus the proclamation of martial law by General Yahya Khan on 26 March 1969 was welcomed by the SMC because it re-established law and order.<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Yahya Khan, who also assumed the presidency of the state, was himself a Qizilbash Shia from Peshawar with good personal relations with Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash of Lahore,<sup>2</sup> whom he made Minister of Finance in his cabinet. Although Yahya Khan never showed any special concern for Shia communal demands, he did not retract the commitments made by the previous government, and some steps towards their implementation were made during his rule.

The Yahya Khan years were among the most eventful in the history of Pakistan with the first countrywide and free parliamentary elections (December 1970) and the subsequent climax of the conflict between West and East Pakistan leading to the secession of the latter in the war of December 1971. Since less than two per cent of the East Bengal population were Shias, the Bengal crisis did not have much impact on Pakistan's Shia movement. By contrast, the elections and their prelude introduced new ideological challenges and political issues and led to fresh internal divisions

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and realignments within the Shia community. During these years, the SMC maintained its momentum and asserted its dominance over the older Shia organisations, in spite of the dwindling health of S. Muhammad Dihlavi who died in August 1971. Much of the leadership of the SMC was provided already in 1970–71 by its Senior Vice-Chairman and Dihlavi's later successor, Justice (retd.) S. Jamil Husain Rizvi.

### *The government and the "three demands", 1969–1970*

During the last months of the Ayub Khan regime some practical steps were taken for the implementation of one of the three accepted Shia demands, namely the freedom and protection of *'azâdârî*. Prior to Muharram 1389H (20 March–18 April 1969) circulars were sent to all Divisional Commissioners, D.C.s and Political Agents to provide facilities and security for the Shia processions and a number of new licences were issued for these. Bans on the entry of individual Shia speakers to certain districts during Muharram were also lifted, except for some bans on S. Muhammad Dihlavi and Mushtaq Husain Naqvi.<sup>3</sup> A sectarian clash in Jhang left seven people killed by police bullets on *'Āshûrâ'* that year,<sup>4</sup> but by and large Shias were satisfied with the performance of the police and administration during the first Muharram after the November 1968 proclamation of the government. Complaints against "biased officials" would resume from Muharram in 1970 onwards, however.<sup>5</sup>

Implementation of the promises regarding the Auqaf Board and the *dîniyât* syllabus turned out much more difficult. On 9 July 1969, a delegation of the SMC met the Brigadier in charge of civilian affairs in Lahore to remind the martial law authorities of the issue and submitted a memorandum.<sup>6</sup> President Yahya Khan received SMC delegations led by S. Muhammad Dihlavi and Jamil Husain Rizvi on 1 and 13 September, respectively. During the latter meeting he expressed sympathy with the Shia demands and decided to confer the matter to the minister Qizilbash.<sup>7</sup> After the many frustrating experiences with Qizilbash since 1965 the SMC leaders could hardly be satisfied. But they had no choice but to put up with the situation, as reflected in an open letter to Qizilbash by Maulana Hashmat Ali of Hyderabad in his journal *Ma'rifat*:

After your meeting with the Governor General Musa [in June 1967] you had announced that the Shia demands have been accepted, although an official confirmation never came before November 1968. But still we have no doubts about your [good] intentions; surely your feelings are with the Shias. Previously you

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have made indirect efforts ... but now you have become member of a government with full powers ... Maybe divine power has given you this chance to prove your compassion with the *qaum* and your religious sincerity during your last assignment and in the last part of your life ... after this ministry you will not obtain another ministerial post, because members of the present cabinet cannot contest elections ... you can now prove those people wrong who have so far thought that you have always preferred politics and ministerial posts to *mazhab* and *qaum* ...<sup>8</sup>

Qizilbash, however, remained as reluctant as ever to press for Shia demands during his term as minister, and throughout the following years until his death in 1982. An extraordinary meeting of the SMC Council had to be called in Hyderabad from 31 January to 1 February 1970 to discuss how to deal with the temporising of the government. The latter on 30 January promptly announced the formation of a new commission to discuss the *dīnīyāt* syllabus. The promise was received with considerable mistrust, and Dihlavi threatened a civil disobedience movement unless it would be implemented within two months.<sup>9</sup> Yet a thirteen-member board headed by the CII Chairman ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi was formed shortly after with Mufti Ja‘far Husain, Mirza Yusuf Husain, Nasir Husain,<sup>10</sup> S. Faqir Husain Bukhari,<sup>11</sup> Maulana Gulshan Ali,<sup>12</sup> and S. Nasir ud-Din Haidar Rizvi<sup>13</sup> as its Shia members.<sup>14</sup> It held its first session on 30 March 1970 in Islamabad, opened with a speech of the Minister of Education, Shams ul-Haqq. He surprised the participants with the announcement of separate textbooks for Shia and Sunni *dīnīyāt*, a long-time Shia demand, which had not been approved by the ten-member board in June 1967.<sup>15</sup> But little else was decided at the meeting. It was promised to remove objectionable parts from new textbooks, which would be prepared by the Education Department, but there was little hope that these would be introduced before an elected government would be in place and possibly change its mind about them. The question of Shia *dīnīyāt* for the matriculation grades at colleges and B.A. grades in Oriental studies at universities was not yet tackled.<sup>16</sup>

There were also divisions among the Shia appointees of the *dīnīyāt* commission. The APSC representatives Mufti Ja‘far Husain and Maulana Nasir Husain did not show up at a reception arranged for all Shia members of the commission by Jamil Husain Rizvi before the 30 March session. After the session Qizilbash hosted another reception, where Mufti Ja‘far Husain criticised the impatience of the SMC regarding the *dīnīyāt* question. Besides, he did not see much difference between the decisions taken that day and those of the CII from 1966. Mirza Yusuf Husain contradicted him, claiming that “a whole generation of Shia pupils had been lost” through timid handling of

the *dinîyât* issue.<sup>17</sup> The SMC was not satisfied with the achievements of the *dinîyât* commission, nor had any steps been taken so far regarding the Auqaf Board. On 11 April 1970 an "Action Committee" of the SMC in Lahore threatened the government with "direct action" starting after two days. On the next morning, while some 400 SMC councillors debated about details of the planned agitation, a delegation headed by Dihlavi was invited for talks with Governor 'Atiq ur-Rahman, Chief Secretary Afzal Agha and the CII Chairman at the Governor's residence. The Governor signed a decree about the creation of a Shia section of the Auqaf Board in the presence of the delegation and also made new promises regarding the swift implementation of separate Shia *dinîyât*. Agitation was called off thereafter.<sup>18</sup>

The Chief Secretary had at first claimed that only three persons could be appointed to the Shia section of the Auqaf Board for lack of financial means, naming two APSC representatives (Maulana Husain Bakhsh and S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari) and Shaikh Abd ul-'Aziz Akhtar from the SMC. On insistence of the SMC, Jamil Husain Rizvi was accepted as an additional member without salary. But shortly after, the APSC succeeded to have its Secretary-General Sha'iq Ambalvi included, too. This was another ploy to keep the large *Qizilbash Waqf* out of reach of the Auqaf Department.<sup>19</sup> As it turned out over the next years, the setting-up of a Shia Auqaf Board remained of little consequence, because only some small *auqâf* with an overall annual income of less than Rs. 10,000 came under its supervision, while the larger Shia *auqâf* remained under the arbitrary control of their *mutawallîs* or had been given to Sunnis.<sup>20</sup>

The first and last session of the Shia Auqaf Board for West Pakistan took place on 26 June 1970. (After the dissolution of the "One Unit" some days later, the five persons named above were made members of the Punjab Shia Auqaf Board). During that session S. Hadi Ali Shah, in an apparent move to pre-empt any decision affecting the *Qizilbash Waqf* and at the same time to please Sunni voters,<sup>21</sup> argued vehemently against the splitting-up of the Auqaf Board into Shia and Sunni sections. His belated plea in favour of "the unity of Muslims" was criticised as inappropriate even by the Chief Administrator of the Auqaf Department.<sup>22</sup> During the same session Jamil Husain Rizvi raised the issue of those Shia *auqâf* which had been transformed into Sunni endowments. On his demand a register of all *auqâf* was prepared in the following months, which revealed where such dispossession had taken place. According to Shia claims, the large *auqâf* of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar (Sehwan Sharif), Shah Shams-i Tabrizi (Multan), Shah Chun Chiragh (Rawalpindi) and Bari Shah Latif (Nurpur Shahan) had been



among those affected.<sup>23</sup> Shias were instructed by the Auqaf Department to deal with such cases in the courts, but they never obtained any court decision in their favor.<sup>24</sup> In another breach of official commitments, separate Shia sections of the Auqaf Board were introduced only in the Punjab and Sindh provinces, but not in East Pakistan, in the NWFP, and in Balochistan.

Regarding the *dinîyât* issue, an apparent breakthrough was achieved during sessions of the concerned commission on April 30 in Islamabad and from 25–27 June in Lahore. Until the preparation of a new syllabus by the Education Department, Shia textbooks, which had so far been used only in private homes, should be introduced in public schools. Out of a selection of seven sets of such textbooks, those prepared by Farzand Raza<sup>25</sup> and Dhakir Husain Faruqi<sup>26</sup> were accepted unanimously to be introduced in classes 3–5 and 6–10, respectively, after the summer holidays 1970.<sup>27</sup> However, the decision fell victim to the dissolution of the West Pakistan “One Unit” on 1 July. Thereafter Shias were put off with promises of a session of Vice-Chancellors of some universities and officials of the Ministry of Education to decide about the introduction of Shia *dinîyât* “once the new provincial administrations worked properly”.<sup>28</sup> After the elections of December 1970 it became increasingly clear, that the matter would only be decided by the elected government, once that would be in place (see below).

### *Ideological battles until the 1970 elections*

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, conflicts between Pakistan’s Shia organisations had originated in rivalries for communal leadership and different attitudes towards the government and the Sunni majority. In 1969–70, these were partially superseded by the challenge of the “socialist” propaganda of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). During those years, most leading members of the SMC as well as the APSC and the ITHS stood more or less strictly opposed to the “socialist camp”, whereas some individual members of these organisations sided with the PPP. Moreover, some younger Shia activists founded a “Shia Political Party”, which was later also denounced as “socialist”.

The campaign in some Shia journals against socialism started in July 1969, when reports about repressive acts of the Ba‘thist regime against Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ in Najaf and other towns of Iraq reached Pakistan and led to a series of Shia protest meetings.<sup>29</sup> One of the largest of such meetings took place in Rawalpindi on 12 September 1969. It was organised by Mushtaq Husain Naqvi in the name of an “Islamic Front of West Pakistan”—which

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included also some Sunni parties—as a “Convention on the *Masjid al-Aqsa*<sup>30</sup> and Iraq”. Fiery speeches against socialism were held, among others, by the JUI leader Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi and two members of the *Jamâ‘at-i Islâmî* (JI). Jamil Husain Rizvi warned that an Iraq-like situation would be created in Pakistan if its people would abandon Islam and bring socialists to power.<sup>31</sup>

Whatever the importance of events in Iraq for the more religious-minded sections of Pakistan’s Shias, there is little doubt that the masses were more concerned with their own social problems and highly responsive to the populist rhetoric which had swept the country since late 1968. The prevailing leftist mood had also carried along most urban middle-class intellectuals, but some of them still felt a strong Shia communal identity. One of the latter, the advocate S. Shâhid Ali Naqvi, expressed his views in an article in *Razâkâr* of 1 August 1969, as follows (excerpts):

The so-called leadership of the Shias has always been in the hand of the influential, the wealthy, and the notables who have never even tried to understand the problems of the Shia *‘awâm*. They have always preferred personal benefits to those of the people...

Nowadays we have hundreds and thousands of religious organisations in every village. Some of them claim countrywide importance, but their activities are always confined to religious matters. Shias have always considered politics a forbidden tree and denounced collective participation in political parties as a sin. Many sufferings and calamities were caused by this mistake ... after the foundation of Pakistan our aloofness from politics turned out a deadly poison ... the history of the last decade has been that of our political death. In that era our proportion in federal and provincial governments and in key state appointments has been zero ... the rulers have robbed the Shias from representation in accordance with their proportion of the people. The Shias have generally been a silent spectator to that drama...

Many practical problems faced by the *Mutâlabât* Movement were caused by lack of political leadership. Religious *anjumans* cannot solve those basic problems which the Shias of Pakistan are facing...<sup>32</sup>

Some weeks later, Shâhid Ali and four other advocates from Lahore announced the foundation of a “Shia Political Party” (SPP) with the following appeal published in the fortnightly *al-Muntazar* (excerpts):

The *millat-i ja‘fariya* is confronted with a number of religious, economic and social problems. Since the foundation of Pakistan and until now mostly religious organisations have worked for their solution within their specific range of action. Because their range of action is confined to the religious realm, they could not achieve much in projects of social welfare ... it is a great calamity that the Shia *qaum* has not been organised socially so far on a sound basis...

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It is still an open question whether we achieved any group status since the foundation of Pakistan. The main reason is that we have always regarded politics as a forbidden tree. We never took part in national affairs as a community, and we have not fulfilled our duty to create political awareness within our ranks ... the large Shia *auqâf* were usurped by others because our political negligence has reached such a degree that we try to obtain our rights through the signatures of the rulers instead of the legislative institutions ... in spite of constitutional guarantees, the police is robbing you of your basic religious freedoms including *tabligh* and we only protest ... wherever national wealth is spent on religious affairs, Shias are forgotten ...

We have all been affiliated to some political party or other individually, but have we been able to achieve anything for Shia social life this way? ... The Shias must now resort to their own means and to their own courage and patience ... There will be numerous difficulties in our path. As ordinary people we will face financial problems ... but if we can raise the dignity and discipline of the Shias we are sure that our caravan can be successful ... a Shia Political Party has come into existence, and we need urgently your cooperation...<sup>33</sup>

The initial outlook of the founding members of the SPP was very much Shia communalist. In draft statutes they proclaimed their aims as “safeguarding the religious, social, cultural, economical, educational, political, and other rights of the Shias”,<sup>34</sup> and they tried to get support from the existing Shia organisations, especially the SMC. While the Secretaries General of the APSC and the ITHS declined invitations to attend a founding convention of the SPP on 12 October, Shaikh Abd ul-‘Aziz Akhtar of the SMC and the editors of some Shia journals did attend.<sup>35</sup> Even S. Muhammad Dihlavi, despite his own abstinence from politics, was initially sympathetic to the SPP project and helped the group to gain some acceptance among SMC supporters.<sup>36</sup> But as early as November 1969 Shâhid Ali Naqvi had to deny accusations that the SPP would support “socialism”.<sup>37</sup>

In any case, the SPP never took off as a party and was not even able to organise a single regular convention prior to the elections apart from the founding convention which was attended by barely a hundred individuals.<sup>38</sup> None of the founders had any political stature so far.<sup>39</sup> Those Shia leaders who did had always contested elections on a non-communal platform, which had been a necessity ever since pre-independence days because of the scattered Shia electorate and the system of majority vote.<sup>40</sup> Thus hopes of some of the SPP founders to become something like a political arm of the *Mutâlabât* Movement faltered even before the break between their party and the SMC.

Such a break came swiftly after an editorial of Ghulam Rabbani Mirza in the SPP weekly *Nidâ-i Qaum* on 5 June 1970. On the occasion of the death

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of S. Muhsin al-Hakim, the *marja' al-taqlid* of the Shia world, two days earlier, Rabbani Mirza accused the editor of *Razâkâr* of having distorted facts and created problems for Muhsin al-Hakim when reprinting his 1960 *fatwâ* against communism on 1 August 1969. According to Rabbani Mirza, the said *fatwâ* could not apply to socialism which was entirely different from communism and compatible with Islam.<sup>41</sup> Muhammad Siddiq, for his part, considered the *fatwâ* still valid and fully applicable to socialism, pointing out that Muhsin al-Hakim had never denied that during his lifetime.<sup>42</sup> On 15 June, S. Muhammad Dihlavi made a declaration that he had previously hoped the SPP could do something useful for the Shias, but that it had now become obvious that the group was "devoted to socialism". Reaffirming that he himself was not a member of any party and had nothing to do with the SPP, Dihlavi asked all Shias who trusted him to distance themselves from the SPP, too.<sup>43</sup> Four days later the Hyderabad branch of the SPP was formally dissolved by its chairman, S. Najaf'ali Shah,<sup>44</sup> followed by similar moves in most other towns. A series of polemics and counter-polemics between defenders and detractors of the SPP and socialism followed, with most Shia '*ulamâ*', whether supporters of the SMC, the APSC or the ITHS, opposing the SPP point of view. Among the prominent '*ulamâ*', only Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi clearly sided with the SPP.<sup>45</sup> He had expressed the same doubts about Muhsin al-Hakim's *fatwâ* as Rabbani Mirza already in October 1969,<sup>46</sup> and since July 1970 he adopted Bhutto's term of "Islamic socialism".<sup>47</sup> Although Kararvi remained closely associated to the SPP during the coming years, his basic aim was probably to please the PPP, which he sensed to be on the way to power.<sup>48</sup>

While the founding of the SPP had achieved nothing to gather any significant number of Shias on a common political platform, many felt worried about the assertive campaigning of the Sunni religious parties which had started in early 1970. Shias were especially annoyed by the election manifesto of the JUI faction led by Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi, which stated that the Head of State had to be Sunni "like 98 per cent of Pakistan's Muslims".<sup>49</sup> When explaining the same manifesto in Radio Pakistan on 30 September, Thanvi openly stated that Shia rituals such as '*azâdârî* processions and *mâtam* would not be counted among the permissible acts (*mubâhât*) in the framework of an Islamic constitution. The JUI would set up a board of '*ulamâ*' to formulate Islamic laws according to the interpretation of the Sunni majority.<sup>50</sup> Such statements were seen as a departure from positions Thanvi had taken at the time of the 1951 '*ulamâ*' conference which had passed the "22 Principles".<sup>51</sup> The JI Chairman Maududi, too, had

said in January 1970 that his party would make a Sunni Head of State obligatory, although he later denied that.<sup>52</sup> Six months later, when the JI campaign had started in earnest, Maududi tried to dispel the impression that his party was against Shias, claiming that Shias would “fully cooperate” with the JI and could also become full-fledged JI members (*arkân*).<sup>53</sup> This was rebuked in an editorial of *Razâkâr* on 24 June titled “No Shia can become [even] a worker (*karkun*) of the JI”.<sup>54</sup> Shortly after the JI also adopted the slogan of the other religious parties that it was struggling for an Islamic system moulded upon the example of the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn*, which was anathema for the Shias.<sup>55</sup> Maududi’s answer to their criticism was the distinction between “public law”, which he wanted to be in accordance with the *sharî'a* as interpreted by the Hanafi Sunni majority and “personal law”, which would leave the minorities free to regulate their personal affairs according to their own *fiqh*.<sup>56</sup> Although such views were quite similar to what had been agreed to by Shia *'ulamâ'* in the framework of the “22 Principles” in 1951,<sup>57</sup> Maududi’s statements were now considered “sectarian” and completely unacceptable in the Shia press.<sup>58</sup> A pointed reply to his adoption of the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn* slogan came from Mirza Yusuf Husain, who reminded Maududi that he himself had only recently criticised the third Caliph in his book *Khilâfat sê mulûkiyat tak*.<sup>59</sup> Among the Shia leaders, only the ITHS Secretary-General Muzaffar Ali Shamsi said something positive about Maududi during the 1970 campaign, allegedly because of a secret electoral alliance with the JI.<sup>60</sup>

The majority JUI faction led by Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi and Mufti Mahmud, which at that time found common ground with Bhutto’s “anti-imperialist” agenda,<sup>61</sup> frequently indulged in open propaganda against Shias during its election campaign, as was the case with the chairman of the JUP at that time, Pir Qamar ud-Din Sialvi.<sup>62</sup> Throughout the election campaign, dedicated Shia communalists found themselves at loss about what recommendations they should give to Shia voters. From mid-1970 numerous appeals were made to call a convention of Shia leaders and intellectuals from different organisations to arrive at some “collective” decision. The “Markazi Shia Federation” of Karachi, headed by the former chairman of the local SMC, Prince ‘Abbas Mirza,<sup>63</sup> at last organised an “All-Pakistan Shia Convention” on 25 October, but it was attended almost exclusively by SMC members. Even these were divided between supporters and opponents of the PPP and no unanimous decision could be reached.<sup>64</sup> Jamil Husain Rizvi, who did not attend due to illness, in his message could only recommend that Shias should decide in each constituency which candi-

dates were "pious and with clean intentions" and would "harbour no enmity against Shias or any other sect". But considering the sectarian propaganda against Shias during the campaign, even Rizvi thought that Shias might have to decide after the elections that they needed separate constituencies "to safeguard their religious peculiarities and their survival".<sup>65</sup> S. Muhammad Dihlavi shortly after recommended looking at the attitude of each candidate towards the main Shia demands and "adequate Shia representation".<sup>66</sup>

The SPP, in the meantime, had almost disappeared except for some presence in the media; it was not even able to contest the elections.<sup>67</sup> But Ghulam Rabbani Mirza, who had meanwhile proclaimed himself chairman of the SPP, caused some uproar with a press conference on 23 November where he proclaimed support for the PPP and a secularist system in Pakistan. He once more dismissed Muhsin al-Hakim's *fatwâ* as irrelevant and said that he considered Shi'ism "a spiritual movement, not a *mazhab*". His statements provoked a lengthy rejoinder of Mushtaq Husain Naqvi during a press conference on 26 November in Lahore.<sup>68</sup>

#### *From the elections to the 1971 war*

National Assembly elections took place on 7 December 1970, with the PPP winning eighty-one out of 138 seats in West Pakistan whereas JI, JUI and JUP together won only eighteen seats.<sup>69</sup> The Sunni religious parties fared no better in the provincial elections ten days later, winning only seven out of 180 seats in the Punjab Assembly, eight out of sixty in Sindh, five out of forty in the NWFP and three out of twenty in Balochistan.<sup>70</sup> In East Pakistan all parties had been routed by the Bengal nationalist 'Awami League in both the national and provincial elections. Thus the spectre of a "Sunni Hanafi state" had completely disappeared for the time being. It was widely assumed that most Shias in West Pakistan had voted for the secularist PPP as the best safeguard against religious fanaticism.<sup>71</sup> The weekly *Chattân* wrote of a Shia "plot" to support the PPP collectively "out of abhorrence from an Islamic system",<sup>72</sup> and organs of the SPP even attributed the triumph of Bhutto to the support given to him by their own tiny party. An editorial of *Nidâ-i Qaum* on 1 January 1971, which was reprinted with comments of Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi in *Shihâb-i Thâqib*, made threatening remarks against those "*fatwâ*-mongering Mullahs" who had declared socialism as *kufir* "influenced by Maududi and Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi".<sup>73</sup>

An analysis of Shia voting patterns in 1970 made by Mushtaq Husain Naqvi tried to draw a different picture.<sup>74</sup> He started with the remark that

Sunnis, who made up between 80 and 85 per cent of Pakistan's population, were responsible for the PPP victory in the first place. Those constituencies that were Shia strongholds had produced mixed results. In the Tehsils of Bhakkar, Layyah and Alipur along the eastern bank of the Indus, where he considered the Shia vote decisive, Shia PPP candidates had lost against those of other parties, whether Shias or Sunnis. The same had happened in the Kurram Agency of the NWFP, with most Shias voting for a Sunni member of the Bangash tribe instead. In Lahore Major Zulfikar Qizilbash, (a younger brother of Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan), who had been elected to the National Assembly in 1964 as an independent candidate, lost on a PPP ticket in 1970. In Rawalpindi most Shias voted for Air Marshall (retd.) Asghar Khan (*Tahrik-i Istiqlâl*). Out of thirteen Shia deputies elected to the Punjab Assembly, only three had won on a PPP ticket, all from Multan District.<sup>75</sup> However, four out of the only five Shia candidates elected to the 313-member National Assembly had contested for the PPP.<sup>76</sup> In Sindh, where Sunni religious parties had falsely portrayed Bhutto as a Shia, not a single Shia was voted into the National or Provincial Assembly. The same was the case in East Pakistan, in Balochistan, and in the NWFP, with the exception of one Provincial Assembly seat.<sup>77</sup> Altogether Shias achieved quite meagre results, reflecting their generally scattered electorate—even in Shia strongholds such as Karachi and Lahore—and the splitting-up of their votes among a number of different parties.

Due to the subsequent power struggle between Bhutto and the Bengal leader Mujib ur-Rahman, whose party held the majority of seats in the National Assembly, the latter was never convoked until after the secession of East Pakistan.<sup>78</sup> The violent confrontation in East Pakistan from March 1971 until December that year almost completely froze any further implementation of the commitments made to Shias by the government between 1968 and 1970 (see above). It also hampered the activities of the SMC.

Yet some important internal developments among Pakistan's Shias took place in 1971. One of them was the way how the question of seeking a new *marja' al-taqlid* after the demise of Muhsin al-Hakim was handled by a number of Pakistani 'ulamâ' since mid-1970 and throughout the following eighteen months.<sup>79</sup> Another were attempts by leaders of the APSC and the ITHS, who had laid numerous obstacles in the path of the SMC during the previous years, to "forge unity" of the Shia organisations. The apparent reason was that neither Muzaffar Ali Shamsi nor the proteges of Nawab Qizilbash had achieved any success during the elections, and that they now felt the need to revamp their position within the Shia community. The



APSC Secretary-General Sha'iq Ambalvi seized the opportunity of a session of the Shia Auqaf Board in the absence of Jamil Husain Rizvi in February 1971 to lure his counterpart from the SMC, Abd ul-'Aziz Akhtar, into an informal talk together with Muzaffar Ali Shamsi. They made him agree to sign a joint declaration and had press photographs taken on the occasion.<sup>80</sup> This unauthorised action provoked a lot of criticism from SMC members, but it was followed up by numerous dramatic appeals for unity from both Ambalvi and Shamsi. Incidentally they now admitted how much harm rivalry between their two organisations had done to Shia causes during the last two decades. Jamil Husain Rizvi, after consulting with S. Muhammad Dihlavi, approved in principle the idea of uniting the three Shia organisations, but set the condition that Ambalvi and Shamsi would state clearly their readiness to dissolve the APSC and ITHS and resign from their functions; the matter could then be decided by the SMC Council.<sup>81</sup>

On 20 August S. Muhammad Dihlavi, who had been ailing since one year and had spent most of the last months in hospital, died at the age of seventy-three years. A meeting in Lahore on 25–27 September 1971 decided about his succession and other organisational matters. Justice (retd.) S. Jamil Husain Rizvi (1905–81), who had been Senior Vice-Chairman of the SMC since its formation in 1966 and the preferred candidate of Dihlavi himself, was elected chairman by unanimous acclamation.<sup>82</sup> The choice could not have been better. Jamil Husain Rizvi was both a committed and effective worker for numerous Shia communal organisations and affairs since the early 1950s and a man with a distinguished career in politics and the judiciary.<sup>83</sup> He provided more competent and energetic leadership for the SMC throughout the 1970s than any other person might possibly have done, although he could not prevent the SMC from declining after 1975. The reasons for that development were not of his making.<sup>84</sup>

The seeds for new internal divisions of the SMC supporters were nevertheless laid at that same SMC session. Mirza Yusuf Husain, the ambitious 'âlim from Lucknow who had been Vice-Chairman of the "Action Committee" of Shia 'ulamâ' (MAUSP) since the 1964 Karachi Convention, insisted on keeping that institution alive and was duly elected its Chairman. Thus the leadership of the *Mutâlabât* Movement was split between the SMC and the MAUSP, and inevitably personal rivalries led to mutual alienation in the following years until the MAUSP separated completely from the SMC in 1974.<sup>85</sup> After the acclamation of the new Chairman, a new team of leading functionaries of the SMC was elected, taking into account the dissolution of the "One Unit" in West Pakistan. Nawab Iftikhar Husain



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Khan, a *muhâjir* landlord from Karachi, became Senior Vice-Chairman, while the advocate Raja Lehrasb Ali Khan replaced Abd ul-‘Aziz Akhtar as Secretary-General. The latter had resigned after he found no support at all for his proposals to merge the SMC with the APSC and ITHS.<sup>86</sup> Mushtaq Husain Naqvi was kept as the Chief Organising Secretary and remained the most active orator and trouble-shooter of the SMC during the following years.<sup>87</sup> Central vice-chairmen of the SMC were also elected from all four provinces of West Pakistan and from East Pakistan.<sup>88</sup> A remarkable feature of the SMC Council meeting, given the situation in East Pakistan, was that its first two sessions were presided over by Maulana S. Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abidi from Chittagong, who also impressed the audience with a sermon about the necessity of *namâz*.<sup>89</sup>

One decision of the meeting was the establishment of a *Qâ'id-i Millat Memorial Funds* chaired by S. ‘Abbas Husain Gardezi, MNA-elect from Multan, within the framework of the AWSM. Donations for it were collected during the following months.<sup>90</sup> In between the sessions, Gardezi and Jamil Husain Rizvi also met with the Chief Secretary Afzal Agha to remind him of the non-implementation of a separate Shia *dīniyât* syllabus and demanded his reply within a week.<sup>91</sup> Not surprisingly, nothing was achieved in this respect. The new Chairman made his first tour to important SMC branches in October, with large public meetings in Multan, Karachi and Hyderabad.<sup>92</sup> A number of similar tours would follow in the coming years, mostly in company of Mushtaq Husain, and Jamil Husain Rizvi won as much respect as a Shia leader in the early 1970s as Dihlavi had enjoyed in the 1960s.

During the last months of 1971, the crisis in East Pakistan and the subsequent war eclipsed everything else. The loss of East Pakistan, traumatic as it was for most Muslims of West Pakistan, did not have much immediate consequences for the Shia *Mutâlabât* Movement, which was overwhelmingly based in West Pakistan anyhow. One of its side-effects was to increase the percentage of Shias among Pakistan’s overall population, but it also made the government and Sunni parties more sensitive to “dangers for national unity” in the following years.

### *The Bhutto government and Shia demands, 1972–1974*

On 20 December 1971, after the final defeat of Pakistan’s armed forces in East Bengal and a cease-fire on the western fronts, Bhutto took over the presidency from Yahya Khan. He led the government in that function until

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August 1973, when he was elected prime minister in application of a new constitution, which had been approved by the National Assembly in April that year.<sup>93</sup> Only one of the twenty-five members of the commission charged with drafting the constitution had been Shia—the Minister of Finances, Dr Mubashir Hasan<sup>94</sup>—but most basic safeguards for minorities, which had already been included in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, were maintained without significant amendments.<sup>95</sup> Articles 21 and 22 of the 1973 constitution contained the following new safeguards:

21. No persons shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on the propagation or maintenance of any religion other than his own.
22. (1) No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.<sup>96</sup>

With hindsight the five-and-a-half years of Bhutto's government can be considered—along with the Yahya Khan interregnum—as the most favourable period for Shias in Pakistan's history. The avowed secularism of Bhutto and the relative weakness of the Sunni religious lobby did not give room for much pressure on Shias from that direction.<sup>97</sup> Although the sectarian front was not altogether calm during these years,<sup>98</sup> such clashes as did occur in the 1970s were not comparable with what happened since the 1980s. It was Bhutto's government which finally started implementation of the promises regarding separate *dīniyāt* (see below) and which introduced some reforms in the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan in 1972, giving a political voice to the mainly Shia population of that part of Pakistan. Bhutto became so popular in the Northern Areas that their foremost Shia religious leader, Shaikh Ghulam Muhammad of Skardu, accepted the chairmanship of the regional branch of the PPP.<sup>99</sup> If we can assume that a majority of both Shias and Sunnis in West Pakistan voted for Bhutto in 1970, a larger proportion of the Shias apparently maintained their loyalty to the PPP after Bhutto's downfall and until present times.<sup>100</sup>

Nevertheless, the Shia *Mutâlabât* Movement had as many problems with temporising of the Bhutto government and its lack of interest in special Shia plights as had been the case under Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Likewise, the Shia rivals of the SMC resumed their obstructive moves more obstinately than ever after the failure of the APSC and the ITHS to infiltrate the SMC in 1971. Thus the Bhutto years were by no means a honeymoon between the government and the main Shia organisation, the partisans of which became more and more impatient from 1972 to 1974.

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During these years, most energies of the SMC were focussed on the *dinîyât* issue. The problem of Shia *auqâf* given to Sunnis also remained unresolved,<sup>101</sup> but was not considered pressing enough as to launch a new protest movement on its behalf. More than anything else, the *auqâf* issue fuelled internal Shia conflicts as a result of SMC demands that the Auqaf Department must take control of the *Qizilbash Waqf*.<sup>102</sup> These conflicts, in turn, delayed a breakthrough regarding separate *dinîyât*.

Many leading members of the SMC had criticised Bhutto's rhetoric about socialism with strong words during the 1970 election campaign. One of them had been Raja Lehrasb Ali Khan, who was later elected Secretary-General of the SMC.<sup>103</sup> But in January 1972, he appealed to Bhutto with the following open letter (excerpts):

Honourable President! Your first speech as President has been a ray of hope in the darkness of despair, and the oppressed have gained hope that the tyrannies committed against them will now be removed...

May I turn your attention to the state of oppression and misery affecting tens of millions of Shias (sic) in Pakistan who are caught in the misfortune of serfdom and are fighting for their survival as a sect. As you have professed your resolve to uphold the law and respect the fundamental rights, we hope that you will give justice to the Shias...

We only demand the right to live as Shia Muslims in this land which we have obtained in the name of Islam. We only want that in those institutions, which are run with funds or financial help from the government, and where *dinîyât* is provided for Sunnis according to their belief, the same will be provided for Shias, because we have our share in the official budget as Pakistanis and as tax-payers...

We are certainly aware of the difficult situation of the country and of your countless occupations ... still we are feeling that if the present state of our affairs remains like that, we will cease to exist as a sect in the near future ... once oppression against Shias is lifted, the mental power of the whole people of Pakistan will increase significantly...<sup>104</sup>

It took until 16 May that year for a delegation of the SMC, headed by Jamil Husain Rizvi, to be received by the Minister of Education, Abd ul-Hafiz Pirzada. The minister promised the introduction of Shia *dinîyât* "as soon as possible".<sup>105</sup> Because nothing tangible happened in the following months, the SMC decided to stage another show of force. A convention was called in Rawalpindi starting from 6 August 1972, which met with even stronger response than the November 1968 convention at the same place. According to SMC sources, more than 25,000 Shia volunteers from all over Pakistan, led by their respective notables and '*ulamâ*', had gathered by 6 August, and more were ready to come during the following days.<sup>106</sup> As

usual, the rivals of the SMC tried their best to foil the convention. Qizilbash met Bhutto on 1 August and asked him to do something to allay growing Shia unrest. Bhutto then distributed an official handout stating that the Shia demands regarding separate *dîniyât* had been accepted and would be implemented soon.<sup>107</sup> Fake announcements were published that the convention had been called off, and posters in that sense were still distributed in Rawalpindi when it had already started.<sup>108</sup> This only increased the resolve of the SMC activists gathered and their leaders. After an initial oratory meeting at Liaquat Bagh, a procession was led to the Presidential House in Islamabad where a sit-in was maintained for forty-eight hours.<sup>109</sup>

An SMC delegation, too, had met with Bhutto and Kausar Niyazi, his Minister of Religious Affairs, already on 1 August, but had not been satisfied by his evasive promises.<sup>110</sup> On 7 August Pirzada told another SMC delegation that the provincial governments of Punjab and Sindh had accepted separate Shia *dîniyât*, but those of the NWFP and Balochistan had refused to implement them.<sup>111</sup> This was considered an admission that Bhutto's "handout" had been worthless. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi demanded that the Federal Government should give orders for separate *dîniyât*, and the SMC would start agitation against the reluctant provincial governments. Pirzada then claimed not to be sufficiently informed about the background of the Shia demands and instructed the delegation to negotiate with Kausar Niyazi. An agreement was reached, but Niyazi failed to make good his promise to submit it to the cabinet for approval and announce the decision on Radio Pakistan on the same evening. Thereafter calls were made for more volunteers to head for Islamabad in preparation for a larger protest movement.<sup>112</sup> On the next morning (8 August) a breakthrough was achieved during negotiations between the SMC delegates and Pirzada, Kausar Niyazi and the Punjab Governor Mustafa Khar.<sup>113</sup> After a written statement by Pirzada that separate Shia *dîniyât* would be introduced on 1 January 1973 in all government schools the protest sit-in was called off. It was also agreed that a meeting of Shia '*ulamâ*' and notables on 16 August in Islamabad would decide about an interim Shia syllabus.<sup>114</sup>

Jamil Husain Rizvi accepted that members of other Shia organisations would take part at the 16 August conference provided that the majority of delegates would be from the SMC. Thus invitations were sent for twenty members of the SMC (including MAUSP), seven independents, five of the APSC and three each from the ITHS, the SPP and the Shia Youth League.<sup>115</sup> However, APSC, ITHS and SPP decided to boycott the meeting and thus almost brought about its cancellation.<sup>116</sup> The APSC later argued that a Shia

*dinîyât* syllabus had already been agreed on in June 1970 and there was no point in reopening a debate on it.<sup>117</sup> But according to the version of the SMC, both Pirzada and Kausar Niyazi had insisted that the “*‘awâmî* government” of the PPP would formulate its own *dinîyât* syllabus, including separate provisions for Shias, instead of implementing decisions of the Yahya Khan government.<sup>118</sup> Niyazi, who chaired the 16 August conference, was not even ready to introduce the set of *dinîyât* textbooks agreed on in 1970 for an interim period, while Pirzada once more pleaded for a common syllabus for Shias and Sunnis.<sup>119</sup> When that was unanimously rejected by the Shias present, he announced that a separate syllabus would be introduced already on 1 October and there would be no need for an interim arrangement. Instead a commission of five Shia and five Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ chaired by Kausar Niyazi was formed to decide about the generalities of the future syllabus.<sup>120</sup>

This commission held its first two sessions on 24–24 September 1972 in Islamabad. Qizilbash had meanwhile arranged for the inclusion of two more Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, Mufti Ja‘far Husain and Safdar Husain Mashhadi, to represent the APSC.<sup>121</sup> The SMC and MAUSP were represented by Mirza Yusuf Husain, S. Murtaza Husain, Muhammad Bashir Ansari, Ibn Hasan Jarchawi and Ibn Hasan Najafi. These five had been made to sign an oath by the SMC Chairman to walk out in case the commission would retract on the principle of separate *dinîyât*.<sup>122</sup> Sunni members of the commission were Professor Ghafur Ahmad (JI), Maulanas Abd ul-Hakim (JUI), Abd ul-Ahad Ghaznavi (JUI), Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari (TAS/JUI), Sahibzada Faiz ul-Hasan (JUP), Muhammad Hanif Nadvi (JAH), and the CII chairman ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi.<sup>123</sup> During the first session Faiz ul-Hasan, Muhammad Hanif Nadvi, Abd ul-Hakim and Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari once more warned against the perils of separate *dinîyât*, but the other Sunni members and the Chairman Kausar Niyazi showed understanding for the Shia arguments. At last all fourteen ‘*ulamâ*’ agreed on the principle of separate *dinîyât*. The next day it was discussed whether the Sunni and Shia syllabi should be included in a joint textbook or not.<sup>124</sup> It took another session (Karachi, 30 September) to settle the matter. Niyazi and some Sunni members of the commission urged the Shias to accept a joint textbook. Reminding them of the loss of East Pakistan and separatist tendencies in other provinces, they appealed to them to avoid as much as possible further separation between Pakistan’s citizens.<sup>125</sup> It was then agreed that a joint textbook would contain the following chapters: 1) such verses from the Koran which both Sunni and Shia children would recite during *namâz* and other religious duties; 2) the *sîrat*

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of the Prophet Muhammad, without elements which would be objectionable to any Muslim sect or denomination; 3) the main tenets of Sunni Muslim belief and practice; lives of the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn* and important *sahâba*; 4) the Shia *kalima* and *usûl ad-dîn* including *imâma*; Shia religious practices and the lives of the *ahl al-bait*.<sup>126</sup>

A working group of four Sunni and four Shia '*ulamâ*' as well as one representative of each provincial government and two from the Federal Government was set up to formulate the new syllabus.<sup>127</sup> It was also decided to revise the syllabi of history and literature and remove objectionable content from them.<sup>128</sup> Although the SMC had not achieved full satisfaction of its demands, its leaders were quite content with the result. Jamil Husain Rizvi found some positive aspects of the proposed joint textbook: a larger number of the books would be printed and make Shia tenets easily accessible to Sunni pupils, too, enabling them "to compare" and also help to remove some misunderstandings about Shia beliefs.<sup>129</sup> The question who would teach Shia *dînîyât* at more than 20,000 government schools, most of them with only a tiny proportion of Shia pupils, was considered a "secondary organisational question". For the SMC the important matter was to have won principal acceptance for having Shia tenets included in the official syllabus.<sup>130</sup>

But other Shia organisations were determined to find fault with whatever concessions the SMC could extract from the government. At first the rumour was spread that the commission headed by Kausar Niyazi had decided to keep the *dînîyât* syllabus unified.<sup>131</sup> Later it was argued that all the costly conventions had achieved less than what had already been recommended by the CII in October 1966 and the ten-member board in June 1967.<sup>132</sup> Finally, after all attempts of misinformation had failed, APSC, ITHS and SPP joined hands in an assault on the 30 September decisions with the argument that they were "detrimental to the unity of the Muslims" and "contradicting the ideology of Pakistan".

The odd "tripartite alliance" (*ittihâd-i thalâtha*) of APSC, ITHS and SPP had first manifested itself during their joint boycott of the 16 August conference (see above). The ITHS had virtually come full circle from spearheading the movement for separate *dînîyât* in the 1950s to adopting the long-time arguments of its Sunni detractors in 1972. But that organisation had almost ceased to exist except for some close associates of Muzaffar Ali Shamsi and its chairman, Azhar Hasan Zaidi.<sup>133</sup> The same could be said about the SPP, which had further split up in August 1972.<sup>134</sup> Its new leader, S. 'Abbas Haidar 'Abidi,<sup>135</sup> almost completely isolated himself among Shias

with a statement that the *sahâba* and the *ahl al-bait* were “the common capital of all Muslims”.<sup>136</sup> The only remaining serious contender of the SMC was the APSC because of the wealth of Qizilbash and his influence on a section of the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, which grew stronger in the coming years.

Although the two ‘*ulamâ*’ representing the APSC had fully endorsed the decisions of the fourteen-member commission, the APSC Vice-Chairman S. Hadi Ali Shah in November 1972 published an advertisement in a Lahore newspaper titled “All Shias have rejected the present *dinîyât* syllabus”.<sup>137</sup> One of his arguments against a separate syllabus was that knowledge about the *ahl al-bait* would be restricted to Shia children only who would also be left “deprived of knowledge about the *sahâba*”, thus giving credibility to the accusation of some Sunnis that Shias were ignorant about the *sahâba*.<sup>138</sup> Even Safdar Husain Mashhadi clearly dismissed such fears, stating that Shias, too, should certainly learn about the *sahâba* including Abu Sufyan, Mu‘awiya and even Yazid, but only in the framework of history lessons and without any anti-Shia bias. In an editorial of his journal *al-Hujjat* he gave the following pointed reply to the SMC’s detractors (excerpts):

Now they are making noise that there will be a division between the *ahl al-bait* and the *sahâba* ... which will create hate and enmity between future generations, i.e. Shias and Sunnis ... who will fight among each other. In the end the Sunnis will become estranged from the *ahl al-bait* and the Shias will be deprived of the *sahâba*, and this hate and estrangement will be harmful for Pakistan. The origin of such far-fetched imaginations is not wisdom but the mutual rivalry between our Shia groups which oppose each other out of pure obstinacy, only for the sake of opposition...

I invite all parties and groups and individuals to indulge in mutual rivalry, enmity and revenge as much as they like ... let them be strong rivals and take full revenge. I have only one request from them: Please don’t sacrifice religion, *mazhab*, *qaum*, *millat*, belief, [religious] acts, truth, justice, reason and wisdom for the sake of your instincts, your mischief and your desire for revenge. Don’t choose the accepted ... separate *dinîyât* syllabus as your object ... have pity with the Shias ... take revenge by other ways...<sup>139</sup>

Although Bhutto had declared in advance that he would approve all recommendations of the commission headed by Kausar Niyazi,<sup>140</sup> the latter were rejected by his cabinet, apparently because of opposition from the minister Pirzada. But this was made public only two years later.<sup>141</sup> Throughout 1973 and most of 1974 the government found a convenient pretext for delaying in the disagreement among the Shia organisations themselves on the *dinîyât* issue. While the latter were quarrelling with each other, the working group appointed in September 1972 was simply never convoked.



Apparently opposition against the *dinîyât* compromise from the side of the APSC was most of all a diversion tactic, aimed at weakening the SMC because of its stance on the *Qizilbash Waqf* (see above). From 1973 onwards, Qizilbash gradually won over some leading '*ulamâ*' of the MAUSP, which had become partially separated from the SMC in September 1971, to his side. Instead of submitting his huge *waqf* to the control of the Auqaf Department, he suggested in early 1973 to set-up a board of Shia '*ulamâ*' to audit its finances.<sup>142</sup> He also lured the '*ulamâ*' with the announcement that the *Jâmi'at Imâmîya* in Lahore, which he had founded along with two high-schools and run with funds from his *waqf* after the Waqf Act of 1959 had threatened the latter, would soon be raised to the standard of the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn* of Lucknow.<sup>143</sup> On 23 February he met informally with Mirza Yusuf Husain and other '*ulamâ*' saying that he agreed with the *dinîyât* compromise. But when this was reported in the pro-SMC press, the organs of the APSC, ITHS and SPP vehemently denied it while Qizilbash kept silent.<sup>144</sup> Likewise, when Mirza Yusuf Husain published a pamphlet about an agreement of all Shia organisations with the decisions of September 1972 on *dinîyât*,<sup>145</sup> the latter was reprinted only by the pro-SMC journals and contradicted by statements of the APSC, ITHS and SPP.<sup>146</sup> Speaking at a meeting of the SMC Council in Multan (15–16 July 1973), Mirza Yusuf Husain said that he had been fooled by the "hypocrites", adding that he had not trusted them in the past and not in the present and would not do so in future.<sup>147</sup> But within less than a year he would find himself in the service of Nawab Qizilbash.<sup>148</sup>

During that SMC Council meeting Jamil Husain Rizvi harshly criticised Qizilbash, blaming him for having spoiled the chance of Shia *dinîyât* when he was entrusted with the issue under Yahya Khan.<sup>149</sup> A resolution was adopted giving the government two more months to implement a Shia *dinîyât* syllabus, otherwise agitation would start in Rawalpindi.<sup>150</sup> Another important decision of the meeting was to change the statutes of the SMC. The right of the MAUSP to veto its decisions was abolished and the number of councillors was expanded from 300 to 400, 100 of whom should be '*ulamâ*'. The Working Committee was expanded from twenty to twenty-four persons, half of whom should be '*ulamâ*'; in case of parity of votes, the vote of the '*ulamâ*' would still be decisive. No member of the SMC was allowed to belong to another countrywide Shia organisation.<sup>151</sup> Besides, some speeches highly critical of the '*ulamâ*' were held, especially by S. Abd ul-Jalil Shah Gardezi, who considered them easily corruptible and unfit for being entrusted with solving any problem that Shias had with the govern-



ment. If the help of ‘*ulamâ*’ was needed for any matter, it would be better to refer to those of Najaf. Many participants were perplexed, and Jamil Husain Rizvi had to ask the ‘*ulamâ*’ present for excuse.<sup>152</sup>

The ultimatum for the government was running out on 20 September. But in the meantime heavy floods had hit the Punjab and Sindh provinces, providing another excuse for the government to delay implementation of its commitments. Jamil Husain Rizvi met Governor Mustafa Khar on 7 August, and on 16 August Senator S. Husain Naqvi, the SMC Chairman for Balochistan, spoke to Bhutto. The prime minister said that he considered the Shia demands justified and promised to convoke a high-ranking conference to find a final solution for the *dinîyât* problem after his return from a trip to the U.S. in September. On 24 August the SMC Working Committee decided to cancel a protest convention in Rawalpindi scheduled for 21 September.<sup>153</sup>

It took until 11 December 1973, for a token implementation of the last promise. On that day Jamil Husain Rizvi, Mirza Yusuf Husain, S. ‘Abbas Husain Gardezi and Senator S. Husain Naqvi attended a meeting of officials of the Education Department headed by the Joint Secretary W. M. Zaki. Rizvi accepted that the same teachers would teach *dinîyât* to Sunni and Shia pupils, but no agreement was reached whether there could be a joint *dinîyât* syllabus in the primary classes. The matter was to be referred to the working group promised since September 1972, along with the preparation of the new syllabus.<sup>154</sup>

Again the working group was not convened and the matter was frozen.<sup>155</sup> On 7 May 1974, Jamil Husain Rizvi was received by Bhutto and complained heavily. Bhutto promised another meeting after his return from China in the presence of Pirzada and asked Rizvi to meet Pirzada in between. That meeting took place on 28 May, with Pirzada now suggesting that the *dinîyât* syllabus for classes 1–8 could be restricted to verses from the Koran, the *sîrat* of the Prophet Muhammad, ethics and *tauhîd*, whereas Shia pupils would have the option not to attend *dinîyât* in classes 9–10. Although this meant backtracking from former commitments, Rizvi agreed to let the SMC Working Committee decide about the offer. After the latter had rejected it on 9 June, Rizvi informed Bhutto about the failure of his talks with Pirzada.<sup>156</sup>

At the same time the government was very much occupied with a fresh campaign of the religious parties against the Ahmadiya sect, triggered by an incident in Rabwah on 29 May.<sup>157</sup> As had been the case in 1953, the campaign was condoned by many Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, who also applauded “the solution of a 90-year-old problem” by the decision of the National Assembly

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(7 September 1974) to have the Ahmadis included among the non-Muslim minorities in relevant articles of Pakistan's constitution.<sup>158</sup> It was conveniently overlooked that similar demands to have Shias declared non-Muslims would be made sooner or later.<sup>159</sup>

In any case, the SMC leaders had lost patience with the delaying tactics of Pirzada and Bhutto. A meeting of the SMC Working Committee in Rawalpindi on 29 August, attended also by some 100 councillors as observers, decided to organise a civil disobedience movement (*Husainî mahâz*) starting on 27 October in Rawalpindi.<sup>160</sup> Preparations for the event gained momentum in early October, with Jamil Husain Rizvi touring different districts of Punjab to ensure maximum participation of Shia volunteers.<sup>161</sup> On 11 October, when Rizvi had reached Peshawar to continue his tour in the Shia strongholds of the NWFP, he and other SMC leaders received invitations for urgent talks with Pirzada and other ministers in Lahore. The meeting took place on 13 October and was also attended by top delegates of the APSC and ITHS.<sup>162</sup> Although its decisions fell somewhat behind those taken in September 1972, it marked the final breakthrough achieved by the SMC in the Bhutto era.

Pirzada defended his principal objections against the introduction of separate Shia *dîniyât* to the last even during that meeting. He once more warned of dangerous consequences if coming generations of Muslims in Pakistan grew up with a consciousness that they were divided into two sections. He also feared that other sects such as the Isma'îlis and the *Ahl-i hadîth* might come forward with similar demands. Moreover, to provide for separate *dîniyât* instruction in some 21,000 government schools in Pakistan would cost the treasury Rs. 8.6 million up to the primary classes, to which Rs. 7.2 million would have to be added up to secondary level and Rs. 15.6 million up to college grades.<sup>163</sup> He also tried to create obstacles by quoting from a letter written to him by Rizvi in May that year in which he had allegedly accepted a joint *dîniyât* syllabus.<sup>164</sup> Nevertheless, the following decisions were made in the end and signed by all participants of the session:

- 1) There will be a joint syllabus for *dîniyât* (*Islâmiyât*) for classes 1–8, comprising verses of the Koran, *namâz* (taught separately to Sunni and Shia children according to their respective rites),<sup>165</sup> the *sîrat* of the Prophet and ethics.
- 2) The separate syllabus for classes 9–10 will comprise religious duties (*'ibâdât*) according to Sunni or Shia *fiqh* and biographies of the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn* or the *ahl al-bait*, respectively.
- 3) Pupils of classes 9–10 will have free choice which courses to attend.
- 4) A working group of Shia and Sunni '*ulamâ*' will prepare a syllabus for *Islâmiyât* which must be acceptable for both sides.
- 5) The textbooks of Farzand

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Raza and Zakir Husain Faruqi<sup>166</sup> will be introduced immediately in classes 9–10 for Shia pupils; they cannot yet be taught in the ongoing school year, but Shia pupils can write their exams based on these books. 6) New syllabi will be introduced in September 1975; if no new syllabus is ready until that time, the books of Farzand Raza and Faruqi can be used by Shia pupils.<sup>167</sup>

Agitation was called off, and Bhutto congratulated himself for “another big achievement of the *‘awâmî* government, cleaning up the bad legacy of the past and promoting national unity”.<sup>168</sup> The prevailing impression among Shias was that this time the government was serious. From 19–21 October, Rizvi concluded his interrupted tour to Peshawar, Hangu and Parachinar amidst celebrations. However, speeches of his companions during that tour reflected that the conflict between the SMC and its rivals, especially the APSC, was far from over.<sup>169</sup> It had rather become sharper since August 1974 because of a new dispute about the *Qizilbash Waqf*. The government had applied its land reform scheme on it and distributed 90 per cent of its lands around Alireza-Abad among the tenants in that month.<sup>170</sup> A polemic between *Razâkâr* and the APSC organ *Asad* ensued, with the editor of the former expressing doubts whether the lands distributed had not been Qizilbash’s private property and demanding clarification on the status of his *waqf*.<sup>171</sup> On 21 September *Nawâ-i Waqt* reported the following joint statement of Mirza Yusuf Husain, Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi, Muhammad Bashir Ansari and Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi:

The demand to put the lands of the Qizilbash Waqf under control of the government is made by people who are ignorant about the *sharî‘a*, because according to the *sharî‘a* a *waqf* can neither be altered nor can its assets be sold or distributed ... The step of the government is against Islam.

If the government is taking any measure which is against the *sharî‘a*, we will not shrink away from any sacrifices ... We appeal to Prime Minister Bhutto not to take any decisions in matters pertaining to Islamic law without consulting the *‘ulamâ’* before. Do not take notice of the demands of any self-appointed leader.<sup>172</sup>

The four signatories were the Presidents and Secretaries General of the MAUSP and the SMUP,<sup>173</sup> the two largest organisations of Shia *‘ulamâ’* in Pakistan, respectively. All four had started gathering regularly in Qizilbash’s palace in Empress Road (Lahore) since the autumn of 1973.<sup>174</sup> The closeness of these *‘ulamâ’*, all of whom were nominally still members of the SMC, to Qizilbash aroused resentments of Sha’iq Ambalvi and other members of the APSC old guard, who had vented their frustration at a meeting in the house of Khaqan Babar on 2 June 1974.<sup>175</sup> While Ambalvi lamented about those *‘ulamâ’* who “travelled on two ships”, Muhammad Bashir Ansari, who was

looking for a pretext to leave the SMC, had protested against the new article of the SMC statutes forbidding membership in other Shia organisations.<sup>176</sup>

On top of the “self-appointed leaders ignorant about the *sharī‘a*” according to the four ‘*ulamā*’ quoted above was no other than Jamil Husain Rizvi, whose lobbying for bringing the *Qizilbash Waqf* under the control of the Auqaf Department had been resented long since.<sup>177</sup> Thus the said ‘*ulamā*’ even refused to accompany Rizvi when he came to pick them up for the meeting with Pirzada on 13 October, and they kept their distance from the SMC delegates during that session.<sup>178</sup> Shortly after, and in spite of having signed the 13 October agreement, too, the four ‘*ulamā*’ published a pamphlet against Rizvi, accusing him of having “messed up” the *dînîyât* issue.<sup>179</sup> At the same time, in reply to a question of the editor of *Razâkâr*, Muhammad Bashir Ansari gave the following further explanation to the statement of the four ‘*ulamā*’ reported on 21 September:

If a *waqf* has been placed under the custody of a certain line of descendants (*nasl*), this trusteeship cannot be ended. If there is a legitimate *mutawallî*, his trusteeship cannot be taken away from him and transferred to any board or organisation. The demand to take the trusteeship of a *waqf* away from his legitimate *mutawallî* is un-Islamic.<sup>180</sup>

Muhammad Siddiq thereafter reminded Ansari and his colleagues that they had all participated in the January 1964 ‘*ulamā*’ convention in Karachi, where the demand for a Shia section of the Auqaf Board had been made unanimously; so there was no point in rejecting such a board now. Members of the APSC, too, had participated in the Auqaf Board and had kept silent about the transformation of some Shia *auqâf* into Sunni ones. Only because the *Qizilbash Waqf* was linked to their personal benefit, some ‘*ulamā*’ would now raise the flag of the *sharī‘a*.<sup>181</sup>

At a session of the MAUSP on 28 October 1974, it was decided to cut all links between the MAUSP and the SMC.<sup>182</sup> The “Action Committee” of ‘*ulamā*’ founded by S. Muhammad Dihlavi in 1964 had now become completely estranged from its later offspring. When a session of the SMC Council was called in Lahore on 14–15 December, Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi and Mirza Yusuf Husain wrote to Jamil Husain Rizvi demanding from him to cancel that session, and later they warned all members of the MAUSP from participating.<sup>183</sup> Only some 150 councillors showed up and re-elected Rizvi chairman of the SMC for another three years. Maulana Hashmat Ali held a speech against the MAUSP and its leaders. One resolution demanded the restitution of distributed lands from the *Qizilbash Waqf* in Alireza-

Abad, but another urged Qizilbash to set up a board of ‘*ulamâ*’ from all Shia organisations to audit his *waqf*.<sup>184</sup>

However, the commitments made by the government on 13 October 1974 were spared the fate of the 1972 decisions, in spite of the worsening split between the Shia organisations. The working group of Shia and Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ charged with formulating the *dīnīyât* syllabus started its work in Islamabad in November 1974, and the new syllabus for classes 3–8 was ready some months later.<sup>185</sup> Relations between the Shia organisations and the Bhutto government during the latter’s remaining years, as well as these organisations’ further internal development, will be dealt with in another section.<sup>186</sup>

### *Divisions among the Shia ‘ulamâ’ at their climax*

The controversy about Shia doctrines and religious practices in Pakistan triggered by the writings of Muhammad Husain Dhakko in the 1960s continued unabated during the 1969–77 period.<sup>187</sup> It reached a climax with the 1974–76 campaign against the Shaikhiya, which was countered by polemics against the so-called “Khalisi group”.<sup>188</sup> The orthodox tendency spearheaded by Dhakko emerged partially victorious from the bitter struggle, which was about money and influence as much as about its publicly professed goals of guiding the Shias on the right path in religious matters. Nevertheless, the populist camp of *zâkirs* and those ‘*ulamâ*’ who had adopted their style of preaching could maintain its influence on the Shia ‘*awâm*, helped by the overzealous attempts of Dhakko and some of his supporters to do away with time-honoured popular beliefs and practices. Many ‘*ulamâ*’ avoided taking sides clearly and tried to mediate, but the basic conflicts were never resolved.

Like their Sunni colleagues, the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ had suffered a further setback to their influence with the rise of Bhutto and his electoral triumph in West Pakistan. During the early years of Bhutto’s reign, secularist ideologies and westernised life-style swept the Shia community as much as their Sunni Muslim countrymen, while the ‘*ulamâ*’ were considered unable to reach out to the westernised educated youth.<sup>189</sup> Instead of giving answers to problems of the time they indulged in their mutual rivalries with increasing obstinacy, thus further eroding their former prestige among the Shia believers. These rivalries were not confined to the split between the orthodox and populists or between native ‘*ulamâ*’ and *muhâjirs*, but also manifested themselves in a prolonged quarrel about the succession of the *marja’ al-taqlīd* after the death of Muhsin al-Hakim in June 1970. Supporters

of Ayatollah S. Kazim Shari'atmadari in Qom were the first to collect and publish statements in favour of their "candidate".<sup>190</sup> Some 'ulamâ' of Lahore came out with an early public declaration in support of Ayatollah Khomeini,<sup>191</sup> seconded in September 1970 by S. Jawad Asghar Naqvi, the editor of the fortnightly *al-Irshâd* (Karachi).<sup>192</sup> Posters, pamphlets and articles were also published in favour of S. Abu'l-Qasim al-Khu'i, S. Muhammad Shirazi, S. Muhammad Reza Golpayegani and Muhammad Kazim Qommi.<sup>193</sup> Thus for the first time the purely religious question of selecting a *marja' al-taqlid* of the Shia world was transformed into a sort of "political campaign" in Pakistan, including negative propaganda against some of the "candidates".<sup>194</sup> Shari'atmadari and other Iranian Grand Ayatollahs sent delegations to Pakistan under the pretext of reviewing *dînî madâris*, which were received with much publicity. Promises of *ijâzât* for collecting *khums*, *zakât* and *sahm-i Imâm* and of financial support for *dînî madâris* were given, and individual supporters were lured with airline tickets, stipends and *wikâlat-nâmas*.<sup>195</sup> It took until October 1971 for the matter to calm down, with most Pakistani practising Shias probably choosing Ayatollah al-Khu'i as their *marja'*.<sup>196</sup>

The *marja'* campaign of 1970-71 coincided with the expansion of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar*, which then became the largest Shia *madrassa* in Pakistan. In 1969 a 21 canal (10,500 square yards) plot was purchased for Rs. 300,000 in the posh Lahore suburb of Model Town, and more donations were collected to cover an estimated Rs. 600,000 construction expenses.<sup>197</sup> By early 1977, when plans were made to further upgrade the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar*, 125 students were enrolled in that *madrassa* taught by eight 'ulamâ' under the supervision of S. Safdar Husain Najafi, who remained its principal until his death in 1989.<sup>198</sup> His predecessor Maulana Akhtar 'Abbas, who had continued his studies in Najaf and Qom from 1964 to 1972, founded a branch of Ayatollah Shari'atmadari's *Dâr ul-Tablîgh al-Islâmî* in his hometown Kot Addu in 1973.<sup>199</sup> Other important Shia *dînî madâris* founded in the early 1970s included the *Madrasat Âyatullâh al-Hakîm* in Rawalpindi,<sup>200</sup> the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn* in Lahore,<sup>201</sup> and the *Jâmi'at Ahl al-Bait* in Islamabad.<sup>202</sup>

In late 1971 Muhammad Husain Dhakko relieved himself of the duties as principal of the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm Muhammadîya* Sargodha in order to concentrate on research and writing.<sup>203</sup> His scathing criticism of the professional preachers was gradually being echoed by younger 'ulamâ' and other Shia intellectuals.<sup>204</sup> Yet for the mass of Shia participants at *majâlis* the attraction of popular preachers had remained intact, and they could still be used

effectively by Shia notables, as described in an editorial of *Razâkâr* of July 1972 (excerpts):

Many so-called Shia leaders have founded their parties and organisations for their own benefit and according to their gusto ... our clever leaders know that they can gather the Shia 'awâm whenever and wherever they want under the pretext of remembering and praising (*zîkr*) Husain, and that they can make use of such gatherings for their benefit. So they use this weapon in any time of need. They distribute huge posters adorned with the names of renowned 'ulamâ' and zâkirs and invite the Shia 'awâm to listen to a *zîkr-i Husain*. The 'awâm, having read the names of the 'ulamâ' and zâkirs with enormous honorific titles, come to participate in great numbers. Our clever leader<sup>205</sup> tells the 'ulamâ' and zâkirs to be grateful for being offered such a great audience, and they duly thank him for organising such a splendid *majlis-i 'azâ* and also collect *chanda* on the occasion. The government gets the impression that if so many Shias gather on his call he must be a beloved leader of his *qaum*. And he does not content himself with that, but has press photographs taken during his speech which are published in the newspapers...

Without the help of the zâkirs and Maulvis and invitations to the ardent lovers of Husain to hear their "message" none of the lovers of Husain would like to attend the meetings of those "great leaders", except for some of their attached clients who shout *zindabâd* for them at such occasions ...<sup>206</sup>

The editorial quoted above was directed against a number of wealthy Shia individuals who had formed organisations mainly to serve their personal interest,<sup>207</sup> but probably especially against Nawab Qizilbash. The latter attracted a number of those 'ulamâ' who were specialised in *majlis-khwânî* to his camp and away from the SMC since 1973,<sup>208</sup> whereas the SMC Chairman Jamil Husain Rizvi and his right-hand man Mushtaq Husain Naqvi moved closer to the "Dhakko group".<sup>209</sup> The weekly *Razâkâr*, too, which had given almost no coverage to the dispute among the 'ulamâ' provoked by Dhakko's books in the 1960s, became more and more outspoken against his leading detractors since 1974, albeit without fully adopting Dhakko's views.

In December 1973 Muhammad Siddiq wrote a short editorial about the benefits of *ijtihâd*, which included a hint on the doubtful authenticity of many *ahâdîth* attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>210</sup> This led the MAUSP chairman Mirza Yusuf Husain—who had enjoyed extensive positive coverage by the journal since many years—to publish a pamphlet titled "The baseless beliefs of the editor of *Razâkâr*".<sup>211</sup> Such an overreaction was all the more resented because Siddiq had only quoted from an Urdu translation of the book of a famous Iraqi scholar.<sup>212</sup> Mushtaq Husain Naqvi attributed it to



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anger about a series of *ahâdîth* from the Imams printed in *Razâkâr* shortly before, which had “exposed those ‘*ulamâ*’ who exploited the believers”.<sup>213</sup>

Until 1974 a number of Shia journals, including *Razâkâr*, had joined the campaign started by *al-Muballigh* one decade earlier against “greedy” *zâkirs* and Maulvis.<sup>214</sup> The latter responded with allegations that those who criticised them were “enemies of ‘*azâdârî*’”. An editorial of *Razâkâr* in May 1974 retorted as follows (excerpts):

It is obvious that no Shia can even imagine being opposed to ‘*azâdârî*’ for the Lord of Martyrs. But I must state with utmost regret that some greedy so-called ‘*ulamâ*’ have said good-bye to all requirements of honesty and have tried to brand those Shias as enemies of ‘*azâdârî*’ who have always offered sacrifices for its protection ...

When those who perform ‘*azâdârî*’ ask the said Maulvis not to increase the fees for *majâlis* and not to break their promises out of greediness,<sup>215</sup> these Maulvis consider themselves above any criticism and call it an insult and dub their critics enemies of ‘*azâdârî*’. Instead of giving reasonable answers to such demands, they try to mix up the dispute with unrelated matters and recount the blessings of ‘*azâdârî*’ (which are not denied by any Shia) to distract the attention of the Shia ‘*awâm*’ from the core of the problem, and to be able to go on with *zâkirî* as their bazaar for plundering and ravaging.

Nowadays complaints about such Maulvis and *zâkirs* are on the tongue of every Shia and it has become a collective problem, which must be tackled by any Shia individual ... I want to make it clear to the said ‘*ulamâ*’ that in the present age of enlightenment and awakening they can no longer make fools of the Shia ‘*awâm*’, because the ‘*awâm*’ know the difference between righteous and bad ‘*ulamâ*’,<sup>216</sup> and they have become well aware of those ‘*ulamâ*’ who are amassing worldly wealth under the cover of religion, belief, and *mazhab* and have made religion a way of livelihood ...<sup>217</sup>

In the same editorial Siddiq quoted from S. Zafar Hasan Amrohavi—a renowned Shia ‘*âlim*’ critical of Dhakko<sup>218</sup>—to support his views:

Nowadays the Shias are most resentful of those Maulvis who enforce their *naz-râna* for *majlis-khwânî* in a harsh and ruthless way and sell their sermons to the highest bidder ... Taking *nazrâna* is no sin and it is necessary to provide a livelihood [for the preacher], but it should not be made like the fees of an advocate or barrister ... also one should not fly from one branch to another because it has more flowers...

In my opinion there are only 20–30 Maulvis in Pakistan who can be called men of knowledge (*ahl-i ‘ilm*). Most of them have reached the limits of their age and will gradually disappear. Those who will take their places will all be political Maulvis, not religious leaders of the Shia *mazhab*.<sup>219</sup>



While the challenge to the professional preachers had gained momentum in 1974, their counter-polemics became also more aggressive. The same Shia journals, which had always denied that abuse of the *sahâba* revered by Sunni Muslims ever took place during their *majâlis*, now frequently deplored that abuse and insulting and the use of vulgar language between supporters of the mutual hostile groups of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ was destroying the sacredness of that very *majâlis*.<sup>220</sup> Although the divisions were not always clear-cut, the SMUP led by Muhammad Bashir Ansari was a stronghold of the ‘*ulamâ*’ opposed to Dhakko since the 1960s. The same could be said about the MAUSP led by Mirza Yusuf Husain after that grouping distanced itself from the SMC in 1974.<sup>221</sup> A third organisation of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ opposed to Dhakko was founded in October 1973 by Muhammad Isma‘il.<sup>222</sup> Dhakko, for his part, founded a *Mu‘tamar-i ‘Ulamâ’-i Shî‘a-i Pâkistân* in July 1974 chaired by himself and with Mufti Ja‘far Husain as “patron”.<sup>223</sup> Among his supporters were mainly ‘*ulamâ*’ running their own *dînî madâris*, although not all of them sided with Dhakko.<sup>224</sup>

Since late 1974 the conflict became sharper because of increased activities of the leaders of two branches of the Shaikhiya school of thought, Ayatollah Abd al-Reza Ibrahimî Kermanî (d. 1979)<sup>225</sup> and Ayatollah Mirza Hasan al-Ha‘irî al-Ihqaqî (1900–2000)<sup>226</sup> to expand their influence in Pakistan with financial help to religious institutions and with the distribution of literature. By that time Dr Kazim Ali Rasa, a long-time active member of the Karachi branch of the SMC,<sup>227</sup> had become the representative of Ayatollah Kermanî, while Maulana Muhammad Hasnain Sabiqî (1945–99), then principal of the *Madrasat Bâb ul-‘Ulûm* Multan,<sup>228</sup> was appointed representative of Ayatollah Ihqaqî in Pakistan shortly after. In October 1974 *Razâkâr* published an advertisement of the newly opened branch of the library of Ayatollah Ibrahimî Kermanî in Karachi sent by Dr Rasa as well as an address of congratulation for the acceptance of Shia demands regarding *dînîyât* from the same Ayatollah.<sup>229</sup> The editor was then made aware by numerous readers that Kermanî represented the “misled sect” of the Shaikhis and was pleaded not to publish anything else from that quarter in future.<sup>230</sup> On 1 November 1974 a long article of Dr Barsatî from Chiniot in *Razâkâr* explained basic facts about the Shaikhiya and its leaders from Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa‘î to Ayatollah Ibrahimî Kermanî and warned against attempts to spread the Shaikhiya in Pakistan “in the guise of Shi‘ism”.<sup>231</sup> Dr Rasa thereafter sued both Muhammad Siddiq and Dr Barsatî in a Karachi court.<sup>232</sup>

Already in 1967 Dhakko had alleged that most Shia preachers in the Punjab since the early twentieth century had propagated Shaikhiya doc-

trines.<sup>233</sup> After 1974 his claims were validated to some extent by the activities of a number of Shia '*ulamâ*' who came out in open defence of Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i, while accusing Dhakko and his followers to propagate so-called "Wahhabi doctrines" of Muhammad al-Khalisi.<sup>234</sup> Most outspoken in that sense were Muhammad Bashir Ansari and Muhammad Isma'il, but they were joined by numerous others who found the bogeyman of "Khalisiyat" a convenient vehicle for fighting the influence Dhakko and other critics of the preachers.

The Shaikhiya dispute was entirely about questions of religious doctrines, namely the (re-)introduction of elements of *ghulûw* into Shia beliefs. But it was mixed up with the criticism of "greedy preachers" who were also accused of propagating such "extremist" beliefs and superstitions, which were characteristic for the Shaikhiya.<sup>235</sup> Attempts to resolve the dispute by bringing together the main protagonists of the opposing camps had been made since late 1968, when S. Bashir Husain Bukhari of Sargodha had tried to arrange a meeting between Dhakko, S. Gulab Ali Shah, Muhammad Isma'il, Muhammad Bashir Ansari and Mirza Yusuf Husain.<sup>236</sup> Since 1974 appeals multiplied in the Shia press for organising a conference of '*ulamâ*' with the aim of re-unifying their positions on central Shia doctrines. It was also strongly recommended to submit the disputed questions to the highest Shia religious authorities of Iraq and Iran, but that was rejected by Muhammad Bashir Ansari, Muhammad Isma'il and others with the argument that *taqlid* was not allowed in the fundamentals of religion (*usûl ad-dîn*).<sup>237</sup> The "populist" '*ulamâ*', who were all well-versed in the art of *munâzara*, demanded a large public meeting where the '*ulamâ*' of both camps would argue for their causes, whereas the supporters of Dhakko demanded that the debate would be restricted to one of specialists behind closed doors. According to them it would be foolish and further undermine the prestige of the '*ulamâ*' if decisions about right or wrong in matters of religious doctrine would be left to the ignorant '*awâm*'.<sup>238</sup>

One attempt to hold a public *munâzara* failed in April 1975 when Muhammad Isma'il, Mirza Yusuf Husain, S. Muhammad 'Arif Naqvi, S. Zamir ul-Hasan Najafi and Ghulam Haidar Kallu had gathered in Ahmadpur Sial (Jhang Dist.) on the invitation of Mehr Ahmad Nawaz Khan Sial. The Maulanas Husain Bakhsh, I'jaz Husain and Akhtar 'Abbas from the Dhakko camp had travelled only up to a place 15 miles away in order to negotiate the conditions of the dispute, while Dhakko himself had stayed at home in Sargodha.<sup>239</sup> No agreement was reached, and resolutions against the "fugitive" '*ulamâ*' were passed by the crowd gathered in Ahmadpur Sial. Husain Bakhsh shortly after distanced himself from Dhakko accusing

him of arrogance and spreading disunity. He also left the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm* Sargodha for Jhang.<sup>240</sup>

Emboldened by this moral victory, Muhammad Isma'il announced the 12<sup>th</sup> annual session of his *Dars-i Âl-i Muhammad* in Faisalabad (30–31 August 1975) with a huge poster featuring, among other things, words of praise for Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i and his successor S. Kazim Rashti.<sup>241</sup> When questioned about its implications, Muhammad Isma'il came forward with a number of declarations of allegiance to the founders of the Shaikhiya. One of them from October 1975 read (excerpts):

I consider their [Ahsa'i's and Rashti's] philosophical, spiritual and *bâtînî*<sup>242</sup> teachings very important for the Shia *mazhab* in the thirteenth century [hijrî] to confront the sedition of Wahhabism and *taqsîr*.<sup>243</sup> I also agree with the statement in the tenth chapter of Maulvi Muhammad Husain [Dhakko]'s book *Usûl al-sharî'a*, that most Shias of the Punjab since 50–60 years consider the beliefs of Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i (may God raise his status) as being in accordance with the Shia *mazhab* and have adopted them. Therefore I consider the late Shaikh as a very great spiritual *muhaqqiq* and '*âlim* of the Shia *mazhab* and share his beliefs ... but I reject those Wahhabi-minded *muqassir* '*ulamâ*' and do not consider them true Shias nor do I share their beliefs, which are propagating Wahhabism and *taqsîr* since some time. Nowadays the wisdom and knowledge of the late Shaikh must be presented in detail in order to stop them, otherwise the Shia belief in the *Âl-i Muhammad* will be in danger.<sup>244</sup>

At the same time *fatwâs* from the Grand Ayatollahs of Iraq and Iran declaring the Shaikhiya a heretic sect appeared in the Shia press.<sup>245</sup> This led even some strong opponents of Dhakko to distance themselves from Muhammad Isma'il, but they resorted to treating the Shaikhiya and "Khalisiyat" on equal footing as dangerous for the Shia *mazhab*.<sup>246</sup> An '*ulamâ*' convention in this sense was held in Jhang on 24–25 October 1975, where Muhammad Isma'il apparently retracted some of his statements.<sup>247</sup> When he himself held a meeting devoted to "refutation of the *muqassirîn*" at the *Dars-i Âl-i Muhammad* on 1–2 November, it was boycotted by most '*ulamâ*'.<sup>248</sup> On 11 November he declared that he was "not a Shaikhi, but a Shia", and that he had made use of the name of Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i only to counter the ideology of Shaikh Khalisi. If Dhakko would be ready "to stop propaganda for Khalisi", he himself would stop talking about Ahsa'i.<sup>249</sup> Shortly after he published a pamphlet with diatribes against those "*khums-eating* Maulvis"<sup>250</sup> whom he accused of undermining the righteous beliefs of the Shias (excerpts):

The party of the *muqassir* Maulvis Muhammad Husain [Dhakko] and Gulab Shah now wants to fulfil the mission of Khalisi, make all Pakistani Shias Wahhabis, eat

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*khums* and *zakât*, and weaken the ‘*azâdârî*’ for the martyred Husain ... my own aim is complete *tabligh* of the Shia *mazhab*, the protection of ‘*azâdârî*, and publishing and preaching about the virtues of the *Âl-i Muhammad*, because that is the *raison d’être* of the Shia *mazhab*. As for the outwardly rules (*ahkâm-i zâhira*) of prayers and fasting, they can be found with every *mazhab* including the *khawârij* and the Wahhabis. It is only some Wahhabi *khums*-eating Maulvis from the Punjab who make this quarrel and dispute, whereas the righteous and wise ‘*ulamâ*’ of Karachi, Lahore, Iran, Iraq and Lucknow are not concerned.<sup>251</sup>

After giving an account of the beliefs of the “*muqassirîn*” comparing them with those of the “*muhaqqiqîn*” he continued:

There was a strong *tabligh* for the Shia *mazhab* going on in Pakistan and ‘*azâdârî*’ was influencing every house, nay every heart, when some ambitious ‘*ulamâ*’-i *sû*’ started the sedition of *taqsîr* for their worldly aims, namely to eat *khums* and *zakât* ... They proclaimed *zâkirî* to be *harâm* in order to get hold of those funds, which are spent for *zâkirî* and *tabligh*, under the pretext of *zakât* and *khums*; they opened an internal front instead of the outside front to destroy unity, brotherhood and love between the [Shia] believers and leave over a special party, which is paying *khums* and *zakât* for them. In their deeds and preaching there is nothing about [religious] truths, wisdom etiquette, ethics, the philosophy of religious duties, love for the *Âl-i Muhammad* or unity, but only one issue: “Perform the prayer and pay the *zakât*” and “Know that from what you take as booty one fifth (*khums*) is for God and his Prophet and the relatives”<sup>252</sup> ... they are eating the goods belonging to the orphans, the poor and the *sayyids*<sup>253</sup> and are becoming *jâgirdârs* and capitalists, but they are not doing any service for religion. They can neither hold a good *majlis* [sermon] nor a *munâzara* nor write a book with proofs and evidence, but only spread internal disunity in order to prepare the ground for collecting *khums* and *zakât*...

Still these *khums*-eaters, who are collecting [private] fortunes, make propaganda that while the *zâkirs* and preachers take fees, they themselves are ready to hold *majâlis* for free ... ask them from where they have received their estates and fortunes ...<sup>254</sup>

In that same pamphlet dated 29 December 1975 Muhammad Isma‘il once more professed his respect for Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa‘i, challenging his opponents to find any quotation from Ahsa‘i which was renouncing the basic duties of Shia Islam.<sup>255</sup> He also accused the “*muqassirîn*” of being paid agents of “others” (i.e. unnamed Sunni organisations or countries), or else their “enmity towards their own *qaum*” could not be explained.<sup>256</sup> His conviction that Dhakko and his supporters had been disciples of Muhammad al-Khalisi, “a foreign agent working for the destruction of the Shia in Iraq”, was based on the fact that Dhakko had explained Khalisi’s views on some pages of his book *Usûl al-shar‘a*.<sup>257</sup> Dhakko later said that during his own

stay in Iraq in the 1950s he had met Khalisi only during some short visits to Kazimain,<sup>258</sup> but he was clearly influenced by Khalisi's reformist ideas and did not hesitate to defend him against his many detractors.<sup>259</sup> In any case, the diatribes of Pakistani '*ulamâ*' against Khalisi, which continued in the 1980s, were based on a very superficial acquaintance with the man and his writings,<sup>260</sup> and they deliberately inflated his importance as the founder of a "sect" within Shi'ism on par with Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i to create a bogeyman. It was rather Khalisi's attacks on many forms of Shia popular religious practices and *ghulûw* beliefs—echoed in the writings of Dhakko—which angered the "preachers' lobby" in Pakistan.

Apart from Dhakko's assault on the misuse of *majâlis*,<sup>261</sup> his rejection of the "special nature of creation" of the *ahl al-bait*,<sup>262</sup> of the use of greeting formula *Yâ 'Alî madad*,<sup>263</sup> and of the inclusion of '*Alî waliyu'llâh*' in the call for prayer were most controversial.<sup>264</sup> His insistence on criticising such well-entrenched elements of popular belief and practice was later estranging even many of those Shias from Dhakko who fully shared his misgivings about the *zâkirs* and the way they were handling *majâlis*.<sup>265</sup>

By early 1976 even the most combative '*ulamâ*' had become aware of the fact that the transformation of Shia religious gatherings into an arena for mutual polemics was detrimental to all of them. Therefore on 25 May 1976 Safdar Husain Najafi and Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi succeeded in bringing together sixteen leading '*ulamâ*' of both camps in the *Jâmi'at Husainiya* Jhang. An agreement was signed to stop hostile propaganda against each other in speech and writing, to sort out religious differences in a scientific and polite manner and to cooperate with each other in matters concerning Shia interests.<sup>266</sup> A follow-up meeting was held in the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* Lahore on 12–13 June.<sup>267</sup> Muhammad Isma'il, who had participated in both meetings and was apparently ready for further reconciliation,<sup>268</sup> died in a road accident one day later.

The Shaikhia tendency received another blow shortly after with the publication of a booklet by Dr Kazim Ali Rasa reproducing facsimile letters of some '*ulamâ*' written to him during the last years. It was particularly revealing with regard to Muhammad Bashir Ansari, who had never admitted publicly his strong inclination towards Shaikhia beliefs.<sup>269</sup> Now it was exposed, among other things, that he considered most Shia '*ulamâ*' in Pakistan "unable to grasp the deeper sense of the writings of Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i" and had offered Dr Rasa all kinds of help in his lawsuit against the "enemy of the *ahl al-bait*", Muhammad Siddiq.<sup>270</sup> And although he was one of the signatories of the "peace agreement" in Jhang, he shortly after wrote:

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There can be absolutely no compromise (*sulh*) in doctrines. *Muhaqqiq* remains *muhaqqiq* and *muqassir* remains *muqassir*. There is only agreement on some resolutions at Shia meetings, nothing more. One can find evidence in the Koran for [the legitimacy of] peace agreements (*sulh*) with the *ahl-i kitâb* for common benefit, but beliefs remain separate ... a *muqassir* cannot escape from curse in any way. No illegitimate benefit must be drawn from the Jhang agreement, otherwise the door to expose the *muqassirîn* will be opened again.<sup>271</sup>

Ansari, who was facing trouble with many of his colleagues in 1975–76 because of mistakes he had made with his contribution to the Shia *dinîyât* syllabus,<sup>272</sup> was nevertheless trying to make them forget his Shaikhiya leanings, claiming that no books had been available to him to study Shaikhiya doctrines thoroughly.<sup>273</sup> In January 1977 he admitted his mistake formally in a public declaration, but not without linking his newly-found rejection of Shaikhiya beliefs with an equal firm rejection of “Khalisiyat”.<sup>274</sup> Likewise, Mirza Yusuf Husain, who had been exposed by letters of Ansari and of himself in the book of Dr Rasa, claimed that his correspondence with Dr Rasa had preceded the Shaikhiya controversy and proclaimed his rejection of both the Shaikhiya and “Khalisiyat”.<sup>275</sup>

By early 1977 the Shaikhiya question had ceased to be a big issue in Pakistani Shia religious circles, although a number of beneficiaries of financial help from Kuwait continued to publish Shaikhiya literature and propagate Shaikhi beliefs.<sup>276</sup> A genuine reconciliation between the rivalling camps of ‘*ulamâ*’ never took place, however, and the “parties” and “groups”, which had emerged in response to the writings of Dhakko, remained alive within in the new Shia organisations formed after the Iranian revolution of 1978–79.<sup>277</sup> Dhakko himself was quite active in Shia communal affairs until 1984,<sup>278</sup> but he would later alienate many former supporters with his book *Islâh ul-rusûm*.<sup>279</sup> The status of the *zâkirs* and other professional preachers remained controversial, but they never lost their popularity with the majority of the Shia ‘*awâm*’.<sup>280</sup> Likewise, most of the latter’s popular religious practices and traditional beliefs about the *ahl al-bait* have not been seriously shattered so far.

### *Re-emergence of the sectarian problem*

Drawing lessons from the 1963 sectarian riots,<sup>281</sup> the government and administration had been able to prevent the occurrence of any major sectarian clash throughout the remaining years of the Ayub Khan era. Apparently Shias had to pay a higher price than Sunnis for this period of security in the form of manifold restrictions for their religious ceremonies

and processions, including the cancelling or non-renewal of licences and “entry bans” for numerous preachers issued by district authorities.<sup>282</sup> But while the demand for unrestricted freedom and protection of ‘*azâdârî*’ had been one of the three main issues of the “*Mutâlabât Movement*”, there is no doubt that ‘*azâdârî*’ processions were flourishing in Pakistan in spite of all restrictions. This was confirmed, for example, even by the zealous Shia *Muballigh-i A‘zam* (“Greatest Preacher”), Maulana Muhammad Isma‘il, in one of his polemics against rivals from his own sect.<sup>283</sup>

After the acceptance of the Shia “three demands” in November 1968, most bans on Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ were lifted, and a number of new licences for ‘*azâdârî*’ were issued.<sup>284</sup> This favourable situation was to continue for some years, but the authorities and activists of local Sunni organisations would gradually create new obstacles for ‘*azâdârî*’ in many places.

During Muharram 1389H (20 March–18 April 1969), the only serious case of sectarian violence occurred in Jhang. Tensions had been provoked by an inscription “Umar Gate” placed by unknown Sunnis on the Khewa Gate of the city’s main commercial era, which was a traditional passage point for all Shia processions. When a procession organised by Shia *muhâjirs* since 1947 passed the gate on 7 Muharram (27 March), its participants allegedly cursed the Caliph ‘Umar and were attacked by Sunni spectators with stones, acid and weapons. The police opened fire and seven people were killed, including a Sunni Maulvi.<sup>285</sup> A number of Sunnis and Shias were arrested, but it took until January 1970 for the Divisional Commissioner and the D.I.G. Police of the Sargodha Division to come to the spot to review the situation in preparation for that year’s Muharram. While spokesmen of the local Sunnis refused to remove the controversial inscription,<sup>286</sup> the Shias were not ready under any circumstances to change the route of the ‘*azâdârî*’ processions in Jhang. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, who led the Shia delegation to the Commissioner, argued that if the “mischievous elements” were rewarded by a change of the status quo they would create tensions in many other places, too, and the police would soon be faced with many more problems.<sup>287</sup> Mushtaq Husain also invoked the precedence of Lahore, where the routes of the processions had not been changed after the 1963 riots in spite of strong Sunni demands.

Muharram 1390H (9 March–7 April 1970) passed without any major incident. The only noteworthy trouble-spot during that year was Dera Ghazi Khan, where the local Shias decided to cancel ‘*Âshûrâ*’ processions protesting against what they called a biased attitude of the district administration. The latter had allowed meetings in the Sunni *Masjid-i A‘wân* on the main



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procession route from where speeches against Shias were disseminated with loudspeakers on 8 Muharram in full sight of police officers.<sup>288</sup> Shias then decided to make a show of strength, performing daily *mâtam* in front of their *imâmbargâhs* until *Chihlum*; at last they took out the missed ‘*Âshûrâ*’ procession on 17 May, defying a martial law decree about a new route.<sup>289</sup> The main “sectarian” issue in 1970, however, was not ‘*azâdârî*’ but the election campaigns of some Sunni religious parties, which caused concern among Shias. After the resounding defeat of those parties at the December 1970 polls, the sectarian problem seemed as much under control as during the first years of the Ayub Khan regime.<sup>290</sup>

In 1971 there were clashes on 10 Muharram (8 March) in Karachi,<sup>291</sup> but apparently no other larger incidents.<sup>292</sup> The East Pakistan crisis of that year and the subsequent war with India further contributed to a lull in sectarian conflicts. It was only after some normalcy had returned with the formation of elected central and provincial governments after the loss of East Pakistan that the Shia-Sunni question gradually resurfaced.

During Muharram 1392H (16 February–16 March 1972), clashes took place in Dera Ghazi Khan around the same *Masjid-i A’wân* which had caused trouble already in 1970. This time stones were thrown on a procession passing near that mosque on 8 Muharram, but no adequate measures were taken. The D.C. came to the spot only to promise the local Sunnis that the route of the procession would be changed next year. On ‘*Âshûrâ*’ (26 February) Shias were again attacked at the same place because of an insufficient police escort.<sup>293</sup> In the following month the TAS organised a conference on the *khulafâ’-i râshidûn* in Multan, reviving its old demand of banning public ‘*azâdârî*’ processions. The conference was also attended by the JUI leader and later Chief Minister of the NWFP, Mufti Mahmud.<sup>294</sup>

When the leaders of the SMC visited Dera Ghazi Khan and the neighbouring districts in early April, Shia-Sunni reconciliation in the town had already made some progress.<sup>295</sup> But Shias remained as adamant as ever not to tolerate any change of the status quo of ‘*azâdârî*’ to their detriment in any town or even village of Pakistan, whatever obstacles were created. New licences for *julûs*—which had often been obtained only after prolonged difficulties—were defended with equal zeal. One example was given in the Multan suburb of Mumtazabad in 1973, where the D.C. had withdrawn a newly issued licence after having received inflated reports about the danger of a sectarian clash. When a local judge issued a decree upholding the licence, the administration was unwilling to implement it and deployed police to prevent a procession on 9 Muharram (13 February). On



that day some 10,000 Shias of all parts of Multan gathered in Mumtazabad to defy the ban, led again by the combative Mushtaq Husain.<sup>296</sup>

In May 1973 the quarter of Shia *muhajirs* in the former Sikh settlement Gobindgarh (Sheikhupura Dist.) was surrounded and attacked by armed locals. The grounds for a clash had been prepared long since by local Sunni Maulvis, but the authorities had not reacted.<sup>297</sup> Repeated clashes also took place in Parachinar from 1970.<sup>298</sup> The situation there became worse for Shias after parts of the Kurram Militia, established in the Kurram Agency in 1892 and recruited from locals, were deployed in other parts of Pakistan from 1971 onwards. The Agency thereafter became more vulnerable to occasional attacks by (Sunni) Afghan *lashkars*.<sup>299</sup> A Sunni “tribal army” also gathered near Gilgit in early 1974 to protest the arrest of the TAS leader for the Northern Areas and attacked some Shia villages, a prelude for worse to come in that place in the 1980s.<sup>300</sup>

Some authors have argued that Bhutto, rather than his successor Zia ul-Haqq, was the first ruler who made significant concessions to religious fanaticism in Pakistan. While Bhutto was always lax in the observance of the tenets of Islam, he made extensive use of Islamic rhetoric for political ends.<sup>301</sup> Thus with his “anti-imperialist” propaganda couched in Islamic phraseology he found common ground with some religious parties, especially the majority faction of the JUI led by Mufti Mahmud and Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi.<sup>302</sup> Whether helped by Bhutto’s style of campaigning or on its own right, the JUI gained enough seats in the 1970 provincial elections to form coalition governments with the Pashtun nationalist National ‘Awami Party (NAP) in the NWFP and Balochistan. They took office in May 1972 after tripartite negotiations between the PPP, JUI and NAP and a commitment of the two latter parties to support Bhutto’s agenda on the national level.<sup>303</sup> The NWFP government led by Mufti Mahmud not only blocked the implementation of Shia *dīnīyāt*,<sup>304</sup> but also tried to introduce Islamic laws in the province, which would be based exclusively on Hanafi *fiqh*.<sup>305</sup> The plan did not get far because Mufti Mahmud resigned in February 1973, protesting against the imposition of presidential rule in Balochistan,<sup>306</sup> but it was a reminder of how little Bhutto was concerned with the fate of minorities as long as political expedience was served.

The most obvious example of this attitude of Bhutto was given in 1974, when he quickly surrendered in the face of a movement against the Ahmadi sect, although Ahmadis had contributed significantly to his own election campaign.<sup>307</sup> The “excommunication” of the Ahmadis in September 1974—although it happened with full support of Shia religious circles—was a sign of the renewed strength of the Sunni religious parties in the first place. At

that time a number of Ahmadis also converted to Shi'ism,<sup>308</sup> and there were even rumours that former Ahmadis would try to infiltrate Shia and Sunni organisations in order to provoke sectarian tensions.<sup>309</sup> Such tensions did increase since late 1974, but mainly because of the waning power of Bhutto's government and his concessions to Shias regarding the *diniyât* syllabus.<sup>310</sup>

On 15 December 1974, a resolution of the SMC council meeting reminded the government of the November 1968 promises regarding '*azâdârî*, complaining that most applications for new licences for *julûs* were meanwhile turned down by the authorities.<sup>311</sup> Some weeks later, the ceremonies of Muharram 1395H (14 January–12 February 1975) triggered sectarian clashes in Karachi, Gilgit, Lahore, Chakwal and some other places of the Punjab.<sup>312</sup> In the village Babu Sabu near Lahore even a Shia *majlis*, held behind closed doors was attacked, leaving three dead and a number of injured.<sup>313</sup> Some incidents followed on *Chihlum* (5 March) that year.<sup>314</sup> The Federal Minister of Religious Affairs Kausar Niyazi promised a judicial enquiry into various incidents in the Punjab, but he later backtracked. Instead, only "reconciliation committees" were set up in Lahore and Karachi, applying the usual principle of "symmetry", which according to many Shias meant "putting the aggressor and the aggrieved on the same footing".<sup>315</sup> On 18 March the Lahore committee decided that no objections could be made against *majâlis* behind closed doors, but the dissemination of "vexing" (*dil-âzâr*) speeches by loudspeakers during such *majâlis* would not be allowed. The same would apply to licensed public processions. Wherever no official licence had been obtained so far, processions could only be taken out after mutual agreement of the local Shias and Sunnis.<sup>316</sup>

The largest "Unity Committee" of '*ulamâ*' formed by the government held its first meeting in Karachi on 30 April. A sub-committee comprising the Sunni Maulanas Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi, Abd ul-Ghaffar Salafi, Sa'adat Ali Qadiri and the Shia preacher S. Nasîr ul-Ijtihadi was appointed to draw up a "Code of Ethics" (*zâbita-i akhlâq*).<sup>317</sup> The latter was adopted during another session of the "Unity Committee" in Karachi on 15 May 1975 chaired by Kausar Niyazi.<sup>318</sup> It contained the following twelve recommendations to check the menace of sectarianism:

- 1) The government should keep a vigilant eye on those elements who are principally opposed to the ideology of Pakistan and are trying to wreck national unity and integrity by fanning sectarian strife ... they should be considered enemies of the state...
- 2) It should keep a vigilant eye on those government employees who try to abuse their official position to give undue favours to members of their own sect...

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- 3) A special committee of '*ulamâ*' should be set up to keep a watch on religious programmes in the radio and television ... so that the religious feelings of no Muslim sect will be hurt...
- 4) Preachers and writers should speak and write in a positive way, i.e. they should explain their own beliefs without portraying the beliefs of others in a provocative manner. They should explain the virtues of their religious authorities in a way, which will not be critical or derogatory of another Muslim sect.
- 5) The government and the '*awâm*' should not encourage such speakers who are suspected of encouraging sectarianism or are disturbing (*dil-âzâr*) for any sect.
- 6) The '*ulamâ*' of all sects should pay special attention to exhort the '*awâm*' of their own sect to perform good deeds with their speeches, especially in Friday sermons ...
- 7) If there are simultaneous prayers, *majâlis* or *mahâfil* in [Sunni] mosques and [nearby] *imâmbârgâhs*, loudspeakers should be used without disturbing each other ... [Sunni] celebrations (*mahâfil*) should not be held intentionally during the same time as [Shia] *majâlis*.
- 8) If by chance a Sunni *mahfil* has been scheduled at the time of a Shia *majlis* in the same quarter, the organisers should reschedule one of them after mutual consultation or drawing lots to avoid a sectarian clash.
- 9) The local administration should enforce the law regulating the use of loudspeakers firmly and fairly. Apart from mosques and *imâmbârgâhs* their use should be allowed only if they are really needed ... and not after one o'clock at night.
- 10) In future the construction of [Sunni] mosques and *imâmbârgâhs* face-to-face or close to each other should be avoided. They should have at least such a distance from each other that loudspeakers used during time of worship will not be disturbing. In places where they are too close to each other the persons responsible for them should take every step to avoid mutual provocation.
- 11) Only two kinds of religious processions should be taken out all over the country: a) '*Âshûrâ*' processions on 10 Muharram, which are organised by Shias, and b) *Milâd an-Nabîy* processions on 12 Rabi' I, which are organised by Sunnis. (Amendment): All processions on '*Âshûrâ*', *Chihlum* etc., which have already been licensed by the police, can be maintained. Permission for other processions will be given on the basis of agreement between both sects.<sup>319</sup>
- 12) The organisers of religious processions should prohibit all such acts by the participants, which may hurt the feelings of others. For instance, during '*Âshûrâ*' processions drum-beating or *mâtam* in front of [Sunni] mosques should be avoided, and during *Milâd an-Nabîy* processions the participants should not stop in front of *imâmbârgâhs* and raise slogans. They should avoid any acts, which violate the sanctity of each other's places of worship.<sup>320</sup>

Kausar Niyazi presided over a similar meeting of '*ulamâ*' from the NWFP in Peshawar on 21 May.<sup>321</sup> On the same day the Punjab government issued

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an order banning the publication of any matter likely to provoke sectarian enmity.<sup>322</sup> Meanwhile two of the Shia signatories in Karachi, ‘Abbas Kumaili and S. Ahmad Jauhar, had already distanced themselves from the “Code of Ethics”, saying it was in contradiction with the constitution and human rights.<sup>323</sup> During a meeting of the SMC Council in Lahore on 1 June it was condemned in a strongly-worded resolution (excerpts):

... the government wants to use the “Code of Ethics” as a weapon to chain ‘*azâdârî* under the pretext of the “unity of Muslims”. The SMC will never acknowledge those Shia participants of the “Unity Committee” as their representatives or leaders who have betrayed the Shia *qaum* and accepted bans for the use of loudspeakers at *majâlis* and restrictions for processions, only to win the favour of the government ... The Shias do not accept any restrictions on ‘*azâdârî*. The mourning for Husain will take place in writing, speech and acts as before...<sup>324</sup>

Instead, the SMC Council demanded a judicial enquiry about the recent sectarian incidents by the governments of Punjab and Sindh and punitive action against negligent officials.<sup>325</sup> On 12 June a meeting of representatives of most Shia *anjumans* in Karachi chaired by S. Ibn Hasan Najafi was equally clear in rejecting the “Code of Ethics”, criticising especially “attempts to divide the Prophet and the Imam Husain between Sunnis and Shias”.<sup>326</sup> The government was reminded that, when setting up a commission for dealing with religious issues, it had to give more than “token representation” of Shias in it.<sup>327</sup> One Shia ‘*âlim* of Karachi was arguing against the proposed separation of Sunni mosques and Shia *imâmbârgâhs*, because there was no contradiction between the worship performed in both, and Sunnis and Shias had been able to coexist in mixed *mohallâs* for centuries.<sup>328</sup>

The “Unity Committee” had indeed lacked proper Shia representation,<sup>329</sup> and the initiative of the government faltered quickly. Meanwhile a new controversy had been created by a mistake in Muhammad Bashir Ansari’s contribution to the new *dîniyât* syllabus for classes 3–8, which was ready in May 1975.<sup>330</sup> In the guidebook for teachers of Shia *dîniyât* it was written that if a non-Muslim wants to become a Muslim he must recite the formula *Lâ ilâha illâ ‘llâh, Muhammad rasûl Allâh, ‘Âli waliyu ‘llâh wasîy rasûl Allâh wa-khalifa bi-lâ fasl*.<sup>331</sup> This provoked an outcry by Sunni zealots who concluded that the Shias were not considering them Muslims because they did not believe in the *wilâya* of Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Thus Sunnis would have every right to consider Shias non-Muslims, too.<sup>332</sup> A writ petition was filed against the Shia *kalima* in the Lahore High Court by Pir S. Abrar Muhammad in early 1976 and a new anti-Shia campaign with speeches and pamphlets was launched throughout the country.<sup>333</sup> Mufti Mahmud took it

as a pretext to reopen the debate about Shia separate *dīniyât*, which he still considered as extremely dangerous for the unity of Pakistan. He also held the Shias responsible in case the *Ahl-i hadīth* or other sects would come forward with similar demands.<sup>334</sup> During a meeting of the MAUSP on 26 April 1976, a corrected introduction to the Shia *kalima* was formulated and conveyed to the ministry of education, namely that all Muslims profess their belief saying *Lâ ilâha illâ 'llâh, Muhammad rasûl Allâh*, but Shias would add the words '*Alī walīyu 'llâh wasīy rasûl Allâh wa-khalīfa bi-lâ fasl*' to profess their Shi'ism.<sup>335</sup> A new edition of the guidebook for teachers was printed, which helped to close the case at the Lahore High Court on 9 June.<sup>336</sup>

Better security precautions of the government prevented major incidents during Muharram 1396H (3 January–1 February 1976), but the general sectarian situation further deteriorated. In March 1976 Shias started agitation in Sargodha after *Chihlum* procession had been banned there by the authorities. They later obtained satisfaction, but only after a bitter quarrel among the Shia leaders themselves.<sup>337</sup> In the last Muharram during Bhutto's reign (1397H, 23 December 1976–21 January 1977), Shias protested against the celebration of the *Qâ'id-i A'zam*'s 100<sup>th</sup> birthday, which fell on 25 December.<sup>338</sup> Apart from that, the Muharram passed with an uneasy calm. On 7 January 1977 Bhutto surprisingly announced that general elections would be held in two months' time. He was immediately faced with an alliance of nine opposition parties, which adopted the slogan of *Nizâm-i Mustafâ* ("Order of the Prophet") as their common platform. Although the "Pakistan National Alliance" (PNA) comprised secularist parties and groups, its "street power" was provided by Sunni religious parties like the JI, JUP and JUI, and Mufti Mahmud was selected as its chairman.<sup>339</sup> Contrary to his stance taken in former years—and again since 1978<sup>340</sup>—he thereafter courted Shias with the following promise published on 21 February 1977:

The PPP is spreading rumours against the PNA and trying to create mistrust among the Shias. But the PNA wants to make it clear that there will be '*azâdârî*' for the Imam Husain as usual, and no Muslim of any sect will be deprived of his rights. The PNA guarantees that all sects will enjoy freedom according to their *fiqh* and beliefs; they will be able to perform their religious duties according to their *fiqh*, and their affairs (*mu'âmalât*) will be dealt with according to the rules of their [own] *fiqh*.<sup>341</sup>

None of the PNA members contradicted this statement, and the JI leaders Mian Tufail and Ghafur Ahmad tried to win over Shia politicians to the PNA, too.<sup>342</sup> Yet the PNA could not muster support from any of the large

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Shia organisations for the time being.<sup>343</sup> According to the editor of *Razâkâr*, who was always critical of the PPP, a majority of Shias once more voted for that party in 1977 because they did not trust “the narrow-minded fanatical Mullahs” in the PNA.<sup>344</sup> When violent agitation started after the anti-Bhutto alliance had lost the March 1977 elections, which had allegedly been massively rigged, Shias had very little part in it.<sup>345</sup> Apart from some conservative Shia ‘*ulamâ*’<sup>346</sup> the only noteworthy Shia initiative in support of the PNA during the first half of 1977 came from Agha Murtaza Pooya who founded a *Markaz ul-Muslimîn* on 1 March that year.<sup>347</sup> According to his own words, it was “a tremendous departure for Shias to be part of an Islamic movement”, but it was only a beginning.<sup>348</sup> The so-called “*Nizâm-i Mustafâ* Movement” was spearheaded by supporters of the said Sunni parties,<sup>349</sup> with their secularist allies trying to reap the fruits of it. It reflected a thorough shift of power in Pakistan’s society since 1970 and paved the way both for the coup of Zia ul-Haq on 5 July 1977 and his subsequent embrace of much of the rhetoric of the Sunni Islamist lobby.<sup>350</sup>

### *Decline of the Shia Mutâlabât Movement*

The concessions regarding the *dînîyât* syllabus made by Bhutto’s government in October 1974 were the greatest success of the SMC since November 1968, but the event also marked the beginning of a gradual decline of the movement founded by S. Muhammad Dihlavi more than ten years earlier. The complete separation of the MAUSP, the organisation of ‘*ulamâ*’ which had “fathered” the SMC in 1966, from its “offspring” came only shortly after,<sup>351</sup> exposing rivalries between the laymen who ran most activities of the SMC and a section of the ‘*ulamâ*’ who tried to preserve some leadership role for themselves with the help of Nawab Qizilbash. Although many other ‘*ulamâ*’ remained loyal to Jamil Husain Rizvi and the SMC, the split inevitably weakened the SMC, without achieving anything to enhance the status of the MAUSP.

While the SMC leaders and thousands of SMC activists all over Pakistan had the largest share in the breakthrough regarding Shia *dînîyât*, it was left to the ‘*ulamâ*’ to translate the concessions of the government into a concrete syllabus. Among the five Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ appointed by the Ministry of Education in November 1974 to prepare the new syllabus together with Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’, only S. Murtaza Husain was still a member of the SMC.<sup>352</sup> Three others were leading members of the MAUSP (Mirza Yusuf Husain, Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi and Muhammad Bashir Ansari) while

Mahdi Hasan 'Alavi was affiliated to the ITHS. The '*ulamâ*' commission first dealt with the joint *dinîyât* syllabus for classes 3–8, which was to contain some separate provisions for Shias regarding *namâz*. Since the latter included the *kalima*—recited both in the prayers and in the *azân*—there was a considerable argument between the Shia and Sunni commission members whether the complete Shia *kalima* could be included in the textbook or not. The maximum Sunnis wanted to concede was the addition of '*Alî walîyu'llâh*' to the well-known formula used by Sunni Muslims, but Mirza Yusuf Husain argued that if the entire Shia *kalima* was not recognised now, lawsuits might be filed later against Shias who recited it in full in the *azân*. At last it was decided to omit the *kalima* in the textbook and quote it only in the guidebook for teachers.<sup>353</sup> Muhammad Bashir Ansari then prepared the part of the guidebook comprising the Shia *kalima*, but with a misleading introduction, which caused more problems with the Sunnis.<sup>354</sup>

The new textbook for classes 3–8 was ready in early May 1975, but it still contained so many inaccuracies that it caused widespread protests by Shias. It was reviewed during a session of the SMC Council in Lahore on 1 June 1975 and corrections were demanded.<sup>355</sup> According to Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, the Shia '*ulamâ*' of the syllabus commission, who had been responsible for screening the entire textbook along with their Sunni colleagues, did not reply in public to reproaches levelled against them for six months. Murtaza Husain only admitted privately that they had been obliged by the Sunnis to accept some subject-matter against their conviction.<sup>356</sup> However, during a session of the MAUSP in Rawalpindi on 15–16 November 1975 they put all the blame on Jamil Husain Rizvi and on the Education Department, accusing the latter of having changed the text after its approval by the commission.<sup>357</sup> A pamphlet of the MAUSP Secretary-General listed up such arbitrary changes in the textbook for classes 9–10 and the teachers' guidebook, criticising also that the Education Department had not included Shia and Sunni *dinîyât* in one single book as agreed on before.<sup>358</sup> The controversy was still going on after the end of the Bhutto government in 1977 (see below).

The SMC, for its part, did not have much more influence on the implementation of Shia *dinîyât* after 1974. Although the government made good its promise of introducing the textbook of Zakir Husain Faruqi for the higher classes,<sup>359</sup> it soon became clear that there were not many teachers at government schools qualified (and willing) to teach separate *dinîyât* to Shias, who in most places made up for only a small proportion of the pupils. Thus the issue, which had been the central rallying point for the



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*Mutâlabât* Movement since 1970, lost much of its “urgency” once the government had agreed to the Shia demands in principle. The SMC could not make any more headway regarding the restitution of Shia *auqâf* or the submission of the *Qizilbash Waqf* to the control of the Shia Waqf Board either.<sup>360</sup> As for the third of the SMC’s central demands, the freedom and protection of ‘*‘azâdârî*’, implementation of the 1968 government promises was found more and more lacking since late 1974.<sup>361</sup> Already at the SMC Council meeting of June 1975 the SMC leadership was criticised for its too passive attitude in the face of numerous attacks on Shias during that year’s Muharram.<sup>362</sup> In the following years the SMC was only reacting to events and challenges, without being able to mobilise large numbers of Shias for any issue.

Things were made worse by the conflict between different camps of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, reaching its peak in 1975–76.<sup>363</sup> In late 1975 Mufti Mahmud could state that there was “no longer any danger from the Shias” because of their internal divisions.<sup>364</sup> At the same time, anti-Shia propaganda was also on the rise because of the *kalima* controversy. Taking into account the gravity of the situation, Jamil Husain Rizvi and other SMC leaders swallowed their pride and formed a “Unity Board” with representatives of the APSC, ITHS and the SPP in early 1976, trying to mediate between the warring factions of the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’.<sup>365</sup>

This alliance with groups which had always worked against the SMC proved counter-productive within a short time, and led to harsh criticism of Jamil Husain Rizvi by some Shia opinion leaders who had hitherto been his most ardent supporters. The reason was provided by his comportment—together with the leaders of the APSC, ITHS and SPP—during a campaign against the ban of *Chihlum* processions in Sargodha in March 1976. A so-called *Husainî mahâz* had started in the town on 10 March, with some 800 Shias being arrested within five days for violating a ban on public meetings and more preparing themselves to come to Sargodha from other towns of the Punjab to join the agitation.<sup>366</sup> The leaders of the four said organisations arrived on the spot on 14 March and negotiated with the local authorities and the provincial Minister Abd ul-Hafiz Cheema, who ridiculed the “drama” staged for the sake of a *zûljinnâh* procession. Cheema also insulted them with the remark, “if you put a *châdor* on a donkey, it becomes a *zûljinnâh*.”<sup>367</sup> On the next morning, after the police had allegedly beaten up hundreds of local Shias inside their houses, mosques, and *imâmbârgâhs* with sticks, Rizvi, Qizilbash and other leaders consented to the same minister’s call for talks in a calmer atmosphere in Lahore and called off the agitation.



It was later very much resented that they had not even paid a visit to the injured, let alone courted arrest themselves.<sup>368</sup> It took another four days for a Shia delegation to be received by the Punjab Chief Minister Sadiq Husain Quraishi (19 March). He apologised for the comportment of the police and accepted demands to punish the responsible officers, to release all arrested Shias, and to provide new licences for *'azâdârî* processions in Sargodha. The provincial Minister of Auqaf, Iqbal Ahmad Khan, was sent to announce the agreement to a Shia crowd assembled at *Karbalâ-i Gâme Shâh*.<sup>369</sup>

Despite the ultimate success of the agitation, “purists” like Mushtaq Husain, Muhammad Siddiq and Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani took severe notice of the “weak attitude” of the Lahore leaders in Sargodha. On 16 April they published an appeal to Jamil Husain Rizvi to call an urgent meeting of the SMC Council, but not in his house in Lahore, because many councillors would boycott it in that case.<sup>370</sup> Meanwhile Muzaffar Ali Shamsi had seized the opportunity to revile Rizvi, stating in his journal *Shahîd* that Rizvi had signed a paper prepared by Cheema in return for vague promises, but he himself had told Cheema that he would rather let himself be shot dead than sign it.<sup>371</sup> (Less than three months later, Shamsi died a natural death, and S. Azhar Hasan Zaidi named his brother Mahbub Ali Shamsi the new Secretary-General of what remained of the ITHS).<sup>372</sup>

The SMC Council meeting was duly held in Multan on 16 May 1976, in spite of attempts of Shamsi to have it banned by the local D.C. on the pretext that plans for further agitation would be discussed there.<sup>373</sup> 236 councillors and 121 observers participated, proving that the SMC was still the strongest Shia communal organisation.<sup>374</sup> But the cooperative attitude of Jamil Husain Rizvi, who patiently explained his actions during the last months, could not undo the blow his leadership had received. When he supported a proposal of the Imamia Mission Pakistan for unifying the SMC with other Shia organisations, he met with general disapproval. Most councillors agreed with Mushtaq Husain that it had been a mistake of the SMC to ally itself with the “opportunistic groups which existed only on paper”.<sup>375</sup>

Nawab Iftikhar Husain Khan of Karachi, Senior Vice-Chairman of the SMC since 1971, tabled two resolutions: 1) no office-holder of the SMC should be allowed to keep his position longer than three years consecutively; and 2) the SMC Chairman should not be allowed to accept any paid public office so that he may not become “a tool of the government”. Many councillors spoke out against the proposals and the resolutions were withdrawn, but it became known for the first time that Rizvi had been drawing a honorary salary of Rs. 1,000 monthly as a member of the CII since January

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1974. Moved by criticism from many sides, Rizvi also hinted that he might give up the chairmanship of the SMC.<sup>376</sup>

The *Husainî mahâz* in Sargodha was discussed last. Most speakers used harsh words against the Bhutto government—including demands for the resignation of the minister Kausar Niyazi—and against the Punjab provincial government because of their alleged indulgence towards anti-Shia propaganda. Only the PPP-MNA S. ‘Abbas Husain Gardezi made a speech in praise of Bhutto, which was received badly. An ultimatum was delivered to the Punjab government to implement all promises regarding Sargodha by 27 June.<sup>377</sup>

The SMC had once more shown a capacity for healthy self-criticism and open debate, but it was no longer able to offer the Shias an inspiring common goal. Even if it was still unrivalled among the Shia communal organisations, the latter now multiplied in a way which was harmful to any Shia cause. In September 1976 Muhammad Siddiq gave the following explanation for “the depressed situation of the Shias” (excerpts):

Now the situation has become such that a sincere, noble and honest Shia person can no longer participate in communal affairs (*qaumîyât*) because the “professional *qaumî* leaders” have already hoisted their flags in that arena and cannot bear the presence of *qaumî* workers with real compassion for the Shias. Therefore the sincere and honest *qaumî* workers are obliged to retreat from *qaumîyât* ... Professional Shia leaders are feathering their nest with the help of *mazhab* and *millat* ... Nowadays dozens of “All-Pakistan” organisations have come into existence and their number is increasing daily ... Founding of organisations has become a business.

These “All-Pakistan” organisations are formed like that: If a so-called Shia leader feels the need to make his leadership shop thrive (sic), he looks for some companions, and together they decide about a name. A beautiful signboard is written and attached to his house or that of some friend, and the office of the organisation is ready. Then he has attractive letterheads printed and rubber-stamps prepared, and the “*qaumî* business” can start. Connections with some journalists and editors are established, and the proceedings of fake sessions are published in newspapers. Occasional statements to win the favour of the government are printed together with the picture of the leader. Once the “All-Pakistan” organisation has become known in the media, one starts with writing letters to ministers and other high-ups, and with a program for *majâlis* and *julûs*.

The professional leader ... collects *chanda* from the Shias for *majâlis* and takes most of it for himself. Posters as tall as a man are distributed carrying the names of renown ‘*ulamâ*’ and *zâkirs* with enormous honorific titles, attracting the ‘*awâm* in great numbers ... The name of a minister is written as the chairman of the *majlis* and some renown person is included as a special guest. The presiding

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minister is made to believe that all the participants at the *majlis* are following the word of the said leader ... Like that he builds up relations with ministers and high-ups ... and can draw personal benefit from them ... The so-called leader becomes plump and fat sucking the blood of the *qaum*, and the poor *qaum* becomes weaker every day ...

If you take a look at the “All-Pakistan” organisations spread all over the country, you will find most of them as described above ... they have no membership, no branches, no annual sessions and no statutes and rules, and their office-holders are never elected ...<sup>378</sup>

The same editorial, while still terming the SMC “the only representative organisation of Pakistan’s Shias”, complained that it was in a process of decline since the death of S. Muhammad Dihlavi.<sup>379</sup> Siddiq’s above assessment was certainly exaggerated, but the number of Shia “paper organisations” notably increased since the mid-1970s, reflecting a general loss of direction and unity among those who felt themselves called upon to act as spokesmen of Shia interests. For example, S. Nasir ul-Ijtihadi founded a *Markazî Tanzîm-i Îmânî-yi Pâkistân* in Karachi in May 1975.<sup>380</sup> S. Nâsir Ali Gardezi, who had parted ways with Qizilbash after having been Secretary of the APSC for twenty-seven years, in October 1975 announced the foundation of an “All-Pakistan Shia Revolutionary Front” in Lahore with great fanfare.<sup>381</sup> Among the many Shia groupings founded during the Bhutto years, only the *Imamia Students Organisation* (ISO) would later grow to become an effective organisation able to mobilise a countrywide following. The ISO was founded by students and teachers of the Lahore Engineering University and the King Edwards Medical College in May 1972, in co-operation with the ‘*ulamâ*’ S. Murtaza Husain, S. Safdar Husain Najafi, S. Riyaz Husain Naqvi and S. Ali al-Musavi.<sup>382</sup> It held its first regular convention in January 1974 in the *Mayo Hospital* Lahore and gradually set up branches in other towns of Pakistan.<sup>383</sup> After 1979 the ISO would become a mouth-piece of the political active Shia youth strongly influenced by the ideology of the Iranian revolution, working in close alliance with the TNFJ.<sup>384</sup>

While the SMC did not hold another meeting of its Council until August 1977 (see below), the MAUSP was also losing ground. Its leaders Mirza Yusuf Husain and Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi had discredited themselves as “court ‘*ulamâ*’” of Nawab Qizilbash since 1974,<sup>385</sup> and from mid-1975 they faced new trouble because of their alleged negligence during their contribution to the new *dînîyât* syllabus. In November 1976 Muhammad Bashir Ansari announced his resignation from membership in the MAUSP,

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accusing its leaders of having accepted an amendment of the Shia *kalima* in the guidebook for teachers.<sup>386</sup> Apparently his allegation was false, because only the introductory text had been corrected, but Ansari continued with mud-slinging against his former allies out of injured pride.<sup>387</sup> Mirza Yusuf Husain, for his part, kept accusing officials of the Ministry of Education of having introduced arbitrary changes in the Shia syllabus “in order to give a bad name to the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’”, even after the syllabus had been corrected in April 1976.<sup>388</sup>

Apart from dissatisfaction with the implementation of the “three demands” accepted since 1968, the SMC and other Shia organisations also blamed the Bhutto government for increased difficulties for pilgrims to the Shia holy places in Iran and Iraq, although not all of these problems were of the Pakistani government’s making. Thus Iran in 1973 introduced a number of bureaucratic hurdles, including a ban on individual pilgrim travels, and complicated rules for the use of transport vehicles and for the import and export of goods.<sup>389</sup> In 1974 Iran stopped issuing transit visas and closed the borders to Iraq for non-Iranian pilgrims. But increased passport fees and a troublesome procedure for obtaining passports from Pakistani authorities were also much resented.<sup>390</sup>

When Bhutto announced new general elections in January 1977, the Shia organisations were even more divided than in 1970 about what recommendations to make. Apart from the tiny SPP, the APSC, ITHS, and Shia Youth League came forward with statements in favour of the PPP, while a number of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, including Mufti Ja‘far Husain, supported the PNA.<sup>391</sup> Bhutto found no time to receive a delegation of the SMC prior to the elections,<sup>392</sup> and during the final weeks of his rule he demonstrated his little regard for the SMC by naming S. Nasir ul-Ijtihadi and S. Azhar Hasan Zaidi Shia representatives in a reshuffled CII.<sup>393</sup> But the SMC was not satisfied with verbal promises made by the PNA leaders in February 1977 either. It was only in August 1977, when the military had already deposed Bhutto but fresh elections had been announced within ninety days, that a serious rapprochement between the SMC and the PNA took place. Murtaza Pooya hosted a reception for PNA leaders in Lahore on 10 August where Shia demands for safeguards were explained, and Mufti Mahmud proclaimed their acceptance in a press conference on the same day.<sup>394</sup> During a meeting of the SMC Council on 11–12 August the PNA offer was discussed and a majority of the councillors opted for support of the PNA, but those who disagreed did not abide by the “joint decision”.<sup>395</sup> On the other hand, verbal commitments made by Mufti Mahmud and the PNA Secretary-General

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Professor Ghafur Ahmad failed to be confirmed by written guarantees, and some PNA member organisations continued to make anti-Shia propaganda in September 1977, shortly before the elections were finally cancelled by Zia ul-Haq.<sup>396</sup> Thus the SMC had been drawn into a political controversy which further split its ranks without getting much in return.

If the SMC had largely outlived its function as “the only representative organisation of Pakistan’s Shias” by late 1977, individual members of the SMC still played an active and useful role in Shia communal affairs during the following years. This was especially true of Jamil Husain Rizvi, who headed the SMC until his death in 1981.<sup>397</sup> However, with the foundation of the TNFJ in April 1979, the SMC would become all but obsolete.<sup>398</sup>



## THE ZIA UL-HAQQ ERA, 1977–1988

### *The impact of Zia's Islamisation policy and the Iranian revolution*

The years 1978–79 marked the beginning of a new era of Shia communalism in Pakistan. Zia ul-Haqq's attempts to "Islamise" the legal system, which were strongly influenced by his political alliance with parts of the Sunni religious lobby, came as the most important challenge to the Shias' legal status since the country's foundation. This alone led to a renewed upsurge of Shia communal mobilisation, which was reinforced considerably by the events in Iran since late 1978. The victory of the "Islamic revolution" in February 1979 gave a boost especially to the Shia '*ulamâ*' and religious-minded youth, but it was a source of pride for almost the entire Shia community of the country, including many westernised intellectuals.<sup>1</sup> Although the Shias remained divided into numerous organisations and supporter groups of rivalling '*ulamâ*', the new mainstream organisation TNFJ, which emerged shortly after the Iranian revolution, eventually grew to become a strong pressure group. During its heyday in the 1980s the TNFJ was able to mobilise more Shias for common goals than any of its predecessors, and to block all legislation which might have curtailed Shia rights permanently.

The shift from secularism to Islamism in Pakistan from 1977 was much less radical than in Iran from 1979 and never pervaded Pakistan's society as a whole, but both events were linked to some extent. Apart from the fact that Khomeini and other leaders of the Iranian revolution had long since been influenced by Indo-Muslim (Sunni) religious-political thinkers like Muhammad Iqbal and Maududi,<sup>2</sup> the very timing of Khomeini's decision to

launch his movement against the Shah regime in late 1977 may have been influenced by developments in neighbouring Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> The July 1977 coup of Zia ul-Haqq, whom Bhutto had hand-picked as the Commander in Chief of the army for his apparent "harmlessness", would not have been conceivable without the agitation of the so-called *Nizâm-i Mustafâ* Movement, which had already undermined Bhutto's position. Being himself a devout Muslim, Zia made use of religious rhetoric from the first days after having seized power. It took him just a few months to figure himself a "saviour of Islam", chosen by destiny "to complete the mission for which Pakistan had been created".<sup>4</sup> Thus attempts to restructure society and the political and legal system according to an "Islamic ideology" almost coincided in Pakistan and Iran. Yet even if Zia ul-Haqq later came to admire Khomeini's stature as a Muslim leader with world-wide appeal,<sup>5</sup> he was by no means an advocate of "clergy rule", and he stuck to a line of foreign policy which was in some respects anathema to that of the Islamic Republic of Iran.<sup>6</sup>

Already Bhutto had resorted to some steps of "Islamisation", like a ban on gambling and alcohol and the introduction of Friday as the weekly holiday, during the final weeks of his rule.<sup>7</sup> His minister Kausar Niyazi had also made plans for a more active role of an enlarged CII, which could not be implemented before Bhutto was deposed.<sup>8</sup> Instead it was Zia ul-Haqq, then only Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), who reconstituted the CII on 29 September 1977 and instructed it to recommend "concrete steps and solid measures for transforming the country's socio-economic structure in accordance with the principles of Islam".<sup>9</sup> Two days later Zia cancelled the promised early elections, announcing that the time made available by their postponement would be used for, among other things, "the initiation of all basic steps which may be possible to enforce an Islamic system". At the same time a martial law order banned all political activities for an unspecified period.<sup>10</sup>

It can be assumed that a majority of Pakistan's Shias have been opposed to the stifling of the political process under the pretext of Islamisation from the outset. However, most Shia '*ulamâ*', as well as the leaders of the SMC and some other Shia organisations, initially joined the Sunni religious parties in applauding Zia ul-Haqq. While the latter multiplied his statements with respect to a forthcoming "Islamic system", the new CII started its deliberations swiftly. It came forward with a number of recommendations already on 2 October,<sup>11</sup> followed by first suggestions for legislation on *zakât* on 13 November and for amendments of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) on 27 November.<sup>12</sup> On 28 November the CII named a board of experts to work out an Islamic economic and financial system.<sup>13</sup>



On 10 December 1977, Zia received a first delegation of Shia leaders, including Nawab Qizilbash, Jamil Husain Rizvi and Mirza Yusuf Husain.<sup>14</sup> The APSC Vice-Chairman S. Hadi Ali Shah assured the CMLA of the “support of Pakistan’s Shias for his sincere efforts” and explained a list of eight requests, closed by the demand to have all legal matters of the Shias ruled by the *fiqh-i ja’fariya* once the *Nizâm-i Mustafâ* would be implemented.<sup>15</sup> This new objective would become the core of Shia demands throughout the era of Zia ul-Haqq, and the most important issue for Shia communal mobilisation during its first years. The proclaimed goal of the CMLA to implement *shari’â* laws seemed to offer a chance for the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ to enhance their position, while most of the laymen who led the Shia organisations were sympathetic to Islamisation, too. On the other hand, both were very apprehensive about the new-found power of Sunni religious parties like JUI, JUP and JI and their designs.

Although all PNA member groups had assured the Shias of full protection of their rights as late as August 1977,<sup>16</sup> some of them quickly forgot their promises after October that year. The JUI chairman Mufti Mahmud was the first to revive the demand for legislation modelled on the Hanafi *fiqh* in public,<sup>17</sup> soon to be echoed by spokesmen of the JUP and JI.<sup>18</sup> On 25–26 March 1978, Mufti Mahmud chaired a “*Khilâfat-i Râshida* Conference” in his hometown Dera Ismail Khan, which was devoted mainly to diatribes against Shias. Its first resolution accused the government of Bhutto—who had already been sentenced to death at that time<sup>19</sup>—of having “trampled upon the rights of the great majority by granting a negligible (*haqîr sî*) minority a separate *dîniyât* syllabus on equal footing” and demanded its immediate revocation. Other resolutions revived the old demand to confine Shia ceremonies to their mosques and *imâmbârgâhs* and to punish any reviling of the *sahâba*.<sup>20</sup> The authorities had not objected to that conference, but at the same time had banned a “*Fiqh-i Ja’fariya* Conference” planned to be held in Sargodha on 16–17 March under the pretext of martial law.<sup>21</sup>

On 30 April 1978 the “Advisory Council” which the CMLA had formed prior to a regular cabinet decided to abolish the system of separate *dîniyât* syllabi for Shias on the ground that it was “harmful for national unity”.<sup>22</sup> A.K. Brohi, then Advisor for Religious Affairs, was instructed to form a board of Sunni and Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ to compile a new joint textbook.<sup>23</sup> The decision was implemented only gradually over the next two years,<sup>24</sup> but it was the first concrete step of the martial law regime directed against Shia interests. At a meeting of the SMC Council on 19 May it was stated that Shias would never accept to reopening the closed file of *dîniyât*, and Zia ul-Haqq was asked to consult the JI leader Maududi whether separate syllabi

were harmful for national unity or not.<sup>25</sup> Yet the *dīnīyât* issue, which had been so important between 1964 and 1974, was never again pursued with much vigour.<sup>26</sup> Instead, the question of the scope of implementation of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* within the projected "Islamic system" had gained priority.

Meanwhile the CII had finalised a draft bill on Islamic punishment (*hudûd*) for theft, and a panel of economists had submitted its suggestions on *zakât*.<sup>27</sup> On 15 March, Zia ul-Haqq had proposed the introduction of a *zakât* collection system in one or two cities of each province on experimental basis.<sup>28</sup> Mufti Ja'far Husain, the only Shia member of the CII, had given his dissenting opinion on both *hudûd* and *zakât* for the record, but to no avail.<sup>29</sup> Although he was lauded for performing his duties well, Shia representation in the CII was generally considered inadequate. So far the validity of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* for Shia personal law had not been questioned, but both *hudûd* and *zakât* fell into the scope of public law. Therefore the demand for having the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* implemented in the domain of public law, too, was henceforth made the central rallying point of Shia communal activism.

After a revocation of the ban (see above), the "All-Pakistan *Fiqh-i Ja'fariya* Conference" in Sargodha was held on 27–28 May 1978. That gathering, organised by S. Bashir Husain Bukhari and the advocate S. Imdad Husain Hamadani with strong support from different *dīnī madâris*,<sup>30</sup> was a great success in terms of Shia unity. More than 500 '*ulama*', lawyers and other representatives of all major Shia organisations participated and reached full agreement on the central issues,<sup>31</sup> which were laid down in a single resolution as follows:

While this ... conference welcomes the efforts of the present government to implement the *Nizâm-i Mustafâ* (in the light of the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet of God), it has the following demands from the government in this respect:

- a) The government has approved in principle, and it has been made an integral part of the constitution, that the law will be applied on each Muslim sect according to an interpretation of Koran and Sunna which is acknowledged by that sect ... this has been clearly stated in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962.<sup>32</sup>
- b) In the framework of implementation of Islamic law constitutional safeguards will be given regarding the application of public and personal law of the two acknowledged sects of Islam, Shias and Sunnis, on the basis of equality.
- c) The current representation of Shias in the CII is insufficient. Shias must be given a reasonable and fair representation on the basis that Shia and Sunni beliefs are equally respected.<sup>33</sup>

With prior agreement of all participants, the conference was chaired by Mufti Ja'far Husain. Although he had been close to Nawab Qizilbash and

the APSC since the late 1960s, his differences with the SMC, which was still the strongest Shia organisation in 1978, had lost their importance during the last years (see below). His voice in the CII was very much needed at that stage, but he also declared that he would resign at once from the CII if any law would be imposed on the Shias which was not compatible with their *mazhab*.<sup>34</sup>

The only noteworthy dissenting voice in mid-1978 was that of the notorious Muhammad Bashir Ansari, who declined an invitation to the Sargodha Conference and later criticised the support of the Shia '*ulamâ*' for the government's plans to introduce the *Nizâm-i Mustafâ*, because "only the rule of the *Mahdi* or his representative could be considered Islamic". Besides, he argued, there were enough guarantees for Shias in the 1973 constitution, which the government had not abrogated so far.<sup>35</sup> At a *majlis* in Taxila on 6–7 July, Ansari had himself proclaimed *Qâ'id-i Millat* by some hundreds of mostly unknown persons and founded a "*Shi'a Islâmî Jamâ'at*".<sup>36</sup> Such rather ridiculous attempts served no other purpose but to secure for Ansari some invitations from government officials, who were always eager to exploit internal differences among the organised Shias.<sup>37</sup>

The only tangible response from Zia ul-Haqq to the Sargodha Conference was the appointment of S. Muhammad Raziq as the second Shia member of the CII in July 1978.<sup>38</sup> The CMLA, who also assumed the functions of the Head of State after the expiry of the term of President Chaudhry Fazal Elahi on 14 August 1978, shortly after formed a cabinet in which two thirds of the portfolios were given to member parties of the PNA, four among them to the JI alone.<sup>39</sup> Under the supervision of that government, the first batch of Islamic laws was finalised and promulgated by Zia ul-Haqq in February 1979 (see below).

Meanwhile the campaign against the Shah of Iran, which had started with violent demonstrations in Qom in January, had taken a serious turn in September 1978 with the proclamation of martial law and a massacre on the Jaleh Square in Tehran. Just one day after (9 September) Zia ul-Haqq arrived for a state visit in Tehran and Mashhad on the Shah's request, albeit without taking sides clearly.<sup>40</sup> Until August 1978, the events in Iran did not have many repercussions among Pakistan's Shias except for religious circles, with some prominent '*ulamâ*' even making public statements in favour of the Shah.<sup>41</sup> But after the turning point of the Jaleh massacre, supporters of Khomeini became very active in Pakistan, too. At the forefront of these were some hundreds of younger Shia '*ulamâ*' who had studied in Najaf and Qom since the mid-1960s, many of whom had personal acquaintance with

Khomeini. Excerpts from his lectures expounding the doctrine of *wilâyat-i faqîh*, i.e. the right of the '*ulamâ*' to assume the reins of government, had been translated into Urdu and published in the journal *al-Muballigh* already in early 1972.<sup>42</sup> The most influential early supporter of Khomeini had been S. Safdar Husain Najafi, the principal of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar*. He had translated Khomeini's *Tauzîh al-masâ'il* into Urdu shortly after the death of Muhsin al-Hakim (1970) in order to win more acceptance for Khomeini's claim to the status of a *marja' al-taqlid*.<sup>43</sup> Already in 1975 he had tried to convince Khomeini to leave Iraq for Pakistan, and he repeated that invitation during a visit to Khomeini in Paris in January 1979.<sup>44</sup> But Safdar Husain, who had long since pursued his dream of transforming the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* into a *Hauza 'Ilmiya*, modelled on the great Shia religious centres of Iraq and Iran, would later face difficulties to get even a middle-ranking Ayatollah dispatched from Iran to Lahore by Khomeini.<sup>45</sup>

Besides from the orthodox Shia '*ulamâ*', for whom the Iranian revolution came as a veritable God-sent after their agonising conflicts with the populist preachers over more than a decade, parts of the Shia academic youth were also enthusiastic in their support for the revolution and its ideology. A key role in this respect was played by the ISO, which was among the first groups to organise demonstrations against the Shah in Pakistan, and which grew rapidly as a result of Khomeini's triumph in Iran. Led by a number of religiously committed "revolutionaries", most important among them Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi,<sup>46</sup> the ISO adopted the entire political agenda of the Iranian revolution long before the TNFJ, and it played a decisive part in the latter organisation's growth in the 1980s.<sup>47</sup>

One early side-effect of the Iranian revolution was the foundation of the *Wafâq-i 'Ulamâ'-i Shî'a-i Pâkistân* on 7 November 1978 in Lahore, urged by Pakistani students and instructors in Qom.<sup>48</sup> The *Wafâq-i 'Ulamâ*', led by Hafiz S. Riyaz Husain Naqvi<sup>49</sup> until 1990, would quickly grow and eclipse all older organisations of the Shia '*ulamâ*', such as SMUP, MAUSP and others.<sup>50</sup> Among its aims, published after its first regular session in Lahore on 7 February 1979, were:

- 1) Creation of unity, brotherhood, harmony and organisation among the '*ulamâ*'.
- 2) Preserving the rights and interests of the '*ulamâ*' and making all possible efforts for these.
- 5) Efforts for the implementation of Islamic laws in Pakistan in the light of the orders of the *ahl al bait*.
- 8) Promotion of *majâlis-i 'azâ* and efforts to let them achieve their real goal, namely [spreading of] the teachings of Muhammad and the *Âl-i Muhammad*.

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- 9) Uplifting the standard of the *dīnī madāris* and solid and constructive steps for their organisation and progress; establishing a great *Hauza ‘Ilmiya*.
- 10) Improving the situation of the [Shia] mosques in Pakistan; supervision the affairs related to mosques and appointment of suitable *khatibs*; efforts for building [Shia] mosques where none such exist.
- 11) Publication of a scientific journal according to modern standards, which will be a mouth-piece of the ‘*ulamā*’ and *madāris*.<sup>51</sup>

While the events in Iran gained decisive influence on Shia communal affairs in Pakistan from the autumn of 1978, with numerous meetings held in solidarity with Iran’s religious leadership and the martyrs of the revolution, one last attempt was also made to unite the main existing country-wide Shia organisations. As in 1971, the initiative came from the more or less defunct ITHS, whose remaining office-holders hoped to preserve some “leadership status” for themselves through an alliance with the SMC. S. Mahdi Hasan ‘Alavi and Col. (retd.) S. Fida Husain approached Jamil Husain Rizvi, and two meetings of representatives from the ITHS, SMC, APSC, SPP and a “Shia Political Conference”<sup>52</sup> were held in Lahore in October. At a session of the SMC Council (2–3 November 1978) it was decided to demand the dissolution of all existing organisations and the formation of a “*Tanzīm-i Shī‘ān-i Pākistān*” during a convention shortly after Muharram (December that year). The chairman and Secretary-General of the new organisation for the first year would have to be elected from among persons who did not hold any office in the old ones. During another joint meeting on 7 November in the house of the advocate S. Muhammad Ali Zaidi (ITHS) the SMC proposal met with little support from the other organisations, and the merger plan faltered like all previous ones.<sup>53</sup> But anyhow, the time was running out for all Shia organisations founded in former decades, including the SMC.

On 11 February 1979, ten days after Khomeini’s triumphant return to Tehran, the Shah’s regime finally collapsed. This almost exactly coincided with Zia ul-Haqq’s promulgation of the *hudūd* ordinances<sup>54</sup> on the occasion of *‘Īd Milād an-Nabīy* (falling on 10 February that year), which had as much immediate effect on the mobilisation of the Shias as the victory of the Iranian revolution. Although the only major difference of the *fiqh-i ja‘fariya* in respect to the Islamic punishments codified in these ordinances concerned the punishment for theft,<sup>55</sup> its blatant disregard was alarming, especially because Zia ul-Haqq had simultaneously announced that he would also promulgate a system for the collection and disbursement of *zakāt* until 30 April.<sup>56</sup> On the same day (10 February), a large gathering of

the *Jamâ'at-i Ahl-i Sunnat* (affiliated to the JUP) in Karachi demanded the "immediate enforcement of Hanafi *fiqh*" and the exclusive appointment of Sunni '*ulamâ*' to the Shariat Benches, which the government had set up at the High Courts of all four provinces in December 1978.<sup>57</sup> On 13 February Mufti Ja'far Husain held a press conference in Lahore where he protested against Zia's one-sided step, reminding the president that his own dissenting view in the CII on *hudûd* and *zakât* had been submitted in writing and read during the last cabinet meeting. He also announced his resignation from the CII if the Shia point of view would not be considered by 30 April.<sup>58</sup> Numerous protest meetings were held by Shias all over the country.

On 25 February they received some noteworthy support from Maulana Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi, who had apparently climbed down from his tough positions taken in 1970.<sup>59</sup> He now argued—just as the Shias—that majority and minority were "purely political terms"; if they were applied as a yardstick on matters pertaining to the religious rights of Islamic sects, there would be a grave danger of mischief. Thanvi reminded of a decision of the 1951 '*ulamâ*' conference that each sect was entitled to laws according to its own interpretation of Koran and Sunna.<sup>60</sup> He even accused "those people who are widening the sectarian gulf with unscholarly and destructive statements" not only of "playing with the fate of Pakistan", but also of giving the impression to other peoples that the experiment of implementing an Islamic system had failed.<sup>61</sup> By contrast, Maulana Maududi argued that the new Islamic laws had the support of all sects because they had been approved by the CII before their enforcement.<sup>62</sup>

On 5 March Zia ul-Haqq received a delegation of twelve Shias and listened to their complaints.<sup>63</sup> He promised that the personal law of each sect would remain in force as before, whereas efforts would be made to take into account the beliefs of each Muslim sect when "Islamising" the public law. For that purpose, he would appoint a Standing Committee of '*ulamâ*' and jurists under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs which would make decisions if needed.<sup>64</sup> At a conference of the *Fiqh-i Ja'fariya Râbita Committee* in Karachi on 20 March it was demanded that Zia should confirm his promise in the form of an ordinance.<sup>65</sup> At a press conference on the following day Mufti Ja'far Husain repeated his 30 April ultimatum.<sup>66</sup>

In the meantime, preparations were under way for what turned out to be the largest Shia convention ever held in Pakistan so far in the small town of Bhakkar<sup>67</sup> on 12–13 April 1979. The driving force behind that historical event was the advocate S. Wazarat Husain Naqvi<sup>68</sup> who had launched his initiative with a local organisation (*Majlis-i Nifâz-i Fiqh-i Ja'fariya* Bhakkar) and with much help from the ISO, while the formation of an organised

“Movement for the Enforcement of the *Fiqh-i Ja‘fariya*” (*Tahrîk-i Nifâz-i Fiqh-i Ja‘fariya*, TNFJ) was the brainchild of Safdar Husain Najafi.<sup>69</sup> Although it had been difficult to place even advertisements for the convention in the non-Shia press, tens of thousands of Shias from all over Pakistan flocked to Bhakkar for what was termed the first ever Shia “*‘awâmî* convention”.<sup>70</sup> In his inaugural address S. Wazarat Husain explained the second important aim of the convention as follows:

In the 31 years of Pakistan’s history, the Shias have become a *qaum* of *mutâlabât*. Ever since the foundation of Pakistan we have kept counting our beads of *mutâlabât*, but you can see the result: bans on ‘*azâdârî* and the entry of ‘*ulamâ*’, cancellation of licences for *zûljinnâh* processions; problems and lawsuits for the construction of *imâmbângâhs* and mosques; here difficulties for pilgrimages to the [Shia] holy sites and there the mess of *dînîyât* and *auqâf*. Why is it like that? Why are we treated like that? There is only one answer, namely our lack of unity and organisation.

We have the great lesson of Karbala in front of our eyes. Every year we are offering our blood in the bazaars, in the alleys and in the ‘*azâkhânas* to keep fresh the memory of this great event but unfortunately we are forgetting the practical implication of the lesson of Karbala. We are dispersed. Our notables, ‘*ulamâ*’, *zâkirs* and organisations are ridden by factionalism ... We are devoid of sincere and impeccable leadership, and we have no unified voice and no centre...

At this important occasion we, the Shia ‘*awâm*, appeal to the ‘*ulamâ*’, the learned men, the *zâkirs* and the notables ... to consider the deplorable state of the Shias and stop all their differences, to sit together at one place and re-establish the Shia dignity ... until they sit together and find out an impeccable leadership our slogan “*Kyâ châhên shî‘a ‘awâm—êk markaz, êk payâm*”<sup>71</sup> will haunt them ... After we had announced the date of this convention, very strong and positive reactions came from all over the country ... the demand and decision for one centre, one voice and sincere leadership has now become so pressing that our notables will be obliged to give up their former ways ... otherwise we will hold this kind of convention in every corner of Pakistan ...<sup>72</sup>

In fact a remarkable degree of unity was achieved at the convention. Its four sessions were chaired by Mufti Ja‘far Husain, Jamil Husain Rizvi, Mirza Yusuf Husain and Muhammad Bashir Ansari, with dozens of speakers elaborating on the demand for implementation of the *fiqh-i ja‘fariya* and the need for a unified organisation and leadership. In the meantime, the leading Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, lawyers and notables sat together and agreed on fifteen resolutions, which were read out by S. Muhsin Naqvi to the crowd for approval.<sup>73</sup> The most important Resolution No. 1 read:

The All-Pakistan Shia Convention ... expresses full confidence in the leadership of .... Mufti Ja‘far Husain regarding the movement for enforcement of the *fiqh-i*



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*ja'fariya* ... if enforcement of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* is not announced by 30 April 1979, the Shia *qaum* will offer any sacrifices for the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* on his orders.<sup>74</sup>

Thirty-one years after having been selected to head the ITHS<sup>75</sup> Mufti Ja'far Husain, meanwhile sixty-five years old, was again placed at the top of a Shia movement, almost against his will. While his popularity had declined to a low ebb during the heyday of S. Muhammad Dihlavi's movement,<sup>76</sup> he had regained the respect of the SMC for his cooperative attitude in 1972, when the leaders of the APSC and other rivals had opposed the SMC's line regarding the *diniyat* issue.<sup>77</sup> Being one of the most distinguished native Shia '*ulamâ*' with few enemies, he had the additional advantage of having been appointed to the CII by Zia ul-Haqq. Mufti Ja'far Husain was apparently promoted mainly due to the influence of Safdar Husain Najafi, who could convince the leaders of the SMC, MAUSP, and SMUP of his choice, although he would become dissatisfied with the Mufti's leadership soon after.<sup>78</sup> When some *zâkirs* tried to speak out against Mufti Ja'far Husain at the Bhakkar Convention, they were shouted down by slogans in his support launched by ISO activists and parroted by the crowd.<sup>79</sup>

Resolution No. 2 authorised Mufti Ja'far Husain to form a delegation for meeting Zia ul-Haqq as soon as possible. One resolution demanded "equal" (*musâwî*)<sup>80</sup> representation of Shia '*ulamâ*' and scholars in the CII, another demanded consideration of the Shia *azân* in Radio Pakistan and Pakistan TV daily broadcasting.<sup>81</sup> Resolution No. 15, later often referred to as "the second-most important resolution adopted at Bhakkar", called on the Shia leaders to launch a Shia daily newspaper. A five-member committee for pursuing that objective was formed and named in the same resolution, consisting of Mufti Ja'far Husain, Safdar Husain Najafi, Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi, S. Muhsin Naqvi, and Muhammad Bashir Ansari. Some 40,000 Rs. *chanda* were collected from the crowd for starting the project and deposited in a bank by S. Wazarat Husain.<sup>82</sup>

Already on 20 April, during a session in Gujranwala, Mufti Ja'far Husain appointed a twenty-four-member Supreme Council of the TNFJ.<sup>83</sup> A six-member commission chaired by S. Wazarat Husain drafted statutes of the new organisation<sup>84</sup> which were passed only in mid-1980.<sup>85</sup> They defined the basic motto (*nasab al-'ain*) of the TNFJ as "the leadership of a qualified (*faqih*), just and pious '*âlim-i dîn* for the protection of all rights of the Shia community in Pakistan."<sup>86</sup> Among the other goals of the TNFJ written in its original statutes were:

- 1) Efforts for the implementation of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* in all existing and future laws of Pakistan, whether public or personal law, and for adequate represen-



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tation of the Shia point of view in all law-giving bodies at central, provincial and local level.

- 5) The establishment of Shia religious, educational and *tablighi* organisations and creating harmony between them; the establishment of a *Hauza 'Ilmiya* to complete that task.
- 7) Efforts for concord between Shias and between Muslims [generally].<sup>87</sup>

Every grown-up Shia of Pakistan agreeing with the goals of the TNFJ could become a member on annual payment of Rs. 5 (Articles 5 and 9). An elaborate system for setting up branches at provincial, district, and local level was designed, but the extensive powers given to the TNFJ Leader would later cause resentment and immobility.<sup>88</sup> The TNFJ was first of all an instrument of the Shia '*ulamā*' to foster their own interests, but the policy of Zia ul-Haqq and the appeal of the revolutionary model in neighbouring Iran helped it to grow fast in the 1980s. A new focus of Shia communal activities in Pakistan had been found, even if the unity displayed in Bhakkar would be short-lived.

### *The TNFJ under Mufti Ja'far Husain, 1979–1983*

After the formation of the TNFJ Supreme Council, Mufti Ja'far Husain led delegations to the Minister of Religious Affairs Mahmud A. Harun and the Punjab Governor General Sawar Khan on 26 and 27 April, respectively, but without receiving any satisfactory reply to the demands reconfirmed at the Bhakkar Convention.<sup>89</sup> When the Shia ultimatum run out on 30 April 1979, Mufti Ja'far Husain duly proclaimed his resignation from the CII at a press conference in Rawalpindi. On the same day Zia ul-Haqq invited the Shia leaders for talks on 5 May. Mufti Ja'far Husain took with himself Mirza Yusuf Husain, Husain Bakhsh, Muhammad Husain Dhakko, Malik I'jaz Husain and S. Wazarat Husain, while the government had invited also the leaders of the APSC, SMC, ITHS and other members of its "Shia good list".<sup>90</sup> Zia ul-Haqq repeated his former assurance that the *fiqh* of one sect would not be imposed on another sect, pointing out that he had already constituted the Standing Committee promised on 5 March for that purpose. He would make public assurances to the Shias within a few days.<sup>91</sup> Thus he did at a press conference in Karachi on 9 May, but in too vague terms and without any commitments regarding public law.<sup>92</sup> Mufti Ja'far Husain, for his part, remained vague in his response to a request of Zia that he should withdraw his resignation from the CII,<sup>93</sup> but he stuck to the demand that the President should first promulgate an ordinance about the implementa-

tion of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* with regard to Shias both in personal law and in any Islamised public law.<sup>94</sup> The resignation of S. Muhammad Raziyy from the CII, proclaimed on 4 May, remained even more ambiguous.<sup>95</sup>

On 31 May the first meeting of the Standing Committee took place to scrutinise draft laws on *zakât* and *hudûd*, attended by the '*ulamâ*' S. Muhammad Raziyy, Mirza Yusuf Husain, Nasir Husain and Husain Bakhsh as well as by Nawab Qizilbash, S. Hadi Ali Shah and Jamil Husain Rizvi.<sup>96</sup> No decisions were made at that and some follow-up sessions in June,<sup>97</sup> while the government went ahead with preparations for implementing a *zakât* system. The promulgation of a "Zakat and Ushr Ordinance" was withheld for the time being because of the Shia objections,<sup>98</sup> but a formal five-tiered structure for the administration of *zakât* was announced on 24 June and all necessary institutions were created shortly after.<sup>99</sup> Mufti Ja'far Husain, who toured Shia strongholds throughout Pakistan in the summer months of 1979 to popularise the TNFJ, called on all Shias to withdraw their money from banks and make other preparations to evade the payment of the new taxes. He withdrew that call on 2 July, after the government had cancelled its programme of deducting *zakât* from bank accounts,<sup>100</sup> but upheld an "order" to boycott all Zakat Committees, the CII and even the Standing Committee.<sup>101</sup> On 6 July he proclaimed a protest day on 11 July for pressing the demand for enforcement of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*.<sup>102</sup>

The TNFJ Leader's call to boycott the Standing Committee, which had been created in response to a Shia request, seemed quite unreasonable and was ignored by a number of '*ulamâ*' and jurists, including Jamil Husain Rizvi. The latter in August submitted a number of proposals to the Standing Committee which would make an ordinance on *fiqh-i ja'fariya* dispensable in his opinion. Rizvi suggested concrete amendments of the *hudûd* laws, which would guarantee that Shia convicts would be awarded punishments according to the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* only, and an addition to Article 203 (b) of the constitution in that sense.<sup>103</sup> Some Shias even participated in sessions of the Central Zakat Council in defiance of the boycott call.<sup>104</sup> Apart from personal rivalry and opportunism, there was also some serious criticism of Mufti Ja'far Husain's style of leadership already during his first months at the helm (see below).

In the meantime, trust in Zia's assurances was also shattered by statements of his former allies. Foremost of them was Mufti Mahmud, who held a provocative speech on the occasion of a memorial day for the Caliph 'Umar (*Yaum-i Farûq-i A'zam*) in Nazimabad, Karachi, on 8 June. He not only reiterated the demand that the Hanafi *fiqh* must be taken as the only

basis for public law in Pakistan, because laws would be shaped by the majority in every country, but he also denied that an orderly compiled and codified *fiqh-i ja'fariya* existed at all. Mufti Mahmud also claimed that Ja'far as-Sadiq, the sixth Shia Imam, had forbidden *mâtam*, weeping and mourning processions, hence such practices should be banned before demanding the implementation of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*. Besides, the question of public law according to the majority had been settled at the 1951 '*ulamâ*' convention, and reopening a closed file would create mischief. There could be no application of two different laws in the country.<sup>105</sup> Mufti Mahmud's speech was in blatant contradiction to some of his statements in 1977,<sup>106</sup> and he was charged of outright lying about the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* and the 1951 agreement of Sunni and Shia '*ulamâ*'.<sup>107</sup> Replying to his last-mentioned argument, Shias recalled that even three or four different laws were being implemented in Pakistan at that time.<sup>108</sup>

One serious argument in response to the central slogan of the TNFJ was that those who demanded implementation of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* in the sphere of public law in Pakistan were not ready to grant corresponding rights to the Sunni minority in Iran. In June 1979 Mufti Ja'far Husain still denied that there would be any discrimination of Sunnis in the Islamic Republic of Iran.<sup>109</sup> Three months later Mirza Yusuf Husain, when replying to such an allegation of the JUP leader Ahmad Shah Nurani, argued that Iran could not be compared with Pakistan, because the latter had been "created by the joint efforts of Shias and Sunnis"; rather Iran had to be compared with Saudi Arabia, the Sunni state par excellence.<sup>110</sup> The same lame excuse was later adopted by both Mufti Ja'far Husain and his successor S. 'Arif Husain.<sup>111</sup>

Until early October 1979, it had still been assumed that no law on *zakât* would be implemented prior to parliamentary elections, which Zia ul-Haqq had repeatedly promised to hold on 17 November. But on 16 October he once more announced the postponement of elections, banned all political parties and meetings and imposed strict press censorship.<sup>112</sup> Shortly before he had organised an "International Seminary on *Shari'a* Application" at the National Assembly Hall in Islamabad (9–11 October),<sup>113</sup> which was also attended by an emissary of Khomeini, Ayatollah Yahya Nuri.<sup>114</sup> This led to another invitation of Shia representatives by Zia ul-Haqq for discussing the *zakât* issue on 14 October.<sup>115</sup> Zia asked for the reasons why the Shias opposed the deduction of *zakât* from bank accounts, and he insisted that Mufti Ja'far Husain would henceforth participate at sessions of the Standing Committee. As there was disagreement whether Shia '*ulamâ*' in Pakistan

were qualified to give an authoritative statement on *zakât*,<sup>116</sup> it was decided to send a Shia delegation to Iran and Iraq to collect *fatwâs* of the leading religious authorities there. Mufti Ja'far Husain did not like the idea, but apparently did not articulate his opposition clearly enough either.<sup>117</sup> He was thus named as one of the four members of that delegation in December 1979, but simply declined to respond. During a last session of the Standing Committee on 19 January 1980, the CII Chairman Muhammad Afzal Cheema insisted that the trip to Iran and Iraq could not be delayed longer, because all *zakât* laws were ready, and only the Shia problem was hampering their implementation. Mirza Yusuf Husain, S. Muhammad Raziyy and Jamil Husain Rizvi thereafter travelled without the TNFJ Leader.<sup>118</sup>

During their stay in Iran (15–27 February 1980) they could not obtain an audience with Khomeini, but they received written answers from the Grand Ayatollahs Shari'atmadari, Golpayegani, Mar'ashi, Sadeq Ruhani and S. Muhammad Shirazi. In Iraq (4–11 March) they met Grand Ayatollah Abu'l-Qasim al-Khu'i. All *fatwâs* were submitted to the government shortly after by S. Muhammad Raziyy.<sup>119</sup> The authorities of Qom and Najaf had been asked the following questions:

- 1) Is *zakât* obligatory or not on agricultural products other than the "four crops", namely wheat, barley, dates and raisins?
- 2) Is *zakât* obligatory or not on bank-notes?
- 3) Is it necessary or not that Shias themselves supervise the collecting of Shia *zakât* and its distribution among those entitled to receive it (*mustahiqqîn*) at each stage?
- 4) Is it necessary or not that rules according to the *fiqh-i ja'fariyya* are applied on Shias in matters of personal and public [law]?<sup>120</sup>

Their unanimous answers were "no" to questions 1) and 2) and "yes" to questions 3) and 4), thus fully endorsing the position of the TNFJ. Nevertheless the three members of the delegation were denounced as "lackeys of the government" for having travelled on government expense and without being authorised by Mufti Ja'far Husain.<sup>121</sup> The latter was "re-elected" *Qâ'id-i Millat-i Ja'fariyya* at a session of the TNFJ Supreme Council in Lahore on 16–17 April 1980,<sup>122</sup> but trust in his leadership qualities had suffered much since April 1979. Mufti Ja'far Husain had drawn large crowds during his tours from Karachi to the Northern Areas in the months following his election in Bhakkar, but that had been due mainly to the efforts of the ISO and local Shia organisations, which had prepared the ground for these tours.<sup>123</sup> His narrow legalistic approach to the new issues confronting the Shias and his failure to communicate his activities and plans

to the Shia public had disappointed many of his supporters. Compared with S. Muhammad Dihlavi, who had assumed a leadership role at the same old age,<sup>124</sup> Mufti Ja'far Husain showed much less activism and organisational skill. He simply believed that as long as the government refrained from practical steps to implement an "Islamic system" based on Hanafi *fiqh*, there was no need for creating disorder and risking the lives of Shias with protest demonstrations and other kinds of "direct action".<sup>125</sup> In the spring of 1980, despite of the mobilising effect of the Iranian revolution and the great success of the 1979 Bhakkar Convention, the TNFJ had not yet created a momentum comparable to that of the *Mutâlabât* Movement led by Dihlavi and Rizvi from 1964 to 1974. A letter published in *Razâkâr* on 1 June 1980—similar to many others of the preceding months—reflected the frustration about the TNFJ at the grassroots-level (excerpts):

Approximately one year has passed since the movement for *fiqh-i ja'fariya* has been started ... In my opinion the movement has been altogether a flop (sic). Its outcome has been that Zakât Committees have been established all over the country and the collection of *zakât* and *'ushr* through official channels will start soon, but Shias have been given no representation in these committees. The same applies to other matters...

Our movement has not achieved its goal ... Now our sensible *'awâm* have realised that the election of leaders<sup>126</sup> one year ago has turned out a mistake. But this was not the mistake of the Shia *'awâm*, because the *'awâm* always follow the example of their leaders. They have always fixed their eyes on the leaders, whether S. Muhammad Dihlavi, Jamil Husain Rizvi or Mufti Ja'far Husain. It is clear that Mufti Ja'far Husain was not even known to 75 percent of our people before 12 April 1979 ... but wherever he went he was given a rousing welcome. This was by no means due to his personal efforts ... but because of religious passions...

The revolutionary mood and religious excitement one year ago would have been enough to achieve success, but unfortunately no benefit was drawn from it ... revolutionary passions cannot be kept alive among the *'awâm* for a long time without action. Therefore, the thinking of the *'awâm* and the leaders has now become different, and no more connection between them exists. Mufti Ja'far Husain has become almost secluded, and the *'awâm* are left in the darkness ...<sup>127</sup>

Muhammad Siddiq, too, joined in the criticism of Mufti Ja'far Husain in a number of editorials of *Razâkâr*, criticising him for not replying to letters and failing to keep in touch with the Shia press. When asked in June 1980 why nothing had come out from the project of a Shia daily newspaper approved one year before in Bhakkar, Mufti Ja'far Husain considered himself not concerned, forgetting that he was supposed to head the commis-

sion formed for that purpose.<sup>128</sup> His neglect of propaganda activities apparently resulted from his personal modesty and his dislike for blowing up any issue beyond its proportions. He was also ready to listen to criticism without feeling insulted,<sup>129</sup> but more was demanded from the leader of the TNFJ at that juncture. By April 1980 a number of other prominent Shias had already called on Mufti Ja'far Husain to resign from his function.<sup>130</sup> While the "old guard" of Shia leaders had never wholeheartedly accepted his leadership role, Mufti Ja'far Husain was also widely out of touch with the rising tide of "political Shi'ism" adopted by the young generation since the Iranian revolution.<sup>131</sup>

It was against this background of renewed Shia internal tussles that Zia ul-Haqq finally promulgated the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance on 20 June 1980, ordering banks to deduct 2.5 per cent of the holdings in all personal and corporate savings and fixed deposit accounts of Pakistani Muslims on the same day.<sup>132</sup> The TNFJ leadership was taken by surprise, just like most bank-account holders, whether Sunni or Shia, who would in later years regularly withdraw large parts from their accounts shortly before the fixed annual date in order to avoid *zakât* deduction.<sup>133</sup> Apparently Zia ul-Haqq, whose domestic and international position had received a boost after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979), meanwhile felt strong enough to implement his *zakât* plans after one year's delay without bothering about Shia objections to them. In any case, the magnitude of the Shia response came as a surprise for his government as well.

Already before 20 June, Safdar Husain Najafi and some of his associates from Rawalpindi had planned to hold a protest meeting in Islamabad on 4 July because of the execution of S. Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr by the Iraqi regime.<sup>134</sup> It was now decided to extend that meeting to a large TNFJ convention to protest the disregard for the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* concerning *zakât*. At *majâlis* throughout Pakistan Shias were told that Zia wanted to do to them what Bhutto had done to the Ahmadis.<sup>135</sup> Again it was the ISO which played the largest role in mobilising more than 100,000 Shias from different parts of the Punjab, the NWFP, and the Northern Areas to come to Islamabad until the evening of 3 June.<sup>136</sup> The intelligence agencies of the government had predicted that only some 10–15,000 protestors would show up and, as a result, had failed to take any special security precautions such as setting roadblocks on the way to the capital.<sup>137</sup> Zia ul-Haqq received Mufti Ja'far Husain on 2 July in an attempt to have the convention called off or diverted to the Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, and rumours were spread that the government had accepted the Shia demands.<sup>138</sup> On the same

day Zia invited the leaders of the MAUSP and other rival organisations of the TNFJ for talks. They duly responded, with Mirza Yusuf Husain leading a ten-member delegation to the President on 3 July, which submitted a memorandum against the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance.<sup>139</sup> They brought forward similar objections as the TNFJ and later claimed that Zia ul-Haqq had accepted them,<sup>140</sup> but the pattern of opportunist leaders dividing Shia ranks at a critical juncture was much too familiar for their arguments to be taken seriously.

The crowd, assembled around a hockey ground near the governmental quarters in Islamabad, kept quiet during the first day (4 July), but was prepared for a stay of several days. At an evening session the TNFJ leadership decided to stay put in Islamabad at all costs until a result was achieved. On 5 July Mufti Ja'far Husain first led a demonstration of 500 '*ulamâ*' to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but the Minister Mahmud A. Harun was only stalling. Thereafter Mufti Ja'far Husain was no longer able to contain the crowd, which marched in the direction of the Federal Secretariat led by ISO agitators and more radical '*ulamâ*'. Defying beatings and tear-gas from the police, which left one demonstrator dead,<sup>141</sup> more than 100,000 Shias laid siege to the Secretariat, a unique event in the history of Pakistan.<sup>142</sup> They were neither discouraged by a rainstorm at night nor by threats of calling out troops. According to several accounts, Zia ul-Haqq would have risked serious divisions within the army, had he ordered it to take action against the Shia crowd.<sup>143</sup>

On 6 July a delegation headed by Mufti Ja'far Husain was invited to the President's House where negotiations lasted nearly twelve hours.<sup>144</sup> They resulted in an historic protocol, henceforth referred to as the Islamabad Accord, signed by him and Mahmud A. Harun. Its significant part read:

After hearing the point of view of the Shia delegation, the President reiterated his earlier assurance that the religious faith of every citizen of Pakistan will be fully respected and *fiqh* (sic) of one sect will not be imposed on another. Allaying the apprehensions of Shia leaders, the President said that he stood by his earlier commitment to the Shia community and would take necessary steps to honour it in letter and spirit.

The President added that if any law, ordinance or act repugnant to the spirit of his insurance (sic) had been enforced necessary amendments would be made to bring it in line with the point of view of *fiqh* jafaria (sic) for Shias. He also assured that while framing laws in future due regard will be given for *fiqh* jafaria for the Shias. Necessary legislation to this effect will be made by 15 September 1980. Mufti Jaffar Hussain (sic) thanked the President for reiterating his position and promised to advise Shias gathered at Islamabad to return to their respective homes.<sup>145</sup>

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The wording of the document could not hide the fact that Zia ul-Haq had been forced to make a U-turn. According to Mushahid Husain (1991), his backtracking in the face of Shia agitation was “a serious dent in the official Islamisation policy which, to be successful, had to have the support by consensus of all sections of the people”.<sup>146</sup> An analysis written in 1997 traces back “the beginning of the sectarian war” in Pakistan to the events of 4–6 July 1980.<sup>147</sup>

At first, however, Zia made good his promise to the TNFJ regarding *zakât*. On 15 September the government announced an amendment of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance which laid down that:<sup>148</sup>

no *zakât* shall be charged ... on compulsory basis in respect of the assets ... of a person who, within the period of three months preceding the valuation date, files with the Deducting Agency ... a declaration in the prescribed form sworn by him before a magistrate or ... any other person authorised to administer an oath ... to the effect that he is a Muslim and a follower of one of the recognised *fiqhs*, which he shall specify in the declaration, and his faith and the said *fiqh* do not oblige him to pay the whole or any part of *zakât* ...<sup>149</sup>

Two days later Zia ul-Haq issued an order for the amendment of Article 227 of the constitution (“All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah ...”) stating:

In the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression “Quran and Sunnah” shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.<sup>150</sup>

Thus an important clause, which had been included in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions,<sup>151</sup> was at last added to the 1973 constitution, but this no longer satisfied Shias who had been demanding the same kind of safeguard for the realm of public law since late 1977. The TNFJ was also opposed to an ordinance issued on the same day, inserting the following new Section 298-A in the Pakistan Penal Code:

Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, decries the sacred name of any wife (Ummul Momineen), or members of the family (Ahle bait) of the Holy Prophet ... or any of the righteous Caliphs ... or companions (sahaaba) of the Holy Prophet ... shall be punished with imprisonment ... which may extend to three years, or with a fine, or with both.<sup>152</sup>

This new law, which put the *sahâba* on the same footing with the *ahl al-bait*, was clearly meant to appease the Sunni religious lobby at a time



when concessions to Shias had been made. Moreover, it was implemented one-sidedly against Shias already in 1980, while Sunni extremists remained more or less free to insult the beliefs and ceremonies of the Shias. At a meeting of the TNFJ Council in Sargodha in February 1981 the government was asked to “withdraw immediately this unnecessary and impracticable ordinance”.<sup>153</sup>

The same TNFJ meeting expressed by and large satisfaction with the amended Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, but demanded that Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ and office-holders of Shia organisations would also be authorised to verify the declaration forms for *zakât* exemption.<sup>154</sup> Rules of the Central Zakat Council for refunding *zakât* deducted from Shia bank accounts were issued only in April 1981 after the expiry of a TNFJ ultimatum.<sup>155</sup> Another reason for complaints was that Shias were requested to submit their declaration forms every year again to obtain exemption from *zakât*.<sup>156</sup> When the collection of ‘*ushr*’ on agricultural products started in 1983 Shias were exempted, too,<sup>157</sup> but a special agricultural tax was levied from Shia landlords instead, which was higher than the ‘*ushr*’ paid by Sunnis.<sup>158</sup>

Other disadvantages of the *zakât* system for Shias were entirely of their own making. Already in the first year of its implementation, Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ and communal activists looked with envy to the huge amount of funds generated by the state-sponsored *zakât* system for Sunni *dînî madâris* and welfare projects.<sup>159</sup> Mufti Ja‘far Husain had announced in September 1980 that Shias would set up their own Zakat Committees on a voluntary basis, but this project never took off. It took him until late March 1981 to name the convenors of such committees, and then his decisions were contested by his rivals.<sup>160</sup> Until March 1984, only in the Sargodha District a number of Shia Zakat Committees were working.<sup>161</sup> Appeals of the ‘*ulamâ*’ that *zakât* was obligatory for Shias as much as for Sunnis and that anyone not paying *zakât* was a sinner (*fâsiq*) fell mostly on deaf ears.<sup>162</sup> Quite to the opposite, the possibility of obtaining *zakât* exemption by professing oneself a Shia led to a wave of fake “conversions” to Shi‘ism,<sup>163</sup> which only served to increase the prejudices of bigoted Sunnis against all Shias.

The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was one element of Zia ul-Haqq’s policy to create client groups among the Sunni religious parties and organisations which could be used against his domestic opponents, another being the upgrading of the *dînî madâris*. In January 1979 a “National Committee for *Dînî Madâris*” was formed to work out suggestions “to extend their scope with a view to transforming them into an integral part of Pakistan’s education system”.<sup>164</sup> Its first report was submitted in December that year.<sup>165</sup> A

number of reforms of the curricula of *dînî madâris* were suggested and partially implemented in the following years. The most important reform, however, was the acknowledgement of certificates from certain categories of *dînî madâris* as equivalent to certificates of B.A. or M.A. in *Islâmiyât* or Arabic from colleges and universities, coming in force from 16 April 1981.<sup>166</sup> Together with the funds from *zakât*—and from a number of Arab countries who propped up the Sunni *dînî madâris* in Pakistan as a means to counter the influence of the Iranian revolution<sup>167</sup>—this led to their “mushroom growth” in the 1980s.<sup>168</sup>

Certificates from the *Wafâq ul-Madâris ash-Shi‘a*<sup>169</sup> were acknowledged in the same way from late 1982,<sup>170</sup> but as the Shias had excluded themselves from the state-run *zakât* system their religious institutions naturally remained largely excluded from state patronage. Neither did these receive much help from the Islamic Republic of Iran. While it was widely believed in the 1980s that Iran would extend all kinds of support to its Shia client groups in Pakistan, the only items which that country supplied lavishly were religious literature and political propaganda.<sup>171</sup> Iran’s seven Cultural Centres (*Khâna-i Farhang*) in Pakistan, which had been established already under the Shah, but after 1979 expanded their activities to include “political education”,<sup>172</sup> served as a convenient vehicle for that purpose. Also much increased was the number of Pakistani students enrolled at different religious schools in Qom and Mashhad.<sup>173</sup> But the efforts of Safdar Husain Najafi and others to upgrade the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* in Lahore with Iranian help met with only a feeble response.<sup>174</sup> It took until 1981 for one Ayatollah S. Hasan Taheri Khorramabadi to accept the invitation to teach at that *madrâsa*, and three years later his visa was not extended.<sup>175</sup>

Between 1981 and 1983 the TNFJ once more declined. Mufti Ja‘far Husain’s prestige had received a short boost by the success of the Islamabad Convention, but criticism of his shortcomings resumed immediately thereafter.<sup>176</sup> The Secretary-General of the MAUSP went as far as branding him “a simple Maulvi, made leader only because he has no opinion of his own and no leadership qualities”.<sup>177</sup> Even a eulogising biographer of Mufti Ja‘far Husain, while deploring how quickly the ‘*awâm* lost their enthusiasm and resolve after the Islamabad Convention, admitted that “secondly, the leadership could not keep alive the passions and feelings of the ‘*awâm* for long”.<sup>178</sup> Safdar Husain Najafi, whose behind-the-scenes dealings had had a decisive influence on Mufti Ja‘far Husain’s election in Bhakkar, became so dissatisfied with him that he boycotted meetings of the TNFJ Supreme Council from late 1980.<sup>179</sup> When Mufti Ja‘far Husain, considering his own waning health and

listening to the advice of other *'ulamâ'*, named Safdar Husain vice-chairman of the TNFJ during the second annual meeting of the *Wafâq-i 'Ulamâ'-i Shî'a* (22–23 March 1982), the latter declined the offer.<sup>180</sup> He excused himself with his duties for *dînî madâris*, but also said that “the circumstances did not allow him to shoulder the responsibility” and that “no movement could be run without capital”.<sup>181</sup> The latter seemed to be a reference to Mufti Ja'far Husain's failure to organise a *zakât* system for Shias.

On 31 May 1981 Zia ul-Haqq appointed a new twenty-member CII, with Jamil Husain Rizvi (then seventy-six years old) and Ali Ghazanfar Kararvi as Shia representatives.<sup>182</sup> Kararvi resigned shortly after and was replaced by Talib Jauhari, a conservative *'âlim* from Karachi.<sup>183</sup> Jamil Husain Rizvi died on 24 August that year but was not replaced by a Shia. This marked also the end of the SMC for all practical purposes.<sup>184</sup> One year later the APSC, too, came almost to a standstill with the death of Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash.<sup>185</sup> Other countrywide Shia organisations like the ITHS and SPP had long since lost all importance. Nevertheless, the TNFJ was not yet able to fill the gap in the years before 1984. Unlike the older Shia organisations it was almost exclusively led by *'ulamâ'*, with the directors of *dînî madâris* given the lion's share of representation.<sup>186</sup> But while that faction of the *'ulamâ'*, just as large parts of the Shia youth, increasingly echoed the “anti-imperialist” discourse of the new rulers of Iran,<sup>187</sup> Mufti Ja'far Husain remained apolitical and always inclined to accommodation with the Zia regime. When he made his only trip to Iran after the revolution in June 1981, the border police exacted a promise that he would not say anything against the Pakistani government during his stay in Iran, which he apparently kept.<sup>188</sup> Shortly after he met Zia ul-Haqq who asked him to suggest names of Shia *'ulamâ'* to be appointed for the CII, the Federal Shariat Court and the Islamic Research Institute, but nothing resulted.<sup>189</sup> Likewise he had submitted a list of forty Shias which he proposed to be included in the so-called *Majlis-i Shûrâ*, a 350-member assembly nominated by Zia ul-Haqq on 24 December 1981.<sup>190</sup>

By that time, activities of the TNFJ had so much decreased that calls for a new organisation to unify the Shias once more resumed.<sup>191</sup> A number of politically ambitious Shias seized the occasion to found an Imamia Council Pakistan on 25 February 1982 in Lahore.<sup>192</sup> One of its leading members, 'Irfan Haidar 'Abidi,<sup>193</sup> dreamt of “mobilising the at least 8.5 million Shia voters in Pakistan around one platform”,<sup>194</sup> but the Imamia Council remained as insignificant as the SPP,<sup>195</sup> despite of some tutelage from the government in later years.<sup>196</sup> The only Shia organisations which quickly

expanded during the years 1981–83 were the ISO and the *Wafâq-i ‘Ulamâ’*. The latter in 1982 started a programme of founding “*Dînîyât Centres*” all over the country to compensate for the abolition of separate *dînîyât* at government schools.<sup>197</sup> By 1985 their total number had already reached 1,015, most of them in the rural districts of Punjab.<sup>198</sup> One declared aim of the *Wafâq* was to multiply the number of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, as stated clearly by Safdar Husain Najafi during his address to its third annual session in the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* in March 1984 (excerpts):

During the last two years the more opposition was made against the *Hauza ‘Ilmiya Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar*, the more *chanda* we have collected ... Therefore do not mind opposition in the way of religion ... If nobody listens to you, don’t become heart-broken. Who had listened to the *ahl al-bait*? Make *tabligh* without caring about majority or minority [status], create at first a revolution inside yourselves.

When Shaikh Akhtar ‘Abbas started his work [in 1955], not a single Shia mosque in Lahore was in use, and now, by the grace of God, we hear ‘*Âli waliyu’llâh* from dozens of mosques. When the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* was founded there were only 10 *tulabâ*’, now they have become 300. Now I see nearly one thousand ‘*ulamâ*’ in front of me. Mark my words: I want to see 100,000 of these turbans. Once you have so many ‘*ulamâ*’ among yourselves, nobody will usurp your rights any more ... governments respect only power.<sup>199</sup>

Although such a growth-rate remained wishful thinking, the *Wafâq* was quite successful in promoting the peculiar interests of the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, and it could attract a majority of them to its ranks within a few years.<sup>200</sup> By contrast, the TNFJ could not make any headway regarding Shia demands other than the *zakât* issue until 1983. Instead it was faced with the problem of increasing sectarian violence since 1980. On 10 Muharram (19 November) that year Afghan refugees, who were deliberately settled near Shia villages in the Kurram Agency, attacked the home village of S. ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini, the later Leader of the TNFJ, apparently with connivance from the government.<sup>201</sup> Similar incidents occurred repeatedly in the following years around Parachinar.<sup>202</sup> Anti-Shia propaganda by religious extremists was again given an almost free rein, while Shia preachers had become more militant, too.<sup>203</sup> In the spring of 1983 Karachi experienced its first wave of prolonged sectarian violence, starting with a clash on the occasion of ‘*Îd Milâd an-Nabîy*’ (19 January), which left at least thirty people wounded and dead.<sup>204</sup> *Chihlum* for the victims of that incident on 18 March triggered continuous rioting for five days.<sup>205</sup>

Mufti Ja‘far Husain, who never quite recovered after falling ill in September 1982,<sup>206</sup> declared support for the “Movement for the Restoration

of Democracy” shortly before the latter started a campaign of mass demonstrations against Zia ul-Haqq in August 1983.<sup>207</sup> He was flown to London on 26 July for medical treatment but decided to return to Pakistan after one week. On 29 August 1983 he died in Lahore.

*Sayyid ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini and the radicalisation of the TNFJ*

Three years after the triumphant Islamabad Convention, the TNFJ was in a state of disarray. After the death of Mufti Ja‘far Husain, it took almost three months for the Executive Committee to gather in Sargodha (18 November 1983) and discuss the procedure of electing a successor for him.<sup>208</sup> According to TNFJ statutes, the leader was to be elected in a joint session of the fifty-member Executive Committee and the 125-member Central Council.<sup>209</sup> Since the latter was still incomplete, a “Leadership Council” was formed to tour all provinces and accelerate the process of selecting the missing members. But two out of five members of that commission (Maulana Husain Bakhsh and S. Imdad Husain Hamadani) dropped out shortly after, followed by Hafiz Riyaz Husain after the completion of a tour of Sindh and Balochistan. Thereafter, only S. Wazarat Husain and Muhammad Husain Dhakko were left to complete the consultations in the NWFP and Punjab.<sup>210</sup> Meanwhile a few ‘*ulamâ*’ and leaders of Shia organisations, who had not attended the Sargodha meeting, gathered in Rawalpindi on 21 December to discuss the leadership question on their own.<sup>211</sup> Finally they agreed to support S. Hâmid Ali al-Musavi, a forty-four-year-old preacher at the local *Ali Masjid* who had been a member of the TNFJ Executive Committee, but had so far led a rather secluded life, and had not even participated in the 1980 Islamabad Convention.<sup>212</sup>

According to his opponents, Musavi’s nomination and subsequent election at a larger convention in Dina (see below) was engineered by some army officers and secret agencies of the regime as part of an alleged plan of Zia ul-Haqq to take revenge for his defeat of 1980 and neutralise the challenge from organised Shias as far as possible.<sup>213</sup> Nevertheless, Musavi and his supporters never acted as mere puppets of the regime, but rather stuck to the same demands which the main Shia organisations had been repeating for decades.<sup>214</sup> Yet they were opposed to the politicisation of the Shias on the model of Khomeini’s revolutionary and “anti-imperialist” ideology, which was more and more echoed by younger Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ and religious students in Pakistan, and even by a section of the *zâkirs*. In the long-standing dispute about Shia religious doctrines Musavi was inclined

towards the Shaikhiya tendency,<sup>215</sup> and his election was immediately hailed from that quarter.<sup>216</sup> The Zia regime, which had just warded off ruthlessly a wave of MRD agitation in the second half of 1983,<sup>217</sup> was merely taking advantage of old divisions among the Shia '*ulamâ*' and communal leaders, which had been covered up superficially through the TNFJ since 1979. However, in the following years the "Khomeinist" faction among the organised Shias would prove much stronger than the moderate camp and become a veritable thorn in the side of the regime.

On 19 January 1984, after the composition of the TNFJ Central Council had been completed, S. Wazarat Husain announced that it would assemble together with the Executive Committee in Bhakkar on 10 February to elect a new leader.<sup>218</sup> At the same time preparations were made for a large convention near Dina (Jhelum Dist.) on that very day with the purpose of consecrating Musavi's leadership.<sup>219</sup> Thanks to the help of the government and the Rawalpindi administration, a considerable number of Shias made their way to Dina and proclaimed support for Musavi who was the only candidate.<sup>220</sup> By contrast, there was no pre-planned outcome of the meeting in Bhakkar, and its participants could rightfully claim that it took place according to the TNFJ statutes.

On the eve of that meeting, members of the TNFJ Supreme Council had agreed to propose Mufti S. 'Inayat Ali Shah, the eighty-two-year-old Friday preacher of the Shah Gardezi Mosque in Multan,<sup>221</sup> as the new leader. But at the plenary session on 10 February, Sha'iq Ambalvi, then still Secretary-General of the TNFJ, spoke out against the election of S. 'Inayat Ali, dubbing him a "coward" and recalling his opposition to Mufti Ja'far Husain.<sup>222</sup> Khalifa Nazîr Husain of Lahore then proposed Safdar Husain Najafi, but he excused himself because of his many duties and activities.<sup>223</sup> It was only thereafter that Wazarat Husain recommended S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini from Parachinar, then only thirty-seven years old, as the most suitable leader of Pakistan's Shias after Safdar Husain, considering his energy, courage, political acumen and religious learning. The proposal was initially received like a shock, but after some ninety minutes of consultations in smaller circles a majority of supporters of Husaini had emerged. He was taken by surprise himself and first tried to decline the offer, but accepted taking up leadership duties after having exacted a promise from the '*ulamâ*' present to keep on cooperating with him.<sup>224</sup>

With the election of Husaini, the TNFJ was given both renewed vigour and a profound change of direction. Husaini was probably the most ardent admirer of Khomeini among Pakistan's Shia '*ulamâ*' of his generation and status.<sup>225</sup> Born in 1946 in the village of Paiwar near Parachinar, he was

extraordinarily pious already as a child and attracted to religious education, although his parents wanted to send him to a college.<sup>226</sup> For a short period he enrolled in the *Dars-i Âl-i Muhammad* of Muhammad Isma‘il in Lyallpur, but he stayed mostly with local ‘*ulamâ*’ in Parachinar until one of them brought him to Najaf in 1967. There he is said to have been one of the first Pakistani *tulabâ*’ to attend the lessons and prayers of Khomeini regularly. He also urged his fellow-students, who were then still shunning contact with the controversial Ayatollah, to support Khomeini’s political stance.<sup>227</sup> After having returned to Parachinar for the first time in 1973, Husaini was denied another entry visa to Iraq and pursued his studies in Qom from 1974 to 1977. There, too, he became involved with the political activities of Khomeini’s supporters and attracted attention of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK.<sup>228</sup> In 1977 he returned to Parachinar to teach at the local *Madrasat Ja‘farîya*, also holding *majâlis* in Peshawar regularly. In 1978 he was the first ‘*âlim*’ in Pakistan to organise demonstrations against the Shah.<sup>229</sup>

After the victory of the Iranian revolution, the Shia youth of the Kurram Agency, which had always been in the forefront of Shia communal movements in Pakistan, became thoroughly indoctrinated by the new political radicalism. Led by Husaini, thousands of volunteers from Parachinar made a strong contribution to the success of the Islamabad Convention.<sup>230</sup> The government retaliated some months later by instigating an attack of Afghan refugees on Husaini’s home village.<sup>231</sup> On that occasion he rushed back from Peshawar and organised an armed self-defence, but also pleaded not to hold all Afghan refugees responsible for the acts of some misguided elements who were “executing an international conspiracy”.<sup>232</sup> He intensified his efforts to organise the local youth, and by 1983 he felt strong enough to challenge the Political Agent and the tribal chieftains on the issue of the distribution of development funds in the Kurram Agency.<sup>233</sup> But sectarian tensions in his home area had been on the rise ever since 1980, which made Husaini reluctant to accept nation-wide responsibilities initially.

He would also face problems to assert his leadership during his first year at the helm of the TNFJ. Although large receptions were arranged for Husaini in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar immediately after his election,<sup>234</sup> the “Musavi group” was able to mobilise considerable support of *zâkirs* and traditional ‘*ulamâ*’ in 1984. They portrayed Husaini as a Pashtun of the “Dhakko group” whose whole-hearted beliefs in ‘*azâdârî*’ and other Shia religious traditions were doubtful.<sup>235</sup> Starting from April 1984, he toured Shia centres in all provinces of Pakistan, while the ISO was espe-



cially active in popularising his leadership.<sup>236</sup> Some *tulabâ* in Qom also arranged for a written certificate of Khomeini appointing Husaini his *wakil* in Pakistan.<sup>237</sup> But as late as December 1984 he had to admit that Musavi had so far been supported by more Shia gatherings than he himself, arguing that numbers were not decisive, because his election had taken place according to the TNFJ statutes, while his opponents were misusing the ignorant people.<sup>238</sup> Husaini also responded favourably to a number of initiatives from '*ulamâ*' and other Shia personalities to arrange a meeting between himself and Musavi with a view to resolve the leadership dispute.<sup>239</sup> One year after his election Husaini even asked a gathering of 100 '*ulamâ*' in Lahore to accept his resignation, because he had not received the support promised at the time of his election; he would therefore prefer to join the *jihâd* in Afghanistan and be martyred.<sup>240</sup> Yet in spite of such doubts concerning his base of support, Husaini pursued his political agenda assertively from the start. He opened a central office of the TNFJ in Peshawar and changed its leading office-holders, naming Wazarat Husain his Secretary-General and entrusting Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi with public relations.<sup>241</sup> Both were strong supporters of Husaini's political line and tireless and able organisers. In particular, Dr Naqvi, a former chairman of the ISO, was at least as adamant as Husaini himself in confronting "Western imperialism" in Pakistan,<sup>242</sup> which became the hallmark of Husaini's term at the head of the TNFJ. Husaini set the tone in a message to the Shias on the occasion of the 1,400<sup>th</sup> birth anniversary (*hijrî*) of the Imam Husain on 5 May 1984 (excerpts):

If you want honour and glory, you have to return to Islam and the Koran. Fighting imperialism with a mindset derived from imperialism can bring nothing but defeat and shame. For many years Israel has been humiliating the Muslims by occupying our first *qibla* [Jerusalem], and our Arab brothers could not obtain any victory against it in a number of wars, because they have cast aside Islamic and Koranic thinking and tried to confront Israel with Western or Eastern ideologies...

Today there is an urgent need for unity of the Muslims, especially in Pakistan. The unity of Muslims is a great danger for the oppressive powers. The Iranian Shia and Sunni Muslims have united and kept the tyrannical powers at bay. The Lebanese Muslims have united and inflicted a crushing defeat on America and France, forcing them to quit Beirut. The Afghan Muslims have united and could frighten the Russians. So why can we not unite and fulfil the dream of real freedom and revival of Islam?

If we really want to make Pakistan an Islamic state, we have to free it from foreign enemies and their agents, and the only way to achieve this is our complete



unity ... Unity means that Sunnis stay as Sunnis and Shias as Shias in Pakistan; that nobody will be deprived of his legal and natural rights and everybody will respect the sanctities of the others. We expect from all Muslims of Pakistan, and especially from the '*ulamâ*' and responsible persons, to become united for safeguarding Islam and the Koran ... to be able to confront the enemies of Islam..<sup>243</sup>

Appeals in favour of Shia-Sunni unity were thus no longer justified by the threat from India, as had been common in Pakistan for decades, but by the need to get rid of "Western imperialism" and Israel. Following the example (and instructions) of Khomeini, Husaini introduced the observance of a "Jerusalem Day" on the last Friday of Ramadan in Pakistan in 1984, later adding a "Death to America Day".<sup>244</sup> In the same vein, Zia ul-Haq's regime was seen by Husaini and many other Pakistani Shias mostly in terms of its "dependence from imperialist powers". This "Iranian" viewpoint was shared by some Sunni intellectuals, but not at all by the bulk of those Sunni religious elements that were responsible for the rise of sectarianism in the 1980s.<sup>245</sup> Even the *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî*, which had been very supportive of Khomeini in 1979, had become disillusioned by the discrimination of Sunnis in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the following years.<sup>246</sup> Nevertheless, Husaini was strongly convinced of the "imperialist" origin of most Shia-Sunni problems in Pakistan and would constantly try to win over Sunni religious leaders for his cause. Likewise, and completely in line with the objectives of the Iranian regime,<sup>247</sup> he became more adamant every year to portray the TNFJ as a "pan-Islamist" rather than a Shia movement (see below).

By the time of Husaini's election, Shia grievances against the government—apart from the return of sectarian violence—included the unresolved problems of *dinîyât* and *auqâf*, the disregard for the *fiqh-i ja'fariyya* in Islamised laws other than those for *zakât* and '*ushr*', the non-representation of Shias in the Federal Shariat Court and other institutions, and some unfulfilled demands regarding the religious programmes of state-owned media.<sup>248</sup> On 6 July 1984, at the fourth anniversary of the Islamabad Accord, Husaini announced another Shia convention to press the demand for its full implementation.<sup>249</sup> Not to be outdone, Musavi threatened on 6 July to start a civil disobedience movement after ninety days unless certain restrictions on '*azâdârî*' processions in Rawalpindi would be lifted. Shortly before his ultimatum run out he sent a delegation to Husaini to ask for his support, but was rebuffed on the ground that he had acted on his own and that it was inappropriate to raise new issues instead of concentrating on implementation of the Islamabad Accord.<sup>250</sup> At that time (1 October 1984) a new

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Shia grievance was added with the amendment of the Police Act (Section 30) by the Government of the Punjab, authorising D.S.P.s to cancel permissions for ‘*azâdârî*’.<sup>251</sup> In that year’s Muharram (27 September–26 October) there were again attacks on Shias in Karachi, including arson of a mosque and dozens of houses in the Liaqatabad neighbourhood.<sup>252</sup> While Musavi’s supporters launched a *Husainî Mahâz* in Rawalpindi from 11 Muharram (7 October) for the repeal of the Police Act amendment and other demands concerning ‘*azâdârî*’, which lasted until May 1985,<sup>253</sup> Husaini proclaimed a “Black Day” on 2 November. During a speech in the Central *Imâm-bârgâh* of Rawalpindi on that day he accused the government in these terms:

We know that the current clashes in Muharram have been stage-managed by the government, which wants to make us abandon our demands through that conspiracy and make its Najdi<sup>254</sup> and Jewish masters happy. All sensible Muslims in the world are very upset by the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, Sabra and Shatila,<sup>255</sup> Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Philippines. But paradoxically, in our beloved homeland Pakistan Najdi terrorists are committing violence, destruction, and mischief under the guidance of the government, which is a proof of its enmity towards Islam ...

The encouragement of these Najdi elements by the government shows that our government and Najdiyat have something in common ... first, both our government and Najdiyat are aligned to one and the same power [the U.S.]; secondly, they have the same aims; thirdly, the government wants to prolong its rule by taking advantage from the acts of Najdiyat. Moreover, these aggressions of the government and Najdiyat against ‘*azâdârî*’ and the Shias are the starting point of a larger plan, namely the revenge of the international imperialist powers from their defeat and humiliation by the Islamic revolution of Iran ...<sup>256</sup>

In spite of such insulting remarks from Husaini’s side, the Minister for Religious Affairs, Raja Zafar ul-Haqq, invited him for talks on the Shia demands on 3 December 1984. Husaini was ready to send a delegation, but changed his mind on 1 December when Zia ul-Haqq announced his plan to hold a referendum about Islamisation and the extension of his own term as President. Thereafter Husaini argued that all principal questions had been settled with the Islamabad Accord and further talks or setting-up of commissions would merely be a waste of time.<sup>257</sup> Zia and his government hence understood that no deal with Husaini was possible, but—probably in order to maintain good relations with Iran<sup>258</sup>—did not take any overt action against him either. Instead, the policy of divide and rule, tacit encouragement of Sunni extremists, and other covert devices were used to deal with the challenge of Shia radicalism. One remarkable ploy was a false report by the Pakistan Press Agency that Husaini supported Zia’s presidential refer-

endum, although the TNFJ(H) had proclaimed its boycott already on 2 December.<sup>259</sup> While calls for boycotting the referendum were launched throughout Pakistan by both the TNFJ(H) and the MRD, some conservative Shia leaders and '*ulamâ*' spoke in favour of Zia ul-Haqq on the national television.<sup>260</sup> It can be assumed, however, that a majority of Shias refrained from participating in the 19 December referendum.<sup>261</sup>

Yet when Zia announced the first general elections since his take-over on 18 January 1985, Husaini—unlike the MRD leaders—pleaded for participation, in order not to leave political representation to Sunnis only.<sup>262</sup> After the holding of (party-less) elections on 25 February and the formation of a civilian government under Muhammad Khan Junejo (10 April), the latter negotiated an agreement with the TNFJ(M) which ended the agitation in Rawalpindi. The so-called Musavi-Junejo Accord of 21 May 1985 included safeguards for traditional '*azâdârî*' procession routes and provided for a sixteen-member commission to make proposals for implementation of the 1980 Islamabad Accord, namely that any further laws on Islamisation would not be in contradiction with the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*.<sup>263</sup> But Husaini and his followers, unwilling to provide Musavi any legitimacy to speak for the Shias, found pretexts to reject it.<sup>264</sup> Instead, Husaini called for huge protest demonstrations on the fifth anniversary of the Islamabad Accord in all provincial capitals except Karachi.<sup>265</sup> When such a demonstration was taken out from the *Imâmbârgâh-i Qandâhârî* in Quetta on 6 July despite a ban, the police opened fire, killing seventeen and injuring dozens. In the wake of that incident, Shia houses were raided and 128 Shias faced trials in a martial law court.<sup>266</sup> Sunni religious journals published reports that the demonstrators had been armed, that they wanted to destroy Sunni mosques, and that Iranians had been involved in the Quetta clash,<sup>267</sup> but apparently none of these allegations were true. The demonstration had been licensed ten days before by the D.C. and a ban had been announced only on 5 July. Most probably, such an incident had been deliberately provoked to discredit the TNFJ(H), and Quetta had been chosen because of its closeness to the Iranian border and its large population of Afghan Shias (Hazaras).<sup>268</sup>

Husaini, who had led a similar demonstration in Peshawar on 6 July, was prevented from entering Quetta, but he organised immediate protests in Lahore and Islamabad. He was arrested and deported to Parachinar but escaped to Peshawar, holding a secret press conference there.<sup>269</sup> Instead of damaging Husaini's position, police brutality in Quetta enhanced his leadership, lending credibility to his exaggerated notions of Zia ul-Haqq's

enmity towards the Shias. On 20 July, members of the TNFJ(H) Central Council defied a ban to gather in Rawalpindi, followed by a demonstration of more than 1,000 Shia '*ulamâ*' and *tulabâ*' from the *Madrasat Âyatullâh al-Hakîm* to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Islamabad.<sup>270</sup> Throughout the following nine months, the demand for freeing all Shia prisoners of Quetta was a convenient issue for the TNFJ(H) to mobilise its followers, crowned with the successful threat of a "Long March" to Quetta.<sup>271</sup>

Only eleven days after the Quetta incident, the commission promised in the Musavi-Junejo Accord was duly formed,<sup>272</sup> but appeals from the government to Husaini that he, too, should name representatives for it fell on deaf ears.<sup>273</sup> The commission was also hampered by a new initiative to accelerate the Islamisation of laws according to (Hanafi) Sunni interpretation: on 13 July 1985, the senators Qazi Abd ul-Latif and Maulana Sami' ul-Haqq (both JUI) tabled a so-called "Enforcement of Shariah Act" which was to become a subject of much controversy for the following three years. This "private Shariat bill", as it became known, provided, among other things, that "all courts of the country shall be bound to decide all kinds of cases, including financial, according to the *shari'a*", which was defined as "Koran and Sunna and the consensus (*ijmâ'*) of scholars".<sup>274</sup> It was not only rejected by the TNFJ (both groups), but also by most Barelvîs and followers of the *Ahl-i hadîth* as an attempt to enforce a Deobandi version of Islamic jurisdiction.<sup>275</sup> One major Shia objection to the Shariat bill—including an alternative version, which was proposed by the Ministry of Law in January 1986—was that it accorded equal weight to *ijmâ'* and *qiyâs* on one side, and to the Koran and Sunna on the other side.<sup>276</sup>

In early 1986, when Iran's President S. Ali Khamenei made a state visit to Pakistan, Zia ul-Haqq asked Husaini to join him for the reception of Khamenei at the Islamabad airport, but he flatly refused.<sup>277</sup> While Khamenei was cheered by the biggest crowds ever to receive a foreign dignitary in Islamabad and Lahore (13–15 January), Zia patiently overheard slogans against him and against his American and Saudi allies shouted by the Shia '*awâm*'.<sup>278</sup> At that stage, Husaini and his followers were obviously overdoing their "anti-imperialist" zeal even in the eyes of their Iranian mentors, who were eager to maintain good relations with Pakistan.<sup>279</sup> Yet the government offered another olive branch to the TNFJ(H) with the release of all Shia prisoners in Quetta three months later.<sup>280</sup> On the other hand, pressure on Shias increased through the rapid growth of militant Sunni extremism, which led to a new upsurge of sectarian violence in September 1986.<sup>281</sup> Husaini, as usual, put the entire blame on the regime of Zia ul-Haqq and

“imperialist conspiracies”, trying to find common ground with Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ wherever possible.<sup>282</sup>

This approach was brought to a logical conclusion with the “Koran and Sunna Conference” in Lahore on the seventh anniversary of the Islamabad Accord (6 July 1987). That largest convention of the TNFJ since 1980 was planned with the double aim of transforming it into a full-fledged political party and overcoming its “sectarian” identity. Instead of setting himself against the tide of Islamisation, which in Pakistan naturally reflected the beliefs of the Sunni majority, Husaini wanted the TNFJ to take a lead in “true Islamisation”, as he understood it. Plans for a country-wide convention had been made since July 1986, and in March 1987 it was decided to name it “Koran and Sunna Conference”.<sup>283</sup> On 23 April a commission was formed to work out a manifesto, which was adopted as the “constitution” (*manshûr*) of the TNFJ in Lahore.<sup>284</sup> It made proposals for Islamisation of Pakistan’s executive structure, legislature, judiciary, economics, foreign policy and educational system without even using the terms “Shia” and “Sunni”.<sup>285</sup> The convention was supposed to be held near Mochi Gate of Lahore’s Old City, but the venue was changed to the *Minâr-i Pâkistân* after it had become clear that more than 100,000 Shias would attend. In his speech to that crowd, which marked the climax of his career as a Shia leader, Husaini tried his best to please a Sunni audience, too (excerpts):

Oh proud sons of the Koran and Sunna! By assembling in the name of Koran and Sunna you have refuted the accusations of our opponents and proven that you never deny the Koran and Sunna.<sup>286</sup> ... In the former India you have given countless sacrifices for the establishment of Pakistan and the enforcement of Islam in that country ... the second aim still remains unfulfilled ... our present government ... knew that the ‘*awâm*’ of Pakistan are true Muslims and love Islam. Therefore it has tried to play with our passions and raised the slogan of an Islamic order for its own benefit. We have made it clear from the first day that the martial law government is certainly not sincere in enforcing Islam. Unfortunately some of our Muslim brothers have believed its promises and supported it, but after the passing of 10 years they, too, call the government a traitor...

We have pursued the struggle for our rights until the government has admitted that it has failed in enforcing Islam ... Now that the government has admitted its failure, should we leave our demands? Never! ... Now our responsibility has grown. Now that the government has fled from the path of enforcing Islam, we demand the enforcement of Islam in the name of all Muslims. An Islamic order where all denominations can live freely ... We are entering the arena bearing the flag of unity of Muslims, and together with the demand for an enforcement of the Islamic order we are declaring war on world-wide imperialism...

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We have studied the problem and come to the conclusion that whatever efforts we will make on our own, we will not succeed in changing the system ... our Supreme Council and Central Council have decided that we will propose an Islamic order for the Muslims of this country and then all Muslims will strive for their common goal together...

Your religion, Islam, is teaching fraternity. We should teach the non-Muslims fraternity, but unfortunately Muslims have become each other's enemies instigated by others. I swear by God, if today the Muslims were united Kashmir and Palestine would be free; there would be an Islamic government in Afghanistan and no suppression and massacres of Muslims in India; Islamic Iran would not be in the grip of war instigated by imperialism; Islamic teachings would not be forbidden in Turkey and Indonesia; Muslims would not suffer in Egypt, Tunisia and other Islamic countries...<sup>287</sup>

While there is no reason to doubt that Husaini was sincere in his proclaimed objectives, appeals to the Shia *'awâm* for attending the convention had not been entirely "non-sectarian". Thus in a TNFJ(H) pamphlet distributed some weeks earlier it had been written (excerpts):

Is it not true that ... fierce poisonous propaganda is unleashed against Shias all over Pakistan ... in different areas and towns Shias are the target of oppression and aggression during Muharram since some years, and that these aggressions have reached a climax in the last year in Lahore and many other areas ... that government officials are involved in these incidents, and that the authorities are unable to safeguard the lives and property, the honour and religion of the Shias ... that the military ruler wants to assert his power with the Shariat bill and wants to enforce the view of a limited religious group on the *'awâm* of all Pakistan? What should we do in such a situation? Stay quiet or struggle for the defence of our rights and our belief?

We know that ... as long as the current system prevails in Pakistan ... as long as the *'awâm* do not have their own representative government ... as long as America interferes in Pakistan ... as long as we have a ruler who represents the interests of the Najdi clique ... the *'awâm* will stay just as deprived as now, fanaticism will continue to grow and the method of divide and rule will prevail. It is necessary to have a system of rule in this country according to the ideology of Pakistan and truly following the Koran and Sunna ... the Shias will have to rise above limited demands, because it has become clear that the present government will not accept our demands, and the deprivation of the Shias and other *'awâm* will increase as long as this system prevails ...<sup>288</sup>

The emphasis on Islamist ideology instead of Shia demands helped to build bridges with the more moderate Sunni religious organisations, but it also meant narrowing of the TNFJ support base. While the TNFJ's newly proclaimed role as a "political party" could not be tested before the

November 1988 elections,<sup>289</sup> its appeal with the masses depended to a large extent on a heroic image of the Islamic Republic of Iran, facing single-handedly the onslaught of “world imperialism” and its regional “tools”. Thus during the last years of the Iran-Iraq war, thousands of Pakistani Shias even volunteered for serving at Iran’s war fronts.<sup>290</sup> Agitation against the regime of Zia ul-Haqq also helped to popularise the TNFJ(H), especially among the young Shia intelligentsia, but the latter was in fact more attracted to the ISO, which did much of the organising ground-work for the TNFJ(H). Behind the smokescreen of populist agitation, however, the largest Shia communal organisation of the 1980s, unlike its predecessors of former decades, remained a mouthpiece of the ‘*ulamâ*’ and religious students in the first place.

This had been the case already during the years of Mufti Ja‘far Husain’s leadership, when most office-holders of the TNFJ had been appointed from among the ‘*ulamâ*’. Six months after the election of Husaini, on 31 August 1984, the statutes of the TNFJ(H) had been discussed at a session of its central cabinet in Parachinar. At that time S. Wazarat Husain had suggested a division of labour between the TNFJ and the *Wafâq-i ‘Ulamâ’-i Shî‘a*, but the ‘*ulamâ*’, not content with running their own organisation *Wafâq*, had insisted to maintain their dominance over the TNFJ, too.<sup>291</sup> This did not prevent rivalries between the TNFJ(H) and the *Wafâq* in the following years, because not all of the latter’s members shared Husaini’s political and religious views,<sup>292</sup> but it was to deprive the TNFJ of competent non-clerical members once the era of revolutionary pathos was over in Iran, and the demise of Zia ul-Haqq changed the political landscape and priorities for Shias in Pakistan.<sup>293</sup>

A few weeks after the “Koran and Sunna Conference”, severe fighting started in the Kurram Agency. Tension had risen there once more after a fresh influx of Afghan refugees in 1986 and attempts of the Shia Turis to disarm some of them. Following incidents in the Sunni village Bushara, these Afghans spearheaded an all-out offensive against Turi villages on 24 July 1987, allegedly with the full connivance of the government, which had planned to turn the Kurram Agency into a permanent base for the Afghan *mujâhidîn* at the expense of the local Shias.<sup>294</sup> Fighting lasted until 3 August, with fifty-two Shias and 120 Sunnis killed according to official figures (unofficially many more) and fourteen villages partially or wholly destroyed. For the first time some Turis, sensing themselves being pushed to the wall, appealed even to the Soviet-backed Afghan government for help.<sup>295</sup>



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While that conflict was still going on, the bloody clashes in Mecca on 31 July, which left more than 400 Shia (mostly Iranian) pilgrims dead, marked the first climax of the Saudi-Iranian conflict that had grown stronger with every passing year since the Iranian revolution.<sup>296</sup> The event further strained Shia-Sunni relations in Pakistan, but Zia ul-Haqq resisted pressure from the U.S. and Saudi-Arabia to cut down bilateral ties with Iran.<sup>297</sup> From 23–27 November 1987 Husaini participated in an “International Congress on Safeguarding the Sanctity and Security of the Holy *Haram*” in Tehran, which demanded to put the holy places of Islam under international Muslim supervision.<sup>298</sup> Similar conferences were organised by the TNFJ(H) and ISO in Pakistan from 1988 onwards,<sup>299</sup> as well as three other “Koran and Sunna Conferences” in provincial towns.<sup>300</sup>

It is noteworthy that the regime of Zia ul-Haqq, while ruthlessly trying to strike at Husaini’s power base in the Kurram valley, almost never directly curtailed his freedom of action and speech. But Husaini and his close collaborators were constantly watched by both Pakistani and foreign secret services, and warnings from well-wishers that his life was in danger unless he scaled down his polemics multiplied from May 1988.<sup>301</sup> He was assassinated in his *madrasa* in Peshawar on 5 August 1988 by killers hired by a member of Zia ul-Haqq’s security guard with the connivance of the NWFP Governor, General (retd.) Fazl-i Haqq, one of the leading figures of the Zia era,<sup>302</sup> but the involvement of Zia himself in the murder plan has never been proven. Although many supporters of Husaini squarely blamed Zia for the crime, and some even planned to assassinate him in retaliation, he attended the funeral prayers of Husaini in Peshawar on 6 August.<sup>303</sup> There has also been an initial suspicion that the Bahawalpur plane crash of 17 August, which killed Zia ul-Haqq, was the result of a suicide mission of a Shia pilot.<sup>304</sup> Shortly after an armed clash claiming more than thirty lives broke out in the Orakzai Tribal Agency near Kurram between Shias, who celebrated Zia’s death, and the local Sunni majority.<sup>305</sup>

The near coincidence of the assassination of both Husaini and Zia ul-Haqq, together with the end of the Iran-Iraq war on 20 August 1988, marked the end of the short heyday of political radicalism among Shias in Pakistan. However, for a sizeable section of the Shia youth and for much of the Shia clergy, the stern and ascetic Husaini has remained an idol, held in high esteem until today. The ISO has re-named its monthly journal after him since 1989 (*al-‘Ârif*) and has never stopped propagating his thoughts, while a number of Shia journals still regularly publish quotes from Husaini on their front pages. In recent years, his strong anti-American rhetoric and



political conspiracy theories have been revived and updated by the *Majlis-i Wahdat-i Muslimin*, meanwhile the largest Shia organisation in Pakistan, whose leaders have also elevated the cult of Husaini to new heights.<sup>306</sup>

*The challenge of Sunni extremism in the 1980s*

If Shia communal mobilisation in Pakistan reached a zenith during the decade from 1979 to 1988, anti-Shia militancy also expanded rapidly during the same period and assumed a new quality. In fact both developments were brought about largely by the same factors and reinforced each other. Thus Zia's Islamisation policy alarmed the Shias while at the same time strengthening the Sunni religious lobby, including extremist elements. The Iranian revolution provoked a new kind of Shia assertiveness and political radicalism which was considered offensive by many Sunnis, especially when targeting Saudi Arabia, a country lavishly funding Sunni *dîni madâris*, mosques, and other institutions in Pakistan, apart from providing job opportunities for hundreds of thousands of its citizens.<sup>307</sup> The flood of propaganda literature from Iran, high-profile activities of Iranian diplomats and emissaries in Pakistan, exaggerated veneration for Khomeini as the *Imâm al-Umma*<sup>308</sup> by activists of the TNFJ and ISO or even by *zâkirs*, and huge Shia conventions and demonstrations brandishing aggressive political slogans, were bound to create some kind of Sunni counter-reaction anyhow. As it turned out, Sunni militants could also exploit social grievances and enjoyed both tacit protection by government officials and support from countries interested in countering Iran's ideological influence. Last but not least, Pakistan's Sunni religious parties in the 1980s benefited from the Afghan war, channelling parts of the international Muslim aid for the Afghan *mujâhidîn* and refugees to their own *dîni madâris* and providing arms and military training for their members, many of whom spent some time in Afghanistan volunteering for the *jihâd*.<sup>309</sup>

As documented in previous chapters of this book, anti-Shia extremism had always existed in Pakistan and even in pre-partition India,<sup>310</sup> but it had rarely assumed proportions of a serious threat to public order. Since the late 1980s, however, sectarianism has become a constant source of trouble not only for its direct victims, but for all successive governments and administrations concerned, and a Sunni sectarian group, the *Sipâh-i Sahâba* (see below), has emerged as a veritable mass movement in certain areas. This development has been attributed mainly to social factors by some studies,<sup>311</sup> but the political context has probably been equally important. As for the

“religious factor”, little new has been added to the centuries-old grievances and accusations of Sunnis against Shias (and vice-versa) by the *Sipâh-i Sahâba* and like-minded organisations since the 1980s. Rather it was the importance given to religious controversies and the sheer quantity of their misuse for political purposes which made the difference. Not surprisingly, the upsurge of sectarian propaganda and violence against Shias in the 1980s also reinforced reflexes of communal solidarity among the latter.

Just as in former decades, followers of the Deobandi school of thought were spearheading the new wave of anti-Shi'ism. A foretaste had already been given by the JUI leader Mufti Mahmud in March 1978 and June 1979.<sup>312</sup> After his death in October 1980, the JUI split into a faction led by his son Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman which allied itself with the PPP in the framework of the MRD,<sup>313</sup> and a pro-Zia faction led by Maulana Muhammad Abdullah Darkhwasti, and after his death (1994) by Maulana Sami' ul-Haqq.<sup>314</sup> The JUI-S has since been generally more antagonistic towards Shias than its counterpart, the JUI-F.<sup>315</sup> In 1981 some Deobandi '*ulamâ*' in Karachi founded a new organisation *Sawâd-i A'zam-i Ahl-i Sunnat* ("Great Majority"), a name hitherto reclaimed by the Barelvis.<sup>316</sup> The *Sawâd-i A'zam*, with connivance of the local Martial Law Administrator, organised several conferences devoted to propaganda against the Shias and Iran and was mainly responsible for sectarian clashes in Karachi 1982 and 1983.<sup>317</sup> But it was the Secretary-General of that organisation in the Punjab, Maulana Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi, who would make the strongest impact. His relentless zeal, combined with the special situation in his native area and the circumstances of the 1980s, made him the pioneer of large-scale popular mobilisation driven by a radical anti-Shia agenda in Pakistan.

Haqq Nawaz was born in 1952 in the village of Chila (Jhang Dist.) into a poor peasant family.<sup>318</sup> After having memorised the Koran within only two years, he enrolled in *dîni madâris* in Kabirwala and Multan, and in 1973 he was appointed preacher in the Piplianwali Mosque of Jhang town.<sup>319</sup> The 1974 campaign against the Ahmadis with their centre in nearby Rabwah gave him a first opportunity to develop his talents as a fiery orator. Thereafter he made Barelvis his favourite targets for some time,<sup>320</sup> but after the Iranian revolution he would devote his sermons almost exclusively to polemics against Shia beliefs and religious practices, and alleged Shia assaults on the "honour of the *sahâba*".<sup>321</sup> In this respect, he was following the example of many preachers from the TAS in the Jhang District and elsewhere in Pakistan since decades, but in the early 1980s his fame and influence was spreading far beyond his home audience. On one side, he

became daring enough to direct his diatribes head-on against the great Shia land-owning families, whose political dominance in the district was resented both by the native Sunni peasants and a large community of Sunni *muhājirs*, who had been settled in urban Jhang after 1947.<sup>322</sup> According to propaganda spread by Haqq Nawaz and his associates, these Shia “feudal” families, who owned some 65 per cent of the agricultural lands in the Jhang District,<sup>323</sup> were not only exploiting their Sunni tenants economically but also suppressing their religious freedom.<sup>324</sup> They were also accused of corrupting the beliefs of the ignorant peasants through Shia “rites of ignorance”.<sup>325</sup> On the other side, Haqq Nawaz’s general attacks on Shi‘ism were also more radical than those of most other sectarian fanatics. His first remarkable “achievement” in the early 1980s was to transform the conclusion of *fatwās* from numerous ‘*ulamâ*’ in the subcontinent since centuries into the popular slogan “*Kâfir, kâfir, Shi‘a kâfir!*”, which was written on countless walls and shouted regularly at public meetings.<sup>326</sup> In his speeches Haqq Nawaz hammered the following arguments for “excommunicating” the Shias into the heads of his audience:

- 1) They do not accept the existing Koran, but think that it has been falsified;
- 2) they do not believe in *tauhîd*;
- 3) they accord an equal status of ‘*ismat* to their Imams and the Prophet Muhammad;
- 4) in their literature they are insulting the Prophet and his family<sup>327</sup> in such a way that they are left without even a far connection to Islam;
- 5) they do not consider the *sahâba* Muslims;
- 6) they are abusing the *sahâba*;
- 7) they not only call the *sahâba* infidels, but all Muslims who do not believe that Ali was the direct successor of the Prophet;
- 8–11) their *kalima*, their *azân*, their way of performing *namâz*, and their *fiqh* are different from that of the whole Muslim *umma*;
- 12) they consider Khomeini a sinless (*ma‘sum*) Imam;
- 13) Khomeini himself considers the Iranian Shias more virtuous than the *sahâba* of the Prophet.<sup>328</sup>

All above allegations except those noted under 3), 6) and 8–11) were grossly inflated, to say the least. The reference to Khomeini was important, because Sunni hard-liners were especially annoyed by what they considered attempts of “Shia proselytising” in the garb of pan-Islamic propaganda, which was massively emanating from Iran since the revolution. It was countered by speeches and pamphlets depicting Khomeini as a bigoted Shia and enemy of the *sahâba*.<sup>329</sup> Apart from distributing Urdu translations

of speeches and writings from Khomeini and all kinds of political propaganda on a large scale in Pakistan, Iran's regime was also accused of financing an unprecedented output of anti-Sunni polemical literature.<sup>330</sup> At least part of such literature, especially reprints of older *munâzara* books and pamphlets, was printed and spread by Sunni extremists themselves to provide ammunition for discrediting Shias generally,<sup>331</sup> but their aggressive polemics were also responded in kind by new writings of Shia authors.<sup>332</sup>

Within a few years Haqq Nawaz had become so notorious for fanning sectarian hatred, that Section 144 PPC (ban on assemblies) was enforced wherever he was scheduled to hold a speech, and he was routinely denied entry permission into the neighbouring districts of Jhang. Nevertheless, he was often able to defy such bans, helped by steadily growing groups of fanatical youthful supporters.<sup>333</sup> On 6 September 1984, Haqq Nawaz started to formally organise his followers with the foundation of the *Anjuman-i Sipâh-i Sahâba-i Pâkistân* ("Army of the Companions of the Prophet"; SSP) in Jhang.<sup>334</sup> The initial stated goals of the new organisation were "the protection of the honour of the *sahâba*", "prevention of Shia provocations" and "paving the way for a system of the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn*";<sup>335</sup> but having Shias declared a non-Muslim minority, a general ban on '*azâdârî* processions, and making Sunni Islam the official religion of the state were soon added to the SSP agenda.<sup>336</sup> An important justification for setting up the SSP was seen in the "anti-Islamic" attitude of many police officers and bureaucrats who were accused of "preventing Sunni *tabligh* under the pretext of protecting religious minorities".<sup>337</sup>

The SSP had been conceived to become a country-wide organisation from the outset, but the rapid extension of its support-base came as a surprise even to its founders. On 10 February 1985, it organised an "All-Pakistan Defence of *Sahâba* Conference" in Jhang which was attended by hundreds of Sunni '*ulamâ*',<sup>338</sup> among them the leaders of the JUI (Fazl ur-Rahman), the TAS (Abd us-Sattar Taunsaivi),<sup>339</sup> the *Jam'iyat-i Ishâ'at al-Tauhid wa'l-Sunna* (Qazi Ihsan ul-Haqq),<sup>340</sup> and the *Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubûwat* (Maulana Khan Muhammad).<sup>341</sup> After that success, Haqq Nawaz was more determined than ever to defy restrictions on his movements and was able to do so on many occasions, facilitated either by negligence of the police or by their complaisance in the face of violent protests.<sup>342</sup> The SSP quickly set up branches in most districts of the Punjab—especially in the "Seraiki belt"—and organised a series of "*Azmat-i Sahâba* Conferences". Such events not only took the pretext of reaffirming the glory ('*azmat*) of the *sahâba* for preaching hatred against Shias, but—along with commemora-

tion days for the *khulafâ'-i râshidûn* and other prominent *sahâba*—actually tried to copy important elements of Shia popular mobilisation. Muhammad Qasim Zaman has aptly observed:

Though an unmitigated hostility towards the Shi'a defines the stance of the Sipah-i Sahaba, its own symbolism shows unmistakable signs of Shi'i influence. Zealous adoration of the Companions of the Prophet has manifest similarities with the Shia veneration of their imams. One may even detect a conscious effort here to claim for Sunnism its share of "charismatic" leaders, who will be the object of intense personal devotion—a tendency "orthodox" Sunnism has traditionally resisted against both the Shi'a and the sufis. [...]

More generally, the Sipah-i Sahaba's symbolism is also interpretable as a response to the ceremonials of Muharram ... [it] aspires to *substitute* a new set of commemorative occasions for the Shi'i ones. The counter ceremonies are intended not so much to attract the Shi'a as to prevent Sunnis from being attracted to Shi'i gatherings, and, more generally, to demonstrate that the Sunni tradition has no dearth of occasions to commemorate. *Cultural* Shi'ism is in fact more of a challenge than Shi'i militancy, for many (putative) Sunnis are unsuspecting victims of it or exposed to its lure.<sup>343</sup>

The same author has also argued that:

... there seems little reason to believe that the rural audience to which radical sectarian organizations now address themselves have had any but the most perfunctory prior acquaintance with urban or literate Islamic traditions. Imparting a sectarian identity is therefore less a case of "converting" rural peasants to Sunnism *from* Shi'ism (or the reverse) and much more of confronting local practices with the Islam of the urban religious scholars and institutions. It is this local Islam, combining "Shi'i", "Sunni", and "sufi" elements, which the Sipah-i Sahaba sees, in part at least, as "Shi'ism", and which it seeks to combat.<sup>344</sup>

Complaints about the "religious ignorance" of the villagers and a missionary zeal to redress such deficiencies have been common among Shia '*ulamâ*' in Pakistan, too.<sup>345</sup> Yet, as the case of Haqq Nawaz himself shows, religious orthodoxy was not completely absent from the rural areas even in the 1960s, and since the 1980s it has gained rapid influence in the countryside due to the "mushroom-growth" of *dînî madâris*.<sup>346</sup> In any case, support for the SSP during its initial years came mainly from the small and middle-sized towns of the Punjab, with Jhang remaining their headquarters and principal stronghold. It is noteworthy that they did not only attract supporters from the disgruntled classes, but also large financial contributions from well-to-do traders and other members of the urban bourgeoisie.<sup>347</sup>

It is more difficult to evaluate the external support for the SSP and like-minded Sunni organisations in Pakistan. SSP leaders have always denied

financial backing from abroad, but given the amount of money spent by Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries for backing Iraq during its 1980–88 war against Iran,<sup>348</sup> one may safely assume that tens (perhaps hundreds) of millions of US dollars have also been spent on “containing the Iranian revolution” in Pakistan during the same period.<sup>349</sup> The greatest beneficiaries of that money have doubtless been *dīnī madâris* of both the Deobandi and *Ahl-i hadīth* denominations which were newly built or enlarged all over the country;<sup>350</sup> but these have also served as an important recruiting ground for activists of sectarian organisations, often even imparting military training to their *tulabâ’*.

As for alleged support of militant sectarianism by the Zia regime and its secret agencies,<sup>351</sup> there is little hard evidence either. Murtaza Pooya, a staunchly pro-Khomeini Shia leader, has plainly exculpated Zia ul-Haqq, but he has put the blame on the U.S. and Israel instead.<sup>352</sup> It is well-known that the rise of the MQM, which was founded in March 1984, was facilitated by the regime to counter the influence of the PPP in Sindh,<sup>353</sup> and the almost simultaneous rise of the SSP in the Punjab could easily be perceived as a means to counter the TNFJ. On the other hand, Haqq Nawaz and other SSP leaders were often harassed by the police and had to face numerous trials in law courts.<sup>354</sup> Some administration officials and police officers were willing to enforce the law against the SSP even in the Zia era,<sup>355</sup> but the prevailing attitude towards them—depending on the individual views of the officials in charge—seems to have been one of *laissez-faire*. Just as had been the case in former decades, blatant sectarian propaganda, including calls for violence against Shias, was simply overlooked by such officials who either harboured sectarian bias themselves, or were afraid of facing the wrath of sectarian fanatics.<sup>356</sup>

Zia ul-Haqq himself obviously pursued a carrot-and-stick policy with regard to the organised Shias, and giving a loose rein to Sunni extremists could be considered as one of his “sticks”. Moreover, in 1985 the JUI faction led by Sami’ ul-Haqq was the most important religious party still supporting his regime.<sup>357</sup> It was therefore logical not to put many obstacles in the way of the SSP, which remained closely allied to the JUI-S. In the same year the JUI-S stepped up its pressure on Zia to make good his promises for further Islamisation, submitting the “private Shariat bill” (13 July)<sup>358</sup> and forming a “United Sunni Front” (*Muttahida Sunnî Mahâz*) together with ten other organisations, which reiterated the demand to declare Pakistan a Sunni state and adopt Hanafi *fiqh* as the public law at a convention in Rawalpindi (4 August).<sup>359</sup>

Starting from 1982, attacks on Shia ‘*azâdârî*’ processions had again become regular events during Muharram and on other occasions. In Muharram 1407H (6 September–5 October 1986) the worst affected place was Lahore. On 9 Muharram that year Dr Israr Ahmad, chairman of the tiny *Tanzîm-i Islâmî* party,<sup>360</sup> provoked Shias with a speech in which he alleged that the Imam Husain’s martyrdom had been part of a simple power struggle.<sup>361</sup> Severe clashes on ‘*Âshûrâ*’ (15 September) followed and curfew had to be imposed for ten days in some parts of the city.<sup>362</sup> In the same month, attacks on ‘*azâdârî*’ also occurred in Karachi, Rawalpindi, Multan, and other towns of the Punjab. S. ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini, who visited all affected places, threatened that “in future, those who erect the flag of ‘Abbas will be able to defend it”.<sup>363</sup> Clandestine efforts to create an armed force for Shia self-defence started in earnest in 1986, which was also the year when many Pakistani Shias volunteered for participating in Iran’s war against Iraq.<sup>364</sup>

Husaini’s allegations about the government’s direct involvement in all violent attacks against Shias were surely exaggerated, but there was connivance of the local administration and other officials with such attacks in at least some cases.<sup>365</sup> In a remarkable display of “infection” by sectarian thinking, the Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the collection of the particulars of all higher-ranking Shia civil servants (grade 17 or above) in early 1987. This step was taken in response to an enquiry of the MPA Manzur Ahmad Chinioti (JUI).<sup>366</sup> Zia ul-Haqq himself became suspicious of Shia army generals and judges.<sup>367</sup> On the other hand, he maintained cordial relations with Iran in spite of all pressure from Pakistani Sunnis, Saudis and Americans<sup>368</sup> as well as provocations from the TNFJ, ISO and even some Iranians themselves. For example, in July 1987 members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards killed three and wounded eighteen Iranian exiles in Karachi and Quetta; six months later thirty Iranians involved in these incidents were quietly deported.<sup>369</sup> The SSP has also complained that the 1980 ordinance proscribing abuses of the *sahâba* was hardly ever implemented against Shia writers.<sup>370</sup>

On 24 March 1987 Ihsan Ilahi Zahîr, then Secretary-General of the *Jam‘iyat-i Ahl-i Hadîth* and the author of polemical books against both Bareilvis and Shias,<sup>371</sup> was fatally wounded by a bomb explosion, which killed another eight people and injured about 100.<sup>372</sup> The carnage was immediately attributed to radical Shias, whereas the leader of the TNFJ denied any Shia involvement and accused the government of having murdered Zahîr for his strong opposition against the Shariat bill.<sup>373</sup> While



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Husaini tried hard to find some common agenda with Sunnis on Islamisation in that year,<sup>374</sup> the TNFJ "Koran and Sunna Conference" of 6 July 1987 found its echo—albeit on a much smaller scale—in another "Sunni Convention" in Multan (11 July), which was attended by both factions of the JUI, the SSP, TAS, *Sawâd-i A'zam*, and some smaller Deobandi organisations.<sup>375</sup> Its immediate cause had been the arrest of Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi and sixteen other SSP members in the Layyah District on 19 June. In a way similar to the TNFJ's exploitation of the Quetta incident of 1985,<sup>376</sup> all Deobandi groups joined forces for the cause of the SSP, securing the release of Haqq Nawaz and his companions within a few weeks.<sup>377</sup>

A climax of sectarian tensions was reached with the clashes in the Kurram Agency (23 July–3 August) and the Mecca massacre of 31 July 1987.<sup>378</sup> After these events, the authorities took stricter security precautions in Muharram 1408H (26 August–24 September 1987) than in the previous year. For example, in Karachi dozens of members of the *Sawâd-i A'zam* were arrested when they tried to stage a counter-procession on 'Āshûrâ' (4 September). However, on 7 October the SSP was allowed to convene its first "A'zmat-i Sahâba Conference" in Karachi, followed by attacks on a Shia *Chihlum* procession one week later.<sup>379</sup>

The last serious sectarian clash of the Zia ul-Haqq era took place around Gilgit in May 1988. The Northern Areas, with a majority of Twelver Shia and Isma'ili population, had become one of the hot-spots of sectarian conflicts since the early 1980s, starting with a large scale attack by Sunnis against Isma'ilis in the neighbouring Chitral District of the NWFP in August 1982.<sup>380</sup> From 18–24 May 1988 a *lashkar* of several thousands armed Sunnis from the Diamir District, allegedly backed up by Afghans from refugee camps in the NWFP, burnt down Shia villages near Gilgit and killed dozens of villagers unhindered by large army garrisons in that town and on their way. The Minister of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, S. Qasim Shah, as well as a former provincial minister of the NWFP, Maulana Abd ul-Baqi, were directly involved in that shameful event.<sup>381</sup>

In Jhang the SSP became so strong that Haqq Nawaz, who was the first person of humble origins to contest a National Assembly election in the Punjab, lost with a margin of merely 7,000 votes to Sayyida 'Abida Husain in November 1988.<sup>382</sup> But it was only after his assassination in February 1990 that Jhang became a permanent trouble-spot and a murderous Shia-Sunni vendetta spread over most districts of the Punjab and other parts of Pakistan.<sup>383</sup>



## THE INTERIM DEMOCRATIC DECADE, 1988–1999

### *From TNFJ to TjP: Return to pragmatism*

On 6 August 1988 funeral prayers were held for S. ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini in Peshawar, but some relatives had insisted on his burial in his home village rather than near the place of his martyrdom, as was favoured both by the TNFJ leaders and a visiting Iranian delegation led by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.<sup>1</sup> The NWFP government and Zia ul-Haqq, for their part, were adamant not to create a venue for Shia pilgrimage in the town. But Zia now praised Husaini as a “standard-bearer of Muslim unity” and even attended the ceremony in Peshawar, braving the anger of many participants who suspected his involvement in the murder from the outset.<sup>2</sup>

On that same day, the TNFJ Working Council convened in Peshawar to elect a successor to Husaini. Safdar Husain Najafi suggested S. Sajid Ali Naqvi, who had been Senior Vice President of the TNFJ since 1986, and was then acclaimed unanimously.<sup>3</sup> He was to remain the uncontested leader of the mainstream Shia movement until 1999 when his opponents provoked another split in the organisation.<sup>4</sup> Although Sajid Ali had been a close follower of the “Iranian line” since the 1978–79 revolution, he was less zealous than Husaini and thus more suitable for the era of politicking and compromise, which was to follow the death of both Zia ul-Haqq and Ayatollah Khomeini. Born in 1940 in a small village in the Pindi Gheb Tehsil (Attock Dist.), he had received his religious education at the *Jāmi‘at Makhzan ul-‘Ulūm* of his uncle S. Gulab Ali Shah in Multan<sup>5</sup> where he stayed as an instructor from 1958 until 1970. Only thereafter he proceeded to Najaf

(1970–75) and Qom (1975–78), and on his return became principal of the *Madrasat Âyatullâh al-Hakîm* in Rawalpindi.<sup>6</sup> He had been a member of the TNFJ Supreme Council under Mufti Ja‘far Husain and had actively participated in the preparation of the 1980 Islamabad Convention, but had otherwise kept a low profile, also remaining absent from the meeting of the Executive Committee in Sargodha after the Mufti’s death.<sup>7</sup> In December 1983 he had attended the meeting in Rawalpindi which had proposed S. Hamid Ali Musavi as the head of the TNFJ,<sup>8</sup> but since the election of Husaini in Bhakkar he had supported the latter. By 1988 he had become important enough to be included in an alleged hit-list of the killers of Husaini.<sup>9</sup>

Few changes were made in the upper echelon of TNFJ office-holders in the first years after the death of Husaini. Sajid Ali kept S. Wazarat Husain as his Secretary-General until 1993 when he was replaced by Anwar Ali Akhundzada,<sup>10</sup> and he continued to rely on such experienced organisers as Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi,<sup>11</sup> S. Iftikhar Husain Naqvi<sup>12</sup> and Ya‘qub Ali Tawassuli.<sup>13</sup> A new face in the TNFJ inner circle was Munir Husain Gilani, who became Sajid Ali’s political advisor from 1988 to 1993.<sup>14</sup> Another early change of style was his press statement after the death of Zia ul-Haqq, which he termed “a great loss for our country and the *umma*”.<sup>15</sup>

One immediate challenge for the TNFJ in the fall of 1988 was the first free parliamentary election campaign since 1977. The dates for new elections (16 and 19 November) had already been fixed by Zia ul-Haqq on 20 July. On 2 October, six weeks after Zia’s death, the Supreme Court ruled that all political parties must be allowed to participate. Although the TNFJ was yet ill-prepared for the role of a political party and failed to strike an electoral alliance with the PPP,<sup>16</sup> it decided to contest National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies elections in a number of constituencies.<sup>17</sup> But just like in 1970 the majority of Pakistan’s Shias probably voted for the PPP, and not a single seat was won by TNFJ candidates even in Shia strongholds.<sup>18</sup> Some TNFJ supporters considered it a matter of pride that for the first time in the history of Pakistan a genuine Shia organisation fully participated in national politics with its own agenda,<sup>19</sup> but Sajid Ali would have preferred to avoid the impression of a “sectarian contest”.<sup>20</sup>

If the failure of the TNFJ to make any impact on the 1988 elections was not unexpected, these had a sobering effect of another kind, too: the TNFJ, which had been founded as a reaction to some acts of Zia ul-Haqq and had made propaganda against the dictator and “lackey of imperialism” the centre-piece of its political discourse since 1984, was now faced with a democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto advocating secular-

ism instead of Sunni Islamisation.<sup>21</sup> The end of the Iran-Iraq war (20 August 1988) and later the death of Khomeini (3 June 1989), followed by a more pragmatic approach of Iran's rulers towards the West and their Arab neighbours, were also depriving the TNFJ of the most dramatic international issues for mobilising the Shias in Pakistan. Although the TNFJ/TJP under Sajid Ali Naqvi kept occupying itself with Palestine, Lebanon, and other international problems to a large extent,<sup>22</sup> it was clear that new priorities had to be set and new issues to be found.

One of the most important issues for the TNFJ throughout the years 1988–93 was the struggle for full disclosure of the Husaini murder conspiracy and punishment of all culprits. But although the actual killer, one Jamilullah from a village in the Nowshera Tehsil (NWFP), and several of his accomplices were caught already in September 1988 and made detailed confessions,<sup>23</sup> and in spite of all pressure from the TNFJ through numerous demonstrations and propaganda campaigns, the case turned into a shameful exercise of concealing the truth and denying justice. A special investigation team of the Peshawar police had quickly nabbed the hired killers thanks to hints from the village of the gang-leader, one Siraj of Turangzai (Charsadda Dist.), who had been a long-time “political worker” for General Fazl-i Haqq (Governor of the NWFP 1978–88) and his brother in law, Senator Hashim Khan.<sup>24</sup> Both apparently had full knowledge of the instructions to kill Husaini (and after him three other leading members of the TNFJ),<sup>25</sup> which were conveyed to Siraj and his companions by Captain Mâjid Riza Gilani, a member of Zia ul-Haqq's security team,<sup>26</sup> on behalf of some foreign country, whether Iraq, Saudi Arabia or the U.S.<sup>27</sup> Hashim Khan brought Gilani and Siraj together, and both men also jointly met Fazl-i Haqq during the preparations for the murder.<sup>28</sup> But this became known to the public only on 8 June 1989, when Siraj's testimony was published in the press.<sup>29</sup> During the nine preceding months all efforts had been made to cover up the confessions of the caught culprits, and one energetic Shia member of the investigation team, Abd ul-Ali Khan Bangash, had been murdered.<sup>30</sup> Once the main facts had become public, the TNFJ pressed for the arrest of Fazl-i Haqq and Hashim Khan. The latter was allowed to escape from a Peshawar courtroom on 24 June, when his bail application had been rejected. Thereafter he spent some time as the guest of the Cheema and Chaudhry landlord families in the Punjab and of the Azad Kashmir Chief Minister Sardar Abd ul-Qayyum, before fleeing to Saudi Arabia. From there he returned in February 1991 and was arrested, but acquitted on 10 August that year.<sup>31</sup> Fazl-i Haqq, too, sought shelter from the

NWFP justice in the Punjab, which was still ruled by Zia ul-Haqq's protégé Nawaz Sharif.<sup>32</sup> After his plea for political asylum in the U.S. had been rejected, he fled to Lahore and was granted temporary bail by the Lahore High Court on 12 July 1989. Back in Peshawar, however, he failed to get his bail extended and was arrested on 22 July.<sup>33</sup> Thereafter his lawyers filed a petition with the Lahore Bench of the Supreme Court, while his family mobilised the street for his cause, including groups like the *Sipâh-i Sahâba*. The prosecution lawyer hired by the TNFJ, Shaukat Ali, was harassed by the Punjab government and had to be exchanged shortly before the hearing of Fazl-i Haqq's case started on 4 October.<sup>34</sup>

At that time, political "horse-trading" was in full swing to save one of Bhutto's ministers (Mukhtar Ahmad 'Awan) from a murder trial in Multan,<sup>35</sup> and her entire government from a motion of no-confidence in the National Assembly, which eventually failed on 1 November.<sup>36</sup> Six days earlier Fazl-i Haqq was granted bail by the Lahore Bench of the Supreme Court.<sup>37</sup> Apparently some secret deal with the PPP had taken place to secure his release at that critical junction.<sup>38</sup> Fazl-i Haqq also enjoyed protection from President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, whose political career he had facilitated in former years.<sup>39</sup> After his release he tried his best to clear himself from the accusation of involvement in Husaini's murder, even buying the services of some Shia religious figures.<sup>40</sup> In November 1990 Fazl-i Haqq was again elected to the NWFP Provincial Assembly, but on 3 October 1991 he was himself assassinated. His son immediately charged Sajid Ali Naqvi, Anwar Ali Akhundzada (then TNFJ provincial Secretary-General in the NWFP) and the Iranian Consul-General, Hamid Reza Sherkhoda'i, with a murder conspiracy, but apart from TNFJ supporters the suspects included political rivals from the Mohmand Tribal Agency.<sup>41</sup>

On 4 January 1992 the trial of Jamilullah and three other members of the gang, which had been hired to murder Husaini, was opened at a session court in Peshawar. Shortly after Captain Majid Gilani, who had been sought by the police for more than three years, was arrested and made revelations about the involvement of other high-ups which were kept sealed from the public.<sup>42</sup> Among those implicated by Gilani in the Husaini murder conspiracy was the former NWFP Minister of Religious Affairs, Maulana Abd ul-Baqi (JUI).<sup>43</sup> Gilani, who was initially eager to "clear his conscience by revealing the full truth" and refused to confirm a distorted version of his confessions in the court, underwent a complete change of heart after having been submitted to a test of his sanity and allegedly having met with some high-ranking persons, including even President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In

April 1993 he revoked his former confession of guilt, and the chief witness Siraj suddenly pretended not to know him.<sup>44</sup> The trial came to a disgraceful end on 31 July 1993 when the session judge Fazl ur-Rahman acquitted all accused, including even the self-confessed killer Jamilullah.<sup>45</sup> The TNFJ appealed against that verdict, but the case dragged on for another eighteen years, until the appeal was finally rejected by the Peshawar High Court in 2011. By that time, only three of the former ten accused were still alive.<sup>46</sup>

The handling of the Husaini murder case showed not only connivance of the PML with some alleged instigators of the crime, but also a considerable lack of interest from the side of the PPP, which headed both the federal and the NWFP provincial governments until August 1990. The TNFJ was therefore at a loss as to with what allies it should enter the political game after its failed first attempt in the 1988 elections. In December 1989 Sajid Ali Naqvi responded favourable to an invitation of Tahir ul-Qadiri, a former professor at the *Islâmiyât* Department of the Punjab University who had founded a *Pâkistân 'Awâmî Tahrîk* in May that year,<sup>47</sup> for talks about a tripartite political alliance, comprising also Asghar Khan's *Tahrîk-i Istiqlâl*. A first meeting of the three leaders took place on 29 December, followed by a joint declaration which was published on 9 January 1990 (excerpts):

In the current miserable political, economical and social situation of the country it is most urgent to bring about a political force which is honest and active, the thought and program of which is based on the Koran and the Sunna, which is revolutionary, oriented on welfare and acting democratically; which considers politics the need for serving the people instead of a business; which will start with a full-fledged revolutionary struggle to wrench political leadership from the exploiting and idle class and transfer it to principled, competent and sincere people; which will create such a revolution as to make Pakistan a great Islamic democratic welfare state ...

We are appealing on Pakistan's oppressed and deprived 'awâm to join this great *jihâd* against the current oppressive, exploiting and imperialist order. The first historical revolutionary meeting in this connection will take place on 2 March 1990 ... at *Minâr-i Pâkistân*, Lahore...<sup>48</sup>

The new alliance, portrayed as "a milestone in the relations between different religious denominations on the Indo-Pakistani Subcontinent",<sup>49</sup> presented also a 19-point "revolutionary program for transforming Pakistan into a modern Islamic democratic welfare state". It included "complete rule of Koran and Sunna" (1), an end to "imperialist domination" (2), providing education and health services for all citizens (7), an end of unemployment, lawlessness, corruption, injustice and other ills, of sectarian, linguistic and

regional fanaticism (12), and “complete safeguarding of the rights of minorities”.<sup>50</sup> Such lofty rhetoric was then almost standard among political groups in Pakistan, including the very “oppressors” whom the signatories wished to get rid of. The public meeting in Lahore was later cancelled and the tripartite alliance was almost forgotten after some months,<sup>51</sup> although its members would remain on friendly terms with each other throughout most of the 1990s.

The dismissal of Benazir Bhutto’s government and all assemblies by the president on 6 August 1990 offered a much better chance for the TNFJ to enter politics. Unlike 1988, the PPP was now in need of allies and formed the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) to contest the national and provincial elections on 24 and 27 October, respectively.<sup>52</sup> On 30 and 31 August Sajid Ali Naqvi met PPP leaders, including Asif Ali Zardari and Faruq Leghari, in Islamabad and reached principal agreement on cooperation.<sup>53</sup> The TNFJ contributed energetically to the PDA election campaign and was allocated PDA tickets in some constituencies,<sup>54</sup> but its candidates fell victim to the general rout of the PDA in these elections.<sup>55</sup> Like Bhutto, Sajid Ali Naqvi protested against alleged rigging of the elections by the victorious IJI, but he also called on TNFJ supporters to keep calm and patient.<sup>56</sup> Already before the election date, Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi had predicted that the TNFJ-PPP alliance would be short-lived, because the PPP was neither ready to confront the U.S. nor the sectarian Sunni Mullahs; yet the alliance would be beneficial for the TNFJ, because it would “rise above the sectarian horizon” and become “part of the political scene” in Pakistan.<sup>57</sup>

The third important issue for the TNFJ during Sajid Ali Naqvi’s initial years, apart from political ambitions and the Husaini murder case, was sectarian violence. This had much increased since the murder of Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi in February 1990 and would become the greatest problem for Pakistan’s Shias ever since.<sup>58</sup> After listening to reports about recent sectarian attacks in Jhang and a number of other places during a session of the TNFJ Supreme Council in Faisalabad (11–12 May 1990), the participants came to the conclusion that in all these cases the authorities had proven their ineptness and unwillingness to cooperate with the Shias. It was therefore decided to create a “Central Ja’fariya Fund” and a “Central Defence Council” in order to be able to react quickly to unforeseen events, to strengthen the *Pâsbân-i Islâm*,<sup>59</sup> procure arms and military training for TNFJ members, and teach them a spirit of self-defence. All means of propaganda should be used to confront “Wahhabism”, while at the same time the TNFJ would have to work for the “unity of Muslims” to root out sectarianism.<sup>60</sup>

On 12 July 1990 the TNFJ had planned to hold a large public meeting in Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi, on the occasion of the 1400<sup>th</sup> anniversary (*hijr*) of *ʿĪd al-Ghadir*,<sup>61</sup> but was denied permission. In his speech in the *Imâmbârgâh-i Yâdgâr-i Husainî* (Satellite Town, Rawalpindi), where the main celebrations had been shifted to instead, Sajid Ali Naqvi addressed the problem of sectarianism as follows (excerpts):

In the recent past we have given so many sacrifices ... and have kept quiet so much. It is very difficult for people with a sense of honour to keep quiet. We have endured all kinds of personal insults, but we cannot tolerate insults against the pure Shia *mazhab* of the *ahl-i bait*. And still we have reacted with patience and forbearance. We had expected that the governments here will take up their responsibilities and that the law will be enforced. Now look what is happening? There is an era of anarchy in this country. During the eleven years of dictatorship our houses have been burnt, our villages have been plundered, our sanctities have been destroyed and hundreds of our people have been martyred. No other party has offered as many sacrifices and struggled as hard against the dictatorship during the past eleven years as the TNFJ. We had expected that the problems of the country would be solved with the advent of democracy. There are the problems of law and order, of the economy, and of political corruption, which all have to be solved. And we had expected that our basic rights, our religious rights, our constitutional rights, our human rights will be granted. But we have seen that the governments which came to power have not fulfilled our expectations.

Whether the provincial governments or the central government, this government cannot enforce the law even on one Mullah ... if it cannot enforce the law on one single Mullah, how will it enforce the law in the whole country?<sup>62</sup>

This speech was notably held less than two months before the TNFJ would join the PPP in an electoral alliance (see above). In a speech on 23 August 1990, Sajid Ali became more explicit (excerpts):

Until now no Muslim of any sect has been dubbed *kâfir* from the TNFJ platform. (If some Shia has called someone else *kâfir*, he has acted individually.) If anyone of us has done so, he will have thought it over many times. World imperialism is using the poison of sectarianism against us only to distract our movement from the path of the Islamic revolution ... We have never lost patience in this charged atmosphere and critical situation, but how long can we remain patient and offer sacrifices? In this country the law is not being enforced. There are some hidden hands who can commit murder and aggression whenever they want ... some of these organisations have been involved in the murder of the martyr Husaini. It would have been easy to take revenge during the last two years, but we have let ourselves be guided by the law of the country ... so far without any positive result. If the poison of anarchy will spread still more, others will not escape from it either..<sup>63</sup>

## THE SHIAS OF PAKISTAN

Although cases of violence against Shias were to multiply in the 1990s, Sajid Ali would never give up a basically conciliatory approach to solving the problem of militant sectarianism. Already in January 1990, S. Ali Khamenei, when appointing Sajid Ali his *wakil* in Pakistan, had admonished him to proceed with great caution and to strive for Shia-Sunni unity.<sup>64</sup> While his moderate line was not appreciated by many youthful hard-liners of the ISO and TNFJ, who set up the militant organisation *Sipâh-i Muhammad* in 1993 to confront the SSP and other extremist Sunni groups,<sup>65</sup> it was doubtless a sound strategy, given the demographic predicament of Shias in Pakistan. At times it also produced tangible results. One example was the success of the TNFJ in having the “Shariat bill” modified in such a way that it was no longer considered a danger to the legal status of Shias at the time of its enactment in 1991.

Both the “private Shariat bill” of the JUI from 1985 and an alternative version tabled by the government in 1986 had been strongly opposed by the TNFJ for their Hanafi Sunni bias.<sup>66</sup> Then in June 1988 Zia ul-Haqq, who had taken the “delay in Islamisation” as one pretext to dismiss the Junejo government, had promulgated a so-called Shariat Ordinance. It went into effect two days before his death but expired in February 1989, because the PPP government was not interested in having it passed by the National Assembly. During the election campaign of 1990, the IJI had promised “to redress this failure”. Thus Nawaz Sharif tackled the issue soon after assuming the post of prime minister in November 1990.<sup>67</sup> But Sharif himself did not want to give the Sunni religious parties any additional leverage either, and he made sure that the original bill was watered down beyond recognition.<sup>68</sup> He also received Sajid Ali Naqvi to hear his suggestions. In response to a demand of the TNFJ, all recognised Muslim schools of thought were listed by name, and Article 227 of the constitution—which mentioned only the personal law of the different sects—was annulled simultaneously with the passing of the Shariat bill on 16 May 1991.<sup>69</sup>

Apart from that success, however, pressure on the TNFJ increased during the first term of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister (1990–93). The IJI had contributed to giving the SSP political respectability, helping its candidate Îsâr ul-Haqq Qasimi to win seats from Jhang both in both the National and the Provincial Assembly in the October 1990 elections.<sup>70</sup> After Qasimi’s assassination in January 1991, by-elections were delayed for fourteen months, but were then again won by an SSP candidate, A’zam Tariq.<sup>71</sup> Although by that time Nawaz Sharif had parted ways with the JUI-S, the parent organisation of the SSP,<sup>72</sup> and two candidates of the PML had run against Tariq,<sup>73</sup> Sharif’s



government and the Punjab provincial government of his party-man Ghulam Haidar Wyne (1990–93) lacked the political determination and sincerity to check the rising tide of sectarian violence in Jhang and elsewhere. Following the pattern of Zia ul-Haq, who had used the Sunni religious parties as a stick against the PPP, Sharif remained inclined to court the religious lobby in order to keep his principal political rival at bay. In the fall of 1992, however, his Ministry of Interior made hints that the government was considering a ban on “organisations promoting sectarianism” which would affect not only the SSP, but also the TNFJ and ISO.<sup>74</sup> This was one reason for the decision made in November 1992 to drop the reference to “enforcement of the *fiqh-i ja‘fariya*” from the name of the TNFJ and rename the organisation *Tahrik-i Ja‘fariya-i Pākistān* (TJP). Another was the fact that none of the two major parties competing for power in Pakistan was interested in any further Islamisation of laws, as the 1991 Shariat bill episode had shown. The idea of giving the main Shia organisation a less “aggressive” and more modern name is said to have come from Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi.<sup>75</sup> It was announced in early 1993 and fully implemented during a first TJP convention in Faisalabad on 16 April 1993, which was devoted to organisational matters.<sup>76</sup> In his speech to that convention, Sajid Ali Naqvi accorded special importance to the collection of *khums* for financing the increasing scope of activities of the TJP (extracts):

The [Shia] *qaum* must not in any way be slow or negligent in performing its duties, and it must be made aware of the severity of the crime of not paying religious dues (*wujūhāt-i shar‘iyya*). Pay your dues yourself and draw the attention of those brothers, who still neglect this obligation, on its necessity. The effort to make those who do not pay compliant to this system has started in the Punjab. You will surely have heard of the *Ja‘fariya* Welfare Fund. The establishment of that system is a religious duty, which we have started very thoughtfully. The consolidation of our *dīnī madāris* and all religious organisations is dependent on the success of that system. You know that the Islamic revolution [in Iran] has been successful, because there the institution of the *marja‘iyya* has never lacked funds, and has always been self-sufficient thanks to the system of *khums*. Therefore make the Shias aware. Especially those people who do not pay *khums* so far must leave the world of negligence (sic) and comply with their religious, divine, and social duty and pay the dues of God and his servants...<sup>77</sup>

The *Ja‘fariya* Welfare Fund referred to above had been set up already in late 1990. In a pamphlet distributed by TNFJ offices at that time, Sajid Ali had propagated the “new system” with these words (excerpts):

... *khums* is one of the necessities of religion, the abnegation (*inkār*) of which means deviation from the *mazhab* of Muhammad and the *Āl-i Muhammad*. You

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will surely know that one of the injustices done to the *ahl al-bait* has been the denial of their special right to the *khums* ... the most important purpose of that denial has been to ruin their economic situation ...

Thank God, all Shias believe in the obligation of *khums*, but unfortunately most are negligent in its practical fulfilment. In reality *khums* is a universal system, which can solve many problems of the *qaum* once it is fully implemented ... there will be no more need for any special *chanda* ... The *khums* is a religious obligation, which is moved by the consciousness of the believers. Therefore, whoever holds the reins of political power, we will be able to do significant work for our ... dignity as a *qaum* and the greatness of the *ahl al-bait* if we follow our own economic system ... All Shias must comply with this duty and must fully co-operate with the persons appointed by us in all larger and smaller towns ...<sup>78</sup>

The said pamphlet had closed with a warning that *dîni madâris* must not be affected by the new system. Therefore those Shias who already paid *khums* and *zakat* for the *madâris* or '*ulamâ*' of their respective area should not be approached to pay for the *Ja'farîya Welfare Fund*, but only those who did not pay any religious dues so far.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, the ambition of the TNFJ/TJP to assume the function of a countrywide collector of Shia religious dues was hardly in accordance with its proclaimed goal to become a "non-sectarian" party. It is not known to what extent such appeals have been successful, but Sajid Ali has repeatedly claimed that the TJP was entirely self-sufficient through the system of *khums* and never got any financial support from outside Pakistan.<sup>80</sup> According to the official report on its activities 1992–94, the TNFJ/TJP has spent more than Rs. 22 million on aid and charities (presumably from the *Ja'farîya Welfare Fund*) in these years as follows:<sup>81</sup>

Table 2: TNFJ/TJP expenses on charities, 1992–4

construction of mosques, dîni	
madâris and imâmbârgâhs	Rs. 4,564,326
sayyids	Rs. 3,553,619
non-sayyids	Rs. 1,474,085
flood-stricken	Rs. 2,807,677
prisoners	Rs. 2,264,686
marriages	Rs. 1,926,617
medical treatment	Rs. 1,223,665
(Shia) Afghan refugees	Rs. 1,078,454
construction of houses	Rs. 874,822
'ulamâ'	Rs. 868,769
education	Rs. 520,622
Northern Areas	Rs. 270,358

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Parachinar	Rs. 180,661
Iraqi refugees	Rs. 159,220
Nurbakhshi students	Rs. 7,540

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This list does not include the cost of further activities of the TNFJ/TJP in those years, like conventions and conferences,<sup>82</sup> publications,<sup>83</sup> travel expenses,<sup>84</sup> lawyers,<sup>85</sup> correspondence,<sup>86</sup> election campaign expenses, security, and others. It can be assumed that the organisation was in need of a much larger annual budget, but also that the amount of help it received from abroad was less than that of several organisations of the Sunni religious groups. Despite all attempts of the TNFJ leaders to exhort the Shias for paying their “religious dues”, Pakistan’s Shias have not changed their decades-old habit of spending lavishly on ‘*azâdârî* and *majâlis*, but only reluctantly on their ‘*ulamâ*’, *madâris* and communal organisations, as compared to their Sunni countrymen.

In 1993, the TJP once more tried to ally itself politically with the PPP. Its members were called to join a planned “Long March” of Benazir Bhutto to the capital in July,<sup>87</sup> and when a caretaker government paved the way for early new elections, the TJP sent a delegation to Bhutto within a few days to negotiate the terms of an alliance. The TJP demanded almost 6 per cent of the PDA tickets for its candidates, but the PPP was only prepared to make seat adjustments in a number of constituencies. Already some weeks before the election dates (6 and 9 October) the alliance was declared “practically dead” by the TJP, which then called on its candidates to run as independents.<sup>88</sup> The intention was henceforth to “punish the PPP for its breach of faith” and create a vote-bank of its own, as well as helping Shias to get elected to the National and Provincial Assemblies.<sup>89</sup> Again not a single TJP candidate was elected, but the TJP congratulated itself for having assured the victory of a number of others through its help.<sup>90</sup>

### *The sectarian vendetta in the 1990s*

Although the rule of Zia ul-Haqq had facilitated the rapid growth of anti-Shia extremism, it was only in the 1990s that sectarian violence against Shias became an every-day problem, affecting almost all parts of the country. This development has been one of the most visible aspects of the general brutalisation of Pakistan’s society since the 1980s which has been widely blamed on Zia and his legacy,<sup>91</sup> especially Pakistan’s involvement

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the Afghan war. Throughout the 1990s (and more so after 2001), the quest for security has remained the most important issue for the TNFJ/TJP and other Shia organisations, completely eclipsing old Shia demands like separate *diniyât* and *auqâf* for the application of the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*. On the other hand, while Shias were clearly the first to be victimised on a large scale by fanatical elements within the Sunni majority, extremist Shia groups have gradually responded in kind, including indiscriminate killing of random victims. Thus the Shia-Sunni conflict degenerated into a veritable vendetta in that decade.

The elected federal and provincial governments, for their part, made numerous attempts to check militant sectarianism, but most of these were merely a display of *ad hoc* activism lacking consistency and credibility. This was especially true of the PML-led governments, which were always inclined to court the Sunni religious lobbies, including the SSP, out of political expediency. But the PPP leadership, too, was shying away from conflicts with the religious parties on most occasions, and it even allied itself with a faction of the JUI from 1993 to 1996.<sup>92</sup> Therefore the approach of both the PML and the PPP towards the sectarian extremists was always vacillating between the carrot and the stick. Harsh clampdowns by the security forces and arrests of militant sectarian leaders alternated with their invitation to high-level meetings for the sake of “peace agreements”, or even their promotion to cabinet posts.

During the years from 1990 to 1995, office holders of the SSP and the TNFJ/TJP have been the main targets of sectarian attacks. However, the August 1988 murder of the TNFJ leader Husaini was not yet part of the “sectarian war”, and the SSP apparently had no hand in it.<sup>93</sup> It was only the murder of Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi on 22 February 1990 which triggered an endless chain of assassinations of both Shia and Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ and communal activists, apart from raising considerably the level and frequency of street violence against Shias. Four Shias from Jhang were accused of having killed Haqq Nawaz and were sentenced in 1991,<sup>94</sup> although it remained unclear whether they had acted on behalf of the TNFJ, the Shia landlords of the district, or the Sunni politician Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal, who repeatedly contested elections in the SSP stronghold Central Jhang until he was himself murdered in 1995.<sup>95</sup> In 1991 Shaikh Iqbal was also suspected of having ordered the murder of Îsâr ul-Haqq Qasimi, the Vice-Chairman of the SSP who had won two seats in the 1990 elections,<sup>96</sup> and was temporarily arrested.<sup>97</sup> Yet the violence in Jhang, which left dozens killed and hundreds injured already in 1990–91 apart from huge material losses,<sup>98</sup> was directed

mainly against Shias, with a number of retaliatory killings of rank-and-file SSP supporters, too. Curfew had to be enforced there during long periods, while criminal gangs, which had joined the SSP just for covering up their activities, kept both the Shia and Sunni population hostage. When by-elections for the vacant National and Provincial Assembly seats of Qasimi could finally be held in March 1992, the SSP threatened that a defeat of its candidate A'zam Tariq (vice-chairman of the SSP since 1991) would not be tolerated. He was supported by both factions of the JUI and even the JI and was duly elected with a margin close to that of 1990.<sup>99</sup> Two months later the SSP candidate Mian 'Abid Husain was elected unopposed to the Provincial Assembly seat vacated by Tariq.<sup>100</sup>

Muhammad A'zam Tariq (1961–2003), born from Punjabi *muhâjir* parents in Chichawatni (Sahiwal Dist.), had risen to prominence within the SSP as *pêsh imâm* of a mosque in Karachi. Allegedly he and other SSP leaders had learned much about the art of violent political blackmail from the example of the MQM.<sup>101</sup> After having consolidated their position in Jhang, A'zam Tariq and Zia ur-Rahman Faruqi, who headed the SSP from the death of Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi until his own assassination in 1997,<sup>102</sup> held a press conference in Islamabad where they professed to believe in “a constitutional struggle for the realisation of the due rights of the Sunni Muslims”, while at the same time asserting that “the due rights of the Shias as citizens must be protected and their problems be solved”.<sup>103</sup> When in May 1992 it had been leaked to the press that the Punjab government was seriously considering to impose a ban on the SSP, Faruqi retorted that he would simply raise another organisation in that case.<sup>104</sup> In June that year, after SSP militants had attacked a police vehicle with anti-aircraft-guns, a large “operation clean-up” was launched against both SSP and TNFJ members in Jhang.<sup>105</sup> However, shortly after SSP delegations were again received by the highest dignitaries in a bid to pre-empt violence during Muharram 1413H (3 July–1 August 1992).<sup>106</sup>

Sufficient precautions were taken in the Punjab that year, but on ‘*Ashûrâ*’ (13 July) a serious clash took place in Peshawar when a Shia procession passed in front of a mosque controlled by the SSP near the Old City’s Kohati Gate.<sup>107</sup> Shias and Sunnis blamed each other for starting the attack, while an official inquiry was hampered by the reluctance of eye-witnesses to testify.<sup>108</sup> The SSP leaders Faruqi and Zia ul-Qasimi, who were received with full honours by the NWFP Chief Minister Mir Afzal Khan shortly after, announced in Peshawar that A'zam Tariq would soon table a “*Nâmûs-i Sahâba* bill” in the National Assembly, providing for death pen-

alty for anyone found guilty of defiling the holy names of the *sahâba*.<sup>109</sup> Debate on it was delayed, however, because at that time the PML took a relatively tough stance against the SSP, following detailed police reports about its involvement in terrorist and other criminal activities.<sup>110</sup> Although plans to ban the SSP and other organisations “involved in promoting sectarianism” were abandoned in November 1992,<sup>111</sup> thousands of SSP supporters were arrested in early 1993, provoking a “Long March” through different districts of the Punjab to Islamabad.<sup>112</sup>

At the same time the TNFJ leadership, which had received a “warning signal” with the arrest of its NWFP Secretary-General in October 1992,<sup>113</sup> decided to adopt the new name TJP and a more moderate image. This step prompted such hard-liners, who had never agreed with Sajid Ali Naqvi’s cautious approach, to form the new organisation *Sipâh-i Muhammad Pākistân* (SMP).<sup>114</sup> One founder of the SMP, S. Ghulam Riza Naqvi, born 1960 in Abbaspur (Khanewal Dist.), had studied at the *Hauza ‘Ilmiya* of Mashhad three years and received military training in Afghanistan as a member of the *Pâsbân* before founding a *madrassa* near Jhang in 1987. He spent three years in prison for his involvement in crime and sectarian violence in Jhang, thereafter becoming *khatib* in Thokar Niaz Beg, a large village on the southern outskirts of Lahore.<sup>115</sup> S. Ghulam Riza, who cultivated a macho image, rallied around himself a gang of devoted followers, which kept the village almost off limits for the law enforcement agencies for several years (see below). Together with the more intellectual Maulana Murid ‘Abbas Yazdani,<sup>116</sup> who was official heading the SMP until his assassination in 1996, he succeeded to make the SMP a strong countrywide semi-clandestine organisation. Yet it is doubtful that all militant Shia groups springing up under the banner of the SMP at numerous flashpoints of sectarian conflict since 1993 were following one central command; rather it was the SMP ideology that won acceptance among a section of the Shia youth. Notwithstanding pretensions of forming “a platform on which both Sunnis and Shias could unite to confront their common enemies” like the U.S., Israel, India and their “agents”,<sup>117</sup> the most important agenda of the SMP was to respond to all kinds of violence against Shias in the same manner, instead of relying on the state for protection and justice. This reflected a mood which had become widespread among younger Shia activists over a decade, and even Sajid Ali Naqvi had often felt himself obliged to use threatening words against aggressors of Shias in order to satisfy them.<sup>118</sup> After the formation of the SMP, however, the TJP kept its distance from that organisation, although it has often been alleged that it actually approved of many of its acts.<sup>119</sup>

On 25 March 1993, Shia congregational prayers for *‘Īd al-Fitr* in the *Jāmi‘ Masjid* of Bahawalpur were attacked with hand grenades and automatic guns, leaving three dead and almost a hundred injured. The town had hitherto hardly been affected by sectarianism, with Sunnis still taking out more *ta‘ziya* processions during Muharram than Shias. The TJP blamed Maulana Abdullah from Zhob (Balochistan), a Central Vice-Chairman of the SSP who had moved to Bahawalpur in 1990, for having openly called for the killing of Shias in his Ramadan sermons.<sup>120</sup> This pattern of wanton sectarian terrorism was to be repeated many times in the following years, spreading a generalised feeling of insecurity among Shias and straining inter-communal relations even in places that had a long history of harmonious coexistence.<sup>121</sup>

Yet there was less sectarian violence in 1993 than in the preceding and the following years.<sup>122</sup> In the October 1993 elections, the religious parties’ share of the 204 Muslim seats in the National Assembly fell from eighteen to nine, but A‘zam Tariq was re-elected in his Jhang constituency.<sup>123</sup> Benazir Bhutto’s second government (1993–6), with its hands strengthened by a PPP president and allied provincial governments in the Punjab and Sindh,<sup>124</sup> in early 1994 announced its intention to reform the procedure of the blasphemy law (Section 295 PPC) to prevent its misuse. This law dating back to the British era had been repeatedly enlarged and stiffened under Zia ul-Haqq, and since 1991 the death penalty had become mandatory for directly or indirectly defiling the name of the Prophet Muhammad. Thereafter dozens of Pakistanis, especially Christians, had been accused of blasphemy, apparently only to settle personal scores.<sup>125</sup> But while human rights organisations and Western countries pressed Pakistan’s government to get rid of that law, or at least render it less menacing, all religious parties were adamant to keep it in place unchanged. The SSP, for its part, wanted to have a provision included that would make insults of the *sahāba* punishable by death, too.<sup>126</sup>

In its bid to have the blasphemy law extended rather than watered down, the SSP tried to add new fuel to sectarian tensions in early 1994, allegedly to force the government to make concessions in exchange for peace prior to Muharram (10 June–9 July that year).<sup>127</sup> On 21 January a hand grenade was thrown into a Shia mosque in Shahr Sultan (Muzaffargarh Dist.), killing six and injuring twenty-five. Shia militants retaliated with a similar attack against a Sunni mosque in Kukkar Hatta (Multan Dist.) on 5 February.<sup>128</sup> In March 1994, A‘zam Tariq made remarks about the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam of the Shias at public speeches in Jhang and Dera Ismail Khan, which were so offensive that the journal *Razākār* refused to publish them in its



report, fearing uncontrollable Shia reactions.<sup>129</sup> Shortly before Muharram, Tariq had presented his "*Nâmûs-i Sahâba* bill", which enjoyed support from all Sunni religious parties, to the National Assembly. He even occupied the chair of the speaker and proclaimed the bill "passed" after most MNAs had walked out because of unruly behaviour of the opposition MNAs.<sup>130</sup> Although the bill did not win the approval of the National Assembly and the Senate, Tariq claimed to have the signatures of more than seventy MNAs supporting it three months later.<sup>131</sup>

In spite of a new series of assassinations and counter assassinations of TJP and SSP members since early 1994, both parties signed a number of peace deals for Muharram mediated by government officials or bureaucrats.<sup>132</sup> The Punjab government of Manzur Wattoo was even ready to grant hundreds of arms licenses for both the SSP and SMP in exchange for such truce agreements, which worked to some extent for the period he remained in power.<sup>133</sup> By that time the SSP leaders were ready to promise that their party would not indulge in violent provocations, because some new splinter groups had emerged from the SSP, which were even more radical and would do the "dirty work" on their own account. Some were bands of ordinary criminals using sectarianism as a cover.<sup>134</sup> One group formed in 1993, the *Harakat ul-Ansâr*, joined Arab and Pakistani veterans of the Afghan war and new volunteers for the *jihâd* in Kashmir, but also sectarian terrorists of the SSP.<sup>135</sup> The most feared SSP offspring, the *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*, was formed by Riyaz Basra, an SSP hit-man and convicted murderer who had escaped from jail in May 1994.<sup>136</sup> Since 1994 the SSP also made its presence felt in Karachi, where the MQM had so far been responsible for the most violent acts. On 23 July six Shias were killed and twenty-seven hurt when a hand grenade was thrown at a coach carrying them back from a *majlis*. Within two months the TJP claimed that another thirty-nine of its activists had been killed in Karachi, while the SSP put its own toll at more than fifty.<sup>137</sup>

During a session in Rawalpindi on 8 June 1994, the TJP Supreme Council accused the Wattoo government of protecting sectarian terrorists.<sup>138</sup> Similar criticism was made in August by the Punjab Governor Altaf Husain.<sup>139</sup> But in the meantime it had become clear that not only Sunni extremists benefited from reluctance of the authorities to enforce the law against them. On 15 July a police raiding party, searching for suspects after a shootout and the bombing of a mosque at the New Campus of the Punjab University (Lahore), met with armed resistance and was humiliated in the SMP stronghold Thokar Niaz Beg.<sup>140</sup> A second search operation in the village could only be conducted after a preliminary agreement with the TJP and had to



leave out the local *imâmbârgâh*.<sup>141</sup> In October 1994 the SMP staged a rally in Lahore with a heavy display of firearms.<sup>142</sup> The group not only implemented its threats of “an eye for an eye” after many cases of anti-Shia violence from 1994 onwards, but also tried to intimidate newspaper editors and committed robbery and blackmail.<sup>143</sup>

On 22 January 1995, the Federal Cabinet discussed the issue of sectarianism and announced a number of counter measures. It was intended to ban direct foreign funding of *dîni madâris*, to track down those institutions which were fanning sectarianism, and to pass new legislation against sectarianism in the National Assembly.<sup>144</sup> The initiative came at a time when the *Taleban* movement, a product of these very *madrasas*, saw its rapid initial expansion in southern Afghanistan with obvious support from the same Pakistani Interior Minister, General (retd.) Nasirullah Babar, who at that time announced an impending crackdown on *madâris* at home.<sup>145</sup> The plan was resisted sharply by all religious parties, which viewed it as an attempt of the Bhutto government “to please its American masters” and other Western countries. As predicted by secularist critics, the government did not make good its threat and the *dîni madâris* remained by and large untouched. The only visible effect was an arrest campaign of members of the SSP, TJP and SMP, including the latter’s “commander-in-chief” Murid ‘Abbas Yazdani.<sup>146</sup> A‘zam Tariq went into hiding when the police raided his house in Jhang on 22 February. He surrendered himself to the NWFP police four months later and remained under arrest for most of the coming five years, facing charges of involvement in a number of murder cases.<sup>147</sup>

The SSP reacted immediately with spectacular assassinations and other terrorist acts. The first victim was Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal, one of the “most wanted” rivals of the SSP from Jhang,<sup>148</sup> followed by the equally important Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi.<sup>149</sup> On 25 February 1995 twenty-two Shias were killed and dozens injured in almost simultaneous attacks on two mosques in Karachi.<sup>150</sup> A revenge attack on a Sunni mosque on the next day claimed seven lives. On 10 March a bomb outside a Shia mosque in Malir (Karachi) killed another ten chance victims.<sup>151</sup> At that time, the TJP leadership declared it would agree to a ban on sectarian organisations and to the arrest of the authors and publishers of all controversial books.<sup>152</sup> The TJP also accepted mediation by the JI leader Qazi Husain Ahmad who had been approached by the SSP for that purpose. He achieved a remarkable short-term success with the formation of the *Milli Yekjihatî* Council (MYC, “National Solidarity Council”) at a conference in Islamabad on 24 March. The MYC comprised not only the TJP and SSP, but all major

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religious parties in Pakistan, which now vowed “to promote sectarian harmony, peace and amity” among the followers of the different Islamic schools of thought.<sup>153</sup>

With the formation of the MYC, the religious parties reacted to the double challenge of sectarian violence, which was more and more undermining the credibility of all these parties, and the hardened attitude of the PPP government.<sup>154</sup> At this juncture, a certain degree of unity was considered essential to confront the PPP’s “anti-fundamentalism” campaign, and to regain political stature after the 1993 electoral defeat. In such a time of crisis, even the 1951 ‘*ulamâ*’ conference and its “22 principles” received a belated appreciation, and an end to all sectarian terrorism seemed suddenly conceivable.<sup>155</sup> On 9 April the MYC followed up its effort with a larger convention in Karachi, which unanimously adopted a 17-point Code of Ethics containing the following provisions:

We condemn terrorism and killings in the name of religion and consider it repugnant to the teaching of Islam and oppose it.

Declaring any Muslim sect infidel or condemning a person to be killed for his/her creed is un-Islamic and a condemnable act.

The sanctity of the Prophet Muhammad, deference of the *ahl-i bait*, the wives of the Holy Prophet and his companions is an integral part of the faith. Any person found in detraction of pious dignitaries (sic) will be deemed being religious outcast. Their desecration and contempt will be thought as a criminal act.

Everybody should refrain from speech or writing that might hurt feelings of any school of thought.

There will be a complete ban on the publication, recording and distribution of subversive literature (pamphlets, posters, books and audio-video cassettes).

There will be a complete ban on voicing antagonistic slogans and chalking on railway bogies, buses and on walls everywhere in the country.

There will be a complete ban on totting arms at public meetings, during processions, in the mosques and other places of worship.

Solidarity amongst Muslims will be strengthened by holding multi-sectarian public meetings.

A high-powered board will be set up to execute the Code of Ethics in letter and spirit. No violation of the charter will be tolerated.<sup>156</sup>

Not surprisingly, interpretations of that document by its signatories differed widely within a short time. The SSP believed that its demand to consider anyone a *kâfir* who did not accept the greatness of the *sahâba* had been finally vindicated.<sup>157</sup> For the same reason, the SMP leader S. Ghulam

Riza Naqvi refused to accept the Code of Ethics, although Yazdani agreed to it.<sup>158</sup> Ahmad Shah Nurani and Qazi Husain Ahmad saw the MYC as a new platform for their political ambitions in the first place. At their behest, a number of purely political resolutions were passed on the 9 April convention. On 27 May the MYC called for a countrywide strike against renewed attempts by the government to amend the blasphemy law, and more issues of national and international politics were taken up by the MYC in the following months.<sup>159</sup> The TJP, for its part, faced much criticism from its Shia constituency for its participation in the MYC and signing of the Code of Ethics. In a pamphlet it defended its stance as follows (excerpts):

The TJP with its circumspect wisdom and its logical and principled method has completely isolated the band of religious terrorists and the *‘awām* have rejected their positions. In fact this group has lost every battle of the war and had no other option left but talks.

The TJP had a decisive part in the formation of the MYC ... Through the efforts of the MYC the series of sectarian killings has been stopped and sectarian tension has now almost come to an end. But unfortunately some desperate, wicked and addicted [to violence] people do not like this atmosphere of calm and security. First they have tried to spread doubts about the formation of the MYC, and now they are busy spreading misunderstandings about the Code of Ethics.

The Code of Ethics of the MYC is in fact a collection of those issues which are most important for each of Pakistan's Muslim schools of thought. It is a document in which they have all defined their respective holy personalities, so that everybody may keep them in respect. It is a compendium of "sensitive beliefs" ... It cannot be expected that our Sunni brothers will profess the *'ismat* of the *ahl al-bait*, nor is it possible that Shias will have the same beliefs about the *khulafā' i rāshidūn* as the Sunnis. Rather the Code of Ethics has insisted that bad talk about the revered personalities (*buzurgān*) of each other must be prevented. There can be no disagreement on that point...<sup>160</sup>

The pamphlet went on to quote a resolution from a MYC meeting in Quetta (28 June 1995), where it had been reconfirmed that the Code of Ethics must be implemented at all cost, and that it was neither contradicting the beliefs of any sect nor could it be considered a victory or defeat for any side.<sup>161</sup> As a matter of fact, Muharram 1416H (31 May–29 June 1995) passed without any major incident thanks to the MYC. But both the SMP—which had joined the MYC only under pressure and later split over its position towards the Code of Ethics<sup>162</sup>—and the SSP had only abided to a short-lived truce. A series of mutual assassinations in Lahore in October 1995 marked its definite end.<sup>163</sup> Shortly before, the PPP had shed all pretensions of sincerity regarding its own attitude towards sectarianism with the

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release of A'zam Tariq from jail in exchange for support from the SSP for the new Punjab Chief Minister Muhammad 'Arif Nakai.<sup>164</sup> Nakai even included the SSP MPA Shaikh Hakim Ali as an advisor in his cabinet.<sup>165</sup> Tariq was re-arrested, along with Zia ur-Rahman Faruqi and 200 other activists of the SSP, SMP, TJP and JUI on 21 November, when the government reacted to a bomb attack against the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad.<sup>166</sup> The MYC, for its part, had become mainly an instrument of agitation against the government by late 1995 and ceased to exert much influence on the sectarian parties.<sup>167</sup> Its only further positive contribution was a relative calm Muharram in 1417H (19 May–17 June 1996).

The last months of Benazir Bhutto's rule were marked by yet another upsurge of sectarian violence and terrorism. On 5 August 1996 S. Tajammul 'Abbas, Commissioner of the Sargodha Division, was shot dead. Although Shia members of the Civil Service had received death threats from the SSP before, these had so far not been taken very seriously.<sup>168</sup> On 14 August, an SSP rally in Karachi marking Pakistan's Independence Day was fired upon, leaving twelve dead.<sup>169</sup> Retaliation came swiftly with an attack on a *majlis* in Mailsi (Vehari Dist.) at the residence of the former PML MPA Irshad Ghallu, with fifteen Shias and three of the assailants being killed.<sup>170</sup> On 10 September heavy fighting started in Parachinar and lasted for several days, this time apparently started by local Shias and with the majority of the more than 200 victims being Sunnis.<sup>171</sup> The murder of the SMP leader Yazdani in Islamabad two days later was also initially suspected to be an act of sectarian retaliation, but later turned out a result of SMP infighting.<sup>172</sup> It was followed by the worst massacre committed by Shias in Pakistan so far on 23 September, when twenty-eight Sunni worshippers were killed and forty injured during prayers in the *Masjid al-Khair* of Mumtazabad (Multan).<sup>173</sup> After this carnage, the Punjab government announced that it would "crush sectarian elements with an iron hand" and launch an "operation clean-up" in *dînî madâris* and places of worship, many of which had long since become safe havens for terrorists and stores of arms and ammunition.<sup>174</sup> A possible ban of "sectarian parties" was once more publicly discussed, including even the TJP.<sup>175</sup>

Nothing significant happened in this respect until 5 November 1996 when Bhutto's government and those of all provinces were dismissed by President Leghari. By that time, the TJP had already shifted its political preference from the PPP to the PML, although this would not bring it closer to a solution of its problems either.<sup>176</sup> Two important events took place in the interim period before the next elections. In November 1996 a

rebellion against S. Ghulam Riza Naqvi was staged within the SMP, after it had become known that he was behind the murder of Yazdani. He went into hiding and the police were finally able to enter Thokar Niaz Beg.<sup>177</sup> On 30 December he was arrested in Multan,<sup>178</sup> while his successor as the head of the SMP, S. Jabbar Husain from Faisalabad, had already tried to project a more moderate image of the organisation.<sup>179</sup> On 18 January, the SSP leader Zia ur-Rahman Faruqi was killed along with twenty-two policemen and three other bystanders when a remote-controlled bomb exploded outside the Lahore sessions court, where he and A'zam Tariq faced several criminal charges.<sup>180</sup> Tariq survived the attack gravely injured and was allowed to contest once more the National Assembly elections in Jhang, but he was defeated by a PML candidate supported by the TJP.<sup>181</sup> In the aftermath of the bomb attack, the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore was set ablaze by members of a SSP funeral procession,<sup>182</sup> and one month later seven people were killed in an assault on the Iranian Cultural Centre in Multan, including its director Muhammad Ali Rahimi.<sup>183</sup>

The elections on 3 February 1997 resulted in a landslide victory for the PML, giving Nawaz Sharif more leverage than any elected prime minister since the foundation of Pakistan. His brother Shahbaz Sharif became chief minister of the Punjab, where the PPP had suffered its worst electoral rout.<sup>184</sup> In spite of such a strong power base and repeated attempts to introduce a parallel judiciary to deal with sectarian terrorism, Nawaz Sharif's second government was not more successful in deterring it than its predecessor. In the Punjab alone 200 people were killed in sectarian incidents in 1997, making it the worst year of sectarian strife in Pakistan so far.<sup>185</sup> After the end of its participation in the provincial government and the death of Faruqi, the SSP and its splinter groups increasingly targeted influential members of the Shia community, whether members of the TJP or not.<sup>186</sup> One spectacular case was that of Ashraf Marth (killed on 5 May), whose efforts as police chief in Multan had resulted in the arrest of some of the most wanted terrorists of the *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*.<sup>187</sup> Thereafter the number of police officers who were ready to risk their lives through serious persecution of sectarian terrorists further dwindled. Although the National Assembly passed an "Anti-Terrorism Act" on 13 August 1997 introducing special Anti-Terrorism Courts and giving more powers to the police,<sup>188</sup> very few cases were actually dealt by these courts.<sup>189</sup> Even arrested sectarian terrorists enjoyed preferential treatment and all kinds of facilities in jail. This came to the open when five alleged multiple murderers from the *Lashkar-i Jhangvi* were easily freed by their accomplices from a "high security prison" in Dera Ghazi Khan on 26 December 1997.<sup>190</sup> The group further

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defied the government with the murder of five Iranian airforce cadets in Islamabad on 17 September and a letter of Riyaz Basra to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in which he demanded, among other things, the closure of all Iranian Cultural Centres and consulates, a ban on Shia religious processions and *azân*, and an amnesty for all arrested members of the *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*.<sup>191</sup>

Table 3: Sectarian incidents in the Punjab, 1987–99

<i>Year</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>
1987	25	11	155
1988	10	1	16
1989	67	18	102
1990	274	32	328
1991	180	47	263
1992	135	58	261
1993	90	39	247
1994	162	73	386
1995	88	59	189
1996	80	86	168
1997	103	193	219
1998	188	157	231
1999	105	86	189

Sources: *Dawn*, 1 January 1998; *Newsline* 10/1999, p. 68.

Table 4: Shias killed in sectarian violence in the Punjab, 1990–97

<i>Division</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1997</i>
Lahore	1	1	2	3	7	14	11	16
Rawalpindi	–	2	–	–	9	–	–	–
Faisalabad	9	20	5	5	3	11	11	24
Gujranwala	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	3
Bahawalpur	–	–	1	5	10	3	8	11
Multan	–	3	1	2	1	6	23	31
Sargodha	1	1	–	–	2	–	3	2
D.G. Khan	3	2	2	–	7	2	–	–
Total	14	29	11	17	39	36	56	87

Source: *Newsline* 9/1997, p. 44.

On 11 January 1998, three gunmen shot dead twenty-five visitors of the Shia graveyard Mominpura in central Lahore. They had a smooth escape

## THE INTERIM DEMOCRATIC DECADE, 1988–1999

and kept moving around with the same highly conspicuous vehicle for another twenty-four hours. On the following day Shia participants of the funeral procession torched public buildings in Lahore, including the residence of the D.C., with impunity.<sup>193</sup> Another drastic example of the inability of the authorities to protect the citizens and enforce law and order was given in Hangu (NWFP) on 21 March that year. In this town a sectarian clash had been anticipated for some months because the chairman of a local “Sunni Supreme Council”, the PML MNA Javed Ibrahim Piracha, had been busy mobilising the Sunnis against the Shia tradition on celebrating *Naurôz* on that day.<sup>194</sup> Following a complete shutdown in Hangu on 20 March, the main *Naurôz* congregation was attacked by a *lashkar* comprising thousands of tribesmen from the surrounding areas on 21 March. While army reinforcements managed to re-establish order in the town within twelve hours, attacks on neighbouring Shia villages with mortar fire continued for two more days.<sup>195</sup>

Table 5: Sunnis killed in sectarian violence in the Punjab, 1990–97

<i>Division</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
Lahore	–	1	–	6	15	11	4	58
Rawalpindi	–	1	1	1	–	–	–	–
Faisalabad <sup>192</sup>	8	18	2	1	3	–	4	14
Gujranwala	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–
Bahawalpur	–	2	2	–	2	–	1	–
Multan	–	–	–	–	2	9	23	4
Sargodha	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	–
D.G. Khan	5	1	1	2	–	–	2	–
Total	13	23	6	11	23	22	34	76

Source: *Newsline* 9/1997, p. 45. (Tables 4 and 5 do not give the full death toll of 1997. Other differences with table 3 can be explained by the fact that all three tables give only official numbers, which are incomplete anyhow).

In August 1998 Pakistani volunteers fighting alongside the *Taleban* in Afghanistan were apparently involved in the large-scale massacre of Shia Hazaras in Mazar-i Sharif.<sup>196</sup> This event, together with the killing of nine Iranian diplomats in the same town, brought Iran to the brink of an open military intervention against the *Taleban*.<sup>197</sup> One reason for Iran’s decision to show restraint after some months of sabre-rattling was the danger of an international “sectarian war”, which could have had severe implications for the Shias in Pakistan, too. Also in August 1998, a training camp of the

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*Harakat ul-Ansâr* near Khost in Afghanistan, sheltering, among others, sectarian terrorists from Pakistan, was hit by American cruise missiles.<sup>198</sup> The fact that these missiles had crossed Pakistani airspace, and that Pakistan's military leadership was apparently informed shortly before, led to an outcry by the religious parties against the government. Nawaz Sharif responded on 28 August by submitting the 15<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment Bill to the National Assembly, which would have proclaimed the Koran and Sunna the supreme law of the country. It was heavily criticised by the PPP and other secularist parties as an attempt to give the ruling party exceptional powers under the cover of religion, and was blocked by the Senate.<sup>199</sup>

Starting from October 1998, the Punjab police killed a number of sectarian terrorists in so-called encounters which were apparently deliberate executions, a method already practised on the orders of Nasirullah Babar against MQM terrorists in Karachi in 1995.<sup>200</sup> The answer did not take long to come in the form of an attempt on the life of Nawaz Sharif near his residence in Raiwind (Lahore) on 3 January 1999.<sup>201</sup> On 4 January, another massacre in a Shia mosque (sixteen killed) took place in the village Karamdad Qureshi (Muzaffargarh Dist.).<sup>202</sup> While leaders of the TJP asked the government to allow the Shias to form private militias for self-defence,<sup>203</sup> Nawaz Sharif made yet another attempt to appease the SSP. On 26 March he and his brother Shahbaz visited Dr Israr Ahmad, who had been asked by Zia ul-Qasimi, the chief patron of the SSP since the death of Faruqi, to mediate between the SSP and the government. They reached principal agreement on extending the scope of the blasphemy law, providing a maximum punishment of fourteen years' imprisonment for insulting the *sahâba*, the wives of the Prophet Muhammad, or the *ahl al-bait*. Another law was suggested at that meeting, which would require anyone accusing another person of being a *kâfir* to prove the accusation in court, or be himself punished strictly.<sup>204</sup>

On 1 April 1999, Dr Israr Ahmad chaired the first meeting of a ten-member committee of '*ulamâ*', including the leaders of the SSP and TJP, in the Prime Minister's House in Islamabad. It was agreed that if the committee would reach a consensus, the government would move ahead with the proposed legislation. Draft laws were discussed at another meeting on 7–8 April, but the TJP had reservations against both of them. On 13 April Dr Israr resigned as chairman of the committee after Sajid Ali Naqvi had reproached him for making public the draft laws.<sup>205</sup> Shahbaz Sharif thereafter went ahead with another committee of '*ulamâ*' from the Punjab who made recommendations similar to those agreed on during the first meeting between the Sharif brothers and Israr Ahmad.<sup>206</sup> Unimpressed by Sajid Ali Naqvi's protest against



what he (Naqvi) termed “a conspiracy to deprive the Shias of all their rights and religious freedoms”,<sup>207</sup> an ordinance amending Section 296 PPC was promulgated by the Government of Punjab on 22 August.<sup>208</sup> In another sign of the Sharif brothers’ eagerness to mend fences with the SSP at that time, A‘zam Tariq was released from jail on 9 July. He promptly appreciated the statesmanship of Nawaz Sharif in internationalising the Kashmir issue without going to a full-fledged war at a time when most religious parties were denouncing Sharif for an alleged “sell-out” in Kashmir.<sup>209</sup>

The last weeks of Sharif’s second term as PM saw another upsurge of sectarian murders, mostly targeting Shias.<sup>210</sup> Among the victims were S. Nasir ‘Abbas Kazimi, an advocate at the Lahore High Court,<sup>211</sup> the TJP senior vice-chairman and financial secretary Khurshid Anwar,<sup>212</sup> ten worshippers in a Shia mosque in Karachi,<sup>213</sup> the former ISO leader Dr Qaisar ‘Abbas Sial,<sup>214</sup> and five other prominent Shias. This prompted yet another U-turn by the government. A‘zam Tariq was re-arrested on 1 October, followed ten days later by the Central Secretary-General of the SSP, Dr Khadim Husain Dhillon.<sup>215</sup> Nawaz Sharif also dispatched the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence, Ltd.-General Zia ud-Din, to Qandahar to demand from the leader of the *Taleban* the closure of training camps for Pakistani sectarian terrorists, and on 7 October made public accusations regarding such camps.<sup>216</sup> Whether a genuine change of policy towards the sectarian parties was intended or not at that juncture is open to speculation, because Sharif was deposed by the military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf only six days later.<sup>217</sup>

### *Decline of the TJP*

In October 1993 the TJP had failed once again to make any headway in national and provincial elections, but Sajid Ali Naqvi remained as determined as ever to make the organisation part of the Islamist mainstream in Pakistan. The poor showing of all religious parties in these elections, which they had contested in three rivalling camps,<sup>218</sup> seemed to offer a chance for rapprochement. During a tour to the Northern Areas in December 1993, Sajid Ali presented a “historic call for unity”, appealing to turn the page of past sectarian conflicts. He also suggested making the common elements of Hanafi and Ja‘fari *fiqh* part of an Islamised general law and leaving the controversial details to the personal law of each sect.<sup>219</sup> On his return he made an appeal for a “grand alliance” of religious parties at a press conference in Peshawar, informing that the TJP had formed a “Unity of Muslims

Committee” for contacting potential partners. These did not include “groups which believe in violence and are meant to fan sectarianism” like the SSP.<sup>220</sup> The TJP had made clear its preference for cooperating with Bareilvi religious leaders already at a special session of its Central Council in Karachi on 18–19 November 1993, when a new five-point programme was discussed. It had defined the goals of the TJP as follows:

- (1) Informing about Shi‘ism through publications and the founding of libraries, strong answers to anti-Shia literature, *tablighi daurât*, and the training and patronage of *muballighûn*.
- (2) Consolidating Shi‘ism through the construction and maintenance of mosques, *imâmbârgâhs*, providing of prayer-leaders, organising conferences of ‘*ulamâ*’, *zâkirs* and leaders, founding of educational institutions and *dîniyât* centres.
- (3) Expanding Shi‘ism through propaganda (*ta‘ârufî*) literature and the establishment of *tablighi* centres in different regions.
- (4) Building up (*ta‘mîr*) Shi‘ism through the establishment of vocational training centres, dispensaries, hospitals, offices and organisations, workshops etc.
- (5) Protecting Shi‘ism through unity conferences [with Sunni Muslims], establishing ties with *mashâ’ikh* and *pîrs*, cooperation and unity with Bareilvi leaders, and informing the Muslims about the requirements of the present situation.<sup>221</sup>

Compared with the July 1987 manifesto of the TNFJ, which had indulged in pan-Islamist phraseology and avoided reference to the Shia identity of the organisation as far as possible,<sup>222</sup> the 1993 “five points” of the TJP were refreshingly straightforward. The olive branch offered to Sunnis in point No. 5 was remarkable for singling out the Bareilvis as potential partners. Efforts to provide security through armed Shia organisations like the *Pâsbân*<sup>223</sup> were conveniently glossed over, however.

While overtures to Sunni religious and political leaders were kept up quietly and took some time to yield results, the TJP pursued its Shia communalist agenda as usual. It protested against the PPP government’s Shia appointees for the CII, because the TJP had not been consulted, and demanded their number be raised from three to five.<sup>224</sup> In early 1994 Sajid Ali Naqvi named six candidates for the Senate,<sup>225</sup> but only two of them had themselves registered.<sup>226</sup> S. Muhammad Jawad Hadi from Parachinar<sup>227</sup> became the first Senator of the TJP thanks to the efforts of the PPP to break up a coalition government of the PML and the Awami National Party (ANP) in the NWFP.<sup>228</sup> Appointed to head the “Political Council” of the TJP in March 1994,<sup>229</sup> he played a high-profile role in the coming years, gradually emerging as a rival of Sajid Ali for the TJP leadership.

In 1994 the most important issue for the TJP apart from sectarian violence was to confront the “*Nâmûs-i Sahâba* Bill” of the SSP.<sup>230</sup> In a press conference one day after the bill had been presented in the National Assembly by A‘zam Tariq, Sajid Ali announced that the TJP would oppose it “tooth and nail”.<sup>231</sup> The TJP lobbied the leaders of both the government and the opposition against passage of the bill, while S. Jawad Hadi moved a bill against sectarianism in the Senate which intended, among other things, to exclude individuals like A‘zam Tariq, who had indulged in fanning sectarian tensions, from the assemblies.<sup>232</sup> A “Research Centre” set up by the TJP prepared a detailed rejoinder to the “*Nâmûs-i Sahâba* Bill”, copies of which were distributed in large numbers. The pamphlet, after denouncing the bill as a “vicious sectarian conspiracy” contradicting the Koran and Sunna as much as the constitution of Pakistan, asked the mover of the bill the following questions:

- 1) Who can be termed a *sahâbi* [companion of the Prophet]? Is everybody a *sahâbi* who has seen the noble Prophet ... and sat near him? Then there are hundreds of verses from the Koran and *ahâdîth* which criticise such people<sup>233</sup> and threaten them with painful punishment. What is your opinion about these?
- 2) How to define “insulting the *sahâba*”?
- 3) Is it also an insult of the *sahâba* to mention their mutual rivalries and conflicts?
- 4) Is it an insult of the *sahâba* to mention the events, which happened between the companions of the Prophet and the *ahl al-bait*, which are recorded in the Koran and the Sunna and in numerous history books?
- 5) Is it an insult of the *sahâba* to divulge the misdeeds of those companions who have revolted against the *ahl al-bait* and insulted ... their holy personalities?
- 6) Do you believe that the *sahâba* were *ma’sûm* like the prophets? And if not, how can you consider it impossible that the *sahâba* could commit small and great sins?<sup>234</sup>

The passing of the controversial bill could be averted, but many other demands of the TJP, which had been listed in a letter to President Leghari and Benazir Bhutto in July 1994, remained unfulfilled. These included punishment for the murderers of S. ‘Arif Husain and divulging the entire background of the crime, effective steps against sectarian violence, Shia representation in the Federal Shariat Court, better Shia representation (including ‘*ulamâ*’) in the CII, inclusion of the *fiqh-i ja‘fariya* in the syllabus of the International Islamic University Islamabad, allotment of plots for Shias mosques and *imâmbârgâhs* in newly constructed urban quarters, a general lifting of restrictions on ‘*azâdâri*’ processions, on the use loudspeak-

ers at such occasions, and on pilgrimages to the holy sites in Iran and Iraq, alongside the old demands regarding separate Waqf Boards and *dinīyāt*.<sup>235</sup> Besides, the TJP was facing difficulties in financing its ambitious programme in spite of its much-trumpeted *Ja'fariya Welfare Fund*.<sup>236</sup> In fact this project could be implemented only in parts of the Punjab, and the amount of contributions to the TJP in the shape of *khums* declined.

The only further success of the TJP in 1994 was its strong showing in the elections for the Northern Areas Council on 25 October. This only sizeable part of the country with a Shia majority population was still ruled by the Minister of Kashmir Affairs and bureaucrats appointed by the Federal Government forty-seven years after its "war of independence",<sup>237</sup> while the powers of its elected "parliament" (since 1974) were confined to a limited say in the allocation of development funds. The TNFJ/TJP had always endorsed the demand of the local Shias for provincial status and full political rights,<sup>238</sup> and it found one of its strongest support bases in this remote part of Pakistan. But in 1991, when the first elections after the Zia ul-Haqq era took place in the Northern Areas, TNFJ leaders had called for their boycott because the borders of one among sixteen constituencies had been redrawn to the disadvantage of Shias.<sup>239</sup> In April 1994, the PPP government announced a reform package for the Northern Areas which did not satisfy the TJP, but was considered "a step into the right direction". It raised the number of councillors to twenty-four and created the office of a Deputy Chief Executive with the status of a Minister of State who would be elected from amongst the members of the Northern Areas Council, as well as a "cabinet" of three to five advisors.<sup>240</sup> The TJP, which fielded candidates in the nine constituencies with a Twelver Shia majority, led a vigorous election campaign, including tours of Sajid Ali Naqvi and S. Jawad Hadi, while the PPP dispatched 'Irfan Haidar 'Abidi and nine federal ministers.<sup>241</sup> The TJP won eight seats as compared to seven for the PPP, one for the PML and eight for independent candidates. But it was the PPP which got one of its councillors (the Isma'ili Pir S. Karam Ali Shah) elected Deputy Chief Executive with the help of some independents, prompting an angry reaction from Sajid Ali Naqvi.<sup>242</sup> Besides, it soon turned out that the Minister of Kashmir Affairs, Mir Afzal Khan, who remained the Chief Executive of the so-called "provincial government", was not ready to delegate any meaningful powers to his deputy and his "cabinet". Therefore not only the TJP and its Shia supporters, but most people of the Northern Areas, turned against the PPP and became more estranged than ever from the Federal Government.<sup>243</sup>

The aftermath of the 1994 Northern Areas Council election marked the final divorce of the TJP from its long-time ally the PPP. Thus in early 1995

the TJP wholeheartedly embraced the anti-government agenda of the *Milli Yekjihatî* Council, which at first looked like a realisation of the alliance of all religious parties advocated by the TJP since late 1993.<sup>244</sup> In July 1995 the TJP even supported a day of solidarity proclaimed by some Sunni parties with a *Tahrik-i Nifâz-i Shari‘at-i Muhammadi* in the Malakand Division of the NWFP.<sup>245</sup> It also braved criticism of the SMP and tried its best to win Shia acceptance for the MYC’s Code of Ethics, although the latter included a clause of self-obligation to show deference to the *sahâba*.<sup>246</sup> In return, Sunni parties like the JI, JUP and JUI-F joined the TJP in observing the “Jerusalem Day” and paying homage to Khomeini in February 1996.<sup>247</sup> Although the MYC was gradually falling apart at that time, the TJP announced the formation of a new alliance with these parties in March 1996, and three months later even the JUI-S and JAH participated in talks aimed at enlarging it.<sup>248</sup> By July 1996 the TJP’s political orientation had come full circle, with Sajid Ali now proclaiming support for an anti-government campaign of Nawaz Sharif.<sup>249</sup>

While the TJP’s communalist agenda remained moderate, repeating mostly demands that had been made by Shia organisation for decades (see above), the SMP leader Yazdani in early 1995 tabled a 40-point catalogue of demands in a letter to President Leghari from his prison cell which included:

- 1) Passing of a law providing death penalty for insulting the *Âl-i Muhammad*.
- 3) Passing of a law providing punishment for dubbing another Muslim *kâfir*.
- 4) Official holidays on the birth and death anniversaries of all Shia Imams with special programs in the state-run radio and TV.
- 5) Either revocation of the holiday on the 1<sup>st</sup> of Muharram in the Punjab<sup>250</sup> or proclamation of 1–12 Muharram as official holidays.
- 6) Confiscation and drowning in the sea<sup>251</sup> of all literature containing insults against the *Âl-i Muhammad*, and a ban on the free-of-charge distribution of Wahhabi literature in Pakistan by Saudi Arabia.
- 8) Broadcasting of the Shia *azân*<sup>252</sup> and of Shia prayers in state-run radio and TV.
- 9) Allotment of half of the time of religious programs in radio and TV to Shia ‘*ulamâ*’.
- 10) Organisation of a *munâzara* on all disputed questions between Shias and Sunnis in front of a panel of judges of the Supreme Court, which will be broadcast live in radio and TV.
- 11) Preparation of a new syllabus for schools and colleges for *Islâmiyât* and history, which will shed proper light on the *Âl-i Muhammad* and distinguished *sahâba* like Salman al-Farisi, Bilal and ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir and the martyrs of Karbala and expose the conspiracies of the Ummayyads against Islam.
- 15) Abolition of the entry “religious denomination” on application forms for the army and civil service.

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- 16) Separate mosques for Shias and *imâmbângâhs* in jails.
- 24) Supervision of the open and secret relations between foreign embassies and sectarian groups in Pakistan.
- 25) Revocation of all arms licences for SSP leaders and immediate grant of ten arms licences to the SMP leaders Yazdani and Ghulam Riza Naqvi.
- 26) Death penalty and annulment of the National Assembly mandate for A'zam Tariq.
- 28) Immediate execution of all convicted murderers of Shias.
- 37) Official holiday on "Jerusalem Day" (the last Friday of Ramadan).<sup>253</sup>

Although such a catalogue might be dismissed as a curiosity, it showed the extent to which notions of "equal rights" had become inflated in the minds of a radical section of Pakistan's Shias in the mid-1990s. The author of the pamphlet was even a "dove" within the SMP, as was shown by his subsequent approval of the MYC's Code of Ethics and conflict with Ghulam Riza Naqvi.<sup>254</sup> Naturally the TJP, which had embarked on a solid course of accommodation with the Sunni religious parties, faced more and more difficulties in meeting the expectations of those youthful Shia communal activists who had a strong religious motivation. The secularist silent majority of Pakistan's Shias, on the other hand, had long since become estranged from the TNFJ/TJP for its adoption of Islamist ideology and emphasis on the interests of the '*ulamâ*' and *dinî madâris*. As the TJP could not do anything either to improve security, the most burning issue for Shias already in the 1990s, its support base was dwindling steadily. For example, in August 1996 the TJP had to stop contributions to the education fund of the ISO because donations to the TJP for that purpose had much decreased.<sup>255</sup>

Sajid Ali Naqvi, who had himself raised high expectations with his *Ja'fariya* Welfare Fund,<sup>256</sup> was increasingly held responsible for the decline of the TJP. He was also accused of taking too many decisions without consultation. His reputation further suffered because of a secret marriage with a teenage girl in February 1995, which had not been registered anywhere in the country. When he had to confirm rumours about the affair one year later to the TJP central leaders, Sajid Ali maintained that he had been entitled to perform the marriage ceremony according to the *fiqh-i ja'fariya* himself and there was no need of registering it, but many young cadres of the TJP thought that his conduct was not befitting a religious leader of his stature. The matter was brought even before Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei who privately asked Sajid Ali to end the controversial marriage.<sup>257</sup> Although resentment against Sajid Ali was growing, his opponents were left with few options, because he had been elected for life in

1988 and had appointed most members of the various councils within the TJP himself. Following a suggestion of Ayatollah Khamenei, the TJP Supreme Council in December 1996 discussed a compromise formula, namely to create the position of a TJP “president” while the “leader” would remain the ceremonial head only.<sup>258</sup> Faced with Sajid Ali’s resistance against such a curtailment of his powers, the TJP gradually split (see below).

In November 1996, the TJP congratulated President Leghari for “saving Pakistan from disaster” with the second ouster of Benazir Bhutto from power,<sup>259</sup> and immediately started negotiating electoral alliances both with the PML of Nawaz Sharif and with the major Sunni religious parties. A joint manifesto of the TJP, the JUP (Nurani group), JI, JUI-S and JAH was drafted at a meeting on 19 November,<sup>260</sup> and a formal alliance of these parties (minus JI) was proclaimed one month later.<sup>261</sup> Likewise, the TJP agreed on electoral cooperation with the PML in some constituencies of the Punjab.<sup>262</sup> One success of this alliance was the defeat of A’zam Tariq in the SSP “reserved” constituency Central Jhang of the National Assembly by Nawab Amanullah Khan Sial, who was supported by both the TJP and the PML.<sup>263</sup> Another candidate who won his seat with the help of the TJP was Ilahi Bakhsh Soomro, who became Speaker of the National Assembly in 1997.<sup>264</sup> Benazir Bhutto, for her part, had even paid a visit to S. Hamid Ali Musavi in Rawalpindi in a bid to save some of the support that the PPP had formerly enjoyed from the Shia organisations.<sup>265</sup>

TJP leaders were convinced that the PML owed its huge victory to the “Shia vote bank” delivered by their party.<sup>266</sup> Some early results of the TJP-PML alliance were the election of S. ‘Abid Husain Husaini from Parachinar to the Senate<sup>267</sup> and the final acquittal of Anwar Ali Akhundzada in the Fazl-i Haqq murder case.<sup>268</sup> In a speech at the 8<sup>th</sup> Organisational Convention of the TNFJ/TJP (Islamabad, 29–30 March 1997) Sajid Ali expressed support for the prime minister’s programme of collecting donations from ordinary Pakistanis to save the country from bankruptcy, as well as optimism in the PML government’s ability to enforce “accountability” of the political class.<sup>269</sup> In the same speech he defended the moderate stance of the TJP as follows:

We believe in political activity and are strongly opposed to unlawful methods (*lā-qānūniyat*). From the standpoint of the *shari’a*, I consider lawlessness a crime. Maybe some people and ‘*ulamā*’ think that some of the current laws in Pakistan were made in the British era and have not yet been changed, and that some of these laws are not right. I want to make it clear that as long as these laws remain in place, as long as those institutions who are authorised to do so have not changed them, it is obligatory and necessary to abide by these laws, and break-



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ing of the laws is *harâm* and impermissible. Therefore during the last years, and until now, we have not said one sentence which smells of breaking of laws even in the most difficult circumstances ... We see how lawlessness is spreading in the alleys and streets and bazaars of this country, and how the constitution is being trampled upon. In the constitution there is a clear definition of Muslims and non-Muslims ... and those people who are now spreading dirt are included [among the Muslims]. There are no other Muslims of a higher grade than ourselves in Pakistan ... I do not issue a *fatwâ* of *takfir* against anyone, they are all Muslims and our brothers. Yet dirty *fatwâs* are being issued, and dirty language is used [against us]...<sup>270</sup>

Referring to the TJP's 5-point-programme of 1993 (see above), which was reconfirmed during the 1997 convention, Sajid Ali said among other things:

I am talking about strengthening Shi'ism ... about strengthening the Shias, but I do not talk against any sect or denomination, I do not talk about sectarian differences, ever. I say so because if the Shias are strong, Pakistan will be strong. The strength of the Shias is the strength of the *umma* ... When I talk about the rights of Shi'ism, of '*azâdârî* for the Lord of Martyrs, this is our right, our constitutional right ... the duty of the police is to assure its protection ... it is not directed against anyone ...<sup>271</sup>

The honeymoon between the TJP and the PML lasted only a few months. In July 1997 the Punjab government, frustrated by another inconclusive raid on the SMP stronghold Thokar Niaz Beg, arrested the acting principal of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar*, Ghulam Husain Najafi, and over 170 students on charges of "distributing sectarian literature".<sup>272</sup> They were released shortly after, but arrests of TJP and ISO members multiplied in the following months and years, while the TJP often complained about insufficient action of the PML federal and provincial governments against the SSP and its offshoot, *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*. But the TJP did not switch back to an anti-PML stance. In June 1998, ahead of a meeting of its Central Council, the Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif received a TJP delegation and accepted a number of its demands, including stricter measures against sectarian terrorism and compensation of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* for money allegedly taken away by the police during the 1997 raid. The TJP Council thereafter decided to continue cooperation with the PML government.<sup>273</sup> In August 1998 Sajid Ali Naqvi even supported the highly controversial 15<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment Bill.<sup>274</sup>

By that time, Sajid Ali's leadership had already been severely shattered. Ayatollah Khamenei and other Iranian leaders, who had invested much effort to build up his prestige ever since his election, had tried in vain to prevent an impending split of the TJP, suggesting setting up a collective



leadership in 1997. The alienation of the ISO and other Shia youth organisations from the TJP forced even a number of elder Shia *'ulamâ'* to openly distance themselves from Sajid Ali. During a meeting at the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* on 21 February 1998, eleven out of twenty members of the TJP Supreme Council asked him to resign voluntarily.<sup>275</sup> At a session of the TJP Central Council on 27–28 June that year, the proposal of a Reconciliation Committee to abolish the life-long leadership principle in the TJP constitution failed due to lack of quorum.<sup>276</sup> Thereafter the dissidents went ahead with forming a new organisation.

On 4 August 1998, on the eve of the tenth anniversary of S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini's murder, a so-called *Shûrâ-i Wahdat-i Islâmî* ("Islamic Unity Council") was set up in Peshawar, electing Senator S. 'Abid Husain Husaini as its Secretary-General.<sup>277</sup> The new organisation, which was formally launched on 14 August in Lahore, claimed to be a federation of various Shia organisations including the TJP, and it still recognised Sajid Ali as the "constitutional" chief of the TJP.<sup>278</sup> But many TJP members had no longer confidence in their leader. Both the ISO and the *Imamia Organisation* shifted their allegiance from the TJP to the *Shûrâ-i Wahdat*,<sup>279</sup> which was organised on the model of the Lebanese *Hizbullâh* and the Afghan *Hizb-i Wahdat*.<sup>280</sup> Both of these latter organisations, unlike the TNFJ in 1979, were founded through direct Iranian intervention,<sup>281</sup> and the name *Shûrâ-i Wahdat* itself reflected Iran's twenty-year-old political line towards Pakistan's Shias.<sup>282</sup> It was probably also no mere coincidence that such an organisation claiming "to work for Shia-Sunni unity" was set up at a time when Iran faced a severe setback in Afghanistan and a crisis in its relations with Pakistan.<sup>283</sup> Yet the crisis of the TJP and its leadership has been termed "a great blow to Iran, particularly Qom" by a well-informed observer. According to him, it had "deprived support to Qom from younger Shia cadres in Pakistan", who were also "no longer enthusiastic about the principle of *wilâyat-i faqih*", the doctrine which justifies the rule of Shia *'ulamâ'* in Iran.<sup>284</sup>

However, a large number of *'ulamâ'* and other TJP members remained loyal to S. Sajid Ali Naqvi, especially in the Punjab. He maintained his public appearances as TJP leader as if nothing had happened. In August 1999, he was one of the few political leaders who did not want to join a campaign against Nawaz Sharif.<sup>285</sup> But after the ouster of the PML government by the military, the TJP suffered a formal split, the second after the 1984 split of the TNFJ. Opponents of Sajid Ali gathered at a convention in the central Shia mosque of Islamabad on 30–31 October 1999, presided over by S. 'Abid Husain, and dedicated to reorganise the TJP.<sup>286</sup> In a pamphlet distributed ahead of that convention it had been stated (excerpts):

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Shi'ism in Pakistan is currently in a deep and comprehensive crisis and a deplorable state ... due to superficial passions, a blind personality cult, opportunist alliances and hollow slogans ... Although the Shias of Pakistan are strongly attached to their *mazhab*, unfortunately they are not able to confront the domestic, regional and international problems of our time because they lack sound ideological and practical commitment ...

Under the derwish-like and pious leadership of ... Mufti Ja'far Husain the [Shia] people have united for solving their problems and for the first time have made their presence felt in the society. After his ... efforts ... came the combative (*mubâriz aur mujâhid*), ideologically committed, and active leadership of the martyr of the unity of Muslims ... S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini ... imperialism has silenced his voice ... after his murder the slogan was raised: "You may kill whomsoever, this whole *qaum* is Husaini". But alas, this slogan could not become a true motto ...

Why do we have to lament about this absence of ideological awareness since ten or eleven years, this political, economical and, last not least, moral decline? ... Who is responsible—the Shia people or the leader? ... The entire Shia people ... and its organisations are partially responsible for this decline and crisis, but the acts and way of thinking of the leadership are very deplorable ... Instead of taking advantage of the awareness created by the sincerity and piety of Mufti Ja'far Husain and the struggle based on thought and action of S. 'Arif Husain ... our passivity and insensitivity ... has encouraged all kinds of terrorists to play the game of fire and blood (sic) against Shias without any risk ... while we are unable even to raise our voices in protest.

As an additional calamity in these difficult circumstances, our "leadership" is not only lacking the required qualities to fulfil the wishes of the people and face the problems of the time, but the disgraceful truths which come to the surface about his private comportment are a great disaster ... this latest blow has hurt the dignity of the '*ulamâ*' and rendered their deeds ineffective ...<sup>287</sup>

The meeting elected S. Fazil Husain Musavi, a former TNFJ vice-president who had lived abroad for the last twelve years and returned to Pakistan only two weeks later,<sup>288</sup> by secret ballot to replace Sajid Ali Naqvi. S. Fazil Husain announced that the new set-up of the TJP would be based on "justice and democracy",<sup>289</sup> but declined to take up permanent residence in the country. His leadership of the breakaway faction would last only one year.<sup>290</sup> Loyalists of Sajid Ali refused to recognise the "fake convention",<sup>291</sup> branding it an attempt "to hijack the TJP just prior to elections in the Northern Areas"<sup>292</sup> and "to implement the external forces' agenda of retaliation against the opposite sect in the wake of increasing sectarian violence".<sup>293</sup> Sajid Ali Naqvi had meanwhile expelled all dissidents and had appointed a new TJP Supreme Council, now comprising forty-four mem-

bers.<sup>294</sup> He still enjoyed support from the *Wafâq-i ‘Ulamâ’-i Shi‘a*, many instructors at *dînî madâris* and long-time TJP office-holders, and a section of the organised Shia students,<sup>295</sup> and would stay at the head of his organisation—albeit weakened—until the present time (2014).<sup>296</sup>



## THE MUSHARRAF AND ZARDARI ERAS, 2000–2013

### *Escalating terrorist violence against the Shia minority*

General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's fourth military ruler, would stay in power for more than eight years after his October 1999 coup. First proclaiming himself chief executive, he became president on 20 June 2001 (after the resignation of President Rafiq Tarar) and remained so until 18 August 2008, when he resigned to avoid certain impeachment. In addition, Musharraf kept the important post of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) until 27 November 2007. While two parliamentary elections took place under his presidency, in October 2002 and February 2008, only the latter was completely free and fair, after Musharraf had already been decisively weakened.

Being an avowed secularist and admirer of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Musharraf showed his disdain for religious extremism and obscurantism from the start, and he later proclaimed "enlightened moderation" as his guiding principle in religious matters.<sup>1</sup> Thus he won initial approval from many liberal-minded Pakistanis, and probably also from a majority of the Shias, who had been hard-pressed by sectarian fanatics already in the 1990s.<sup>2</sup> His government did make some significant attempts to rein in Islamist hardliners in the years 2000–2002, and after the attacks of 11 September 2001 Musharraf braved strong resistance from a broad alliance of Sunni religious parties and groups when allying himself with the American "war on terror" in Afghanistan. But already during his first years in power Musharraf's strategy against extremism was hampered by some of the same inconsistencies and shortcomings which have been observed

from 1989 to 1999. Ever since the elections of 2002, when the mainstream Sunni Islamist parties achieved a remarkable success, political expediency would guide Musharraf's attitude towards them. At the same time, anger over the U.S. war in Afghanistan and the fall of the *Taleban* regime led to an unprecedented surge of militant Islamist groups which challenged the writ of the state head-on, committing terrorist attacks with ever increasing ruthlessness and "professionalism". Most of these groups were also virulently anti-Shia, and a deadly nexus between Pakistani and foreign jihadists and the terrorists of *Lashkar-i Jhangvi* (LeJ) became the hallmark of the 2004–13 decade. While the new brand of extremists operating under the umbrella of the *Tahrik-i Tâlibân-i Pâkistân* (TTP) since December 2007 have mainly targeted military personnel, political leaders, luxury hotels, symbols of the state, and even shrines of the Barelvi Sunnis, terrorist attacks against Shias have also multiplied and become more severe in recent years.

During the first two years after the 1999 coup a relative lull could be observed in sectarian violence, as compared with the preceding years. Although Musharraf had never proclaimed martial law, the very fact that the military had once again seized the reins of power had a short-term "calming down" effect on anti-Shia extremist groups, as had already been the case after the coups of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia ul-Haqq. But there were a number of serious incidents in 2000–2001, too. On 12 April 2000 (6 Muharram that year), fourteen Shias were killed and thirty injured by the assault on an *imâmbârgâh* in Malohwali village near Pindi Gheb (Attock Dist.).<sup>3</sup> In the same month, ten more Shias in different towns of Pakistan became victims of target killings. When the new Minister of Interior, apart from enhanced security measures, responded with attempts to mediate yet another "truce" between the TJP and the SSP, S. Sajid Ali Naqvi showed little interest, refusing to have the TJP treated on the same sectarian footing as the SSP. Instead, he proposed setting up a special force to eliminate terrorists and lauded the former government for "having done a great job by killing terrorists in encounters".<sup>4</sup> When the long-time Secretary-General of the TJP, Anwar Ali Akhundzada, was murdered on 23 November 2000 in Peshawar, his successor S. Raziuddin Rizvi rejected the usual official statements about the possible involvement of "foreign hands", putting the blame squarely on "a group of terrorists whose members get military training in a neighbouring Islamic country".<sup>5</sup>

In the spring of 2001 several sectarian clashes took place in the FATA and adjoining areas, starting with two days of fighting in the Orakzai Agency (4–5 January) which left twenty-six local Shias and Sunnis dead and more

than fifty seriously wounded.<sup>6</sup> These were followed by riots in Hangu on 1–2 March (thirteen killed) and a tribal clash in Paiwar (Kurram Agency) on 7 March (seven killed).<sup>7</sup> Shortly before, the government had reacted to a SSP campaign protesting against the pending execution of a LeJ operative in Mianwali with the arrest of hundreds of activists in the Punjab and Karachi, including the SSP leader A'zam Tariq.<sup>8</sup> In an apparent act of revenge, gunmen killed fourteen Shias in Sheikhpura on 4 March, while nine Sunnis were killed and eleven critically wounded in an attack on a SSP mosque in Lahore on 12 March.<sup>9</sup> Thereafter Musharraf announced that the government would strongly move against sectarianism and religious extremism. The cabinet proposed a ban of sectarian groups and, as a first step, decided to stop providing leaders of SSP and TJP with police security guard because "they should realise their responsibility for a peaceful settlement of their differences".<sup>10</sup> On 14 August 2001 the LeJ and the SMP were officially banned, while both the SSP and the TJP were warned of a possible ban.<sup>11</sup>

Shortly after, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington (11 September 2001) crucially changed the political environment for militant Islamist groups in Pakistan. Musharraf, who earlier had always pleaded for "engaging" the Afghan *Taleban* instead of isolating them, now quickly complied with a list of American demands which included cutting off all relations with the *Taleban* regime and granting blanket over-flight and landing rights to U.S. aircraft.<sup>12</sup> Musharraf tried to win over representatives of all political parties, including the mainstream Islamists, for his policy of "Pakistan first", but the latter organised a series of huge protest rallies in all urban centres after the U.S. had started their bombing campaign in Afghanistan via Pakistan's airspace on 7 October 2001. The JUI-F<sup>13</sup> and the *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî* took the lead in the protests, which calmed down only after the *Taleban* had surrendered at their last stronghold in Qandahar on 7 December that same year. Both parties later formed the backbone of the "United Action Committee" (*Muttahida Majlis-i 'Amal*; MMA), which included also the JUI-S, JUP, JAH, and the TJP and became a successful electoral alliance, winning sixty of 342 seats in the National Assembly and a majority in the NWFP Assembly in October 2002.<sup>14</sup>

The American war in Afghanistan directly affected thousands of Pakistani volunteers who had fought alongside the *Taleban*, including wanted criminals from the SSP and LeJ. On the heels of that war came India's strong reaction after a terrorist attack by *Lashkar-i Taiba*<sup>15</sup> on the parliament house in New Delhi (13 December 2001) which brought about another U-turn in Pakistan's policy towards militant Islamists. On 12 January 2002, after India

had mobilised 500,000 troops along the international border, Musharraf pronounced a ban on *Lashkar-i Taiba* and *Jaish-i Muhammad*,<sup>16</sup> the two most radical groups of the “Kashmir Jihad”, as well as on the *Tahrik-i Nifâz-i Sharî‘at-i Muhammadiya*,<sup>17</sup> the SSP and the TJP.<sup>18</sup> The inclusion of the TJP in that list, although it had never committed or abetted violence, was plainly unjust, a fact admitted also by Senator Hafiz Husain Ahmad of the JUI-F.<sup>19</sup> But, following a decades-old pattern of “balance”, the TJP was treated as the Shia “equivalent” of the SSP by the government in order not to leave room for accusations of a “pro-Shia bias”.

Most arrested activists of SSP and TJP were released after a few weeks and their offices and other assets were hardly touched,<sup>20</sup> allowing both groups to gradually resume their activities. But the law enforcement agencies did crack down seriously on LeJ in 2002, following a murderous assault on Shia worshippers in the *Shâh-i Najaf* mosque in Rawalpindi on 25 February<sup>21</sup> and a fresh round of target killing of Shias in Karachi starting in the same month.<sup>22</sup> A number of LeJ terrorists were killed in encounters with the police,<sup>23</sup> most prominent among them the LeJ founder Riyaz Basra<sup>24</sup> who died on 14 May 2002 near Mailsi (Vehari Dist.).<sup>25</sup> Allegedly Basra had already been caught six months earlier in Okara on his way back from Afghanistan, but his arrest had been kept secret to get maximum benefit from his interrogation.<sup>26</sup> According to one account, Basra was killed in a staged encounter after the authorities had concluded that LeJ had worked in tandem with *Jaish-i Muhammad*, first in the kidnapping and murder of the American journalist Daniel Pearl<sup>27</sup> and then in a bomb attack against French naval engineers at the Karachi Sheraton Hotel on 8 May 2002.<sup>28</sup> Another important LeJ operative, Mian Muhammad Ajmal aka Akram Lahori, was caught in Karachi on 29 June, revealing more details of the LeJ network and its links with both *Jaish-i Muhammad* and *Al-Qâ‘ida*.<sup>29</sup> By August 2002 LeJ seemed to be at its most vulnerable,<sup>30</sup> and a number of death sentences followed in 2003.<sup>31</sup>

At the same time, the SSP leader A‘zam Tariq, who had been jailed since January 2002 (and during much of 2001), was in critical condition due to a prolonged hunger strike.<sup>32</sup> Shortly before the polling day of 10 October he was allowed to contest elections.<sup>33</sup> After winning a seat in the National Assembly from Jhang, Tariq was freed on the orders of the Lahore High Court.<sup>34</sup> The Punjab provincial government sought his disqualification from the NA,<sup>35</sup> but on the other hand the SSP was needed to assure the vote of confidence for the new Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali on 21 November.<sup>36</sup> On 20 April 2003 Tariq announced the formation of a new



party, the *Millat-i Islâmîya-i Pākistân* (MIP), which would have “a broader agenda than the SSP”.<sup>37</sup> The MIP, which was actually the old SSP with a new name, started a fresh drive for “enforcement of the *sharī‘a*” in September,<sup>38</sup> but on 6 October 2003 A‘zam Tariq was assassinated when his car stopped at a toll plaza near Islamabad.<sup>39</sup> His murder provoked a rampage by his supporters in Islamabad and Jhang on the following day, while the police refrained from interfering.<sup>40</sup> Tariq was succeeded by Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi who absolved the government from responsibility for the murder, recalling Tariq’s role in voting for PM Jamali in 2002.<sup>41</sup> His brother ‘Alam Tariq named the TJP leaders S. Sajid Ali Naqvi, S. Sibtain Kazimi and Amanullah Khan Sial as main suspects behind the killing.<sup>42</sup> All three were acquitted by a Rawalpindi court one year later.<sup>43</sup>

Prior to the assassination of A‘zam Tariq, there had been some major anti-Shia terrorist attacks in 2003. On 22 February three gunmen opened fire at the entrance of the *Imâmbârgâh-i Mahdî* in the Malir district of Karachi, killing nine and injuring eleven. Most of the victims hailed from the Northern Areas.<sup>44</sup> On 8 June, two LeJ gunmen on a motorcycle killed thirteen Shia Hazara police cadets and injured nine in Quetta after intercepting their van at a traffic circle.<sup>45</sup> A few weeks later, on 4 July, three LeJ terrorists stormed the *Imâmbârgâh-i Kalân* in Quetta during Friday prayers and opened fire for ten minutes on the more than 500 worshippers gathered with AK-47s and hand grenades. When assaulted by some worshippers, one of them exploded a suicide belt. Fifty-three Hazara Shias died and over sixty were injured.<sup>46</sup> This was the worst sectarian massacre in Pakistan until that year and a harbinger of worse to come in the same town in later years. While the Baloch PM Jamali was quick to blame “foreign hands”,<sup>47</sup> two of the attackers were indentified shortly after as hailing from Mastung Dist. near Quetta.<sup>48</sup> In September 2003 it was disclosed that Dawud Badini, a brother-in-law of the *Al-Qâ‘ida* operative Ramzi Yusuf, was the mastermind of the 4 July carnage.<sup>49</sup> On 3 October, six Shia employees of *Suparco* (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organisation) were shot dead while on their way to Friday prayers in a mosque in Mauripur (Karachi) by bus.<sup>50</sup>

On 15 November 2003, the government proclaimed a ban on the MIP (former SSP), ITP (former TJP) and *Khuddâm ul-Islâm* (former *Jaish-i Muhammad*), followed by another campaign of short-lived arrests.<sup>51</sup> Three more organisations were banned on 20 November.<sup>52</sup> Apart from arrests, 377 activists of banned “sectarian” organisations were put under restrictions in the Punjab alone.<sup>53</sup> These measures coincided with a thaw in Pakistan-India relations and increased attempts by Musharraf to rein in the MMA, which

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finally agreed to support a 17<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment consecrating most of his extra powers on 28 December 2003. Although Musharraf repeatedly pledged to eradicate religious extremism and sectarianism and to transform Pakistan into a moderate Muslim state, he found the Islamist alliance MMA more amenable to his pressure tactics than the PPP and PML-N<sup>54</sup> and ended up coopting the MMA to counter opposition from the mainstream secularist parties.<sup>55</sup> This, however, could not placate the extremists, which made two assassination attempts against Musharraf in December 2003 and quickly grew stronger in the following years.

Already in October 2003, the Pakistan Army had led operations against local and foreign militants in the South Waziristan Agency, which were resumed with greater vigour in January 2004 and continued throughout that year, in spite of a first “peace agreement” with militants signed on 24 April in Shakai (Waziristan).<sup>56</sup> The FATA, and especially the South and North Waziristan Tribal Agencies, would remain an arena of conflict and source of ever increasing anti-state terrorism throughout the reign of Musharraf (and later of the PPP-led government 2008–13). At the same time, those parts of FATA and adjoining areas which gradually fell under the sway of hardcore militants would also serve as a refuge and source of strength for terrorists from the Punjab and other parts of Pakistan, including the LeJ. The latter, although temporarily weakened in 2002–3, continued its attacks on Shia civilians in 2004.

On 28 February a suicide bomber exploded his device in a mosque adjacent to the *Imâmbârgâh-i Husainî* in Rawalpindi, but he managed to kill only himself and injure four worshippers.<sup>57</sup> Much more serious was the attack on an ‘*Âshûrâ*’ procession in Quetta on 2 March 2004 by four gunmen, who first hurled hand grenades from rooftops and then kept firing with automatic weapons for twenty minutes, killing thirty-six Shia Hazaras on the spot. In the subsequent chaos another five Shias died through police fire, while a mob ransacked and torched over 150 shops and other buildings, including a cinema-house and two banks. The overall death toll reached forty-four, with ninety-eight people being injured.<sup>58</sup> The attack was carried out by LeJ, but preliminary investigations hinted at involvement of *Al-Qâ’ida*, too.<sup>59</sup> Shaikh Ya’qub Ali Tawassuli and Yunus Changezi, a provincial minister, later alleged that most victims died in firing by personnel of the Frontier Corps and the police deployed for protecting the procession,<sup>60</sup> a claim strongly rejected by the Shia Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat.<sup>61</sup> Representatives of the Quetta business community, for their part, demanded a ban on all processions through bazaars.<sup>62</sup>

On 7 May 2004, a suicide bomber killed fifteen Shia worshippers in the Hyderi Mosque within the premises of the historic Sindh Madrasat ul-Islam in Karachi.<sup>63</sup> Again spontaneous protest rallies of Shias caused additional damage.<sup>64</sup> One day after the assassination of a prominent Deobandi scholar, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamezai,<sup>65</sup> in Karachi (30 May), the *Imâmbârgâh-i 'Alî Rizâ* in the same part of the town was targeted by a suicide bomber, killing sixteen Shias performing their evening prayers.<sup>66</sup> Two more suicide attacks against Shias occurred in 2004: one struck at the *Zainabiya Mosque*, the oldest place of worship for Shias in Sialkot, during Friday prayers on 1 October, killing thirty and seriously injuring fifty.<sup>67</sup> Allegedly this was done in retaliation for the killing of Amjad Faruqi, one of the most wanted LeJ terrorists, during a police raid on 26 September.<sup>68</sup> Another suicide bomber hit the *Jâmi'at Kashmîrîyân* mosque in Lahore's old city on 10 October, killing three and injuring nine Shias.<sup>69</sup> In between these two attacks, on 7 October, suspected Shia terrorists killed forty-one participants in a memorial gathering on the first anniversary of the assassination of the SSP/MIP leader A'zam Tariq in Multan with a car bomb.<sup>70</sup> Possibly Shias were also responsible for the murder of Mufti Jamil Ahmad, a prominent Deobandi scholar close to the Afghan *Taleban*, in Karachi on 9 October.<sup>71</sup>

On 8 January 2005, Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, the leading Shia *'âlim* of Gilgit,<sup>72</sup> was gunned down together with his two bodyguards. He succumbed to his injuries five days later in a Rawalpindi hospital. The murderous attack provoked violence by Rizvi's Shia supporters who set fire to government offices and private buildings in Gilgit, including the house of a forest officer who was burned to death along with five members of his family.<sup>73</sup> Another prominent Shia *'âlim*, Ghulam Husain Najafi, Vice Principal of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* in Lahore, was shot dead on 1 April 2005.<sup>74</sup> On 27 May, a suicide bomber struck at a *majlis* organised by the TNFJ(M) during the annual *'urs* at the shrine of *Bârî Imâm* in Islamabad, killing twenty and injuring more than 100.<sup>75</sup> Three days later the *Madînat ul-'Ilm Mosque* in Karachi was hit by another suicide attack, killing three Shias and three assailants. Again, an enraged mob burned down an outlet of the American fast-food chain KFC, which caused the death of six staff members.<sup>76</sup> There were no other high-profile attacks against Shias in 2005, but on 13 October a clash between Shia protesters and rangers in Gilgit led to widespread firing and the imposition of a curfew on the town.<sup>77</sup> A number of LeJ terrorists were arrested in 2005, among them Ramazan Mengal, who had been involved in the March 2004 attack in Quetta,<sup>78</sup> and Asif Chotoo, the chief operational commander of the LeJ since the arrest of Akram Lahori.<sup>79</sup>

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In 2006 Hangu was the scene of that year's worst anti-Shia violence. This district capital on the main road from Kohat (NWFP) to the Kurram Agency with mixed Shia-Sunni population had a history of sectarian conflict<sup>80</sup> which would repeatedly flare up in the following years, too. On 9 February two blasts hit an '*Āshûrâ*' procession on the main Hangu-Thall road, the first one caused by a suicide bomber, followed by riots with indiscriminate firing, arson attacks and lootings in different parts of the town and surrounding villages that lasted for two days. Some villages were shelled with rockets from nearby hills.<sup>81</sup> Apparently wide-spread Sunni-Shia clashes was precisely what the perpetrators of the '*Āshûrâ*' attack had intended to provoke.<sup>82</sup> Two months later, LeJ committed its first large-scale terrorist attack against Barelvi Sunnis during a ceremony marking the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad at the Nishtar Park in Karachi on 11 April 2006. A suicide bomb blast claimed fifty-seven lives, including many leaders of the *Sunni Tahrîk*.<sup>83</sup> In another Karachi suicide attack on 14 July, the Sindh leader of the TJP and provincial Vice President of the MMA, Hasan Turabi, was killed outside his house.<sup>84</sup>

Even if there were fewer attacks against Shias in 2006 than in previous years, militant extremism took hold firmly in large parts of FATA in that year, with the state unwilling, or unable, to stop this trend of "Talibaniisation".<sup>85</sup> On 5 September 2006 another "peace accord" was signed between the government and militants in North Waziristan which *de facto* ceded control of territory to extremist groups that never implemented their part of the agreement. Starting from late 2006, these militants steadily expanded their writ to most of the FATA and even adjoining parts of the NWFP, including the Swat valley. In the first half of 2007 they also staged a show of strength in the heart of Islamabad, making the Red Mosque (*Lâl Masjid*) and the adjacent *Jâmi'at Hafsa* a base for armed militants and vigilante actions in the capital. The storming of the Red Mosque by security forces on 10–11 July 2007 marked the beginning of a new wave of radicalisation,<sup>86</sup> which found its expression in a surge of terrorist attacks and the proclamation of the *Tahrîk-i Tâlibân-i Pâkistân* (TTP) in December 2007. These developments would strongly affect Shias, too, with violence against them picking up in 2007 mainly in the NWFP and reaching an unprecedented scale in subsequent years, with Shias of the Kurram Agency and Quetta suffering most.<sup>87</sup>

In January 2007, coinciding with Muharram 1428H, Hangu was again the focus of trouble, starting with a suicide attack on 25 January aimed at a delegation discussing security arrangements with the local authorities.<sup>88</sup> On

‘Āshûrâ’ day (30 January), an *imâmbârgâh* in Hangu was shelled with mortars just after the procession had concluded, killing two and wounding fourteen.<sup>89</sup> One day earlier a suicide bomber had blown himself up near a police checkpoint in Dera Ismail Khan, killing two people and injuring eight others critically just before a 9 Muharram procession was to pass the area. Six other members of his gang were arrested along with explosive belts.<sup>90</sup> On the same day (29 January) rockets fired at an *imâmbârgâh* in Bannu injured twelve people.<sup>91</sup> In the following months several Shia leaders in Dera Ismail Khan were murdered.<sup>92</sup> Two prominent Shias were also assassinated in Peshawar: S. Qamar ‘Abbas, Secretary-General of the PPP’s NWFP chapter and a former provincial minister, was gunned down along with his close relative Muhammad Ali, a son of the slain TJP leader Anwar Ali Akhundzada, on 6 May.<sup>93</sup> The journalist S. Mehdi Husain, who then served as a spokesman for the MMA government in the NWFP, was shot dead on 5 June.<sup>94</sup>

The year 2007 ended with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan after eight years of self-imposed exile to contest parliamentary elections, on 27 December in Rawalpindi, presumably by killers sent by the TTP leader Baitullah Mahsud.<sup>95</sup> Nawaz Sharif, too, had returned to Pakistan on 25 November after seven years of forced exile, while Musharraf had finally relinquished the powers of COAS to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on 28 November. The latter took care to assure free and fair elections to the National Assembly and the four Provincial Assemblies on 18 February 2008. The PPP, now led by Bhutto’s widower Asif Ali Zardari, won a majority in the NA and the Sindh PA and formed coalition governments in Islamabad and in the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan. In the NWFP, the MMA, weakened by the defection and boycott of the *Ĵamâ‘at-i Islâmî*, won only fourteen of 124 seats. The secularist ANP won thirty seats in the NWFP PA and formed a coalition government with the PPP. In the Punjab Shahbaz Sharif headed a coalition government of PML-N and PPP.<sup>96</sup>

The new democratic era began auspiciously for the PPP, with a huge vote of confidence for Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani on 25 March and Asif Ali Zardari’s election as President of Pakistan on 6 September 2008, after the forced resignation of General Musharraf. Yet neither the PPP-led federal government nor the four provincial governments had the strength and will to seriously tackle the problem of Islamist militancy, including the anti-Shia extremist groups. The preferred strategy of dealing with violent extremists was often appeasement, which further emboldened the latter

and led to a record number of terrorist attacks in all provinces of Pakistan in the Zardari era (2008–13).<sup>97</sup> As for the SSP/MIP, its leader Maulana Ludhianvi and four other members were allowed to contest the 2008 elections from Jhang,<sup>98</sup> and the party could operate almost unhindered throughout the following five years in spite of the official ban.

Most large-scale anti-Shia terrorism in 2008 again occurred in the NWFP, starting with a suicide blast inside the *Imâmbârgâh Mîrzâ Qâsim Baig* in Peshawar on the 7<sup>th</sup> of Muharram (17 January) which killed twelve people.<sup>99</sup> It was followed by a major suicide attack in Parachinar on 16 February.<sup>100</sup> In Hangu sectarian clashes were triggered on 21 March 2008, when the participants of a function at the Shia *Jâmi'at 'Askari* were attacked from the nearby hills with heavy weapons.<sup>101</sup> On 17 June gunmen shot dead four Shias in the main bazaar of Hangu.<sup>102</sup> The army launched an inconclusive operation against TTP militants in Hangu and surrounding areas in July 2008.<sup>103</sup> In Dera Ismail Khan four Shias were killed when driving in a rickshaw on 26 May, drawing immediate deadly retaliation against a SSP member.<sup>104</sup> On 19 August, gunmen first shot down a Shia shopkeeper in the same town, and later a suicide bomber killed at least thirty-two people, mostly his friends and relatives, who had gathered outside the emergency unit of the district headquarters hospital, in a powerful blast. The TTP claimed responsibility and threatened more attacks if military operations against it were not halted.<sup>105</sup> Again in Dera Ismail Khan, on 21 November nine Shias were killed and forty-three injured by a remote-controlled blast during the funeral of a cleric who had been murdered a day earlier.<sup>106</sup>

Targeting crowds at a hospital and a funeral showed the vicious inventiveness of the new brand of anti-Shia terrorists and their masterminds, more of which would be displayed in subsequent years. Another perfidy, which was foiled by intelligence agencies and the police in Karachi in January 2008, was a plot to poison water fountains (*sabîl*) posted along the route of Muharram processions with cyanide, in addition to bomb blasts.<sup>107</sup> Three more major terrorist acts against Shias succeeded in 2008, however. On 6 October at least twenty-two people, most of them Shias, were killed by a suicide bomber when the PML-N MNA Rashid Akbar Niwani was meeting people of his constituency outside his house in Bhakkar.<sup>108</sup> On 8 November a bomb planted inside the *Imâmbârgâh Châh Pîr Bâchâ* in Peshawar destroyed the building and injured eight, followed by a car bomb explosion outside the *Imâmbârgâh-i 'Alamdâr* in the same town on 5 December which killed twenty-two and injured more than sixty and set ablaze a number of shops.<sup>109</sup> During the last months of 2008 there were also

several incidents of target killing of Hazaras in Quetta<sup>110</sup> which would multiply in the following years. Already on 18 January 2008 two convicted top terrorists of LeJ, Usman Saifullah Kurd and Shafiq ur-Rahman Rind, had escaped from the well-guarded headquarters of the Anti-Terrorism Force in Quetta under mysterious circumstances. They were later held responsible for much of the killing spree in Quetta in the following years.<sup>111</sup>

In the first half of 2009, most high-profile anti-Shia terrorism again occurred in the NWFP. On 9 January an 'Āshûrâ' procession from nearby villages heading for Hangu was attacked with rockets from the hilltops, provoking fierce clashes in the town and a number of villages. Both Sunnis and Shias used heavy weapons like mortars and anti-aircraft guns and raised big *lashkars*, including fighters from Orakzai and Kurram Agencies. Security forces shelled hideouts of the rival groups with gunship helicopters. In three days at least forty people were killed and fifty-one injured.<sup>112</sup> On 20 February a suicide bomber killed at least thirty Shias and injured another 157 during the funeral of a murdered Shia leader in Dera Ismail Khan.<sup>113</sup> Some weeks earlier apparent Shia terrorists had killed six people and injured twenty-five others with a remote-controlled device at the Gomal Medical College in the same town. The likely target was MPA Khalifa Abdul Qayyum, the provincial head of the banned SSP/MIP.<sup>114</sup> A number of target killings of both Shias and Sunnis in Dera Ismail Khan followed in 2009.<sup>115</sup> On 3 July, Shia and Sunni elders signed a detailed agreement to contain sectarian violence in the town after mediation by the JUI-F leader Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman.<sup>116</sup>

Some larger terrorist attacks against Shias took place in the Punjab and Karachi in 2009. On 5 February a suicide bomber killed at least thirty participants in a *Chihlum* procession outside the *Imâmbârgâh-i Wadânî* in Dera Ghazi Khan.<sup>117</sup> Similar scenarios were repeated in Chakwal on 5 April and in Shakrial village on the outskirts of Islamabad on 24 December. In Chakwal a man stormed into the crowd leaving an *imâmbârgâh* after a *majlis* and blew himself up after security guards tried to stop him. Twenty-four people died and 140 others were injured, thirty-five of them seriously.<sup>118</sup> In Shakrial the security guard of the *Imâmbârgâh-i Qasr-i Sakîna* stopped a suicide bomber for a body search on 24 December, thus preventing greater damage when he exploded his device.<sup>119</sup> On the afternoon of 28 December, another suicide bomber targeted the main 'Āshûrâ' procession<sup>120</sup> in Karachi's M.A. Jinnah Road, killing forty-four people and injuring sixty. The ensuing rampage of Shia mobs was the worst ever after similar incidents, while personnel of law enforcement agencies vanished from the



spot. Some 2,500 shops were gutted and overall damage was estimated to run into tens of billions of rupees.<sup>121</sup> A TTP commander, ‘Asmatullah Shahin, claimed responsibility, saying the decision of that terrorist act was taken by the TTP *shûrâ* “for the protection of the honour of the *sahâba*”.<sup>122</sup>

Balochistan’s capital Quetta was still spared larger bomb attacks in 2009, but the series of target killings of Hazaras picked up pace in that year, starting with the D.S.P. Hasan Ali (14 January)<sup>123</sup> and the Chairman of the Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) Husain Ali Yusufi (26 January).<sup>124</sup> There were a number of similar murders in 2009, with very few of the perpetrators being arrested.<sup>125</sup>

While the number of anti-Shia attacks had increased significantly in 2009, terrorism of the TTP and allied groups against other targets—including hard targets like army bases—reached an unprecedented level in the same year, too, mainly in reaction to the large-scale military operations in the Swat valley and South Waziristan.<sup>126</sup> Hundreds of terrorist attacks unrelated to Shia-Sunni conflicts have hounded Pakistan since then.<sup>127</sup> On the other hand, many of these attacks since 2009 have been attributed to so-called “Punjabi Taliban”, a loose network of operatives of LeJ, SSP and *Jaish-i Muhammad* which had developed strong connections with the TTP, the Afghan *Taleban*, and other militant groups based in the FATA.<sup>128</sup> But some assassinations were apparently still being carried out by Shias, most prominent among them in 2009 the murder of Maulana Ali Sher Haidari, the Chief Patron of SSP/MIP, who was gunned down near his hometown Khairpur (Sindh) on 17 August.<sup>129</sup>

By that time the SSP had assumed yet another name, *Ahlu Sunnat wal-Jamâ‘at* (ASWJ). In February 2010, Rana Sana’ullah, Minister of Justice in the Punjab government, who sought the support of the SSP/ASWJ for a candidate of the PML-N during by-elections in Jhang, appeared jointly with the ASWJ leader Maulana Ludhianvi at an election rally.<sup>130</sup> When this provoked demands for Sana’ullah’s dismissal, Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif reminded his detractors that Ludhianvi had been duly qualified to run in the 2008 elections, polling more than 40,000 votes, and that the PPP, too, had solicited the support of the “banned” SSP at that time.<sup>131</sup> Shortly afterwards the chief minister created another stir with an interview, saying that the TTP should not carry out attacks in the Punjab as the provincial government would “not take dictation from outsiders”.<sup>132</sup> Shahbaz Sharif thus implicitly gave reason to the claim of the Islamist parties that Pakistan’s involvement in the U.S. “war on terror” was the main reason for the terrorism of the TTP. But after suicide bombers hit one of the largest shrines of



Barelvi Sunnis, the *Dâtâ Darbâr* in Lahore,<sup>133</sup> the Punjab government ordered another short-lived crackdown on banned organisations, including the SSP/ASWJ.<sup>134</sup>

Suicide and other attacks against Shias continued in 2010 in all provinces, starting with Karachi. On 5 February terrorists first targeted a bus filled with mourners on their way to join the main *Chihlum* procession and later hit rescue workers and relatives of the dead and injured of the first explosion at the Jinnah Hospital.<sup>135</sup> A similar *modus operandi* was used in Quetta on 16 April: a suicide bomber blew himself up inside the Civil Hospital where dozens of Shias had gathered to protest against the target killing of a private bank manager, Arshad Zaidi, earlier that day.<sup>136</sup> On 17 April, two days after the NWFP was officially renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), two LeJ terrorist detonated their suicide jackets just minutes apart at a registration centre for Shia refugees from Kurram and Orakzai near Kohat.<sup>137</sup> On 18 July a suicide bomber detonated his device at the gate of the mosque and *imâmbârgâh* of the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Muhammadiya* in Sargodha after he was denied entry by a security guard.<sup>138</sup> On 1 September, thirty-one people were killed and over 280 injured in three consecutive suicide blasts targeting processions of *Yaum-i ‘Âli* on their way to *Karbâlâ’-i Gâme Shâh* in Lahore. A furious mob beat up policemen and even drivers of ambulances in the aftermath.<sup>139</sup> This was followed by the worst anti-Shia attack of the year in Quetta on 3 September, where a suicide bomber hit a rally taken out by the ISO on the occasion of *Yaum al-Quds* at the Meezan Chowk. Again Shias accused personnel of the Anti-Terrorism Force and the Frontier Corps of firing on protesters after the blast, causing many of the at least fifty-four deaths. The police, for their part, blamed the participants of the rally for having transgressed the agreed route.<sup>140</sup> In the aftermath a complete ban on religious processions in Quetta, as demanded by Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties, was seriously considered by the provincial government, while leaders of the secularist Hazara Democratic Party, too, criticized the Shia clergy for “inviting avoidable trouble”.<sup>141</sup>

Two more terrorist attacks against Shias were committed in KPK in 2010: On 8 December a fourteen-year-old suicide bomber hit a coach with mostly Shia passengers aboard at the *Tirah Bazaar* in Kohat.<sup>142</sup> On 16 December a hand grenade was hurled at a 9 Muharram procession despite tough security arrangements in *Chowk Yâdgar*, Peshawar.<sup>143</sup> There was also one ugly incident of Shia mob violence in 2010: On 18 March Hafiz Abdullah, Secretary-General of the ASWJ in Dera Ghazi Khan District, was dragged out of the police station in Choti Zirin and burnt alive shortly after he himself had

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murdered a local Shia leader and his father.<sup>144</sup> In Gilgit there were repeated incidents of target killings and sectarian clashes,<sup>145</sup> with police personnel found to have been directly involved in some cases.<sup>146</sup> Target killings of Shias also continued in Karachi, with the MQM MPA Raza Haidar as the most prominent victim in 2010,<sup>147</sup> and especially in Quetta.<sup>148</sup>

Since 2011 the 3–400,000 strong Hazara community in Quetta has paid the highest price for the state's inability to rein in anti-Shia terrorism. Already in 2008–10 LeJ killers had operated with remarkable impunity in this town in spite of a heavy presence of security forces, but 2011 marked the beginning of a series of systematic murders of Hazaras which has since regularly been termed “genocide”, not only by Shias. This ruthless campaign started shortly after Usama Bin Laden was killed in an American raid on his compound in Abbottabad on 1 May, and LeJ was among the extremist groups that vowed to avenge his “martyrdom”.<sup>149</sup> On 6 May dozens of Shias making early morning exercises at a playground in *Hazara Town* were attacked with automatic weapons, rockets, and hand grenades, leaving at least six dead and fifteen wounded.<sup>150</sup> Two weeks later a pick-up carrying ten Hazara passengers on their way back from a vegetable market was assailed by two gunmen who killed six of them on the spot and injured the others. A girl was also killed by a stray bullet.<sup>151</sup> On 17 June the former Olympic boxer S. Abrar Husain was gunned down near a Quetta stadium.<sup>152</sup> Six days later four people were killed and eleven others injured when gunmen fired at a bus carrying thirty Hazara pilgrims returning from Iran in Hazar Ganji town, Quetta.<sup>153</sup> All those killings took place at a small distance from the security check-posts. One local Hazara interviewed by *Dawn* remarked: “It isn’t that the sectarian organisations are not targeting other Shias. We happen to be an easier target ... because of our distinct Mongolian features ... It is curfew-like: we can move freely in our areas but not venture out.”<sup>154</sup> On 30 July terrorists again intercepted a pick-up van carrying people from Hazara Town to Quetta city and opened fire indiscriminately at the passengers. Three died on the spot while eight others succumbed to their injuries on their way to the hospital.<sup>155</sup> After all those murders the LeJ had claimed responsibility. In August 2011 the group distributed a “night-letter” signed by “The Principal, *LeJ Pakistan*” on the streets of *Marri-Abad* (Quetta) stating:

All Shias are *wâjib ul-qatl* (worthy of killing). We will rid Pakistan of [this] unclean people. Pakistan means land of the pure, and the Shias have no right to be here. We have the *fatwâ* and signatures of the revered ‘*ulamâ*’ in which the Shias have been declared *kâfir* [infidel]. Just as our fighters have waged a suc-

successful Jihad against the Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, our mission [in Pakistan] is the abolition of this impure sect and people, the Shias and the Shia-Hazaras, from every city, every village, every nook and corner of Pakistan. Like in the past, [our] successful Jihad against the Hazaras in Pakistan and, in particular, in Quetta is ongoing and will continue [in the future]. We will make Pakistan their graveyard—their houses will be destroyed by bombs and suicide bombers. We will only rest when we fly the flag of true Islam on this land. Our fighters and suicide bombers have [already] successfully operated in Parachinar, and are awaiting orders to operate across Pakistan. Jihad against the Shia-Hazaras has now become our duty. Our suicide bombers have successfully operated in Hazara Town on May 6, and now our next target is your houses in Alamdar Road.<sup>156</sup>

Such threats were quickly followed up with more severe terrorist attacks. On 2 September the *‘Id al-Fitr* congregation at *Alamdar Road* had just finished prayers when a car loaded with explosives tried to get close, but was intercepted by Hazara scouts who halted it by parking a car in front of it. The terrorist then exploded the car on the spot which claimed eleven lives while scores of others sustained injuries, but the loss of lives could otherwise have been much higher. The Quetta MNA S. Nasir Ali Shah charged that not a single policeman was deployed for the congregation of around 6,000 people.<sup>157</sup> On 20 September, a bus carrying fifty passengers, most of them Shia Hazara pilgrims, was intercepted 50 km west of Quetta by eight-ten armed men. They ordered the passengers to disembark, lined them up after checking their identity cards, and opened fire on them from close range, killing twenty-six people on the spot and gravely injuring eight others. Later three others were killed who tried to bring the injured to Quetta in an ambulance.<sup>158</sup> Only three days later another bus was sprayed with bullets from a car a few miles south of Quetta, killing three Hazara passengers and injuring five others.<sup>159</sup> Almost the same scenario was repeated on 4 October between *Hazar Ganji* and *Akhtarabad* when fourteen bus passengers were massacred.<sup>160</sup> According to an eyewitness, one of the terrorists said in reply to the last question of a victim: “You have not done anything wrong, but we have been told that killing one Shia will open five doors of heaven for us.”<sup>161</sup> On 5 November a suicide bomber tried to strike worshippers in an *imâmbârgâh* in Hazara Town, but was prevented from entering.<sup>162</sup> In December 2011, research by *Human Rights Watch* indicated that at least 275 Shias, mostly of Hazara ethnicity, had been killed in sectarian attacks in Balochistan alone since 2008.<sup>163</sup> In the same month, suspected Pakistani terrorists of the LeJ killed fifty-five Hazaras in Kabul in an unprecedented attack.<sup>164</sup>

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The provincial government admitted in September 2011 that forty alleged terrorists had been released in one year in Balochistan due to lack of evidence against them.<sup>165</sup> This was just one example of a general weakness of Pakistan's judicial system when dealing with sectarian and other terrorists during the last decade. Prosecutors had always had difficulties in convicting suspects because of a lack of resources and training to try terror cases, a lack of basic investigative skills with the police, and the intimidation of both judges and witnesses by accomplices of the accused.<sup>166</sup> On 11 July 2011 a bench of the Supreme Court in Lahore granted bail to Malik Muhammad Ishaq, a notorious LeJ hit-man. He had been arrested in 1997 and charged with the murders of seventy people, most of them Shias, in forty-four different cases, but he had escaped conviction in each case due to "lack of evidence".<sup>167</sup> As became known then, Malik Ishaq had enjoyed almost VIP status in jail. In October 2009 he had been flown to Rawalpindi for negotiations with TTP terrorists who had taken hostages in the General Headquarters of the Army.<sup>168</sup> After his release, he started touring the southern Punjab, resuming hate-speeches against Shias. He was put under protective house arrest on 22 September and jailed only five month later.<sup>169</sup>

Terrorist attacks against Shias focused on Quetta and the Kurram Agency<sup>170</sup> in 2011, but there were some major incidents in other parts of Pakistan, too. On 25 January teenage suicide bombers tried to hit *Chihlum* processions in both Lahore and Karachi. In Lahore a boy first hurled a bag containing explosives and then blew himself up close to a security checkpoint. Three policemen were among eleven dead. In Karachi a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden motorbike into a police van after being stopped from approaching the *Chihlum* procession, killing at least three people. In both cases the number of victims could have been much larger if the terrorists had got closer to their targets.<sup>171</sup> On 13 March militants opened indiscriminate fire on a Peshawar-bound passenger coach in Hangu District, killing eleven Shias from Parachinar.<sup>172</sup>

In 2012 some of the ugliest atrocities against Shias were committed in Gilgit-Baltistan.<sup>173</sup> On 28 February eight men wearing army uniforms stopped four buses on the Karakorum Highway near the Harban Nala in Chilas District and ordered the passengers to get off the vehicles. After checking their papers, eighteen passengers with obviously Shia names were separated and gunned down. A speaker of the group *Jundullâh* later claimed responsibility for the attack which according to eyewitnesses was carried out by locals from the nearby valleys of Darel and Tangir. Earlier two people belonging to Chilas District had been killed in a sectarian clash

in Gilgit, and people in the area had vowed to avenge them.<sup>174</sup> On 3 April, after weeks of Shia agitation, a hand grenade was thrown at a Sunni gathering called by the ASWJ in Gilgit, killing two men and injured thirty-five others. Thereafter firing and attacks started in different localities of Gilgit and continued for the whole day. In Chilas at least twelve Shias were dragged out of passenger buses and killed by a mob.<sup>175</sup> Shias in the Nager District took hostage thirty-four workers from Chilas and Kohistan who were released only seven days later.<sup>176</sup> The Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik who met with Sunni and Shia *'ulamâ'* in Gilgit on 4 April declared in typical manner that the violence had "nothing to do with sectarianism", rather "hidden forces" were involved which "would be identified soon".<sup>177</sup> But in addition to more than ten days of curfew in Gilgit, the Shia and Sunni central mosques there remained sealed until both sides had accepted a new "Code of Conduct" which was passed as a law by the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly on 29 May.<sup>178</sup> Shias protested against "equating the victims and perpetrators", as well as against an operation of security forces against "terrorists" in Hunza-Nager instead of Kohistan and Chilas.<sup>179</sup> On 16 August the modus operandi of 28 February was repeated near the Babusar Pass, on an alternative route from Rawalpindi to Gilgit which was thought to be less dangerous for Shias than the Karakorum Highway. Dozens of gunmen wearing army uniforms intercepted a convoy of four vans, ordered the passengers to step down and started inquiring about their sect. The Shias were taken aside and shot dead. The twenty-two victims killed included four Sunnis who had refused to help the terrorists identifying Shia passengers. The Darra Adamkhel chapter of the TTP later claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>180</sup>

There were many more terrorist attacks against Shias in all provinces of Pakistan in 2012. On 15 January a bomb blast near the *Darbâr-i Husain Imâmbârgâh* in Khanpur killed eighteen participants in a *Chihlum* procession.<sup>181</sup> On 18 July a roadside blast killed fourteen Shia passengers in a pick-up truck heading to Kohat from lower Orakzai.<sup>182</sup> Incidents in Karachi included the target killing of three Shia lawyers on 25 January,<sup>183</sup> the bomb attack against a bus carrying people going to attend the *Yaum al-Quds* rally of the ISO on 17 August,<sup>184</sup> the first terrorist attack targeting the Isma'ili Bohra community on 18 September,<sup>185</sup> the attack on a funeral procession of a slain Shia *'âlim* on 6 November,<sup>186</sup> a bomb blast near *Imâmbârgâh-i Mustafâ* in Abbas Town on 18 November,<sup>187</sup> and two blasts within one hour close to *Masjid-o-Imâmbârgâh Haidar-i Karrâr* in Orangi Town on 21 November.<sup>188</sup> On the same day, corresponding to the 6 Muharram 1434H,

twenty-three Shias were killed when a suicide blast ripped through a mourning procession taken out from the *Imâmbârgâh-i Qasr-i Shabbîr* in Dhoke Syedan, Rawalpindi.<sup>189</sup> Three days later another Muharram procession was hit by a remote controlled device in Dera Ismail Khan,<sup>190</sup> followed by another bomb attack in the same town against a procession on 'Ashurâ' day (25 November). Fourteen people were killed in the two incidents and 104 sustained injuries.<sup>191</sup> Yet another attempt of a suicide bomber to hit a Muharram procession was prevented in Lakki Marwat on 23 November.<sup>192</sup>

As in previous years, the greatest number of murderous attacks against Shias in 2012 was carried out in the Kurram Agency<sup>193</sup> and in Quetta, where Hazaras were again killed throughout the year. Most of the victims seem to haven been chosen haphazardly, just because they were easy targets for terrorists who were still given an almost free rein in the town, while others were chosen because of their social or professional standing. On 25 January, an artist, a police inspector, and a poet were gunned down inside their car by armed men on a motorcycle.<sup>194</sup> On 29 March four men on motorcycles opened fire on a van on Spiny Road killing six Hazaras. Two others were shot dead by the police when a violent mob set a girls' college on fire and attacked a number of government buildings.<sup>195</sup> Another drive-by shooting on 9 April killed six customers in a shoe store in Masjid Road.<sup>196</sup> On 14 April two more vehicles were sprayed with gunfire, killing eight Hazaras.<sup>197</sup> Again on 21 April two Hazaras were shot dead in Brewery Road.<sup>198</sup> On 26 April a suicide bomber tried to enter a crowded vegetable market in *Hazara Town*, but allegedly some local youths stopped him and were able to pull off the detonator of his suicide vest. He was shot dead when trying to flee.<sup>199</sup>

The unprecedented series of Hazara murders in quick succession raised alarm even in Europe<sup>200</sup> and questions about the reasons why the killers were able to carry on their criminal activities with apparent impunity.<sup>201</sup> In May 2012 a fact-finding mission of international observers and legal experts who had come to Quetta in November 2011 published its findings.<sup>202</sup> On 7 June a rare bomb attack against a Deobandi Sunni *madrassa* was carried out in Quetta's Satellite Town, killing sixteen and injuring forty-six.<sup>203</sup> Shortly after, the terrorist campaign against Shias picked up again. On 18 June a remote-controlled car-bomb killed five students in a passing bus of an IT university and injured at least seventy, many of them Hazaras.<sup>204</sup> The same modus operandi was used against a bus with mostly Hazara pilgrims returning from Iran near the fruit market in *Hazar Ganji* (Quetta) on 28 June, killing thirteen and injuring twenty.<sup>205</sup> HDP President Abd

ul-Khaliq Hazara spoke of the “ethnic cleansing” of Hazaras in a systematic manner, while the PPP MNA S. Nasir Ali Shah said the state institutions were “hibernating”, allowing killers to go on the rampage without any fear of being arrested and proceeded against.<sup>206</sup>

On 16 August gunmen opened indiscriminate fire from automatic weapons on an auto-rickshaw heading for Hazara Town, followed by a similar attack on a taxi on 27 August; six passengers died in the two attacks.<sup>207</sup> On 30 August a judge, who had received threatening phone calls before, was gunned down along with his driver and a guard.<sup>208</sup> On 1 September four armed men stopped a bus, told five Hazara men to get off, lined them up and shot them dead. Two others were killed at a bus stand minutes after the first shooting. Violent protests erupted and two more people, including a policeman, were killed.<sup>209</sup> On 18 September a roadside car-bomb was again used against a bus carrying Shia pilgrims.<sup>210</sup> On 6 and 11 November six more Hazaras were shot dead in their cars in Quetta,<sup>211</sup> and on 12 November gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire at a shop in the bazaar of Mach town, killing two Hazaras and leaving five seriously injured.<sup>212</sup> The largest number of Shias in a single Balochistan attack of 2012 died when a car bomb hit a convoy of Iran-bound buses in Mastung District on 30 December, setting one bus on fire. Most of the twenty victims and twenty-five injured hailed from the Punjab.<sup>213</sup>

The worst massacres ever in Quetta were committed in the first months of 2013. On the evening of 10 January a suicide bomber exploded his device in a snooker club in Alamdar Road. Ten minutes later a bomb planted on an ambulance car detonated outside the club, destroying the building and damaging fifty shops and nearby houses. Most of the ninety-six killed, including twenty-five rescue workers and nine policemen, were Hazaras.<sup>214</sup> On the following day, hundreds of Hazaras began a sit-in on Alamdar Road with the coffins of eighty-seven victims, refusing to bury their dead until their demands were accepted.<sup>215</sup> By 12 January 5,000 people had gathered for the vigil at the site of the bombings in spite of cold and rain.<sup>216</sup> Huge protest demonstrations were organised all over Pakistan by Shia organisations, and some smaller by human rights activists.<sup>217</sup> The protests were only called off after Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, who had come to Quetta for negotiations, announced the imposition of Governor’s rule in Balochistan after sacking the provincial government of Nawab Aslam Khan Raisani on 13 January.<sup>218</sup> The chief minister, who for days had refused to return to Quetta from abroad after the gravest terrorist attacks so far in the town, was unrepentant and claimed that he had been sacked for his refusal



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to hand over the *Reko Diq* gold mines to an international consortium.<sup>219</sup> But his government had long since been blamed for utter negligence when dealing with the LeJ terrorists which had almost found a safe haven in Raisani's constituency, the Mastung District.<sup>220</sup>

As predicted by many, the imposition of governor's rule shortly before elections were scheduled to take place anyhow changed little in the Quetta situation. Already on 16 February another major terrorist attack shook Hazara Town. Liquid explosives were used for the first time with the composition of diesel and potassium chlorate when a water tank loaded on a tractor-trolley detonated in a crowded bazaar at 5.30 pm.<sup>221</sup> The initial death toll of sixty-five rose to eighty-four when many badly burned victims had died in hospitals. At least four markets and over twenty shops caught fire or were razed to the ground by the explosion which also destroyed many vehicles. Again thousands of Hazara men, women and children staged a protest sit-in and refused to bury their dead, demanding that the security of Quetta should be handed over to the army.<sup>222</sup> The Federal Government, however, was reluctant to relinquish more space to the army. Instead a large operation of the Frontier Corps was launched on 19 February on the outskirts of Quetta. 170 suspects were taken into custody, among them a provincial leader of the ASWJ and some wanted LeJ terrorists.<sup>223</sup> As it turned out, the Quetta police had prepared a secret dossier with details about the LeJ network in Balochistan and had shared it with the Frontier Corps weeks earlier, with a proposal to launch a targeted operation without any delay. But it had taken another large-scale terrorist attack for this to be translated into action.<sup>224</sup> One day later representatives of Shia organisations and the local Hazara community agreed to end the sit-in after further promises of the Governor and a parliamentary delegation from Islamabad which had joined negotiations.<sup>225</sup>

Already on 16 February a spokesman of LeJ had demanded from the government to immediately shift its under-trial prisoners from the high-security Anti-Terrorism Force jail in Quetta Cantonment to the central jail or get ready to face yet another suicide assault, this time targeting the ATF prison. He also hurled new threats at the Hazaras:

The government should be under no illusion now that the imposition of the Governor's Rule in Balochistan has failed to dissuade us from targeting our enemy—the Shia Hazaras. We want to make it clear to the Shia Hazaras that they should not consider themselves safe and secure till the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in Pakistan. The Mujahidin of the LeJ will continue to kill Shias regardless of the imposition of the Governor's rule or the deployment of the



Army. We will protect the honour of Islamic Caliphs by sacrificing each and every one of us. The February 16 *Fidayeen* attack by a vehicle bomber was the second one in the Shia dominated area since the beginning of 2013. Let me inform the Shia Hazaras that we have 20 more such vehicles which are packed with lethal explosives and ready to hit the enemy. We are only waiting for next orders from our leadership to hit our targets in Alamdar Road, Mehrabad and Hazara Town. We are neither afraid of the Governor's rule nor the Pakistan Army and we will continue to kill Shias Hazaras in their homes.<sup>226</sup>

On 22 February the LeJ leader Malik Ishaq was again jailed after he offered his arrest at his residence in Rahimyar Khan.<sup>227</sup> Shia leaders demanded his renewed trial, but the HDP Chairman Abd ul-Khaliq Hazara believed that Ishaq's arrest was a mere eye-wash, just to put him out of business for a limited period.<sup>228</sup> The Balochistan government did not make a request from the Punjab for his custody.<sup>229</sup> As was disclosed then, Ishaq had been appointed vice president of the ASWJ already on 18 September 2012 by Maulana Ludhianvi, who considered this a praiseworthy step aimed at making Ishaq "throw away his weapon".<sup>230</sup> Moreover, the PML-N and ASWJ had reached a consensus on seat adjustments for Punjab PA and NA candidates in the upcoming elections after renewed parleys between Ludhianvi and the minister Rana Sana'ullah.<sup>231</sup> Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik claimed that a list of 734 terrorists who should be arrested had been given to the Punjab government earlier, but the latter had taken action against the banned outfits only half-heartedly.<sup>232</sup> This was also confirmed by a confidential report prepared by the Counter Terrorism Department of the Punjab police.<sup>233</sup>

Meanwhile more terrorist attacks targeting Shias were committed outside Balochistan prior to the May 2013 elections. On 1 February, twenty-eight people were killed and forty-six injured when a suicide bomber struck outside a mosque in the Pat Bazaar of Hangu just after the Friday prayers.<sup>234</sup> On 3 March a remote-controlled car bomb exploded at the time of early evening prayers near an *imâmbârgâh* between two apartment blocks at the entrance to Abbas Town in Karachi.<sup>235</sup> The ground and first floors in two blocks were badly damaged, killing several residents even inside their apartments. Forty-eight people died and 135 were injured in the blast of an estimated 150kg explosives. Four others were killed during violent protests after the victims' funeral on 4 March.<sup>236</sup> There were also new target killings of Shias in Peshawar,<sup>237</sup> Lahore,<sup>238</sup> and Karachi.<sup>239</sup>

In March 2013 the National and Provincial Assemblies elected in 2008 completed their regular term, and 11 May was fixed as election date. The ASWJ

leader Ludhianvi again filed his candidacy for both a NA and a PA seat in Jhang, but he was surprised to find his archrival Sheikh Waqas Akram (formerly PML-Q) running against him on a ticket of the PML-N. Nawaz Sharif had meanwhile decided to distance his party from the ASWJ which felt outright betrayed.<sup>240</sup> But the PML-N awarded a ticket to Chaudhry 'Abid Raza, who had spent five years in jail on murder charges and had links with Amjad Faruqi and Malik Ishaq of LeJ, in the NA-107 (Gujrat) constituency,<sup>241</sup> and to Sardar Ebad Dogar, a long-time member of the SSP/ASWJ, as a candidate for NA-178 (Muzaffargarh).<sup>242</sup> Altogether the election commission allowed forty candidates of the ASWJ to contest in the Punjab alone.<sup>243</sup> In Karachi the ASWJ Information Secretary Aurangzeb Faruqi, who was accused of murder by local Shias, ran for a NA and a PA seat.<sup>244</sup>

The TTP launched a vicious campaign of terror against the secularist parties (PPP, MQM, and ANP) in the last weeks before the general elections,<sup>245</sup> while the PML-N and the *Pākistān Tahrīk-i Insāf* (PTI) of Imran Khan, which had both denounced the American drone strikes against militants in FATA<sup>246</sup> and pleaded for talks with the TTP, were largely spared. The PPP was routed both in the NA and in the Punjab PA elections, as was the ANP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. But there was a smooth transfer of power to the PML-N, which had won a comfortable majority both in the NA and in the Punjab PA, and to the PTI, which formed a coalition government in KPK with the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*. President Zardari retired with full honours on 8 September after completion of his term. He had anyhow already transferred key presidential powers to the parliament through the 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment in April 2010.<sup>247</sup>

None of the ASWJ candidates was successful in the May 2013 elections, but the party continued its activities despite an official ban. Ludhianvi polled 71,598 votes against 74,324 for Waqas Akram and demanded a recount.<sup>248</sup> Shortly after the elections, 112 activists of ASWJ and LeJ, who had been arrested in Punjab after the mass murder of Hazaras in Quetta three months earlier, were released, among them Malik Ishaq.<sup>249</sup> At the same time two policemen were arrested in Quetta who allegedly had close links with the LeJ leaders Asif Chotoo and Saifullah Kurd.<sup>250</sup> In August it was announced that four convicted criminals, two each from the TTP and the LeJ, would be hanged at the Sukkur jail shortly. Under the PPP government since 2008, not a single civilian had been hanged as a matter of policy, although the number of prisoners with death sentences had grown to 7,046 countrywide. 6,408 appeals against death penalties were pending before the high courts and the Supreme Court, and 532 mercy petitions were pending with the President.

When the PML-N government decided against continuing the moratorium, the TTP warned that it would have to pay a heavy price for such a “declaration of war”.<sup>251</sup> There was also strong pressure from European countries against resuming the execution of death sentences in Pakistan, and on 17 August the prime minister went back on his decision.<sup>252</sup>

Terrorist attacks against Shias continued after the elections during the last months of President Zardari’s tenure. On 15 June a female suicide bomber wearing a *burqa* sneaked into a bus parked in the Sardar Bahadur Khan Women University premises in Quetta and blew herself up after some forty girl students, most of them Hazaras, had boarded, killing fourteen. When twenty-two injured girls were brought to the Bolan Medical College hospital’s emergency, another suicide bomber struck there and gunmen started indiscriminate firing at the hospital staff, as well as on security forces and government officials who had rushed to the place. The D.C. of Quetta was among the thirty dead in the combined attacks which, according to a LeJ spokesman, came in retaliation to a raid by security forces on militants in the Kharotabad area of Quetta on 6 June.<sup>253</sup> In Peshawar three gunmen stormed the seminary named after S. ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini, who had been assassinated at the same premises in 1988,<sup>254</sup> on 21 June. One of the attackers forced his entry into the mosque inside the building and blew himself up, killing fourteen, among them a grandson of the former TNFJ leader.<sup>255</sup> On 30 June a suicide bomber detonated his vest after a failed attempt to enter an *imâmbârgâh* in Aliabad Bazaar (Quetta) killing twenty-eight people, most of them from the Hazara community.<sup>256</sup> Another attempted suicide attack was foiled in Hazara Town by alert residents on 27 July,<sup>257</sup> but there were more target killings of Hazaras by gunmen in Quetta.<sup>258</sup> On 8 August a gathering of policemen attending the funeral prayers for an officer shot down on the same day was hit by a suicide bomber. Thirty-eight died, among them the Quetta D.I.G Police (Operations), Fayyaz Sumbal. The Balochistan police had in the months before stepped up its efforts to nab sectarian militants in Quetta, so retaliation from the extremists had been expected.<sup>259</sup>

One of the worst anti-Shia suicide attacks of the year 2013 was carried out in Parachinar on 26 July.<sup>260</sup> On 9 August a terrorist stormed into the ‘*Alî Masjid* in Bhara Kahu near Islamabad during ‘*Îd al-Fitr* Friday prayers, spraying bullets at the worshippers present, but he was killed before he could detonate the explosives in his suicide jacket. Investigations revealed that a group of local students, including an eighteen-year-old girl and a boy of fourteen, were behind the act.<sup>261</sup>

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The above account of terrorist violence against Shias in the years 2000–2013 was compiled mainly from the mainstream English language Pakistani press. It covers all major terrorist incidents with mainly Shia victims during these years, but it is by no means complete. A more detailed documentation of such crimes can be found on Websites such as <http://www.shiitenews.com/>, <https://www.facebook.com/shiakilling3> and <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>.

Just as in earlier decades, the provincial governments and their law enforcement agencies have always tried their best to protect the Shia ‘*azâdârî*’ processions throughout the country at great cost, thus fulfilling a core demand of Shia communal organisations since the establishment of Pakistan, namely safeguarding their freedom of religious practice. There have also been numerous cases where the law enforcement agencies have acted with great courage and determination to nab anti-Shia terrorists and deliver them to justice. Yet the general security situation of Shias in Pakistan has deteriorated severely during the last decade. The most important factor has been the emergence of new extremist Sunni Islamist groups in the wake of the 2001 American war against the *Taleban* in Afghanistan (TTP and predecessors), the terrorism of which against multiple targets in Pakistan has almost dwarfed anti-Shia terrorism since 2009. But most murderous acts against Shias have still been carried out by sectarian fanatics affiliated to the LeJ which has existed since 1994, and which received a new lease of life through the “Talibanisation” of the FATA and other mainly Pashtun areas after 2002. TTP, LeJ, *Al-Qâ’ida* and other extremist groups have worked hand-in-glove in Pakistan to pursue their delusions of power and “doctrinal purity” with indiscriminate terrorist violence, much of it directed against Shias.

The greatest obstacle for an effective anti-terrorism strategy in Pakistan is probably the wide-spread illusion that extremists can be instrumentalised for strategic goals abroad, and at the same time be contained or appeased inside the homeland. In recent years this has led many political leaders to propagate a “political solution” of the terrorism problem to be negotiated with the TTP as “stake holders”. Such a strategy has been vehemently rejected by the leaders of Shia organisations, who very well understood its implications for their community.

### *The Shias of Kurram Agency under siege*

Violence against Shias in the Kurram Agency, which has reached an unprecedented level in the years since 2007, has paralleled the terrorist

campaign to which Shias have been exposed in other parts of Pakistan. But the situation was different there in several respects. First, the escalation of Shia-Sunni conflicts in the Kurram Agency has been closely related to the situation in Afghanistan, where the *Taleban* insurgency against NATO troops and the post-2001 political order had gathered steam since 2006, and to the mushroom growth of extremist groups in the FATA which have been organised under the umbrella of the TTP since December 2007. Secondly, while anti-Shia terrorists all over Pakistan have always targeted unarmed gatherings or individuals, Shias of the Kurram Agency have not only been victims of terrorist and other armed attacks; rather they have also fought back vigorously, as had been the case in former decades.<sup>262</sup> Thirdly, perpetrators of violence against Shias in Kurram have not only been motivated by sectarian fanaticism. In the case of local Sunni rivals of the Shia Turis and Bangash,<sup>263</sup> tribal solidarity and traditions of revenge have probably been more important, while Islamist militants of the TTP from neighbouring areas and Afghan Taliban have confronted the Shias of Kurram mainly for the sake of power and strategic goals.

Today 250,000 Shias of Kurram are concentrated in the Upper Kurram Agency around the town of Parachinar. Kurram is considered the least “tribal” of the FATA, because the local Shias have always sought protection from the state already under British rule and their literacy rate is comparable to national levels.<sup>264</sup> They have rightfully complained that they have always been fiercely loyal to Pakistan, but have often been treated poorly or have been outright abandoned by the state. Such resentments have grown very strong in recent years.

The Kurram Agency had remained fairly quiet for six years after Shia-Sunni clashes in April and May 2001,<sup>265</sup> but April 2007 marked the beginning of a prolonged ordeal for the local Shias which had become increasingly vulnerable after militant extremists had established their writ in the neighbouring Tribal Agencies of North Waziristan and Orakzai.<sup>266</sup> The trigger for the most serious period of conflict in the history of Kurram was a Sunni procession on 1 April 2007 in Parachinar. Mansur Khan Mahsud gives the following account:

In April 2007, Sunnis in Parachinar chanted anti-Shia slogans during their *Rabi‘ ul-Awwal* procession (marking the birth of the Prophet Muhammad), angering the Shia community. Shia leaders complained to local political authorities, who arrested some of the Sunni chiefs involved in the incident. The Sunnis, for their part, claimed the Shia had thrown stones at the procession. The situation escalated, and the next day Shia leaders claimed Sunnis had attacked a Shia religious

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procession with rockets and hand grenades fired from a Sunni mosque in Parachinar. Sectarian violence soon engulfed the entire city and spread to nearby villages ... When soldiers in the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps attempted to intervene, they too were attacked by both sides, and more than a dozen security personnel were killed. More than 100 people total were killed in this series of conflicts.

As bloody violence spread across Kurram, a *jirga* of Sunni and Shia elders from Hangu was convened and managed to broker a cease-fire between the two sects in Parachinar. The fighting stopped, but the residents of the city were forced to spend 45 days under a curfew implemented by the government as the situation settled down. However, sporadic clashes continued across the agency, forcing roads to close down, trapping many Shia and Sunnis in their villages.<sup>267</sup>

According to Shias from Parachinar interviewed by the same author, a former Political Agent of Kurram in December 2006 had predicted a deterioration of the situation there “after March 2007”, while the Governor of the NWFP, Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai, had warned of the same just a few days before the clashes described above.<sup>268</sup> Dr Mohammad Taqi has later explicitly blamed “the deep state” for “working overtime to manufacture a sectarian crisis in Kurram in April 2007”.<sup>269</sup> The main issue already then was a safe passage via Parachinar for insurgent operations in Afghanistan, because the “Parrot’s Beak” of Kurram was the shortest route from the FATA to Kabul. As in former decades, the Turis had flatly refused to provide such a safe passage through their areas. Shia elders from Parachinar alleged that two Political Agents had asked them to facilitate the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban’s movement or be ready for the consequences.<sup>270</sup> The actual fighting started on 6 April, and when a cease-fire went into effect on 12 April sixty-three people from both sides had been killed and 162 were injured according to the Political Agent.<sup>271</sup> A formal peace agreement was signed on 1 May in Parachinar, but a majority of Sunni tribal elders believed that it did not address their main apprehensions and initiated a fund-raising campaign to buy arms.<sup>272</sup>

On 4 August, a suicide bomber rammed his car into a parked vehicle in the *‘Idgāh* Market of Parachinar to attract a crowd and then blew it up. Five people died on the spot while forty-eight others sustained injuries.<sup>273</sup> Another round of fierce sectarian clashes erupted in Parachinar on 16 November 2007 and spread to a number of villages in Upper and Central Kurram, claiming 109 lives and 245 injured already during the first four days.<sup>274</sup> In spite of heavy deployment of troops and a number of cease-fire agreements, new flare-ups in various places of the Kurram Agency continued for almost two months.<sup>275</sup> The road connecting Parachinar with Thall

(Hangu Dist.) and the rest of Pakistan remained closed after 16 November, forcing inhabitants of Upper Kurram to travel via Afghanistan to reach Peshawar.<sup>276</sup> When an agreement was signed on 13 January 2008 after continuous efforts by the Hangu reconciliation *jirga*, the political administration, and elders of the area, 335 had died and 750 had been injured.<sup>277</sup> Allegedly militants from other parts of FATA had a large part in the fighting already in late 2007.<sup>278</sup>

On 16 February 2008, a suicide bomber rammed a car loaded with explosives into the election office of the PPP-backed independent candidate Dr S. Riyaz Husain Shah in Parachinar, killing forty-seven people. The explosion sparked riots in the town and a number of houses and shops were torched. Troops opened fire to quell the disturbances.<sup>279</sup> S. Riyaz Husain, who had not been in his office at the time of the explosion, survived another assassination attempt near Sadda town on 26 February.<sup>280</sup> There were more ambushes on the main road of Kurram, targeting an ambulance near Parachinar on 27 March,<sup>281</sup> a convoy of private vehicles escorted by security forces on 5 April,<sup>282</sup> and a convoy of trucks with food-stuff on 19 June. Eleven Shias kidnapped in the latter ambush in Lower Kurram were found murdered shortly after.<sup>283</sup> Turi Shias, for their part, kidnapped thirty Frontier Corps personnel on 30 June near Paiwar, most of them from the rival Mengal tribe.<sup>284</sup>

A new round of severe Shia-Sunni fighting started in Lower Kurram on 8 August 2008, and by 14 August it had spread to most of the Agency. Heavy weapons were used extensively by both sides, and there was massive displacement from many villages. Sunni members of the Bangash tribe alleged that the Afghan government was supporting the Turis, while the latter claimed that TTP militants were helping their rivals. Allegedly the TTP deputy commander Wali ur-Rahman had made an offer to the Turis in August 2008 to provide protection for Shia travelers if the Shia tribes stopped blocking the TTP's access to routes from Kurram into Afghanistan. The Turi elders rejected this move, suspecting that the TTP would simply take over their areas.<sup>285</sup> When a partial cease-fire was reached on 13 September, casualties had added up to more than 500.<sup>286</sup> From 19 to 27 September, a 100-member peace *jirga* from the Turi and Mengal tribes, including some MNAs and Senators, met in Peshawar and Islamabad and agreed on a cease-fire in Kurram Agency until 31 December. All the occupied places by the rival sects would have to be vacated and handed over to the real owners, prisoners would be exchanged, and the Thall-Parachinar Road would be reopened for general traffic.<sup>287</sup> The *jirga* also resolved that



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there was “no Sunni-Shia tension in Kurram Agency, rather a third hand is involved in pitting the two tribes against each other” and that “we will foil all conspiracies against our tribal people”.<sup>288</sup> On 16 October a written agreement was signed in Murree confirming the above terms.<sup>289</sup> The road to Parachinar was reopened, hostages were exchanged, and occupied villages were vacated during the last weeks of 2008.<sup>290</sup>

Implementation of the Murree Accord was found lacking in 2009, with the blockade of the main road to Parachinar resuming in already in late February.<sup>291</sup> On 16 June renewed fighting broke out in Lower Kurram which ended only on 1 July, when the army finally intervened on the side of Turi *lashkars* fighting TTP militants.<sup>292</sup> The driving force behind the new round of violence was the fervently anti-Shia extremist Hakimullah Mahsud, then TTP commander for Kurram, Orakzai, and Khyber Agencies.<sup>293</sup> At that time many TTP militants had fled a large-scale Pakistani military operation in the Swat valley and surrounding districts,<sup>294</sup> providing reinforcements to the renewed and expanded anti-Shia assault in the Kurram Agency.<sup>295</sup> Hajji Ra’uf, a Turi tribal leader, said the Turis had lost 700 young people in the last two years but had not allowed the extremists to secure a toehold in upper Kurram, although the influx of militants from Swat, Dir and other areas was worsening the situation more recently.<sup>296</sup> Others claimed that while the government had essentially stood by and watched, the Shias had been virtually wiped out in some places of Kurram, with those who could do so having fled.<sup>297</sup> Elders of six Sunni tribes, for their part, alleged that the Indian consulates in Afghanistan were supporting the Turi tribesmen who had expelled thousands of innocent Sunnis from their villages and homes in the past years.<sup>298</sup> In fact the Sunnis of Upper Kurram, especially those of Parachinar town, which in the past had often successfully calmed down sectarian conflicts, were also victims of the escalation since 2007.<sup>299</sup>

In late 2009, after the army had started another major offensive in South Waziristan,<sup>300</sup> there were signs that it took the militant threat in Kurram more seriously. On 9 November Pakistan Air Force jet fighters pounded the compounds and hideouts of TTP militants in Central Kurram for the first time.<sup>301</sup> On 15 November a first convoy of twenty-five trucks of security forces carrying food, medicines and other necessary items reached Parachinar.<sup>302</sup> More military action against the TTP in Kurram followed during the last weeks of 2009.<sup>303</sup>

The Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps pursued their operations against TTP militants in the central Kurram Agency throughout the year 2010, but little was done to free the road from Thall to Lower Kurram from



their stranglehold. Even local Sunni tribes, which resented the presence of TTP fighters from other parts of FATA in their areas and tried to put up resistance, were subdued in March 2010 by militants under the command of Mullah Tufan and had to pledge allegiance to the TTP.<sup>304</sup> On 15 May gunmen kidnapped about sixty-four people travelling from Parachinar to Hangu in two separate convoys.<sup>305</sup> Two more convoys carrying Shias from Parachinar were ambushed in July. Eleven Shias were killed in Afghanistan's Paktia province on 10 July<sup>306</sup> and eighteen more in Lower Kurram on 17 July. The latter were driving in a convoy, comprising sixty vehicles, under the escort of political officials and the Frontier Corps personnel, which was attacked with heavy weapons near Charkhel village.<sup>307</sup>

In August and September 2010 renewed fighting between the Mangal and Turi tribes in Upper Kurram, said to be related to local water and forest ownership disputes, claimed more than 150 lives.<sup>308</sup> At the same time, maximum pressure was applied on the Turis to open up their area as a refuge and transit corridor for Afghan insurgents of the Haqqani network<sup>309</sup> in case they would have to relocate from neighbouring North Waziristan. Already in 2009 the U.S. had multiplied deadly drone strikes there against individuals affiliated with the Haqqani network and other militant groups. In 2010 pressure was mounting for an army operation in North Waziristan which had emerged as the most notorious hub of extremists in Pakistan.<sup>310</sup> So at the same time when Pakistan's military stepped up operations against the TTP in Kurram, it sought to create an alternative safe haven there for fighters of the Haqqani network which remained focused on Afghanistan and had never supported hostilities of the TTP against the Pakistan Army. Concerted efforts were made to soften Shia opposition to this scheme, while at the same time letting the Haqqani network appear as "peace-makers".

Starting from September 2010, two brothers of Jalaluddin Haqqani participated in negotiations of Kurram tribal elders in Peshawar and Islamabad. The talks basically aimed at removing the obstacles for implementation of the 2008 Murree Accord, but peace efforts were now linked with the demands of the Haqqanis, which were supported by Pakistan's military leadership.<sup>311</sup> A NATO airstrike in the Matta Sangar area on 27 September furnished a pretext for the closure of five border crossings from Upper Kurram to Afghanistan by the army, thus tightening the economic strangulation of the Shia tribes.<sup>312</sup> At the same time a narrative was spread by some Pakistani papers that the Turis had "sought help" from the Haqqanis.<sup>313</sup> In reality, a large number of Turi tribal leaders and '*ulamā*' were still very much opposed to a deal with the Haqqani network on

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1 November 2010, stating they would rather “eat grass” than giving the Taliban access to their lands.<sup>314</sup> But faced with a twin blockade, other Turi leaders, including the MNA Sajid Husain Turi and former Senator, S. Sajjad Husain, gradually gave up their resistance in return for new guarantees of safe passage for Shias on the main Parachinar-Peshawar road.<sup>315</sup>

After two more raids on convoys<sup>316</sup> and the target killing of a moderate Sunni leader from Parachinar in Peshawar<sup>317</sup> in January, a new peace accord was finally proclaimed in Islamabad on 4 February 2011 by a *jirga* of Shia and Sunni elders from Kurram, presided over by the Minister of Interior. It confirmed the tenets of the 2008 Murree Accord (return of captured or deceased tribesmen, opening of the Thall-Parachinar road and resettlement of internally displaced persons), while additionally granting the Haqqanis and militant groups affiliated to them access to Afghanistan through formerly hostile Shia terrain. At that time casualties from almost four years of conflict in Kurram were estimated to have reached 2,000 killed and 3,500 wounded.<sup>318</sup>

While the new agreement was celebrated with a convoy of cars carrying Shia and Sunni leaders as well as government officials to Parachinar and local people distributed sweets and danced in the streets there and in Sadda,<sup>319</sup> analysts agreed that the Haqqani network was the main beneficiary.<sup>320</sup> Even a dissident commander of the TTP in Lower Kurram, Fazl Sa‘id Haqqani, himself a wanted criminal who had initially not been in favor of the agreement,<sup>321</sup> threatened “severe punishment under the *shari‘a*” for any violator of the peace deal.<sup>322</sup> But as expected, new ambushes on the Thall-Parachinar road occurred already in March 2011,<sup>323</sup> including the kidnapping of forty-seven Shia passengers from three vans on 25 March committed by Fazl Sa‘id’s men.<sup>324</sup> Apparently the TTP militants, which were supposed to be reined in through the influence of the Haqqani network, were much less satisfied than the latter and continued to press for their demands with violence and attempts of extortion.<sup>325</sup> In April MNAs who had been signatories of the February agreement raised the issue of its implementation in the National Assembly,<sup>326</sup> followed by agitation of the *Youth of Parachinar* in Islamabad.<sup>327</sup>

On 27 June 2011 Fazl Sa‘id parted ways with the TTP leadership and formed his own group *Tahrîk-i Talibân-i Islâmî*. He announced that his group would continue jihad against NATO forces in Afghanistan and “anti-Islam elements” in Pakistan, but would not harm state interests, saying: “We abhor killing innocent people through suicide attacks and bomb blasts, attacks on our own army, and destruction of social infrastructure.”<sup>328</sup> The real reason for Fazl Sa‘id’s defection was later revealed to be his removal

from command by the TTP leader Hakimullah Mahsud, who had demanded that the Shia hostages kidnapped by the men of Fazl Sa'id on 25 March be handed over to him so that he (Mahsud) could receive ransom for their release. Fazl Sa'id's deputy had refused, killing eight of the hostages instead.<sup>329</sup> In any case, weakening the anti-state TTP while strengthening the hand of the Haqqani network—with which Fazl Sa'id had allied himself since early 2011—was also the strategy of the Pakistan Army in Kurram.<sup>330</sup>

On 3 July the Pakistan Army and Air Force launched a full-fledged operation against the TTP in Central Kurram, focusing on the mountainous areas adjacent to the Orakzai Agency.<sup>331</sup> It was later backed up by a *lashkar* of the Sunni Masozai tribe joining the fight against the militants.<sup>332</sup> But the strongholds of Fazl Sa'id in Lower Kurram, the focal point of security problems, were spared in this offensive which was suspected by local Shias to be just a prelude to the planned disarmament of the Turis in Upper Kurram.<sup>333</sup> In fact the Thall-Sadda road was still not safe for Shia travelers when the Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani flew to Parachinar on 18–19 August and declared Kurram free of “miscreants”. The operation had also forced thousands of civilians to leave their homes temporarily, allowing TTP militants to burn down sixteen vacated villages with an average of fifty to sixty houses.<sup>334</sup>

While the military operation against the TTP was still going on, a rare terrorist attack was committed by Shias near Parachinar. On 16 July a pick-up truck was sprayed with bullets in Bushara village, killing eleven Sunni passengers, including three women and three children.<sup>335</sup> In an apparent act of retaliation, armed men attacked a convoy of trucks, kidnapped ten people and set six vehicles on fire near Charkhel village in Lower Kurram on the next day.<sup>336</sup> On 1 and 2 September two more vans were ambushed by gunmen, killing eleven mainly Shia passengers.<sup>337</sup> In September and October 2011 two convoys were not allowed to proceed to Peshawar from Parachinar due to security concerns.<sup>338</sup> A Sunni MPA from Hangu stated that the Thall-Parachinar road had been “virtually seized by Taliban”, and that “because of ... acts of terrorism by Taliban and the warlords, traders and farmers have ... suffered losses amounting to at least Rs. 70 billion so far”.<sup>339</sup> But in late October 2011 an important step towards implementation of the peace accord was made with the return of eighty Sunni families which had been displaced from Parachinar since 1982 and of Shia families to Sadda town.<sup>340</sup> At the same time, Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps personnel took over security checkpoints in Parachinar from Shia militiamen.<sup>341</sup>

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In January 2012 attacks by TTP militants against an outpost of the Pakistan Army near Jogi village, overlooking important pathways between the Orakzai and Kurram Agencies, triggered another round of heavy fighting.<sup>342</sup> On 17 February, while the military operation was still going on, a suicide bomber killed dozens in a busy market outside a mosque in Parachinar. Three more were killed when security forces stopped angry Shia protestors from damaging property of local Sunnis.<sup>343</sup> Fazl Sa'id Haqqani, who had eight months earlier declared his "abhorrence" of suicide attacks, claimed responsibility, saying: "We have targeted the Shia community of Parachinar because they were involved in activities against us. We also warn the political administration of Parachinar to stop siding with the Shia community in all our disputes."<sup>344</sup> According to another report, Fazl Sa'id had specifically blamed the Shias for taking sides and backing the government and armed forces in the ongoing military operation against the TTP in Kurram Agency.<sup>345</sup>

In another protest rally on 20 February, the Shia group *Youth of Parachinar* demanded the execution of Fazl Sa'id and punishment of those who had allegedly opened fire on protesters three days before. They also reiterated the fact that no terrorist attack had occurred in Parachinar during the last four years when Shia volunteers had manned check-posts.<sup>346</sup> One day later security forces demolished three houses and a filling station owned by Fazl Sa'id and his relatives, but he was not otherwise harmed.<sup>347</sup> In the following months there were some more attacks on vehicles on the main highway in Lower Kurram,<sup>348</sup> and on 10 September 2012 another major terrorist attack hit Parachinar. A car bomb exploded in the busy Kashmir Chowk, killing two people on the spot while twelve others died at or on their way to the hospital. The blast destroyed thirty shops and badly damaged 100 others. A previously unknown Ghazi Group of the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack and said it was aimed at the Shia community.<sup>349</sup> Some other terrorist attacks occurred in Kurram in the autumn of 2012,<sup>350</sup> but the hazards for Shias travelling the Parachinar-Thall road had slightly decreased as compared to previous years.

On 9 January 2013 the Parachinar PPP leader Dr Riyaz Husain, who had survived two attempts on his life in 2008, was shot dead in Peshawar and buried in his hometown.<sup>351</sup> On 12 May 2013 Sajid Husain Turi, who had endorsed the 2011 peace agreement without reservations, was re-elected in the NA-37 constituency (Parachinar) as an independent candidate. Female supporters of his rival S. Qaisar Husain Shah, a former air-marshal, alleged that they had been stopped from casting their votes, and there were other

accusations of rigging.<sup>352</sup> One week before the elections a remote-controlled bomb killed twenty-three people at an election rally of the JUI-F in Sewak (Central Kurram). A TTP spokesman claimed responsibility and said the target had been the former MNA Munir Khan Orakzai, who escaped the blast unhurt.<sup>353</sup> Thus the TTP, which was further pressed by military operations in Kurram in 2013, did not even spare the leaders and supporters of a Sunni Islamist mainstream party. On 26 July terrorists struck once more against mostly Shia civilians in Parachinar. Two hours before *iftar* two blasts carried out by suicide bombers in close intervals killed sixty people shopping in a busy market and caused widespread destruction.<sup>354</sup> The spokesman of *Ansâr ul-Mujâhidîn*—a front organisation of the TTP<sup>355</sup>—declared that more similar attacks against the Shia community in Pakistan were planned “to seek revenge of the brutalities of Shia on Sunni Muslims in Syria and Iraq.”<sup>356</sup> On the same day another passenger car was attacked with an improvised explosive device in Lower Kurram.<sup>357</sup> Again there were questions as to how the terrorists had been able to cross several security check-posts, and Shia leaders demanded that the security of Parachinar town should be handed back to local volunteers.<sup>358</sup>

The balance sheet of the February 2011 Kurram peace agreement has so far been hardly encouraging. Although the worst case scenario which some of its detractors have evoked—disarmament of the Shia Turis to leave them at the mercy of Afghan *Taleban* of the Haqqani network and their militant allies—had not come true until the autumn of 2013, the new series of bomb attacks may be a foretaste of worse to come. There have been no major armed clashes between local Shia and Sunni tribes since 2011 and the blockade of Upper Kurram has been eased, but the road from Parachinar to Thall was still far from safe for Shia travelers. In the coming years the further course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the extent of Pakistan’s involvement in that conflict will be critical for the fate of the Shias in Kurram, as well as the state’s policy towards the local militants of the TTP. In the best case scenario the government and army of Pakistan would seriously confront the TTP to re-establish its writ all over the FATA and stop supporting Afghan insurgent groups, but that was still far from reality in the autumn of 2013.

#### *Responses from Shia communal organisations*

Escalating violence against their co-religionists in many towns and other areas of Pakistan, as described in the two previous sections, has remained

the most important issue for all Shia organisations in the era from 2000 to 2013. In response to that challenge both the TJP/ITP, which remained under the leadership of S. Sajid Ali Naqvi throughout this period,<sup>359</sup> and the new organisation *Majlis-i Wahdat-i Muslimîn*, which has quickly eclipsed the influence of the TJP/ITP after 2009,<sup>360</sup> stuck to a strategy which had been introduced already by the TNFJ leader S. ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini in the 1980s, namely to seek common ground with mainstream Sunni Islamist parties on political and religious issues as much as possible. Anti-Americanism, often in the garb of “anti-imperialism”, has remained the most convenient common denominator with Sunni Islamists which both Shia organisations have emphasised consistently. In accordance with this line of thinking, which has also been the agenda set by Iran’s religious leaders for their followers in Pakistan since the 1980s,<sup>361</sup> terrorist violence against Shias has regularly been portrayed as the result of American and Israeli “instigation” or “conspiracies” to divide the Muslim *umma* and weaken the Islamic nation of Pakistan, with the Saudi “Wahhabis” allegedly giving support to local Sunni extremists “at their masters’ behest”.

In their struggle against violent sectarian fanaticism the Shia organisations have found most common ground with Barelvi Sunni organisations such as the JUP, the *Sunnî Tahrîk* and the *Sunni Ittihad Council*, especially after Barelvi religious gatherings and shrines had become targets of terrorist attacks, too.<sup>362</sup> But more important for the TJP/ITP, at least during the years 2002–8, was its political alignment with the JUI-F and the *Jamâ‘at-i Islâmî*, the two most influential parties of the Islamist alliance MMA.<sup>363</sup> Although Sajid Naqvi had backed President Musharraf’s Afghan policy U-turn after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he was nevertheless opposed to direct military cooperation with the U.S. during the latter’s airborne war against the Taliban in the autumn of 2001.<sup>364</sup> When those parties which had led country-wide protests against the U.S. war in Afghanistan formed the MMA on 2 January 2002, the TJP was accepted as one of the six members of that alliance, and both the JUI-F and the *Jamâ‘at-i Islâmî* defended the TJP against the unjust decision of its ban ten days later.<sup>365</sup> Sajid Naqvi first announced to rename the TJP *Millat-i Ja‘fariya-i Pakistân* and vowed to challenge its ban in the Supreme Court, adding that the TJP was not involved and would never indulge in terrorism.<sup>366</sup> The request to lift the ban on the TJP was finally rejected on 10 July 2002,<sup>367</sup> but shortly after it was allowed to register under the new name *Islâmî Tahrîk-i Pâkistân* (ITP) for the October 2002 parliamentary elections.<sup>368</sup> The TJP/ITP did contest the elections under the umbrella of the MMA and remained an integral part of

that alliance throughout the following six years, but it did not win a single NA or PA seat in October 2002; neither did the MMA facilitate the election of a single ITP candidate to the Senate in February 2003.<sup>369</sup> On the other hand, when Sajid Naqvi was arrested on 15 November 2003, five weeks after he had been named among the suspects in the A'zam Tariq murder case,<sup>370</sup> the MMA stood by his side, considering the renewed ban on the ITP—which was proclaimed on the same day—as an attempt to weaken the MMA at a critical junction.<sup>371</sup> Allegedly government agencies offered Sajid Naqvi release on three conditions at that time: first, to hold a dialogue with the new SSP leader Ahmad Ludhianvi; second, to support the “Shariat Bill” moved by A'zam Tariq in the National Assembly on 1 October;<sup>372</sup> and third, a joint declaration of the TJP/ITP and the SSP/MIP in favour of an amnesty for all those accused of sectarian killings. Sajid Naqvi, who had refused to let the TJP be treated on equal footing with the SSP already in 2000,<sup>373</sup> was not ready to speak with Ludhianvi alone, but only if the latter would be included in a panel of senior religious leaders.<sup>374</sup> On 27 March 2004 Naqvi was released on bail without having met any of the three conditions mentioned above,<sup>375</sup> and he was finally acquitted in the murder case in November 2004.<sup>376</sup> A few days later Qazi Husain Ahmad, who had just been re-elected *Amîr* of the *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî* and was then the acting President of the MMA, visited Sajid Naqvi in Islamabad and both confirmed that the ITP was “very much part and parcel of the MMA”.<sup>377</sup> Qazi Husain Ahmad had long since considered Naqvi innocent and had demanded his release.<sup>378</sup>

In the same year major terrorist attacks against Shias in Quetta, Karachi, Sialkot and Lahore called for a strong reaction. After the ‘*Āshûrâ*’ massacre in Quetta (2 March 2004) the leading Hazara Shia ‘*âlim*’, Shaikh Ya‘qub Ali Tawassuli, levelled harsh accusations against the security forces and the local administration and threatened not to bury the dead until twenty-six arrested Shias would be released.<sup>379</sup> In chorus with the ITP, Sunni ‘*ulamâ*’ and leaders of the MMA blamed unspecified “intelligence agencies” and the U.S. for the terrorist attack and subsequent mob violence.<sup>380</sup> In Karachi and Sialkot, too, Shia leaders were unable to stop protesters of their community from arson and violence after suicide attacks on mosques in 2004 and blamed the authorities’ failure to punish the culprits for the rampage.<sup>381</sup> In October 2004 Shia terrorists also committed one of the worst ever retaliatory attacks against Sunni supporters of the SSP in Multan.<sup>382</sup> The largest Shia communal mobilisation of that year, however, took place in Gilgit where local Shias had protested since 2000 against textbooks and curricula which they found biased in favour of Sunni religious beliefs. In May 2004



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Shia students began to boycott classes and stage rallies, and more than 300 of them went on a hunger strike. When Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, the head of the local *Anjuman-i Imâmîya*, set an ultimatum for the government to remove controversial parts of the syllabus by 3 June, the army imposed a curfew in Gilgit. Despite the curfew, demonstrations took place and turned violent, especially against governmental institutions, and clashes between Shia protestors and security personnel spread to other parts of the Northern Areas.<sup>383</sup> Ziauddin Rizvi was later assassinated,<sup>384</sup> and schools were reopened in Gilgit only in May 2005, after the controversial textbooks had been replaced.<sup>385</sup>

The pattern of angry Shia protestors damaging public and private property after terrorists had struck at Shia places of worship, mourning processions or other gatherings, often killing and wounding dozens of innocent victims, was to be repeated in the following years. Although each new terrorist attack drew strong-worded condemnations from government officials and political leaders, neither the federal and provincial governments nor the law enforcement agencies were able and willing to tackle the root cause, namely the proliferation of anti-Shia hatred and religious fanaticism by countless *madrasas*, in a serious and comprehensive way, in spite of attempts to impose state control and curricula reforms on the *dînî madâris*.<sup>386</sup> Another key factor facilitating anti-Shia violence, the widespread laxity of law-enforcement agencies and courts dealing with known sectarian criminals and hate preachers—some praiseworthy exceptions notwithstanding—was harshly criticised by the ITP and other Shia organisations consistently, but with little effect. In Pakistan protest rallies and other forms of agitation for a myriad of causes have been daily events for decades, and even terrorist attacks have been carried out in such huge numbers in recent years that combating terrorism against Shias has not been perceived as an urgent priority by political decision-makers.<sup>387</sup>

Thus there is little wonder that the TJP/ITP, which had lost steam already in the 1990s and was further weakened by opposition of many former supporters against Sajid Naqvi's leadership role since 1998,<sup>388</sup> could not meet the expectations of its Shia popular base which was growing more and more desperate about the state's inability to provide protection from terrorists and punish known culprits of crimes against Shias. The TJP/ITP faced the additional problem of being technically a "banned outfit" since at least November 2003, despite having changed its name.<sup>389</sup> Although the SSP, renamed MIP and later ASWJ, had to cope with the same handicap, this had a different quality, because the SSP—unlike the TJP/ITP—had in fact preached hatred against Pakistani countrymen ever since its foundation in 1984.



Before the general elections in February 2008 the MMA had disintegrated, mainly due to rivalry between the JUI-F and the *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî*. The latter party boycotted the elections, and the JUI-F, contesting under the name of MMA on its own, won just eight of 341 seats in the National Assembly and fourteen of 124 seats in the NWFP Provincial Assembly.<sup>390</sup> The TJP/ITP has since remained without the political cover of the MMA, although Sajid Naqvi has in later years participated in attempts to resurrect that alliance.<sup>391</sup> In any case, just as in 2002 the ITP did not win a single NA or PA seat in 2008.

On 3 August 2008 the ISO organised an '*Azmat-i Shuhadâ*' Conference in Islamabad on the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the murder of S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini.<sup>392</sup> History repeated itself on that day, because exactly ten years earlier the same anniversary had served as the occasion to proclaim a *Shûrâ-i Wahdat-i Islâmî*, meant as an alternative to the TJP, in Peshawar.<sup>393</sup> This time the alternative organisation, which then presented itself to a larger public for the first time, was named *Majlis-i Wahdat-i Muslimîn* ("Council of Unity of Muslims"; MWM), and it turned out to be much more successful than its predecessor—and the renamed TJP—at mobilising Shias for communal causes and exerting political pressure. Although the founding date of the MWM is given as 2 August 2009 in an official self-portrait,<sup>394</sup> the same source also mentions the '*Azmat-i Shuhadâ*' Conference in Islamabad one year earlier as the "precursor to the launch of MWM on the national stage".<sup>395</sup> Its actual foundation by a core group of '*ulamâ*' in the Punjab dates back to April 2008.<sup>396</sup>

An overwhelming influence of Iran on the MWM was visible from the start. It has a collective leadership with a Supreme Council (*shûrâ-i 'âlî*) comprising fourteen '*ulamâ*', seven "technocrats", and four provincial *Amîrs*. Its Secretary-General, Raja Nasir 'Abbas Ja'fari, was first appointed by a Supervising Council (*shûrâ-i nazârat*) of '*ulamâ*' and in turn selected a sixteen-member cabinet.<sup>397</sup> Three years later Raja Nasir 'Abbas disclosed that before the establishment of MWM he had contacted the office of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei for advice and got the message that "inaction of Shias should end in Pakistan". Nasir 'Abbas also said that he considered all those believing in *wilâyat-i faqîh* part of the MWM.<sup>398</sup> Khamenei, for his part, has found among Pakistan's Shias an important constituency for his claim to supreme religious authority (*marja'îya*), which has long remained disputed in Iran in spite of his selection as the successor of Khomeini in 1989. Alex Vatanka has given the following interpretation:

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It is well-known that Pakistani Shia have from days predating the Islamic Republic looked to the clerics of Qom for religious leadership. However, since Khamenei came to power the Shia religious linkages between Iran and Pakistan have noticeably shifted away from the *marja*'s (the clerical sources of emulation) of Qom. Now, the linkages appear focused on garnering Pakistani acceptance of the Khomeinist concept of the *wilāyat-i faqih*. Meanwhile, this process has also included a great deal of lionizing of Khamenei when Iranian efforts target the Shia of Pakistan. [...] ... because Khamenei lacked religious qualifications and a spiritual following before he was selected as Supreme Leader, he opted to look beyond Iran's borders to establish his name as a *marja*'. Because of the large size of the Shia population in Pakistan ... and also because there are relatively few leading Shia religious figures in the country, it appears that Khamenei decided that Pakistan was a fertile ground for his religious outreach.

[...] many of Pakistan's Shia religious figures have become highly vocal and partisan supporters of Khamenei [...] Not only do Pakistan's pro-Iran Shia '*ulamā*' come to Khamenei's defense when he faces his internal Iranian detractors, but they give much publicity and credence to his vision and role as a pan-regional Islamic leader [...] Thanks to Iranian funding, this veneration of Khamenei has also become strongly visible in cyberspace. Today, dozens of Pakistani Shia Islamist websites are in operation and they actively engage in propagating the Iranian regime's messages and the teachings of Ayatollah Khamenei.<sup>399</sup>

The MWM joined together a number of well-known dissenters of the TJP/ITP and younger Shia '*ulamā*' and communal activists who strongly believed that the Islamic Republic of Iran could serve as a role model for Pakistan, notwithstanding its large Sunni majority.<sup>400</sup> This was also the ideology of the ISO, which gave all-out support to the MWM from the start, and of the late S. Arif Husain al-Husaini, whose veneration was raised to new heights by the MWM. Its official three-point agenda was: (1) ensuring Pakistan's stability, particularly defending it against foreign interference; (2) preventing sectarian infighting and insisting on a united *umma*; and (3) ending injustice.<sup>401</sup> But although any reference to Shi'ism was omitted from its name—as has been the case with the TJP successor ITP already since 2002—almost all MWM activities, naturally, focused on Shia grievances, with terrorist violence against Shias on top of the list.

A joint call with other Shia organisations for a shutter-down and wheel-jam strike in Karachi and three days of mourning after an attack on the main '*Āshûrâ*' procession on 28 December 2009 was the first of countless MWM protest actions.<sup>402</sup> After another terrorist attack in Karachi on 5 February 2010 the MWM and ISO jointly led rallies in Lahore and Sindh province.<sup>403</sup> On 23 April 2010 the MWM organised its first countrywide

protest against what it termed the “genocide” of Shia Muslims in Pakistan. Its leaders demanded from President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani and Army Chief Kayani to take concrete steps to stop the target killing of Shias in Quetta and to immediately initiate an army operation in Quetta, the Kurram Agency and Kohat to eliminate the terrorists from these areas.<sup>404</sup> At a sit-in outside the Provincial Assembly in Lahore (26 April) MWM leaders expressed their deep concern about the support of the Punjab Government for “the banned terrorist’s outfit SSP” and denounced its “discriminatory policies against the Shia community”.<sup>405</sup>

In the meantime, the MWM held its first party convention in Islamabad on 10–11 April 2010. Raja Nasir ‘Abbas Ja’fari was confirmed as Secretary-General for three years by more than 300 representatives of the MWM Central Executive Council from Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. The convention was also meant as a show of strength directed at the rivaling TJP/ITP. Muhammad Amin Shahidi, the number two of the MWM, said that the main reason of its formation was to provide a platform to Pakistan’s Shia community as the former leader (S. Sajid Ali Naqvi) had failed to represent it and defend its interest. The major objective of the MWM would be to create harmony among the Muslim sects and initiate efforts to rid the country of the U.S. influence.<sup>406</sup>

Although the leaders MWM have never hidden their ambition to supersede the TJP/ITP, they often cooperated with the latter for pressing common demands. In May 2010 both groups jointly threatened to lead a march to Quetta and besiege the governor’s and chief minister’s houses unless stern action were taken against the perpetrators of target killings of Shias there.<sup>407</sup> The threat was not followed up in Quetta at that time, but on 18 June MWM leaders launched a “Defence of Shi’ism” campaign with the same demands in Karachi, accusing also the Sindh government of failing to act against anti-Shia terrorists.<sup>408</sup> In what would become typical of a more assertive style of agitation, both the MWM and the ISO defied a ban on rallies on 20 June. Speakers blamed the “genocide” of Shias in Pakistan on a “deep-rooted conspiracy of the Zionist-controlled U.S. administration”.<sup>409</sup> The next step of the MWM was a convention in Islamabad under the slogan *wahdat-i millat* (unity of the people) on 1 August, focusing on the plight of the Shias in Upper Kurram and announcing a “peace caravan” with relief goods to Parachinar.<sup>410</sup> In the same month the MWM also organised help for Shia victims of that year’s disastrous floods in southern Punjab.<sup>411</sup>

After attacks on Shia processions in Lahore and Quetta in September 2010 the MWM, together with the ISO, was again leading the largest protest

rallies,<sup>412</sup> followed by agitation after two other incidents in Karachi.<sup>413</sup> On 3 October the MWM hosted a "National Shia Conference" in Islamabad where anti-Shia terrorists were accused of "working on the very own agenda for the U.S. to destabilise and disintegrate Pakistan". Speakers demanded that the government not only immediately restore its writ in the Kurram Agency, but also "take effective and immediate measures to stop the drone and ISAF forces attacks inside Pakistani territory".<sup>414</sup> In the same convention and in press conferences ahead of Muharram that year MWM leaders made it clear that they would not accept any restrictions on the usual Shia '*azâdârî* processions, which were a constitutional right'.<sup>415</sup> The MWM central spokesman S. Hasan Zafar Naqvi claimed that a vast majority of Pakistani Shias had been united under the banner of the MWM which in fact was "a platform of unity of Muslims".<sup>416</sup>

In the spring of 2011 the MWM welcomed the uprisings in the Arab world as an "Islamic liberation movement" and organised rallies and conventions in their support.<sup>417</sup> Just as in Iran, the uprising in Bahrain was the focus of solidarity for Shias in Pakistan,<sup>418</sup> while that of Syria remained excluded from any sympathy.<sup>419</sup> The MWM joined the outcry of Sunni Islamist parties against the American CIA contractor Raymond Davis,<sup>420</sup> and even the condemnations of the U.S. raid against the residence of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad.<sup>421</sup> In May 2011 Pakistan's rising political star Imran Khan visited S. Hasan Zafar Naqvi at his residence in Karachi with a delegation of his *Pākistān Tahrīk-i Insāf* (PTI), inviting the MWM to attend a PTI sit-in protesting against the increasing drone attacks and U.S. influence in Pakistan.<sup>422</sup>

Swimming with the rising tide of anti-Americanism which has swept Pakistan in recent years may have been politically convenient for the MWM and other Shia organisations, but it also hampered a proper response to the reality of homegrown anti-Shia fanaticism and terrorism. Instead of allying itself with secularist parties and progressive elements that have strived for the protection of minorities in Pakistan, the MWM has indirectly given political support to the very forces which have fathered the extremists of the SSP, LeJ and TTP, or have at least consistently tried to appease and accommodate them.<sup>423</sup> In July 2011 the MWM and ISO organised another convention in Islamabad on the death anniversary of S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini, this time a week earlier to avoid the month of Ramadan. It was named "Independence of Pakistan Convention" and speakers duly condemned "foreign conspiracies against Pakistan",<sup>424</sup> but the focus was on the situation of Shias in Parachinar. Already in April that year the *Youth of*

*Parachinar* had set up a protest camp outside the National Press Club in the capital which was maintained for 110 days, and the MNA Sajid Husain Turi had made himself a spokesman of the protestors.<sup>425</sup> S. Hasan Zafar Naqvi visited the camp on 11 May and the MWM, not to be outdone, compared the blockade of Parachinar with that of Gaza in Palestine, organising another convoy of relief goods for the town's Shias.<sup>426</sup>

On 8 August 2011 leaders of the MWM met representatives of the MQM, ANP and *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî* in Karachi to discuss the prevailing law and order situation in the city, but not without emphasising the need "to bring out Pakistan from the clutches of America and Israel".<sup>427</sup> Thereafter the mass murder of Shia pilgrims in Mastung near Quetta on 20 September sparked another wave of countrywide protests in which the MWM and ISO took the lead,<sup>428</sup> demanding the immediate dismissal of the Balochistan government.<sup>429</sup> On 18 October some MWM leaders for the first time publicly accused Pakistan's intelligence agencies of giving patronage to the terrorists involved in the killing of Shias in Quetta,<sup>430</sup> and ten days later the MWM joined hands with the TJP/ITP and local organisations in a conference in Quetta honouring the martyrs and expressing solidarity with the Hazara community of Balochistan.<sup>431</sup> On 29 December 2011 a delegation of the MWM visited the headquarters of the *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî* near Lahore to sort out a conflict between the latter's student's organisation, the *Islâmî Jam'iyat-i Talaba*, and Shia students at the Punjab University campus. The talks were held in a friendly atmosphere and *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî* leaders were ready to accommodate the MWM,<sup>432</sup> which had meanwhile established itself in the political scene and earned the respect of the mainstream Islamist parties.

On 10 January 2012, a second high-level meeting between the MWM and the PTI took place and both parties agreed on a number of issues which were outlined at a joint press conference of Imran Khan and Raja Nasir 'Abbas Ja'fari. Both leaders demanded, among other things, an independent foreign policy of Pakistan, a complete stop of transit facilities for NATO troops in Afghanistan,<sup>433</sup> and complete provincial autonomy for Gilgit-Baltistan. Both also negated any Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan, blaming "some agents of America" of "hatching the conspiracy of sectarian strife in the country to fulfill their vested interests".<sup>434</sup>

The massacre of Shia bus passengers in Gilgit-Baltistan on 28 February 2012<sup>435</sup> triggered another wave of country-wide Shia protests in which the MWM took the lead.<sup>436</sup> At the same time the MWM announced a convention in Karachi on 25 March which was to focus on American interference

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in Pakistan, but also on the pressing issue of terrorism.<sup>437</sup> It turned out the largest Shia congregation under the auspices of the MWM so far with some 250,000 participants from all parts of Pakistan, although attempts had been made to obstruct it by removing banners and posters in parts of Karachi.<sup>438</sup> Raja Nasir 'Abbas Ja'fari as the main speaker declared that Shias would not support those political parties in the forthcoming elections which had previously secured their votes but then remained silent on their "genocide". They had decided to vote for those who sided with Shias in hardships. Moreover, only those candidates who rejected the U.S. agenda for Pakistan would be voted. He accused "U.S. imperialism" of wanting civil wars and destabilisation in all Muslim countries, especially in Pakistan. The MWM would enjoy "unwavering support from Muslims" and oppose terrorism and extremism, but "empty words and lip service" could not eliminate these menaces.<sup>439</sup> A number of other speakers lamented the "genocide" of Shias in Pakistan which according to 'Abbas Kumaili had reached 8,000 victims so far but had not caught the attention of Pakistan's superior courts.<sup>440</sup> They criticised the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Amnesty International and many writers and media persons for being either silent on Shia "genocide" in Pakistan or dishonestly misrepresent it as equal violence between Sunnis and Shias.<sup>441</sup> A critical observer of the convention gave the following resume:

In this conference, which was misrepresented or blacked out on the pages of *Express Tribune*, *Dawn* and several other so-called progressive media outlets, one speaker spoke the typical ISI line and deflected the blame of Shia genocide by pandering to the *Jamâ'at-i Islâmî* lobby (e.g. stop the NATO supply line, U.S. and Israel are killing Shias of Pakistan). However, this speaker was not the only one and as shown, most other speakers highlighted the real issue of who is killing Shias, who has failed them (army, judiciary, PPP, MQM) and how the intelligentsia, civil society, liberal secularist lobbies and human rights activists have stayed mostly silent on this burning issue. This last group should have been at the forefront of highlighting Shia genocide but it seems that they are more interested in nit-picking and misrepresenting the work of activists who are highlighting Shia genocide in Pakistan. In the media, *Dawn* and *Express Tribune* blacked this out from their live updates and provided some token column space in their Karachi section. This did not even qualify in their National and Headline section.<sup>442</sup>

Another observer focused on the anti-American rhetoric during the convention, remarking that:

While we welcome the increasing wave of awareness amongst Pakistan's Shia Muslims in response to their ongoing genocide by Jihadi-sectarian terrorists (ASWJ-SSP, Taliban), it is important to offer some advice to the organisers of the

Quran-o-Ahle Bait Conference ... particularly the leaders of ... MWM. We are worried that some of the discourse being used by at least some Shia speakers and religious scholars seems to be directly inspired from the official policy of Pakistan army and intelligence agencies and is not very different from the xenophobic and conspiracy theory discourse of the ISI-sponsored *Difā'-i Pākistān* Council.<sup>443</sup> ... Out of the 16 points of the resolution passed by the conference, at least 8 seem to be directly taken from a *Difā'-i Pākistān* Council or ISPR<sup>444</sup> press release with minor edits or tweaking. We suggest that MWM must refrain from recycling and reinforcing the *Difā'-i Pākistān*'s discourse on NATO supplies, US-Israel conspiracy in Shia genocide, etc. Why can't they plainly hold the Saudi-funded, ISI-supported Jihadi-Deobandis responsible for Shia genocide in Pakistan? They must not forget that the US's actions, of course shaped by its own priorities, served to save Shias of Afghanistan from *Taleban* and Shias of Iraq from Saddam Hussain. Yes, US's role on Iran, Israel and Bahrain is based on hypocrisy, yet politics is the art of possibilities. Nobody is killing Shias in the USA, UK or India, they are being killed in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain by Jihadi-Deobandis and Jihadi-Salafis.<sup>445</sup>

Jehangir Hafsi has commented on the convention in the same vein, advising the MWM to practice more intellectual honesty:

With due respect, MWM leaders and Shia intelligentsia must focus on the urgent issue. There is a Shia genocide going on in Pakistan and the perpetrators do not distinguish as to whether their next Shia victim does *taqlid*, believes in *wilāyat-i faqih*, is secular, is abusive of Shia beliefs, etc. You don't have to look far back as it was just Kohistan where Shias were simply separated on the basis of name and sect, and then butchered. Furthermore, those who are killing Shias are also killing Ahmadiya Muslims, Christians and Sunni Barelvis. MWM did not go far enough in reaching out to fellow sufferers. Also, limiting criticism to the US and Israel and providing token critique to the security establishment including judiciary, and their Saudi financiers, that developed Strategic Depth and enabled Jihadis (who are doing this mass killing) is intellectual dishonesty. This will only harm the otherwise commendable effort of gathering close to half a million Shias in Karachi.<sup>446</sup>

Whether such kind of advice has ever reached the leaders of MWM or not, it would not have been heeded in any case. They stuck to their line of linking their fully justified lamentations against anti-Shia terrorists and official passivity in dealing with them with diatribes against the U.S., Israel, and occasionally even India. This was also the case during a protest campaign after renewed killings of Shias in Chilas near Gilgit in April 2012.<sup>447</sup> After rallies in Karachi and Quetta, with the usual burning of U.S. flags and slogans against the joint "conspiracy" of the U.S., Israel, and banned terrorist outfits,<sup>448</sup> the MWM staged a sit-in outside the Parliament House in



Islamabad which was kept up for nine days until the government accepted a number of demands.<sup>449</sup> In the meantime Raja Nasir 'Abbas, addressing a rally in Karachi, had demanded the government close the U.S. embassy and expel U.S. diplomats and "Zionists" if it was serious in thwarting sectarian tensions in Pakistan. According to the MWM leader, the Federal Interior Minister should also be dismissed and the Chief Minister of Balochistan be arrested for "genocide" against Shias.<sup>450</sup> And even after the apparent acceptance of its demands concerning Gilgit-Baltistan, the MWM would soon find reasons to complain about the way the government was dealing with the tensions there.<sup>451</sup> Referring to an operation against Shias in the Hunza-Nager District, Raja Nasir 'Abbas accused state institutions of having formed "an undeclared alliance with the terrorists": Instead of supporting the local Shias—who had liberated Gilgit-Baltistan from India in 1947–48 and then joined Pakistan—against terrorists, state institutions had launched a crackdown on them.<sup>452</sup> In July 2012 the local government tried to ban his entry into Gilgit-Baltistan, but had to give in after strong protests of Shias in Skardu and Gilgit.<sup>453</sup>

Already in April 2012, after the great success of its Karachi Convention, the MWM announced plans to transform itself into a political party. "Pakistan needs an honest and patriotic leadership, and we shall bring that qualified leadership", Amin Shahidi said on 26 April. He further opined that religion was defamed because religious groups and leaders had been hijacked in many cases by intelligence agencies in the past, but now the country would need "an ideological movement".<sup>454</sup> One month later, during a speech in Multan, Raja Nasir 'Abbas stated that political parties had always begged votes from Shias but had given nothing to them in return. Now Shias would no longer vote for those parties which had not benefited them. He accused the PML-N of supporting banned terrorist groups and the PPP of being a silent spectator to the "genocide" of Shias in Quetta.<sup>455</sup> During another speech on 10 June in Bhakkar, Raja Nasir 'Abbas termed *wilāyat-i faqīh* "the best political system, that brings pious people to rule the people", and said that time had gone when Shias were lured to vote for secular parties. From now on Shias would vote for only those parties who would serve their interests according to their legitimate inalienable rights.<sup>456</sup>

On 1 July 2012 the MWM staged another show of strength in Lahore with a much publicised "Koran and Sunna Conference" at *Minâr-i Pâkistân*, following the example of S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini twenty-five years earlier.<sup>457</sup> Among the many Shia dignitaries invited was also S. Sajid Ali Naqvi<sup>458</sup> whose TJI/ITP was meanwhile reduced to the role of a junior



partner of the MWM, but who still headed the *Shia Ulama Council* and enjoyed some standing among his Sunni partners in the MYC and the defunct MMA. The conference, although probably with less attendance than the 25 March convention in Karachi,<sup>459</sup> was another example of successful mass mobilisation by the MWM, with the participants braving scorching heat all day with great discipline. Raja Nasir ‘Abbas Ja‘fari used it as a platform to announce full participation of the MWM in the next parliamentary elections, claiming that all the Shias of the country were now converged on a new platform for achieving their religious and political rights. He accused each mainstream political force of having cheated the Shias after getting their votes and warned that no party, including the PPP, could deceive the Shia populace any further. In the next year Shias would be “the biggest political party in the country” and Shia votes would not be given to any party joining hands with terrorists or banned groups. Ja‘fari warned that the MWM would lay siege to the Army headquarters, the President’s house and the Prime Minister’s house if the target killings of Shias was not stopped, but as usual, his harshest threats and polemics were reserved for the Americans. He termed the U.S. embassy and consulates “the real centers of terrorism in Pakistan” and warned that the Shias would “expel the Americans from Pakistan if the state institutions failed to do so”. According to him, Americans had faced defeat in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria and would face the same fate in Pakistan. “We will expel the Americans from Pakistan with insult”, the MWM leader threatened.<sup>460</sup>

MWM activities remained in high gear in the second half of 2012. These included a showdown in Gilgit-Baltistan after the expulsion order for Nasir ‘Abbas Ja‘fari on 18 July,<sup>461</sup> agitation against a speech of the released LeJ terrorist Malik Ishaq in Chiniot on 8 August<sup>462</sup> and after a new case of selective killing of bus passengers on their way to Gilgit on 16 August,<sup>463</sup> setting up a protest camp in front of the National Press Club in Islamabad on 3 September,<sup>464</sup> and organising an All Shia Parties Conference in Islamabad on 15 September. The latter was attended also by some MNAs, but not by the *Shia Ulama Council* or the TJP/ITP.<sup>465</sup> At the same time the MWM wholeheartedly joined agitation against the anti-Islam movie trailer “Innocence of Muslims”, which provoked especially violent reactions in Pakistan.<sup>466</sup> On 16 September ISO and MWM directed a protest rally towards the American consulate in Karachi in defiance of a ban. It was baton-charged and fired upon by the police, killing one S. Raza Taqvi whose “martyrdom”, together with alleged police brutality, became a new MWM grievance for months.<sup>467</sup> As Mehreen Zahra-Malik put it, “for a

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group that ... wants to catapult itself onto the national and political stage and emerge as the definitive representative of Shias in Pakistan, the anti-Islam film provided just the right moment ... to raise its public profile".<sup>468</sup> In fact the MWM kept up agitation against the film well into October 2012,<sup>469</sup> and after the murderous attack on Malala Yusufzai on 9 October, which drew strong condemnations from almost all public figures in Pakistan, Nasir 'Abbas Ja'fari joined those voices which claimed that "the agents of the U.S. and Israel attacked Malala to divert public attention from the worldwide reaction to the sacrilegious movie".<sup>470</sup>

In November 2012 Amin Shahidi announced the planned establishment of a "Shia Solidarity Council" to promote harmony among the Shia community of Pakistan, explaining that the MWM had been making all-out efforts to unite all Shia parties of Pakistan on one platform. He also mentioned the MYC which had existed since 1995,<sup>471</sup> but reminded that the MYC could not play an effective role to stop violence against Shias in Pakistan.<sup>472</sup> On 14 November, two days before Muharram that year, Nasir 'Abbas Ja'fari urged government officials not to make "irresponsible statements" about limiting the mourning processions. Instead, they should take adequate steps to protect the processions and the mourners during Muharram, which were a fundamental legal right of Shia citizens. The government would have to take action against those fanning religious hatred, otherwise it would be deemed equally responsible for terrorism.<sup>473</sup> In the same month he declared it as obligatory for all Shias in Pakistan to join 'azâdârî processions on 9 and 10 Muharram "to foil the attempts of Yazidi forces to isolate the 'azâdârî for the Imam Husain". He also demanded a countrywide army operation to eliminate terrorists, and that the media would refrain from printing or airing statements of "notorious outlawed outfits".<sup>474</sup>

In January 2013 the MWM was one of the few parties supporting Tahir ul-Qadiri's "Long March" to Islamabad which aimed at enforcing crucial reforms before the general elections and ban corrupt individuals from contesting these.<sup>475</sup> Unlike most other parties the MWM also made a clear statement rejecting negotiations with the TTP. Amin Shahidi argued that the home-grown Taliban had massacred innocent civilians and security forces' personnel alike and complained that nowhere in the world terrorists were dealt with as softly as in Pakistan. The "sacred blood of the martyrs" would demand of the government to launch an evenhanded operation to eliminate the TTP "notorious terrorists" instead of holding talks with them.<sup>476</sup>

After at least eighty-seven Shias had fallen victim to the worst terrorist attack in Quetta so far on 10 January 2013, the MWM spearheaded a countrywide protest movement which was joined also by non-Shia actors and

forced the outgoing PPP-led government to yield to some of its demands.<sup>477</sup> Amin Shahidi publicly challenged General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani: “I ask the army chief: what have you done with these extra three years you got [in office]? What did you give us except more death?” Yet the MWM, jointly with local Hazara leaders, demanded that the army would take over security of Quetta.<sup>478</sup> While relatives of the victims started a sit-in on Alamdar Road with eighty-seven coffins, a list of fifteen demands was formulated as follows:

- 1) The Chief Minister of Balochistan must resign; Balochistan’s Provincial Government must be removed, the province must be put under Governor’s rule and the army be made directly responsible and accountable for the law and order and safety of all people including Shias;
- 2) Full enforcement of the legal ban on the SSP which currently is allowed to operate freely under the new name ASWJ. Arrest ASWJ leaders ... and punish them for inciting hate speech against Shia Muslims;
- 3) Carry out a targeted military operation in the notorious areas of the province known for being the training camps and hide-outs of the LeJ (SSP-ASWJ) terrorists, most importantly, Saryab Road in Quetta, Kanak and Mastung. All leaders and militants of SSP (currently operating as ASWJ-LeJ) must be arrested and awarded exemplary punishment after summary hearings;
- 4) Urgently implement death sentence of ASWJ-LeJ militants already sentenced to death by a court;
- 5) Stop allowing publication of threats against the Shia community by LeJ-SSP in local newspapers and TV channels. Stop providing air time to Ahmad Ludhianvi, Tahir Ashrafi, Malik Ishaq and other ASWJ-LeJ leaders in the media;
- 6) Financially compensate over 1,000 Shia victims (Rs. 1 million per victim), and provide Rs. 0.5 million plus free medical facilities to the wounded; all those injured in terrorist activities must be treated on government expenses in Agha Khan Hospital, Karachi and other reputable and trustworthy hospitals;
- 7) Provide jobs to every victim who lost their guardians or male members;
- 8) Release innocent Shia Muslims arrested in false cases;
- 9) Provide protection to Shia businessmen, transporters, vendors, officers, school, college and university students;
- 10) Set up security check posts of police in areas where Shias have been regularly targeted. In particular, set up permanent check posts in and around Alamdar Road and Hazara Town;
- 11) Provision of free licensed weapons for self-defence, X-Ray scanners, training to Shia volunteers to defend their life, property, and family. Allow Shia scouts and volunteers to set up private security in Shia areas;
- 12) End of apartheid in the Balochistan University and other institutions against the Shia Hazaras, and all Shias;

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- 13) Resettle the Shia Hazara families who were evicted from Khuzdar and Mach and protect and compensate them;
- 14) Full and accurate coverage of Shia genocide by Deobandi militants of SSP (ASWJ-LeJ) in media; must not obfuscate it as Hazara-specific, ethnic or Sunni-Shia sectarian violence. Pakistan government, in particular Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), must take action against those media channels and newspapers which misrepresent Shia genocide as Sunni vs Shia sectarian violence or present it as Hazara-specific ethnic violence.
- 15) Set up a high-level judicial inquiry, also including members of the UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, to investigate allegations of collusion between militant groups and military intelligence and paramilitary forces.<sup>479</sup>

This list of demands, apparently formulated with a strong input from secularist Hazaras within the Quetta Solidarity Council (QSC)<sup>480</sup> which led the agitation in Quetta jointly with the MWM, was notably free of any reference to alleged U.S. instigation of anti-Shia terrorism so typical for MWM rhetoric. On the other hand, its point 14 reflected more the country-wide Shia organisations' point of view, namely refusing any portrayal of violence against Shias in Quetta as Hazara-specific or ethnically motivated. As for the term "Sunni vs Shia sectarian violence"—which is very common in Pakistani mainstream media—both Hazara secularists and Shia Islamists such as the MWM fully agreed on its rejection because it carries the notion of reciprocal violence, whereas in most cases innocent Shias have been the victims of plain criminal terrorism and murder. Some weeks later Amin Shahidi stated:

Use of these Sunni-Shia infighting words is a conspiracy of America and the West against Pakistan. Some NGOs and even some elements in the media which are aligned to the West or Americans repeatedly use these terms to fuel sectarianism. ... Sectarian violence in Pakistan is not at all a fight between Sunnis and Shias. It is, in fact, a fight between terrorists and the Muslims. ... Terrorist elements and groups are not at all representative of the Sunni Muslims ... These terms are used by pro-West lobbies to escalate sectarianism in Pakistan.<sup>481</sup>

There was, of course, no chance of the government yielding to all the above demands,<sup>482</sup> but Nasir 'Abbas Ja'fari claimed just that when he announced the end of the sit-in on Alamdar Road on 14 January together with the QSC leader Abdul Qayyum Changezi.<sup>483</sup> The most important symbolic victory in any case was the sacking of the Chief Minister and imposition of governor's rule in Balochistan (point 1), while promises were probably made regarding a number of other demands on the list. But gov-

ernor's rule could not prevent another severe terrorist attack against Hazaras in Quetta on 16 February.<sup>484</sup> Once more there was a country-wide outcry with multiple protest rallies not confined to Shias,<sup>485</sup> with additional protest activities outside Pakistan.<sup>486</sup> The MWM again took a very active part in the agitation and this time demanded a written agreement of the government for a targeted operation against anti-Shia terrorist in Quetta and its surroundings.<sup>487</sup> But by 20 February the MWM and the QSC were ready to call off another sit-in with the coffins of the victims after promises from the Balochistan Governor and the Federal Government.<sup>488</sup>

In March 2013, shortly after the MWM had been registered with the Election Commission, its leaders were confident that the party would make a strong showing at the 11 May parliamentary elections. The secretary of its political wing, Nasir 'Abbas Shirazi, announced that the MWM would field its own candidates for sixty NA and forty PA seats in mostly Shia-dominated areas. He claimed that the main purpose of contesting elections would be to block the entry of extremist elements into politics and expected that a large number of Sunnis, mainly Barelvis, would be natural allies of the MWM.<sup>489</sup> Attempts were made to forge an electoral alliance with both the Barelvi *Sunni Ittihad Council* and the *Shia Ulama Council* of S. Sajid Naqvi.<sup>490</sup> In Karachi, where the MWM intended to field ten PA and eleven NA candidates, its central leader Asghar Zaidi declared readiness for seat adjustment with any party subject to three conditions: first, it would have to speak out against the double standards of U.S. foreign policies; second, it had to oppose every sort of terrorism, especially such affecting Pakistan; and third, it needed to respect Islam and other faiths, too.<sup>491</sup> By 11 April the approved MWM candidates in Karachi had boiled down to twelve, including five contestants for the National Assembly,<sup>492</sup> but the city remained the focus of its campaign.<sup>493</sup> In an interview one week later Zaidi claimed that there were "more than 5 million Shias" in Karachi which so far mainly had voted for the MQM, but that would change because of the MWM. "Our community's best people were targeted and no one heard our cries", he said. "Now we are standing up for our rights and for the protection of the Shia community."<sup>494</sup>

The MWM finalised its electoral strategy at a convention in Islamabad on 6–7 April 2013, where 500 delegates also approved another three-year term for the Secretary-General Nasir 'Abbas Ja'fari.<sup>495</sup> On 21 April he addressed another convention in Karachi's Nishtar Park, presenting the MWM manifesto and proclaiming readiness to "join hands with every patriotic, religious or political party which ensured all-out cooperation to eliminate

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terrorism from the country". He also promised to restore the confidence of traders, and that the MWM "would try its level best to ensure sectarian harmony in Karachi as well as the whole country".<sup>496</sup> The MWM manifesto was also presented to the media in Lahore on 22 April. Its focus was on the economic problems of Pakistan, with the proposal of a comprehensive "national plan" covering a period of forty to fifty years. While the MWM wanted to make Palestine and Kashmir the main issues of Pakistan's foreign policy, it rejected "states within the state, terrorism and the so-called jihad of the fanatics".<sup>497</sup>

On 24 April the daily *Dawn*, which had so far almost ignored the MWM, published an article about its electoral chances which stated among other things:

The PPP's perceived failure to check the growing attacks on the Shia community has alienated its traditional supporters within the community. This perception is rather strong despite the fact that two of the older Shia parties are still aligned with the PPP—the ITP headed by Sajid Naqvi has made an alliance with the PPP while the supporters of TNFJ led by Hamid Ali Musavi are traditionally known to vote for the PPP. However, the MWM's decision to enter the electoral fray and contest the elections across the country has given rise to questions and speculation about the Shia vote causing an upset this time around.

Indeed, the MWM is attracting attention for a number of reasons. The first, of course, is its impressive debut in the protests after the Hazara attacks. The peaceful protests across the country took everyone by surprise and forced the PPP-led government in Islamabad to impose governor's rule in Balochistan. What was particularly impressive was the party's ability to organise protests in Karachi where the MQM is seen to have the street muscle. [...] But despite the party's high profile and the mood of the Shia community, will it manage to win seats? It is difficult to say anything for sure at the moment not just because the MWM is new, but also because in the past the Shia community has never voted as a bloc.<sup>498</sup>

Ten days later a Hazara intellectual opposed to the MWM made the following sober predictions, which shortly after proved correct:

MWM will contest in all those constituencies which have a sizeable Shia vote bank. Mainly these will be areas like Parachinar, Quetta, and some areas in Karachi. Rest assured MWM will not be able to win in Parachinar because the local Turis are allied with PPP, and in Karachi the Urdu-speaking are diehard supporters of their nationalist party, the MQM. The MQM will never allow MWM to make inroads in their constituency. Those vocal 'Shia activists' who were initially supporting MWM have now all receded and are now supporting their individual political parties (PPP & MQM). If the MWM wins in PB-2, this will be the only constituency in entire Pakistan which sends a Shia Islamist party

to the assemblies. A party whose leaders openly give allegiance to a political leader of another country.<sup>499</sup>

Indeed the MQM proved to be the toughest political rival of the MWM in spite of its strong opposition to some joint enemies, especially the TTP, which had gained influence among Karachi's Pashtun population in recent years.<sup>500</sup> Although a large number of MQM activists were Shias and some of them had also been targeted by LeJ terrorists,<sup>501</sup> the party was repeatedly accused by the MWM of hobnobbing with the SSP/ASWJ.<sup>502</sup> In the run-up to the elections the MWM complained about obstruction of its campaign by the MQM and demanded that the army should be deployed in Karachi for the safety of voters and candidates.<sup>503</sup> After their defeat in the elections, MWM leaders accused the MQM of rigging and aggression against its candidates in four Karachi constituencies.<sup>504</sup>

At the end of the election campaign on 9 May, the number of MWM candidates for NA seats had been reduced to twenty, including twelve in Sindh, seven in Punjab and one in Quetta. In addition, the MWM fielded fifty-two candidates for PA seats (twenty-seven in Sindh, twenty in Punjab, and five in Balochistan).<sup>505</sup> It had reached electoral adjustments with the Bareilvi *Sunni Tahrik* and JUP,<sup>506</sup> whereas its proposed alliance with the *Shia Ulama Council* of S. Sajid Naqvi had not materialized. The latter, contesting elections under the banner of the ITP, preferred to remain allied with the PPP<sup>507</sup> but failed miserably, getting just 2,694 out of 45,388,404 votes cast for the NA on 11 May. The MWM bagged only 41,520 or 0.09 per cent of the NA votes<sup>508</sup> and one single PA seat in Quetta (PB-2).<sup>509</sup> This fell far short of the number of people mobilised by the MWM at various conventions since 2010, and it stood in huge contrast to the success of Imran Khan's PTI, which had won just one NA seat in 2002 and had boycotted the 2008 elections, but emerged as the second largest party in 2013 with 7,679,954 votes (16.92 per cent) for its NA candidates.<sup>510</sup> The MQM's share of NA votes fell to 5.41 per cent (2,456,153 votes) in 2013 from 7.43 per cent (2,573,795 votes) in 2008, but this was due to the rise of the PTI and had little to do with competition from the MWM in Karachi. Likewise, the huge losses of the PPP which came down from 30.79 per cent (10,666,548 NA votes) in 2008 to 15.23 per cent (6,911,218 NA votes) in 2013 benefited only the PML-N and the PTI, but not at all the MWM.

Probably the main reason for the MWM's failure at the polls was the majority voting system practiced in Pakistan which has always placed the small parties at a disadvantage, combined with the scattered demographic distribution of Shias.<sup>511</sup> So even many strong supporters of the MWM may

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not have voted for the party in such constituencies where its candidates stood no chance of winning anyhow. Even the mainstream Sunni Islamist parties, the JUI-F and the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*, have always faced the same handicap and only achieved some noteworthy success in 2002, when they were allied with four more parties in the MMA.<sup>512</sup> But the astonishing fact remains that the MWM, in spite of its undeniable success in drawing large Shia crowds, received even less votes in 2013 than what the TNFJ had received in 1988, when the total number of votes cast was less than half of 2013.<sup>513</sup>

The MWM Secretary-General refused to acknowledge defeat. According to him, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had manipulated the elections and “got the desired results”. He also accused the Election Commission, the caretaker government, and security and intelligence agencies of “stealing the votes” of the nation.<sup>514</sup> In any case, the MWM has established itself as an effective spokesman of Shia communal grievances since 2010 and it will continue to play this role in the coming years, regardless of its failure as a political party during its first test at the polls. Its future influence will to a large extent depend on whether the state can improve on its performance in combating violent extremism in Pakistan and protecting its Shia citizens or not.



## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This book deals mainly with three aspects of Shi'ism in Pakistan which are to a large extent interwoven: first, the activities of such individuals and organisations which can be termed "Shia communalists" and who have assertively defended both the distinct identity and full equal rights of the Shia minority whenever they perceived those to be in danger; second, the development of a class of Shia '*ulamâ*' in Pakistan, (many of whom have played leading roles in communal organisations), and its internal conflicts which have focused outwardly on Shia religious doctrines, but which have also been about rivalry for social status and sources of income; and third, conflicts with the Sunni majority, which have been numerous and sometimes violent already during the first three decades of Pakistan, but have become a serious problem only since the 1980s, with sectarian fanaticism mushrooming and violence directed against the Shia minority multiplying, reaching frightening dimensions in the years after 2003.

Shi'ism in Pakistan is heir to more than 700 years of history of Twelver Shias on the Indian subcontinent, which has also included some powerful regional kingdoms and principalities ruled by Shias since the fourteenth century (section 1.1). Factors contributing to the spreading of Shi'ism in the subcontinent have been the strong influence of Persian culture among subsequent dynasties of Muslim rulers and the key role played by itinerant preachers who followed in the conquerors' footsteps in converting many of the Hindu natives to Islam. Most of these preachers were *sûfis* and/or *sayyids* of Persian or Central Asian origin teaching tenets close to Shia

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Islam. Folk Islam in India and Pakistan is still strongly influenced by Sufism, with its emphasis on the veneration of *pîrs* (holy men) and their descendants, and the transition from Sufism to Shi'ism has often been fluent. And even when Shias became more discernible with their regular *ta'ziya* processions in a number of Indian towns since the eighteenth century, this would attract also many Sunni Muslims who would often participate in such ceremonies. Shias in India and Pakistan are very much aware that their colourful and emotional ceremonies of '*azâdârî*' have been a key factor both for winning new converts in the past and for strengthening communal bonds of their *qaum*' until the present time. The same is also acknowledged by Sunni detractors of public '*azâdârî*' processions, who have sometimes pictured them as a "danger" for the correct beliefs of their co-religionists (sections 3.5; 6.4).

While the principality of Awadh (Oudh) in the central Ganges plain has been the most important Shia stronghold in India since the early eighteenth century, Shi'ism also took roots in the Punjab and other regions that would become West Pakistan in 1947, namely parts of Sindh, the Kurram valley and Gilgit-Baltistan. It was further strengthened through the influx of Shia refugees and other emigrants (*muhâjirs*) from India after partition, many of whom belonged to the intellectual and professional elite. Since the 1950s it has generally been assumed that 10–15 per cent of West Pakistan's population have been Shia, with a strong presence in all major towns, but also scattered around large parts of rural Punjab and Sindh. But there was only a small number of native Shia '*ulamâ*' in Pakistan in the 1950s, and there were genuine fears of some zealots that the survival of the Shia *qaum* would be in danger due to wide-spread ignorance in religious matters among the Shia common people (section 3.4).

The percentage of Shias in Pakistan (no longer comprising East Pakistan since 1972) is approximately the same as that of Shias in the predominantly Sunni Muslim world today. As has been the case in other parts of the Muslim world ever since the Sunni-Shia divide came into being in the seventh century AD, Shias in the Indian subcontinent have often suffered enmity or even persecution from the Sunni majority, especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, following a policy of maximum tolerance under the Mughal emperor Akbar (section 1.2). Campaigns targeting Shia *ta'ziya* processions increased together with the latter's visibility, and a huge amount of polemical religious literature was written by both Sunni and Shia authors since the eighteenth century, much of which is still being reprinted and quoted today. But from the early nineteenth century onwards

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Shias have mostly benefited from the gradual extension of British rule over the entire Indian subcontinent. The British found some of their most loyal subjects among Shia landlords from the Punjab, and they guaranteed religious freedom for all denominations, using coercive means if needed to keep sectarian conflicts in check. They may have followed a policy of “divide and rule” between Indian Hindus and Muslims as a whole, but not between Sunni and Shia Muslims. On the other hand religious freedom, which was increasingly taken for granted by Shias, also contributed to sharpen their “sectarian” identity. Since 1907 Shia communalists have organised themselves in an All-India Shia Conference (section 1.3), and as late as 1939 the *Tabarra* Agitation, centred in Lucknow, was a strong reminder of the new-found Shia assertiveness (section 1.2).

Ever since the foundation of Pakistan in 1947, Shias have claimed that they have made crucial contributions to that country’s emergence and consolidation after independence. The prominent role of Shia individuals in Muslim political awakening in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India, and later to the “Pakistan movement”, is undeniable and may even have been decisive for the latter’s success (section 2.1). Yet in the years 1940–47 many Shias have been apprehensive about their status and rights in the prospected Muslim state with a clear-cut Sunni majority and have demanded guarantees from the All-India Muslim League. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the iconic founding father of Pakistan (who had nominally converted to Twelver Shi’ism around 1904), was rather annoyed by such demands and parted ways with overzealous Shias in the 1940s, but he did give some promises regarding equal rights which have often been quoted in later decades. By 1946 most Shias in those Indian states which would become Pakistan in 1947 had been converted to unconditional support for Jinnah’s Muslim League (section 2.2).

In March 1948 an All-Pakistan Shia Conference (APSC) was convened in Lahore on the initiative of some prominent Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ and landlords, on top of them Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash, who became the APSC chairman in 1951 and remained so until his death in 1982. But one of the resolutions passed by the APSC at its founding session, asking the government to “declare all Muslims of Pakistan one *qaum* without any distinction regarding sect or descent and abolish such laws which were made for some special sect”, provoked strong protests from more committed Shia communalists. They founded an “Organisation for Safeguarding Shia Rights in Pakistan” (*Idârat-i Tahaffuz-i Huqûq-i Shî’a*, ITHS) within days after the APSC, which met with countrywide response and remained the chief rival

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of the APSC until the early 1960s. Its first chairman was Mufti Ja'far Husain, a religious scholar who was to play a prominent role again in 1979–1980, but the driving force behind the ITHS was S. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, a politically ambitious layman (section 3.1).

In the 1950s APSC and ITHS occasionally joined hands for common goals, but both organisations vied for the role of a “central spokesman for Pakistan’s Shias” and their attitudes towards the Sunni majority and successive governments were different. Nawab Qizilbash, whose political career culminated in his appointment as Chief Minister of West Pakistan in 1958—he also became Federal Minister of Finances under General Yahya Khan, 1969–71—always took care not to alienate his Sunni voters and political allies, and the same was true for other APSC leaders. The ITHS gradually became dominated by Shia landlords, too, but its activists were generally more combative when pressing for Shia demands, such as “adequate representation” in state institutions and separate religious instruction (*dîniyât*) in schools and colleges. Another important issue for both the APSC and the ITHS until the passing of Pakistan’s first constitution in 1956 was to fend off any legislation pushed by the Sunni religious lobby which might jeopardise equal rights for Shias in future, and the Shia organisations were quite successful in this respect (section 3.2). In the following two years Sunni hardliners focused their attention on the Shia Muharram processions in public places which they wished to be curtailed by state authorities, and the ITHS spearheaded a forceful defence of Shia ‘*azâdârî*’ traditions and their “freedom of religious observance” (section 3.5). A number of violent assaults on Shia Muharram processions in August 1957 and a noted increase of aggressive anti-Shia propaganda led to the demand of “reserved seats” at an All-Parties Shia Convention in December 1957 attended by both ITHS and APSC members. It was then feared that most Shia candidates would not stand a chance to win seats in the first country-wide elections which were scheduled for 1958. But within a few months the demand was abandoned, and instead of elections for a National Assembly Pakistan saw its first military coup in October 1958 (section 3.6).

The rule of General Ayub Khan (1958–69) was initially welcomed by many Shias, including the leaders of the ITHS, because the activities of Sunni extremists were curtailed. But after martial law was lifted in June 1962 the campaign against ‘*azâdârî*’ was resumed forcefully, and in June 1963 Muharram processions were attacked in Lahore and other places in the worst anti-Shia violence so far in Pakistan. The causes of the 1963 riots were investigated by a special commission which made a number of recom-

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mentations that were largely implemented. While no serious violence in Muharram occurred during the following six years, Shias had to accept more restrictions on their *'azâdârî* processions (section 4.2). A pattern of "symmetry" was established which has since been followed by all federal and provincial governments of Pakistan, namely that any repressive action against Sunni extremists had to be "balanced" with some reciprocal action against Shia troublemakers, even if the latter were not comparable in quality and quantity.

Another consequence of the 1963 anti-Shia riots was a new movement led by the religious scholar and preacher S. Muhammad Dihlavi which superseded both the ITHS and APSC and led to the largest mobilisation of Shias in Pakistan for communalist demands so far in 1966–1968. It started with an "All-Pakistan Shia *'Ulamâ*' Convention" in Karachi in January 1964 and focused on three demands, namely separate *dînîyât* for Shias, exclusive Shia control over their religious endowments (*auqâf*) and freedom and protection of *'azâdârî*. The above "three demands" were termed "purely religious", and Dihlavi was received by President Ayub Khan as early as March 1964 and given vague promises. But constant delaying tactics from the government side and repeated attempts by the leaders of APSC and ITHS to strike their own deals with the government on the "three demands" and take the credit for it led Dihlavi to launch his own movement in 1966 with a central "Shia *Mutâlâbât* [Demands] Committee" (SMC) and SMC branches in hundreds of towns. Dihlavi turned out a charismatic and effective leader with a devoted followership which put pressure on the government through a number of well-attended conventions and disciplined street agitation, finally winning full approval of the "three demands" in November 1968 (sections 4.3 and 4.5).

In spite of this outward success, the religious traditions and practices of *'azâdârî* had meanwhile become seriously challenged by parts of Pakistan's Shia *'ulamâ*' class themselves. Already in the 1950s, when there were only a few Shia religious schools (*madrasas*) in Pakistan with a meagre output of graduates, some *'ulamâ*' would complain that Shias would spend lavishly on *'azâdârî* processions and sumptuous mourning sessions (*majâlis*) for their revered Imams, but niggardly on religious education. They warned that the *majâlis* had degenerated into mere "shows" where overpaid professional preachers (*zâkirs*) made the people weep with self-fabricated dramatic stories about the sufferings of the twelve Imams, but never exhorted them to perform the basic duties of Shia believers, such as regular prayers and payment of religious dues like *khums* (section 3.4). In the early 1960s,

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when the prestige of the Shia '*ulamâ*' was at low ebb (section 4.3), one religious scholar who was also a very successful preacher at *majâlis* (Muhammad Isma'il) accused those '*ulamâ*' who were running *madrasas* of misusing *khums* for self-enrichment. The conflict about proper religious practices and allocation of sources sharpened with the writings of Muhammad Husain Dhakko starting from 1964 in which he accused the *zâkirs* with harsh words of distorting Shia beliefs in Pakistan. Dhakko met with strong resistance from many of those '*ulamâ*' who made their living through preaching at *majâlis* but he pursued his mission stubbornly, with the result that the Shia '*ulamâ*' became divided into two opposing camps in the 1960s (section 4.4). This conflict became sharper in the 1970s, with Muhammad Isma'il and his camp accusing the "*khums*-eating" '*ulamâ*' of reducing Shia beliefs to such tenets which would serve their purposes, while the camp of Dhakko fustigated the "greediness" of professional preachers, including a number of '*ulamâ*', whom they accused of spreading baseless, exaggerated beliefs and superstitions among the Shia common people (section 5.6). In fact such exaggerations which were nurtured by the professional preachers were also an important factor of fuelling anti-Shia resentment among Sunni Muslims in Pakistan, thus paving the way for extremist preachers who have pursued the goal of having declared Shias a "non-Muslim minority" since the 1980s (section 6.4).

After the ouster of Ayub Khan in 1969 the implementation of his 1968 commitments towards the SMC took another six years of negotiations and occasional agitation, although the governments of both General Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were basically sympathetic towards the Shia demands (sections 5.2 and 5.5). In the interim period up to Pakistan's first countrywide elections, when Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) enjoyed a steep rise of popularity in West Pakistan, Shia communal organisations were mostly opposed to Bhutto's "socialist" rhetoric, except for a short-lived "Shia Political Party" founded in 1969. But apparently a majority of Shias have voted for the PPP in December 1970 (section 5.3), a pattern to be repeated in all subsequent National Assembly elections in Pakistan. The SMC, which later adjusted its attitude towards Bhutto, run out of steam after 1974 anyhow (section 5.8), while ITHS and APSC had become largely obsolete already during the SMC heyday in 1966–8. Sectarian propaganda and violence against Shias gradually resurfaced in the early 1970s, but it still remained within limits which could be kept under control by the PPP government (section 5.7).

Shias had almost no role in the anti-Bhutto agitation of the "Pakistan National Alliance" which paved the way for the military coup of General Zia

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ul-Haqq in July 1977. The eleven years rule of Zia ul-Haqq, who allied himself with Sunni Islamists as convenient junior partners of the military, brought great new challenges for Pakistan's Shias who at the same time became strongly influenced by the successful "Islamic revolution" in neighbouring Iran (1978–79). General Zia's attempts of "Islamising" laws in Pakistan were initially applauded even by the Shia communal organisations and '*ulamâ*', but as early as December 1977 they demanded that only their own religious jurisprudence (*fiqh-i ja'fariya*) should be applied on Shia citizens. When Zia in February 1979 promulgated his first ordinances concerning some "Islamised" rules of penal law following the Hanafi-Sunni interpretation, Shias reacted sharply and organised a huge convention in Bhakkar (Punjab) where a "Movement for the Enforcement of Ja'fari [Shia] Jurisprudence" (*Tahrîk-i Nifâz-i Fiqh-i Ja'fariya*, TNFJ) was proclaimed in April 1979. The TNFJ, led by Mufti Ja'far Husain until his death in 1983, quickly superseded the old organisations ITHS, APSC and SMC. Unlike the latter, the TNFJ was dominated by politically ambitious '*ulamâ*' who received an enormous boost from the triumph of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in the same year. The TNFJ also got strong support from the *Imamia Students Organisation* (ISO), founded already 1972 in Lahore, which wholeheartedly adopted the ideology of the "Islamic revolution" in 1979 (section 6.1).

There had been some committed supporters of Khomeini among Pakistan's Shia '*ulamâ*' already in 1970 (section 5.6), but it was only in 1979 that Iranian influence became predominant in Pakistan's Shia communal organisations. Mufti Ja'far Husain still belonged to the "old guard" of '*ulamâ*' without political ambitions, but he was used as a figurehead of the TNFJ, also because in 1979 he was the only Shia representative in the "Council of Islamic Ideology" which had advised Zia ul-Haqq on "Islamisation" since 1977. In July 1980 the TNFJ organised the largest Shia demonstrations in Pakistan's history so far in Islamabad to protest a new ordinance of Zia concerning the forceful annual deduction of the religious tax *zakât* from bank accounts. Zia backtracked and agreed to exempt Shias from *zakât* deduction (section 6.2), but subsequently he viewed the organised Shias as a threat which had to be kept in check. After Mufti Ja'far Husain's death the military facilitated a split within the TNFJ (section 6.3), and since 1981 Zia ul-Haqq gave a loose rein to anti-Shia extremist which in 1984 founded the *Sipâh-i Sahâba* ("Army of the Companions of the Prophet"), a group which made the slogan "Shias are infidels!" its battle cry (section 6.4).

The radicalisation of a section of the Sunni majority in the 1980s, especially in some districts of Punjab with a strong Shia presence, was mirrored



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to some extent by the radicalisation of parts of Pakistan's Shia youth influenced by the anti-American and "anti-imperialist" propaganda emanating from Iran. In 1984 S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini, a young Pashtun religious scholar from the Kurram Agency and zealous admirer of Ayatollah Khomeini, was elected to head the majority faction of the TNFJ. In line with Iran's political leadership he viewed the increasing anti-Shia militancy in Pakistan as a result of "U.S. imperialism", which allegedly used some Sunni groups as its "tools"—with its ally Saudi Arabia interposed—to undermine the unity of Muslims against common foes such as Israel and India. Husaini also tried to find common ground with Sunni Islamists, organising a huge rally in Lahore termed "Koran and Sunna Conference" in July 1987, but met with little success. He was assassinated in August 1988, presumably on instigation from political allies of Zia ul-Haqq, who himself died just twelve days later in a mysterious plane crash (section 6.3).

The end of General Zia's dictatorship in Pakistan coincided with that of the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), followed by the death of Khomeini (June 1989) and a more pragmatic approach of Iran's foreign policy. Husaini's successor S. Sajid Ali Naqvi adjusted to the changed environment and freed the TNFJ from its ideological overload. Its name was changed to *Tahrîk-i Ja'fariya Pakistan* (TJP) in 1993 to appear less aggressive and "sectarian". The TNFJ allied itself with the PPP during the 1988 elections, but its candidates received only 0.22 per cent of the votes and not one single seat, and it failed in the 1990 and 1993 elections (then renamed TJP) as well (section 7.1). In the 1990s, anti-Shia propaganda by the *Sipâh-i Sahâba* and terrorist acts committed by its offspring *Lashkar-i Jhangvi* became the most important issue for Shia mobilisation. Sajid Naqvi's legalistic response to that challenge did not satisfy young Shia hardliners who founded the group *Sipâh-i Muhammad* in 1992, which retaliated with terrorist acts of its own, targeting also innocent Sunnis. The elected governments became increasingly clueless about a strategy for combating sectarian violence, most of which was directed against Shias (section 7.2).

The TJP did succeed in forging rather good relations with the largest mainstream Sunni Islamist parties, reflected for example in the formation of a *Millî Yekjihatî* [National Solidarity] *Council* (MYC) in March 1995, but its Shia support base steadily declined already in the 1990s (section 7.3). Just as had been the case with the TNFJ since its foundation in 1979, the TJP reflected the interests of the Shia '*ulamâ*' and religious schools in the first place, and this became less appealing for the majority of Pakistan's Shias after General Zia's attempts of "Islamising" the state according to Sunni interpretation had become a thing of the past. It must be kept in mind here



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that Shia communalism had never reached mainstream politics in Pakistan, with the 1980 protests against Zia's Zakat Ordinance the only possible exception. Thus most Shias became simply disinterested in the TJP, and even among the 'ulamâ' strong opposition against Sajid Naqvi surfaced in 1997 because his private conduct was found lacking. His opponents set up a so-called "Islamic Unity Council" (*Shûrâ-i Wahdat-i Islâmî*) in August 1988 to undermine his leadership, and in October 1999 they tried to remove him as head of the TJP, but did not succeed (section 7.3).

Under General Musharraf, who ruled Pakistan from October 1999 until his forced resignation in August 2008, there were initial attempts to rein in "sectarianism", starting with a ban on *Lashkar-i Jhangvî* and *Sipâh-i Muhammad* in August 2001 and followed by a ban on *Sipâh-i Sahâba* and the TJP in January 2002. The treatment of the TJP, which had never committed or abetted violence, on the same footing with the rabidly anti-Shia *Sipâh-i Sahâba* was another example of the policy of "symmetry" or "balance" to the detriment of Shias followed already after the 1963 riots. But both organisations banned in 2002 continued to function under new names, the TJP as *Islâmî Tahrîk Pâkistân* (ITP). Shortly before its ban, the TJP had joined hands with five Sunni Islamist parties in the MMA (*Muttahida Majlis-i 'Amal*), which became a successful political alliance in the October 2002 parliamentary elections. But although the TJP/ITP was allowed to contest these elections, again it did not win a single seat. It remained a mere junior partner within the MMA, which anyhow disintegrated before the 2008 elections (section 8.3.).

If the government was not serious in implementing the ban on the TJP/ITP, it was even more inconsequential with the *Sipâh-i Sahâba*, notwithstanding occasional campaigns of arrest of known activists which would regularly be released after a short detention. It was renamed *Millat-i Islâmiya-i Pâkistân* (MIP) in 2003 and *Ahlu Sunnat wal-Jamâ'at* (ASWJ) in 2009 and contested all elections even after its 2002 "ban", but its leader A'zam Tariq was assassinated in October 2003, presumably by Shias. The anti-Shia propaganda of MIP/ASWJ continued largely unhindered, but a more serious problem in the era of Musharraf—and later under the democratically elected PPP-government (2008–13) was the mushrooming of terrorist violence against Shias, most of which was attributed to the *Lashkar-i Jhangvî* (LeJ). Although there was a serious crackdown against the LeJ in 2002, with a number of notorious terrorists killed in encounters or sentenced to death, the group resumed target killing of Shias in an unprecedented scale in the following years. The victims were not only participants at Shia religious gatherings, where terrorist attacks often claimed dozens

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of lives with a single strike, but also often individual members of the Shia professional elite. Most terrorist attacks against Shias in the decade from 2003–13 occurred in Quetta, Karachi, Lahore and other larger towns of Pakistan, but there were other sectarian hotspots such as Hangu and Gilgit, and basically no district with a sizeable Shia population was safe from LeJ terrorists (section 8.1). Especially serious was the situation in the Kurram Agency, where the local Shias were subjected to a veritable siege in addition to frequent armed attacks and bomb blasts for several years since 2007 (section 8.2), but also in Quetta, where murderous attacks against the easily recognizable Hazara Shias—migrants and refugees from Afghanistan and their descendants—reached such proportions that not only Shias have spoken of a veritable “genocide” committed against them.

This wave of violence against Shias occurred against the background of a generalised campaign of terror by extremists in Pakistan, spearheaded since 2007 by the *Tahrik-i Tâlibân-i Pâkistân* (TTP) which claimed more than 10,000 lives in the years 2009–12 alone and was closely related to the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan. But Shias have been at risk of becoming random victims of terror more than any other group of Pakistan’s citizens. And while the law enforcement agencies have often acted with resolve and courage against criminal extremists, they have not always received the necessary backing from political leaders and the judiciary. A case in point has been the release on bail of the LeJ hit-man Malik Muhammad Ishaq in July 2011 for “lack of evidence”, although after his arrest in 1997 he had been accused of murdering seventy people, most of them Shias, in forty-four different cases. And sometimes even convicted mass murderers affiliated to the LeJ have been allowed to escape from their prison cells (section 8.1).

Anti-Shia terrorism has thus emerged as the most important issue for Shia communal organisations in the last decade, and it has affected also the silent majority of Pakistan’s Shias who have never been much interested in their activities. While the TJP/ITP has lost almost all relevance, a new Shia organisation emerged in 2008–2009 named *Majlis-i Wahdat-i Muslimîn* (“Council of Unity of Muslims”; MWM), which in the last few years has been able to once more mobilise Shias at huge conventions and for country-wide agitation in the streets. The central demands from the state at these events have been, naturally, to provide security for its Shia citizens and take effective action against terrorists. But being an organisation of politically ambitious ‘*ulamâ*’ from a generation which has grown up with and fully adopted the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the MWM has found it appropriate and necessary to put the blame for anti-Shia

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terrorism—and for other ills of Pakistan—on America and Israel in the first place at its public meetings. This may have served the purpose of finding common ground with mainstream Sunni Islamists—a line adopted already by the TNFJ leader S. ‘Arif Husaini since 1984 and later by his successor S. Sajid Ali Naqvi—but it has rightfully been criticised by less ideologically-minded Pakistani Shias (section 8.3).

In mid-2012 the MWM announced its decision to contest the forthcoming elections, and it did field twenty candidates for the National Assembly and fifty-two others for the four provincial assemblies in May 2013 after an intense and professional election campaign. But astonishingly the MWM received only 0.09 per cent of the NA votes and won just one single PA seat in Quetta. The total number of votes bagged by its NA candidates (41,520) was much less than the number of participants at various MWM conventions in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad in the previous years. This has once more proven a constant political reality since the 1950s in Pakistan, namely that Shia candidates cannot win elections with a Shia communalist agenda. On the other hand, Pakistan’s mainstream political parties have until present times never made a distinction between Shias and Sunnis, which is an encouraging fact.

In conclusion it can be said that although the different Shia organisations which have been active in Pakistan since 1948 have never mobilised more than a fraction of its Shia citizens, they have been successful in safeguarding their full equality before the law. Fears of a possible “loss of identity” of the Shia *qaum* in the overwhelmingly Sunni state, which were widespread among Shia zealots until the 1960s, have also turned out misplaced. As for the Shia public religious ceremonies (*‘azâdârî*), they are nowadays more than ever threatened by violent attacks from Sunni extremists, but the law enforcement agencies are doing their best to protect them country-wide at great cost every year. Anti-Shia violence of all kinds is universally condemned by the political class, but unfortunately most political leaders in Pakistan have so far not mustered the courage to tackle its root cause, namely religious extremism, in a forceful manner. Instead they indulge in regular appeals for “sectarian harmony”, while at the same time often trying to appease hate-preachers and even terrorists.

Shias in Pakistan are nowadays threatened by terrorist violence, but they are far from being an oppressed minority. Throughout the history of the young state they have been fully integrated at all levels of Pakistan’s society, and they have stood up for their rights whenever that was perceived to be necessary.



## NOTES

## 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Rizvi, *A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isnâ 'Ashari Shi'is in India*, Vol. I, pp. 153-62; see also below, pp. 6-7.
2. Hollister, *The Shi'a of India*, pp. 101-11; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 247-62.
3. Ibid., pp. 262-81; Hollister, op. cit., pp. 112-116; Cole, *Roots of North Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq*, pp. 23-24.
4. Hollister, op. cit., pp. 117-20; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 281-92.
5. Ibid., pp. 292-341; Hollister, op. cit., pp. 120-5; J. Burton-Page, "Haydarâbâd", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. III, pp. 318-23; R. M. Eaton, "Kutb Shâhi", ibid., Vol. V, pp. 549-50.
6. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 159-70; Abdul Majid Mattoo, "The Nurbakhshis of Kashmir", in: Christian Troll (ed.), *Islam in India*, Vol. II, (Delhi: Vikas Publ. House, 1984), pp. 98-113.
7. Rieck, "The Nurbakhshis of Baltistan", passim; see also section 3.1, p. 56.
8. Hollister, op. cit., p. 145-9; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 170-84.
9. Ibid., pp. 178-85; Abdur Rashid, *History of the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent*, pp. 200, 368-9; Umar, *Islam in Northern India*, pp. 191-2.
10. Rieck, "Mountain Refuge", pp. 215-20.
11. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 45-8, 117-28; Mirza, *From Plassey to Pakistan*, pp. 21-122.
12. Also known as Sa'adat Ali Khan.
13. On the political history of the Awadh Nishapuri dynasty see Cole, op. cit., 36-41; 252-71; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 52-61, 74-91.
14. Cole, op. cit., pp. 127-39.
15. Ibid., pp. 198-204; for biographical details on the most prominent Shia 'ulamâ' of Lucknow until the mid-19th century see ibid., 50-66, and Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 128-55, 164-71.
16. Cole, op. cit., pp. 195-8, 204-13.
17. Ibid., pp. 42-4, 229-33.
18. Ibid., pp. 272-81; see also section 1.3, p. 25.
19. Hollister, op. cit., pp. 340-45; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 142-6; Daftary, *The Ismâ'ilis: their history and doctrines*, pp. 125, 180.
20. Ibid., p. 180; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 147. Generally on the dynasty see Lari, *History of Sindh*, pp. 45-53; Sumra, *The Soomras*, pp. 134-240.
21. Asghar Ali Engineer, *The Bohras*, 2nd revised ed. (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1993), passim; Daftary, op. cit., pp. 299-323; Hollister, op. cit., pp. 271-305.
22. Ibid., pp. 351-63; Daftary, op. cit., pp. 478-90. The tombs of several of those Pirs are located

- in present-day Pakistan, most noteworthy among them those of Pir Shams ud-Din (Shams-i Tabrizi) in Multan and of Pir Sadr ud-Din near Uchch (Daftary, pp. 478–9).
23. Daftary, op. cit., pp. 498–516.
  24. M. W. Khân, *Tashkil-i Pākistān mên shī'ân-i 'Alī kā kardār*, Vol. II, pp. 120–30.
  25. Hollister, op. cit., p. 127; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 189–90.
  26. Ibid., pp. 192–95.
  27. Ibid., pp. 199–205.
  28. Ibid., pp. 220–9, 347–50.
  29. Ibid., pp. 206–46; Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 47–98; Roy Choudhury, *The Din-i-Ilahi, the Religion of Akbar*, 3rd ed. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publ., 1985), pp. 177–97.
  30. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 343–8. In 1591–92 he was also entrusted with reporting on the revenue situation in the newly conquered Kashmir (ibid., p. 350).
  31. See section 1.2, p. 15.
  32. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 4–33; Abolghasem Dadvar, *Iranians in Mughal Politics and Society (1606–1658)*, (Karachi: Indus Publications, 2000), passim.
  33. Cole, op. cit., p. 26.
  34. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 36–7.
  35. Ibid., pp. 10–14, 18–20, 33–6. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, p. 102, quotes examples of disloyalty of some of Aurangzeb's Shia notables.
  36. Ibid., p. 107; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 39–41.
  37. Ibid., pp. 50–60. Rizvi quotes also a prophecy of Shah Waliyullah Dihlavi (see section 1.2, p. 16) that “no *râfizis* [a derogatory term for Shias] would be left in Delhi” which “came true” after a massacre perpetrated by Ahmad Shah Durrani's army in 1761. He contends, however, that “those who were still practising *taqiya* survived” (ibid., p. 60).
  38. Ibid., pp. 61–5. Qureshi, op. cit., p. 130, blames Mirza Najaf for “sectarian bias amounting to grave intolerance”.
  39. The British allowed Shah 'Alam and two of his successors to reside in the Delhi Red Fort with royal attributes until the last Mughal (Bahadur Shah II.) was deposed after the suppression of the “Mutiny” in 1858.
  40. Sumra, *The Soomras*, pp. 173–6; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 139–42 (referring to him as Abdullah al-Ashtar).
  41. Ibid., pp. 142–3.
  42. Shia *sayyids* migrated from Iran to India especially after the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries; see Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 153–9.
  43. For a list of such shrines see Aziz, *Historical Handbook of Muslim India*, pp. 613–26. Pockets of Shia population in the Punjab can nowadays be found near all *sûfi* shrines (information provided by S. Iqbal Husain Kermani, 31 January 2001). See also below, Fn 99.
  44. Shah Yusuf had migrated from Gardez (Afghanistan) to Multan in 1088. His descendants were granted *jâgîrs* (See Glossary, p. XVII) for the maintenance of their family and Shah Yusuf's shrine by Baqir Khan Najm, a Shia governor of Multan under the emperor Akbar; see Humaira Faiz Dasti, *Multan: A Province of the Mughal Empire (1525–1751)* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1998), p. 264; also Durrani, *History of Multan*, p. 24; Conran & Craik, *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*, Vol. II, pp. 313–16.
  45. On S. Jalal ud-Din Haidar Naqvi Bukhari, also known as Makhdum Jahaniyan Jahangasht, see Qureshi, *Muslim Community*, p. 52; Ikrâm, *Âb-i Kausar*, 277–84. The *sajjâda-nishins* of Bukhari's *khânqâh* (See Glossary, p. XVII) in Uchch had become Shias by the eighteenth century (Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 72).
  46. Named after the local dialect Seraiki, which is closer to Sindhi than to the Punjabi vernacular. The Seraiki belt comprises the districts of Bhakkar, Jhang, Dera Ghazi Khan, Muzaffargarh, Multan, Bahawalpur, Rajanpur and Rahimyar Khan in present-day Pakistan.

- Its written literature has been mostly Shia religious poetry (*marâsi* etc.); see Tâhir Taunsa'vî, *Sirâ'iki kitâbiyât, âghâz tâ* 1993, (Islâmâbâd: Akâdamî-yi Kitâbiyât-i Pâkistân, 1994); also Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 103–32.
47. They are descendants of Shaikh Baha ud-Din Zakariya (d. 1270) and his equally famous grandson “Rukn-i ‘Alam”; see Ikrâm, op. cit., pp. 255–61, 263–7). They also call themselves “Asadi”, claiming descent from Ali Ibn Abi Talib (authors interview with S. Iqbal Husain Kermani, 31 January 2001).
  48. Conran & Craik, op. cit., pp. 303–9; Anjum, *Siyâsat kê fir‘aun*, pp. 187–99.
  49. He was a descendant of S. Jalal ud-Din Haidar of Uchh born in Qannauj (present-day U.P.) and lived near Patiala (East Punjab) and in Lahore before moving to the village near Jhang which has since been named after him. He acquired the name Shah Jiwna (“life-bringer”) due to many cases of miraculous healing attributed to him; see Zubairi, *Tazkira-yi awliya-yi Jhang*, pp. 211–17.
  50. Anjum, op. cit., pp. 309–24. Among them were S. Mubarak Ali Shah (see section 4.1., p. 108), S. ‘Abid Husain (ibid., p. 104), his daughter ‘Abida Husain and her cousin S. Faisal Salih Hayat, currently the *sajjâda-nishîn* of Shah Jiwna.
  51. See section 1.2, p. 14.
  52. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 198–9; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 301–2.
  53. Unlike the other mentioned districts, D. I. Khan belongs to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (1901–2010 NWFP).
  54. No census data on the distribution of Shias in Pakistan are available, but the said districts are generally known as Shia strongholds. See also sections 5.4, p. 157, and p. 432, Fn 198.
  55. Gazetteer of Muzaffargarh District 1929, p. 23, reprinted in *Extracts from the District & States Gazetteers of the Punjab (Pakistan)*, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1983), Vol. II.
  56. Ibid., p. 33; Gazetteer of the Dera Ghazi Khan District, revised edition 1893–97, *Extracts from the District & States Gazetteers of the Punjab*, Vol. I, pp. 33–4; Conran & Craik, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 346–51; Sumra, *The Soomras*, pp. 236–9; Ghulam Ali Khan Balûch Nutkânî, *Muraqa‘-i Dêra Ghâzi Khân*, (Taunsa Sharîf: Jumhûrî Kitâbghar, 1986).
  57. *Razâkâr* 25/19–21 (8 June 1962; “Ta’rikh-i ‘Azâdâri No.”), p. 106.
  58. The most detailed study on the history of the Kurram valley up to the 1990s is the Ph.D. thesis of Bangash, *Political and Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, here pp. 31–4.
  59. Ibid., pp. 35–7.
  60. Ibid., pp. 164–65. A similar request for a British take-over by the Shia Orakzais was rejected in 1903; see Lal Baha, *N.-W.F.P. Administration under British Rule 1901–1919*, (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), pp. 55–6. (The NWFP was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010).
  61. Its population in 1981 was close to 300,000 according to the official census (Bangash, op. cit., p. 15.). From 1984 to 1988 a *sayyid* from Paiwar was leading the TNFJ, then the largest Shia organisation in Pakistan (see section 6.3, pp. 219–31). For other examples of the Kurram Agency’s importance for twentieth century Shia movements see below, p. 366, Fn 58; p. 394, Fn 180; p. 403, Fn 390; p. 409, Fn 109.
  62. Lari, *History of Sindh*, pp. 158–70; E.H. Aitken, *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1986; reprint from 1907), pp. 113–19, 134–9; Mubarak Ali, *A Social and Cultural History of Sind*, (Lahore: Book Traders, 1987), pp. 223–312.
  63. Aitken, *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, pp. 510–19; A list of Khairpur rulers is given in H.T. Sorley, *The Gazetteer of West Pakistan. The Former Province of Sind (including Khairpur State)*, (Lahore: Government of West Pakistan, 1968), p. CXLIV.
  64. Husain, *Nuqûsh-i râh*, pp. 87–9.
  65. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 235–6; Faiz Mohammad Soomro, *Cultural History of Sind*, (Karachi a.o.:

- National Book Foundation, 1977), pp. 139–43; C. Shackle, “Sind ... Language and literature”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. IX, p. 637.
66. Husain, *Nuqûsh-i râh*, p. 194; *Razâkâr* 25/19–21:104 (8 June 1962); Sayyid Muhammad Latif, *Lahore, its history, architectural remains and antiquities*, (Lahore: New Imperial Press, 1892), p. 271; Muhammad Baqir Malik, *Lahore, past and present*, (Lahore: Punjab University, 1952).
  67. Husain, *Nuqûsh-i râh*, pp. 173–5. Kasra is a large village in the Rawalpindi District inhabited entirely by Shias. The services of the Kazimi sayyids of Kasra, including S. La‘al Shah and Shah Chun Chiragh (a seventeenth century *sûfi* buried in Rawalpindi), for the promotion of ‘*azâdârî*’ all over the Punjab are mentioned in *Razâkâr* 25/19–21:102–3 (8 June 1962).
  68. Conran & Craik, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 295–301; Husain, *Nuqûsh-i râh*, pp. 194, 206; on the Faqir family see also Som Anand, *Lahore: Portrait of a Lost City*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1998), pp. 128–38.
  69. Conran & Craik, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 297–302.
  70. Anjum, op. cit., passim; P.H.M. van den Dungen, *The Punjab Tradition. Influence and Authority in Nineteenth Century India*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 42–108; I. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 1849–1947, (New Delhi 1988), pp. 48–66.
  71. Roger Savory, “Kizil-bâsh”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. V, pp. 243–5; idem., *Iran under the Safavids* (Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 18–37.
  72. Ali Khan Qizilbash was appointed governor of Qandahar by Nadir Shah after having been his “right-hand man” during his Indian campaign. He also accompanied Ahmad Shah Durrani during his 1861–2 campaign against Delhi but was murdered on his instigation in 1870; see Conran & Craik, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 253–4.
  73. Ibid., pp. 255–7; Husain, *Nuqûsh-i râh*, p. 199.
  74. Conran & Craik wrote in 1909 that “for more than eighty years Ali Raza Khan and his descendants have served the British Government with a devotion which has been as perfect as it has been disinterested ... it would be difficult throughout Hindustan to find a family, however bound to the English Government by gratitude or duty, which has, for its sake, risked so nobly and disinterestedly life and everything that can make life desirable” (op. cit., pp. 258–9).
  75. Nawab Nawazish Ali Khan was awarded the titles “Sir” in 1880 and “Knight Companion of the Indian Empire” in 1888. He became a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1887 (ibid.).
  76. Nawab Nâsir Ali Khan had administrated the family’s estates in Awadh until 1890. He held also various posts in the Indian Civil Service for twenty-five years (ibid., p. 258).
  77. Nawab Fateh Ali Khan was a son of Nisâr Ali Khan (d 1878), himself the youngest son of Ali Riza Khan. He was nominated a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1897 and of the Governor General’s Legislative Council in 1904 and received highest honorary titles (ibid., p. 258). During World War I he donated Rs. 22,000 and made other contributions to the British war effort (Anjum, op. cit., p. 249).
  78. Ibid., p. 250; author’s interview with Begum Afsar Riza Qizilbash (Lahore, 5 January 2001). On Nisâr Ali Khan see his obituary in *Razâkâr* 7/17:3 (24 April 1944).
  79. Abu’l-Qasim al-Ha’iri, the son of an Iranian immigrant to Kashmir, had studied in Lucknow, Najaf and different Shia seminaries of Iran. He was the author of thirty printed and twenty-four other books on *tafsîr*, *fiqh* and other subjects. His son S. Ali al-Ha’iri (1871–1941) also earned fame as a Shia *muballigh* and *munâzir*; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 46–8, 189–91; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 106–7.
  80. Ibid., pp. 103–4; Husain, *Matla‘-i anwâr*, pp. 234–6. Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari, “Panjâb mên shî‘a tabligh ki ta’rikh”, *Razâkâr* 18/13:4 (1 April 1955); 18/14:4 (8 April 1955).
  81. An English translation of the Deed of Endowment dated 17 June 1892 and kept in the Nawab



Palace in Empress Road (Lahore) mentions real estate in Lahore (Qila Gujar Singh, Mochi Gate, Mo'min-pura) and in the villages Bela Basti Ram, Baghbanpura, Bhojiwal, Khaliqabad, Rakhpura, Bhoptian, Sattokatla, Niaz Beg, and Hanjerwal. The *Qizilbash Waqf* became a bone of contention between its *mutawalli* Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash and Shia communal organisations before it was nationalised by the Bhutto government in 1974; see section 5.5, pp. 161, 166, 169–70.

82. Husain, *Nuqûsh-i rāh*, pp. 195, 213; Razākār 25/19–21:108 (8 June 1962).
83. Husain, *Nuqûsh-i rāh*, pp. 247–52.
84. Minority Support Group, *The Shia Hazara of Pakistan*, pp. 8–9.
85. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 333.
86. Husain, *Nuqûsh-i rāh*, p. 180.
87. Ibid., pp. 357–62; J. A. Haywood, “Marsiya ... in Urdu literature”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VI, pp. 610–12.
88. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 357.
89. One example is quoted in section 4.2, p. 109; see also section 6.4, p. 233 and the source given in Fn 325 to chapter 6 (p. 438).
90. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, pp. 64–7, 217–18.
91. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, passim; general on *munâzarât* in the subcontinent see Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 215–33; Umar, *Islam in Northern India*, pp. 211–22.
92. See sections 1.2, p. 19; 1.3., pp. 25–26.
93. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, passim. Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 697 Fn 28, lists up the relevant page numbers from the Persian edition of Naqvi’s biographical notices on Shia ‘*ulamâ*’. Metcalf, referring to Muslim-Hindu *munâzarât*, writes that “each side invariably claimed that they had won” (op. cit., p. 231).
94. Muhammad Siddiq, “Dil-azār litrachar kī zabtī kā mutālaba”, *Razākār* 26/33:3 (1 September 1963). According to that article the most successful *munâzirs* in the early twentieth century were “those who could criticise and denigrate the beliefs of other sects in the most insulting terms”.
95. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 157–8; Husain, *Matla‘-i anwār*, pp. 355–7, 676–7. Preachers of the *Madrasat ul-Wā‘izin* were also sent to Burma, East Africa, and even Europe. Some of the most influential Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ in Pakistan during its first decades have graduated from that *madrasa*; see sections 3.1, pp. 56–57, and Fn 212–43 to chapter 3 (pp. 375–77).
96. This differentiation had been introduced only with the 1911 Census of India on demand of the *All-India Shia Conference*; see Hasan, *Sectarianism in Indian Islam*, p. 20.
97. Namely 4 per cent of the Muslims in the NWFP, 5 per cent in Kashmir (including Gilgit and Baltistan), 2 per cent in the Punjab and Delhi, and 3 per cent in the Bombay province (which then still comprised Sindh); see a table in Hasan, op. cit., p. 4, quoting from the *Census of India 1921*, Vol. I, p. 120.
98. See a quotation from the *Census of India 1921*, Vol. I, Part I, (Calcutta: Government of India Printing, 1924), pp. 119–20: “The trustworthiness of the return of Shias must always be suspected as their religion allows them to conceal their sectarian identity, a privilege of which, owing to the contempt and hatred with which they were frequently regarded by the Sunnis, they have frequently availed themselves in the past”.
99. See section 3.1, p. 55. S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi has claimed in a conversation with the author (Islamabad, November 2000) that a great number of *sayyids* who were revered as *sajjādānishins* and *pīrs* in rural Punjab and Sindh have declared themselves openly Shias in 1947, when the wealth of these *pīrs* had much increased because they had bought land and houses from fugitive Hindus and Sikhs at throwaway prices or even received their property as “religious gifts”. These “crypto-Shia” *pīrs* would have taken along many of their *murids*, thus increasing the ratio of Twelver Shias in West Pakistan’s population

- significantly. Some Pakistani Shia intellectuals have confirmed this information in interviews, but others have not subscribed to Naqvi's theory.
100. For estimates of Shia demographic strength in Pakistan see below, p. 363, Fn 4 to chapter 3, and the Index, entry "Shias", sub-entry "demography".
  101. See also the preface, p. xi.
  102. See section 1.1, p. 4.
  103. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. I, p. 157.
  104. Ibid., pp. 250, 263–5.
  105. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistani Subcontinent*, p. 162–3. Even Qureshi, who writes apologetically about the orthodox 'ulamā' of that time, concedes that "the Sunnis should have been ready to make greater efforts to win the Shi'ahs over to their side" (ibid.).
  106. Literally: "Reformer of the Second Millennium", i.e. the second millennium of the Islamic calendar starting in 1591 AD. On his writings see Sh. Inayatullah, "Ahmad Sirhindi", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. I, pp. 297–98; Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 85–98; Yohanan Friedmann, *Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outline of his Thought and a Study of his Image in the Eyes of Posterity* (Montreal & London: McGill Queen's University Press, 1971).
  107. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. I, pp. 243–6.
  108. Ibid., pp. 350–51.
  109. Ibid., pp. 178–80, 212.
  110. Ibid., pp. 233–4; on Mullah Ahmad Thattavi's scholarly career see ibid., pp. 227–32.
  111. Ibid., p. 363.
  112. Ibid., pp. 362–3; for a general discussion of that book, which was remarkable for listing many eminent *sūfis* of the past as Shias, see ibid., pp. 351–7, 365–8.
  113. Verbatim quotations (slightly edited) from ibid., pp. 375–6; more details of *Ihqâq ul-haqq*, which was written as a rejoinder to Fazlallah bin Ruzbihan's book *Ibtâl nahj ul-bâtil wa-ihmâl kashf ul-'âtil* (completed 1503), are given ibid., pp. 370–74.
  114. Ibid., p. 377. Rizvi's term "innovators" probably refers to *bid'ât*, i.e. "unlawful innovations" added to orthodox Islamic ritual.
  115. Ibid., pp. 377–83, discusses different versions of the event.
  116. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 5.
  117. See details on the careers of Ali Mardan Khan (d. 1657) and his son Ibrahim Khan, ibid., pp. 16–20. The latter even appointed a board of Shia 'ulamā' to compile a collection of polemical literature, the *Bayâz-i Ibrâhîmî*, during his second tenure as governor of Kashmir (1701–6); see ibid., p. 19.
  118. A. S. Bazmee Ansari, "Dihlawî, Shâh Walî Allâh", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. II, pp. 254–5; Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 35–43; Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Shah Wali-Allah and his Times: A Study of Eighteenth Century Islam, Politics and Society in India*, Vols. I+II, (Canberra: Ma'rifat Publishing House, 1980).
  119. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 115–16.
  120. I.e. those who believed that Ali Ibn Abi Talib was superior to the first three Caliphs without adopting other Shia doctrines; see Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-'Azîz*, pp. 199–204.
  121. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 69–70. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, p. 116, considers *Izâlat ul-khifâ* a "well balanced piece of sober and solid research", written with the intention to "remove hatred and hostility and reduce differences to the level of academic and doctrinal disagreement".
  122. Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-'Azîz*, p. 255.
  123. Ibid., pp. 260–61. A detailed account of all sections of the *Tuhfa-i Ithnâ'ashariya* is given ibid., pp. 261–355.

124. Ibid., pp. 337–52.
125. Ibid., pp. 357, 359–68, 378–88, 412–13. Hakim Mirza Muhammad Kamil wrote some further polemic books against Sunnis and was poisoned in 1819. He is remembered by Indian Shias as the “Fourth Martyr”; see Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 96–7.
126. Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-‘Azîz*, pp. 388–411, 461–6.
127. Ibid., pp. 368–78, 414–61. His book *Tashyid al-matâ’in* (discussed *ibid.*, pp. 414–50) is a rejoinder to Shah Abd ul-‘Aziz’ account of Shia indictments against the first three Caliphs, ‘A’isha and the *sahâba* generally, as well as against his arguments for their defence (see *ibid.*, pp. 305–37). On Mufti S. Muhammad Quli see also Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 164–8.
128. Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-‘Azîz*, p. 190.
129. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 48–9.
130. Cole, *Roots of North Indian Shi‘ism*, pp. 93–5.
131. Named after his town of birth Rae Bareli in Awadh. Among Muslims of the subcontinent he is better known as S. Ahmad Shahîd.
132. Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-‘Azîz*, pp. 485–97; generally on S. Ahmad see also Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 140–52; Metcalf, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–68.
133. Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-‘Azîz*, pp. 478–9; Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 89, 305–7.
134. Ibid., pp. 90–91; Cole, *op. cit.*, pp. 233–9.
135. Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-‘Azîz*, pp. 497–508. The *mujâhidin*, volunteers recruited by S. Ahmad mainly in north Indian towns from Delhi to Bengal, still occupied some villages near the upper Indus river until 1863 when they were expelled by the British.
136. A. S. Bazmee Ansari, “Ismâ‘îl Shahîd”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. IV, pp. 196–7.
137. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 56, 200–1; Rizvi, *Shâh Abd al-‘Azîz*, p. 509, mistakenly refers to *Taqwîyat ul-îmân* as an Urdu translation of the first chapter of Muhammad Ibn Abd ul-Wahhab’s *Kitâb at-tauhid*.
138. Ibid., pp. 517–22. The main objections of Sunnis to the book concerned its narrow definition of *tauhid* and *shirk* and remarks about the Prophet Muhammad which were considered sacrilegious.
139. On the *Ahl-i hadith*, which started as a group of reformers led by S. Nazîr Husain Muhaddith Dihlavi (d. 1902), see Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, pp. 113–22; Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 268–96; Martin Riexinger, *Sanâ‘ullâh Amritsari (1868–1948) und die Ahl-i Hadis im Punjab unter britischer Herrschaft* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2005). A self-statement of the sect is given by Muhammad Ibrâhîm Mîr, *Ta’rikh-i ahl-i hadith*; an example of many polemics by Bareilvi Sunnis against it is Ziyâ‘ullâh Qâdirî, *Wahhâbî mazhab* (Sialkot: Qâdirî Kutubkhâna, n.d.).
140. For example, the *Ahl-i hadith* do not recognise any of the four orthodox schools of *fiqh*, whereas the Wahhabis follow the Hanbali school. Responding to a campaign by S. Muhammad Husain, editor of the newspaper *Ishâ‘at us-Sunna* (Lahore), provincial governments throughout India replaced the word “Wahhabi” with *Ahl-i hadith* in official correspondence by 1889 (Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, p. 173; Metcalf, *op. cit.*, p. 281).
141. Metcalf, *op. cit.*, pp. 291–2.
142. For an exception in Baltistan (1946) see Fn 10 to chapter 3 (p. 363).
143. Metcalf, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–137, 348–60; Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–6.
144. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, p. 451.
145. Metcalf, *op. cit.*, p. 152, referring to the *Fatâwâ-i Rashidiya*, a collection of Gangohi’s *fatwâs*.
146. On S. Ahmad Khan see Christian W. Troll, *Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of*

- Muslim Theology* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978); see also section 2.1, pp. 32–33, and references *ibid*.
147. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 370. For his 1878 review of that translation titled *Tuhfa-i Hasan* see *ibid.*, pp. 399–402.
  148. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 371.
  149. See section 2.1, pp. 32–33.
  150. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 392–3; Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 328–9.
  151. On Muhsin ul-Mulk see Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, pp. 82–95.
  152. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 409–10. A rebuttal in three volumes titled *Āyât-i muhkamât* was written by his younger brother, S. Amir Hasan (*ibid.*).
  153. Cole, op. cit., p. 240.
  154. Cole writes: “Since many Sunnis revered the Prophet’s family and marched at Muharram, only cursing the Caliphs established a Shi’i identity decisively. Requiring such imprecations became a means of social closure.” (*ibid.*). Yet even in Lucknow Sunnis and Shias continued to hold Muharram processions jointly until 1905 (see below).
  155. Hjortshoi, “Shi’i Identity and the Significance of Muharram in Lucknow”, pp. 289, 298–301. Sectarian clashes in Lucknow have occurred as recently as June 2013 and August 2014.
  156. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 300–5. They were interrupted only by the invasions of Ahmad Shah Durrani and the subsequent reign of his agent Najib ud-Daula; see *ibid.*, pp. 60–62.
  157. *Ibid.*, p. 65; J. A. Haywood, “Mazhar”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VI, p. 956.
  158. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 341–6.
  159. Cole, op. cit., pp. 240–43; Bayly, “Pre-History of ‘Communalism’”, pp. 186, 195.
  160. See section 1.1, p. 12.
  161. For the first Shia organisations in India see section 1.3, pp. 25–27.
  162. Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims*, pp. 2–3, 345.
  163. Cole, op. cit., p. 243; Crooke, *The North-Western Provinces of India*, pp. 263–4; Rieck, “Sectarianism”, p. 436; see also below, pp. 20–21, for British pre-emptive measures in Lucknow 1906–9.
  164. Katherine Prior, “Making History: The State’s Intervention in Urban Religious Disputes in the North-Western Provinces in the Early Nineteenth Century”, *Modern Asian Studies*, (1993) pp. 179–203, here pp. 191–9.
  165. *Ibid.*, pp. 199–200.
  166. Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 199–215.
  167. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, p. 332; Hjortshoi, “Shi’i Identity”, p. 298. For a specification of *tabarrâ* see below, p. 23; for Shia apologetic explanations of *tabarrâ* from the 1950s and 1960s in Pakistan see sections 3.5, pp. 91–92; 4.2, p. 113.
  168. Hjortshoi, op. cit., pp. 298–9; editorial “History of Madh-e-Sahaba”, *Moonlight* (Lucknow), 6 May 1939, reproduced in S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, pp. 9–12, here pp. 9–10.
  169. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, p. 332.
  170. S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, p. 10.
  171. Hasnain & Husain, *Shias and Shia Islam in India*, p. 170; Hasan, “Traditional Rites and Contested Meanings”, p. 128.
  172. See section 1.3, pp. 25–26.
  173. Case prepared by S. Sultan Ahmad of Patna on the *madh-i sahâba* controversy (1939), quoted in S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, pp. 4–9, here p. 4.
  174. See section 2.1, pp. 36–37.
  175. *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.
  176. Ganju, “The Muslims of Lucknow”, p. 287. Maulana Abd ul-Shakur Faruqi (1877–1962) had

- previously taught at the *Nadwat ul-'Ulamâ'* Lucknow. He also founded a monthly, *al-Najm*, which was published as a weekly during the height of Shia-Sunni tensions in the 1930s; see 'Umar Kamâl ud-Dîn, *Khânawâda-i Kâzimiya kâ adabi khidmât*, (Delhi 1997), p. 111.
177. Hasan, "Traditional Rites", p. 130.
  178. On the *Majlis-i Ahrar* see below, p. 355, Fn 73 to chapter 2, and section 2.1, p. 41.
  179. Ganju, op. cit., p. 290; Hasan, *Sectarianism in Indian Islam*, p. 8.
  180. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
  181. S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, p. 15.
  182. On the JUH see below, p. 355, Fn 72 to chapter 2. Husain Ahmad Madani (1874–1957) was also *Shaikh ul-Hadith* of the Deoband seminary; see Bukhari, *Akâbir 'ulamâ'-i Deoband*, pp. 100–5; Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 340–5.
  183. Hasan, *Sectarianism*, p. 9; Ganju, op. cit., p. 291.
  184. Hasan, *Sectarianism*, pp. 9–10; Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 212.
  185. Hasan, "Traditional Rites", p. 124; S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, p. 7.
  186. See section 2.1, pp. 40–41.
  187. Hasan, *Sectarianism*, p. 10.
  188. *Razâkâr* 9/2:2 (8 January 1946).
  189. Among them were S. Ghulam 'Abbas of Raju'a Sadat and Major S. Mubarak Ali Shah of Shah Jiwna (both Jhang Dist.); see "Sardarân-i Jhang ki 'adim al-nazir qurbânîyân", *Razâkâr* 2/19:1+15 (1 June 1939); Qâsimî, *Sawânih-i hayât ... Haqq Nawâz Jhangwî*, pp. 85–7.
  190. Hasan, *Sectarianism*, p. 11.
  191. *Razâkâr* 2/15:3 (24 April 1939).
  192. Statement in *Pioneer* (Lucknow and Delhi), 22 June 1939, reproduced in S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, pp. 29–31, here p. 29. A rejoinder of S. Asghar Husain, president of the *Tanzîm ul-Mu'minîn*, is reproduced ibid., pp. 34–6.
  193. *Razâkâr* 9/2:2.
  194. See below, 2. 349, Fn 238.
  195. Also known as "Nasir ul-Millat", he later became a member of the U.P. Provincial Assembly for fourteen years and principal of the Shia Arabic College in Lucknow. During the *Tabarrâ Agitation* he was also seriously injured by gunfire; see Husain, *Matla'-i anwâr*, pp. 619–20.
  196. Also known as "Sa'id ul-Millat"; on his biography see ibid., pp. 546–9.
  197. S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, p. 52.
  198. Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 215–16; S. A. Husain, *Madh-e-Sahaba: Tabarra Controversy*, p. 4.
  199. Ibid., pp. 16–18.
  200. Ibid., pp. 5–6. For developments in Lucknow after 1963 which culminated in a severe riot in May 1969 see ibid., pp. 7–15; Hjortshoj, op. cit., p. 299–300, and a booklet of Abul Mohsin, *What really happened in Lucknow on May 26, 1969. Victimization of Shia Minority* (Lucknow: Central Shia Relief Committee, 1969).
  201. Muhammad Siddiq, "Shi'ôn kô ab kyâ karnâ châhiyê?", *Razâkâr* 2/26:3 (1 October 1939).
  202. Letter from Gandhi to S. Asghar Husain, 12 June 1939, quoted from S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, pp. 40; 44.
  203. Syed Ashfaq Husain, "The truth about Tabarra", *Moonlight* (Lucknow), 1 May 1939, quoted in S. A. Khan (compil.), *Shion ki Daur-e Bedari*, pp. 12–14 (Italics in the original; *laanat* replaced with *la'nat*).
  204. Typical for that school of thought are G. Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); K.N. Panikkar (ed.) *Communalism in India* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1991); Mushirul Hasan,

- Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1855–1930* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1991). Among western scholars the thesis of the “creation” of communalism in India by the British has been propagated especially by Sandria Freitag, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). For a counter-position see C. A. Bayly, “Pre-History of ‘Communalism’? Religious Conflict in India, 1700–1860”, pp. 177–203.
205. Veena Das (ed.), *Mirrors of Violence. Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Achin Vanaik, *The Furies of Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity and Secularization* (London: Verso, 1997).
206. Harish Sharma, *Communal Angle in Indian Politics* (New Delhi, Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2000); on the historical background see John Zavos, *The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
207. Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 2–3, referring to Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, as the most prominent example of that school of thought. See also Hafeez Malik, *Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington D.C., 1963).
208. See for example Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the birth of Pakistan*, p. 65.
209. Instead, the terms “sectarian organisation” and “sectarianism” are frequently used which, of course, have a negative connotation.
210. See examples—also for the use of the word *qaum*—in sections 4.3, p. 116; 4.5, p. 134; 5.2, pp. 148–49; 5.8, pp. 192–93; also p. 350, Fn 420 to chapter 3.
211. Hasnain & Husain, *Shias and Shia Islam in India*, pp. 163–5.
212. See section 4.5, p. 144.
213. See section 2.2, pp. 31–41.
214. Cole, *Roots of North Indian Shi’ism*, p. 271.
215. Ibid. pp. 281–2; Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 141, 148, 151, 172.
216. Ganju, “The Muslims of Lucknow”, pp. 282–4.
217. Both were founded by S. Abu ’l-Hasan “Abbu Sahib” (1834–1917); see Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 155–6; Husain, *Matla’-i anwâr*, pp. 32–4, 676. The former was opened in the *Jâmi’ Masjid* of Asif ud-Daula and transferred to a new building in 1911 (ibid., p. 4).
218. For field studies about the working of such *anjumans* in Karachi and Hyderabad (Deccan) in the late 1980s see Schubel, *Religious Performance*, and Pinault, *The Shiites*; idem, “Shi’a Muslim Men’s Associations and the Celebration of Muharram in Hyderabad, India”, in: *JŚAMES* 16(1992)1, 38–62.
219. See section 2.1, p. 33.
220. Safi, *Sahîfat ul-millat ma’rûf bi lakht-i jigar*, p. 8. This source, on which much of the following has to rely, was made available to the author by S. Anwar Abbas (Lucknow, 29 January 2001). Its main part consists of a history of the AISC in verses (*nazm*) which were composed by “*Lisân ul-Qaum*” Maulana S. Ali Naqî Safi of Lucknow (1862–1937) and recited at its annual sessions from 1909 to 1933, together with explanations in prose from his son S. Manzur Ali Wasiy and a preface from Mumtaz Husain Jaunpuri.
221. See section 2.1, p. 34.
222. See section 1.2, pp. 20–21.
223. S. Agha Hasan, known as “Qudwat ul-‘Ulamâ”, also founded an *Anjuman-i Yâdgâr-i ‘Ulamâ’* in 1910 and a Shia *Bait ul-Mâl* (“Public Treasury”) in 1919; see Rizvi, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 147–8.
224. Ibid. and *Razâkâr* 27/2–3:3 (Inaugural address of S. Ibn Hasan Najafî at the Shia ‘ulamâ’ convention in Karachi, January 1964).
225. On Bilgrami and Tayyabji see below, p. 353–53, Fn 14, 18, 35 and 54 to chapter 2. *Sahîfat ul-millat*, pp. 7–8, also names Muhsin ul-Mulk and the Agha Khan III as opponents of the

- anjuman*. One aim of the *anjuman* was “to check the growth of liberal thinking”. Its first initiative was the founding of an Arabic-medium *madrasa* in Lucknow (ibid.).
226. A civil servant and judge born in Panipat in the 1870s, who as a student in Aligarh had founded a society for promoting physical and moral reforms called *Ikhwân us-Safâ*; see Jain, *Muslims in India*, Vol. I, pp. 178–9; Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 370; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 396; for his political role see also section 2.1., p. 34.
  227. An Urdu novelist, poet, translator and writer on scientific, philosophical and religious subjects born in Lucknow who taught Arabic and Persian at the Christian College of that town from 1888 to 1919 when he found employment at the Osmania University of Hyderabad (Deccan). He published his first journal *Ishrâq* in 1884 and a Shia journal *al-Hakam* from 1902 to 1907. See Munibur Rahman, “Ruswâ”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VIII, pp. 641–2; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 151.
  228. The Vice-Secretary of the *Anjuman-i Sadr us-Sudur* who became Secretary-General of the AISC 1907 and was re-elected at seven consecutive annual sessions (see below).
  229. *Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 8–10.
  230. Known as “Najm ul-Millat”, he was one of the leading *mujtahids* of Lucknow in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He was principal of the *Madrasat Nâzimîya* since its foundation and helped to establish the *Madrasat ul-Wâ‘izîn* in 1919; see Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 157–8; Husain, *Matla‘-i anwâr*, pp. 675–8.
  231. From 1847 to 1935 the later Sindh province was attached administratively to Bombay.
  232. A partial list of participants is given in *Razâkâr* 27/2–3:3–4 (16 January 1964). See also *Sahifat ul-millat*, p. 10.
  233. *Sarfarâz* (Lucknow) 79/19:2 (9 September 1999).
  234. Hasnain & Husain, op. cit., pp. 158–9.
  235. Hasan, *Sectarianism*, p. 19.
  236. Ibid. and *Sahifat ul-millat*, p. 11.
  237. Short resumes of these twenty-five sessions are included in *Sahifat ul-millat*, together with more detailed references to AISC activities in each preceding year in subsequent parts of the poem *Lakht-i jigar* (see above, Fn 17). Apart from that, only the publications of Mushirul Hasan, Ganju and Hasnain & Husain and some references in *Razâkâr* have been available for this tentative analysis of the AISC in its early decades. A thorough research on the AISC would have to make use of its organ *Sarfarâz* (see below) and other primary sources.
  238. Known as “Nâsir ul-Millat” (1867–1942), he was the oldest son of the *mujtahid* S. Hâmid Husain Musavi and had to shoulder leadership responsibilities at an early age after the death of his father (1888). He was strongly involved in communal affairs like the movement for a Shia College; see Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 172–3; Husain, *Matla‘-i anwâr*, pp. 658–68.
  239. A *mujtahid* from Lucknow.
  240. Ruler of the largest princely state in the U.P. and a staunch pro-British conservative. Both he and his son Raja Riza Ali Khan were important sponsors of Shia institutions and ‘*ulamâ*’.
  241. A former President of the Indian National Congress.
  242. See see above, p. 342, Fn 79.
  243. A *ta‘alluqdâr* from Faizabad (U.P.).
  244. See below and section 1.1, p. 10.
  245. A *ta‘alluqdâr* from Nurpur (Faizabad Dist.).
  246. A notable from Pandrawal (Aligarh Dist.).
  247. A civil servant (collector) from Fatehpur (U.P.).



248. A *ta'alluqdâr* from Devgaon (Faizabad Dist.).
249. A notable and civil servant (inspector of schools) from Delhi; co-founder of the AWSM (see below).
250. Then consul general of Iran in Lucknow: also known as Nasir ul-Mamalik.
251. A *mujtahid* from the Punjab.
252. S. Ibn al-Hasan (1874–1949) was a *mujtahid* from Lucknow who had studied in Iraq 1909–17; see Husain, *Matla'*, pp. 42–3.
253. S. Kalb-i 'Abbas Naqvi (1891–1974) was a lawyer from Rae Bareili who was elected to the U.P. Legislative Council from 1937 to 1946. He was a member of Central Working Committee of the AISC from 1914 till death, Honorary Secretary-General of the AISC from 1935 till death and a founding member of the AISC 1929 (see below), besides from holding important offices in numerous other Shia institutions; see Jain, *Muslims in India*, Vol. II, p. 84, and an obituary published by the Fakhre Qaum S. Kalbe Abbas Memorial Committee (Lucknow), made available to the author by his son, S. Anwar 'Abbas. See also section 2.2, pp. 48, 50.
254. A Member of the U.P. Legislative Council. The AISC organ *Sarfarâz* was founded in 1925 on his initiative and named after him (*Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 167–8).
255. An advocate from Lucknow.
256. Ruler of the Khairpur Principality (Sindh). He could not attend due to illness, but acted as host and sponsor of the 21<sup>st</sup> AISC annual session in Sukkur.
257. A landlord from Beganpuli (Madras).
258. He was then Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University.
259. Raja S. Riza Ali Khan (1906–49) was the son and successor of S. Hamid Ali Khan of Rampur; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 116–17.
260. Also known as Prince Afsar ul-Muluk, he was a son of Wajid Ali Shah, the last ruler of Awadh.
261. This town in West Punjab was renamed Sahiwal in the 1970s.
262. *Sahifat ul-millat*, p. 141. Before the AISC annual session in Multan, Mumtaz Husain Jaunpuri tabled a resolution in that sense in the AISC Subject Committee, but it was rejected (ibid.).
263. I was not able to find out the year of foundation of the PuSC. According to *Razâkâr* 2/36:3 (24 December 1939) it became dormant after some years, but was re-established in Talagang in 1936 and held an annual session in Ludhiana in the same year. For a report of its December 1938 session in Dokoha Sadat (Jullundhur Dist.) see *Razâkâr* 1/7–8:4 (24 December 1938). On its development 1940–47 see section 2.2., pp. 45, 49, 53.
264. *Sahifat ul-millat*, p. 116.
265. See section 2.1., pp. 35–36, 40.
266. *Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 20, 26.
267. Ibid., pp. 150–51.
268. Ibid., pp. 152, 165. Some opponents of the AISC took the unwillingness of the great *mujtahids* to travel to Bombay as a pretext for trying to stall the Bombay session by all means, including the mobilisation of Sunni '*ulamâ*' against it (ibid., p. 165).
269. Ibid., p. 206.
270. The initiative for a "Shia Sugar Factory" had come from Khan Bahadur S. Muhammad Hadi, then Assistant Director of Agriculture, U.P. It was opened in Amroha in 1909 but closed down in 1915 (*Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 15, 60).
271. S. 'Abid Husain Naqvi, "Hamâre qaumî kârnâma", *Razâkâr* 9/1:6 (1 January 1946). Only after the foundation of Pakistan a branch of the Shia Orphanage was opened in Jhang.
272. *Sahifat ul-millat*, preface, p. 31. S. 'Abid Husain Naqvi, *Razâkâr* 9/1:6, also mentions an



- “economic plan” of S. Kalb-i Husain, a son of S. Agha Hasan (1892–1963); on the latter’s biography see Husain, *Matla’-i anwâr*, pp. 433–36.
273. On its foundation see *Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 167–68.
274. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11, mentions the following Shia journals at the time of the foundation of the AISC (1907): *Akhbâr-i Imâmîya*, *Tazkira*, *al-‘Awârîf*, *al-Hukm*, *Bâyân* (all Lucknow); *Ithnâ’ashariyya* (Delhi), *al-Shams*, *Sâlih*, *Shi’a* (Khajwa, Saran Dist.), and *‘Asr-i Jadîd* (Meerut). The last one, founded by Khwaja Ghulam us-Saqlain in 1903, was Muslim communalist but not Shia communalist. Important later additions from the Punjab were *Durr-i Najaf* (Sialkot, 1908) and *Shi’a* (Lahore, 1921).
275. *Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 28–9 (preface) and 20–24 (main part), attributes the first initiative for establishing a Shia College to S. Ali Naqi Safi, the author of *Lakht-i jigar* (see above, Fn 220).
276. Hasan, *Sectarianism*, p. 29; Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 234–5. Qizilbash had failed in 1913–14 to prevent a transformation of the Muslim League to a less conservative pro-British line (*ibid.*, pp. 230–34) and devoted most of his energies to the Shia College project thereafter.
277. No annual session of the AISC took place in 1916 for that reason (*Sahifat ul-millat*, p. 79).
278. *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 92–93.
279. *Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 152, 168.
280. S. ‘Abid Husain Naqvi, “Hamâre qaumî kârnâma”, *Razâkâr* 9/1:6.
281. On the history of the AWSM see *Razâkâr* 16/40–41 (8 November 1953; Special AWSM No.). Its assets were divided between Indian and Pakistani branches after 1947 and it is still very active in Pakistan, publishing also a monthly, *Anjuman-i Wazîfa*, from Lahore. Reports on the annual sessions of the AWSM (including detailed accounts of its sources of income and expenses) can be found in *Razâkâr* (usually in September) and other Shia journals.
282. *Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 179, 219, 232.
283. *Ibid.*, p. 35. In March 1912 Russian troops intervened against the renegade leader Yusuf Khan, who had taken control of the town of Mashhad and parts of the Iranian province of Khorasan, bombarding Mashhad and killing hundreds of Shia pilgrims and other civilians; see M. Streck, “Mashhad”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VI, pp. 713–16, here p. 715.
284. *Ibid.*, p. 125. On the 1920 uprising in Iraq and its aftermath see Peter Sluggett, *Britain in Iraq 1914–1932* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), pp. 39–43, 78.
285. The destruction of the tombs of Fatima, and several Shia Imams in *Jannat ul-Baqi’* (Medina) had enormous repercussions throughout the Shia world; see A. J. Wensinck, “Baki ul-Gharkad”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. I, pp. 957–8; R. B. Winder, “al-Madina” (part II), in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. V, pp. 998–1007, here p. 994. In India it led to the establishment of numerous *anjumans* which tried to build up public pressure for their reconstruction. The AISC devoted a special session in Amroha to the problem (1926) and established an *Anjuman-i Tahaffuz-i Ma’âthir-i Mubâraka* (*Sahifat ul-millat*, pp. 179–80, 261). The destruction of *Jannat ul-Baqi’* is still being remembered with annual protest days by a number of Shia organisations in India and Pakistan until present times.
286. *Sahifat ul-millat*, p. 219.
287. See section 2.1, p. 34–35.
288. Very little information about the early years of the AISPC in addition to that provided by Hasnain & Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 159–62 could be found out during research for this book. In any case, the contention in Hasan, *Sectarianism*, p. 32, that the AISC was “renamed AISPC” before 1911 is completely mistaken. An important founding member of the AISPC, S. Kalb-i Abbas Naqvi, remained affiliated with the AISC, however (see above, Fn 253).

289. Hasnain & Husain, op. cit., pp. 159–62. For AISPC positions taken since late 1939 see section 2.2, pp. 42, 46, 48.
290. Ghazipuri, “Shi’a âpnê huqûq kâ tahaffuz kyûn chahtê hain?”, *Razâkâr* 9/31:2 (16 August 1946).
291. S. Ali Zahîr, the eldest son of S. Wazir Hasan, a prominent member of the Muslim League until 1937 (see section 2.1, pp. 35–36, 39–40), was elected president of the AISPC in 1941 and again in 1945. On his political career see Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 80–81; on some of his activities in the 1940s see section 2.2, pp. 46, 48, 52.
292. Ganju, “The Muslims of Lucknow”, p. 289. The bill, introduced by Zahîr in the U.P. Legislative Assembly, could be passed only after Indian independence (ibid.).
293. See section 2.1, pp. 40–41.
294. See section 2.2, pp. 48, 51.
295. On the *Unionist Party* see section 2.1, p. 39.
296. *Razâkâr* 6/46–47:4 (1–8 October 1943). On the 1943 resolution of the PuSPC see section 2.2, pp. 45–46.

## 2. SHIAS AND THE PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

1. One exception was the relative small Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ class.
2. See sections 3.1, pp. 58, 63; p. 71; 4.3, p. 119; 6.3, p. 227. Entirely devoted to that subject are the two volumes of M. W. Khân, *Tashkîl-i Pākistân mên shî‘ân-i ‘Alî kâ kardâr* [The deeds of Shias for the establishment of Pakistan].
3. Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 227–30.
4. Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, pp. 6–12. The book was written nearly a quarter of a century before the famous travelogue *Talkhîs al-ibrîz* of the Egyptian scholar Rifâ‘a Rafî‘ al-Tahtawi. Mirza Abu Talib Khan in 1775 served as prime minister under Nawab Asaf ud-Daula of Awadh and later for different British colonial officers in Bihar and Bengal (Rizvi, op. cit, pp. 230–32).
5. Ibid, pp. 97–100. The paper was closed and Maulana Muhammad Baqir was executed by the British during the 1857 “Mutiny”. On Muhammad Baqir and his son Muhammad Husain Azad (1830–1901), a teacher at the Lahore College and renowned writer, see also Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 293–4.
6. See Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 21–3 (where some biographical details are confused with those of a Sunni Maulana with the same name) and Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 366–8. The *Risâla fî ma‘âkhidh al-‘ulûm* was translated into English by his disciple S. Amir Ali (see below) in 1868.
7. Ibid, pp. 407–8; Ahmad, op. cit, pp. 57–64; Jain, *Muslims in India*, Vol. I, pp. 141–22.
8. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 376–8.
9. He became the first Muslim barrister at the Calcutta High Court in 1873 and the first Muslim judge at the same court in 1890. In 1878 he was appointed member of the Bengal Legislative Council and in 1884 of the Imperial Legislative Council. On his further career see Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 85–6; W. Cantwell Smith, “Amîr ‘Alî”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. I, pp. 441–2; K. K. Aziz, *Ameer Ali. His Life and Work* (Lahore: Publishers United, 1968); Shan Muhammad (ed.), *The Right Hon’ble Syed Ameer Ali. Political Writings* (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1989); Muhammad Yusuf Abbasi, *The Political Biography of Syed Amer Ali* (Lahore: Wajidalis Ltd., 1989).
10. Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 89–94; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 420–27.
11. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 88; Rizvi, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 421–2.
12. The organisation, then renamed Central National Mohammedan Association, had fifty-

- three branches in various parts of the subcontinent by 1888 but gradually ceased to function after S. Amir Ali's departure for England in 1904. See Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 432; Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, p. 105.
13. Ibid. and M. W. Khân, *Tashkil-i Pākistān*, Vol. I, p. 98. On the 1906 deputation see below.
  14. M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 98–9. He defended his plan in a letter to Badr ud-Din Tayyabji, a Bohra Twelver Shia barrister of Bombay who presided over the third annual session of the Congress that year (ibid.). See also below, Fn 54.
  15. Preliminary classes at Aligarh started in 1875. Generally on the Aligarh College see Mumtaz Moin, *The Aligarh Movement (origin and early history)* (Karachi: Salman Academy, 1976); Shah Muhammad, *The Aligarh Movement* (Meerut 1978); David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).
  16. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 389–90. Shia members of the founding committee of the college were Salar Jang (Prime Minister of Hyderabad), Khalifa S. Muhammad Hasan (Chief Minister of Patiala State, Punjab), Nawab Mushtaq Ali Khan of Rampur, Nawab Fateh Ali Khan Qizilbash (Lahore), the Raja of Mahmudabad, S. Husain Bilgrami, S. Amir Ali, the Agha Khan III, S. Tahir Saif ud-Din (Bombay), S. Husain Bakhsh Gardezi (Multan), Mir Turab Ali (Agra), Muhammad Husain Shauq Saharanpuri, Mumtaz Husain Jaunpuri, S. Ghulam us-Saqlain (Meerut) and S. Âl-i Nabiyy (Agra); see M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 74–5.
  17. Until 1858, when the British confiscated a major portion of the Mahmudabad estate, it had comprised over 600 villages, covering an area of more than 400 square miles in the districts of Sitapur, Barabanki, Kheri and Lucknow; see S. I. Husain, *The Life and the Times of Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad*, Vol. I, p. 3.
  18. Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 389–90. S. Husain Bilgrami (1844–1926) was Director of Public Instructions at Hyderabad (Deccan) from 1887 to 1902. On his further career and his services for the Aligarh College, along with his brothers Major S. Hasan (d. 1916) and S. Ali (1851–1911), see ibid., pp. 404–6; Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 133–5; Husain, *Matla'-i anwâr*, pp. 334–35.
  19. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 5.
  20. Ibid, pp. 8–9, mentions his visit to Karachi in 1911, where the Shia Mir Imambakhsh Talpur of the Khairpur State also pledged a donation of Rs. 100,000 for Aligarh.
  21. Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 77.
  22. Ibid, p. 55. On the Agha Khan III (Sultan Muhammad Shah), who had become spiritual head of the Khoja Isma'ilis and of Nizari Isma'ili communities world-wide in 1885, see Daftary, *Isma'ilis*, pp. 518–44, and references ibid., p. 721, Fn 174.
  23. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, pp. 242–3.
  24. M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 81.
  25. See sections 1.2, p. 18; 1.3, p. 29; a non-specified sectarian dispute led to the withdrawal of Raja Amir Hasan Khan's grant in 1888 (see above).
  26. M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 77–81, 90; see also below, p. 41.
  27. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, pp. 246–7, 252; Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, pp. 35–6; Farman Fatehpuri, *Pakistan Movement and Hindi-Urdu Conflict* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1987), pp. 58–217; Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 59–78.
  28. Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 133–9; Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 67–8. Muhsin ul-Mulk had to scale down his protest campaign after pressure from the U.P. governor, but in 1903 he organised an *Anjuman-i Taraqqi-i Urdû* as a wing of the Muslim Educational Conference (ibid.).
  29. S. Karamat Husain taught law at Aligarh 1891–6 and thereafter practised as a barrister in Allahabad until his appointment as a judge at the High Court of that town in 1908. Later he became a member of the U.P. Legislative Council. He is especially known for his efforts to promote female education; see Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 412–18.

30. A graduate of Aligarh from Amroha who practised law in Lucknow and had been a member of the Indian National Congress until the late 1890s; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 190–91; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 433.
31. See below, Fn 33, and p. 349, Fn 226 to chapter 1.
32. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 434; According to Rizvi, S. Karamat Husain had formed an *Urdu Defence Association* in Allahabad already in 1898.
33. Ibid, pp. 435–6. Ghulam us-Saqlain in 1903 started publishing the monthly '*Asr-i Jadid* from Meerut, which pleaded for a Muslim political organisation. Selected articles have been published in Khwāja Ghulām us-Saqlain Pānīpatī, *Ta'zīyatnāma*, (Meerut: 'Asr-i Jadid Press, 1915).
34. Ibid, pp. 435–6; on S. Husain Bilgrami see above, Fn 18.
35. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 29–30. The initiative for the deputation came from Muhsin ul-Mulk, who drafted the memorandum together with S. Husain Bilgrami (Ikram, op. cit, pp. 89–92; he refers to Bilgrami as "Nawab Imad ul-Mulk"). Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 435, and M. W. Khān, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 102, mention only Bilgrami as the author of the memorandum.
36. He was born near Patna and became a leading lawyer of Bihar in the 1890s; in 1917 he was appointed judge at the Patna High Court. S. Ali Imam presided over the second annual session of the Muslim League in Amritsar (1908) and was elected its vice-president in 1910 and again in 1916, but later became opposed to separate electorates for Muslims (Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 73–5, Robinson, *Separatism*, p. 431).
37. Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 436.
38. Ikram, op. cit., p. 195. The Karachi session was presided over by the Bombay businessman Rafī' ud-Din Adamji Pirbhai (1846–1910), a Bohra Isma'ili who had been a member of the delegation to Lord Minto (Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 48).
39. Muhammad Yusuf Abbasi, *London Muslim League (1908–1928). An Historical Study* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1988).
40. Ibid, p. 106; Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 86. In January 1909 he led a Muslim deputation to Lord Morley in London in this connection.
41. Ikram, op. cit., p. 85; see also excerpts from his speech read by Mian Muhammad Shafī' in M. W. Khān, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 105–6.
42. Jain, op. cit., pp. 85–6.
43. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 231–5.
44. He was born in a well-to-do family of the Jaunpur District (U.P.) and had joined the Lucknow Bar in 1903. From 1930 to 1934 he was chief judge at the Lucknow High Court and after retirement practised as a barrister at the Allahabad High Court; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 207–8; Robinson, op. cit., pp. 371–2.
45. Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 207; M. W. Khān, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 107, 112, 117, 120. The amendments went into force in March 1913 (Ikram, op. cit., p. 240).
46. Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 36–8.
47. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 28–32.
48. Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, pp. 42–8; S. I. Husain, *The Life and Times*, Vol. I, p. 11. In the Lucknow Pact, which was never implemented, the Muslim League relinquished its demand for separate electorates in return for a guaranteed quota of seats in assemblies and governments in a future independent India.
49. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 8. According to M. W. Khān, the Agha Khan had remained Acting President after his resignation in December 1913 until he was replaced in that function by the Raja of Mahmudabad. The latter was formally elected President of the League on 1 January 1915 (op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 120–21). He was also a member of the Imperial

- Legislative Council from 1909–16 and of the U.P. Executive Council in the 1920s (Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 77–8).
50. M. W. Khān, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 107; S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 11. The League head office remained in Lucknow until 1927 when it was shifted to Delhi.
  51. Ibid, p. 10, quoting from Khaliquzzaman, op. cit, p. 38. The Raja of Rampur had also arrested the Ali brothers on behalf of the British; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 191.
  52. Ibid, p. 78; Wolpert, op. cit., p. 34, gives the credit to S. Wazir Hasan and Maulana Muhammad Ali.
  53. As Wolpert puts it, Jinnah “left the Aga Khan’s ‘Sevener’ Khoja community ... opting instead to join the less hierarchically structured Isna ‘Ashari sect of ‘Twelver’ Khojas, who acknowledged no leader” (op. cit., p. 18). Some examples of Jinnah’s indifference towards Islamic tenets are given ibid, pp. 78–9, 341.
  54. Ibid, p. 18. Badr ud-Din Tayyabji (1844–1906), a Bohra Twelver Shia, was the first Muslim to head the Indian National Congress (elected during its third annual session, Madras 1887); see Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 195–7, and references ibid.
  55. Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 33–4.
  56. Ibid, pp. 34–102; Ikram, op. cit., pp. 240–50.
  57. See section 2.2, pp. 43, 49–50.
  58. Ahmed, “The Shi’is of Pakistan”, p. 286, Fn 7.
  59. Wolpert, op. cit., p. 53; S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 34.
  60. Ibid., p. 14. Among the other trustees were S. Wazir Hasan, Choudhry Khaliq uz-Zaman and Raja S. Muhammad Mahdi of Pirpur (see below).
  61. See section 1.3, p. 29.
  62. Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 77; S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 9–10. The initiative for the foundation of a university in Lucknow had also come from him; see Ganju, “Muslims of Lucknow”, p. 284.
  63. Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, pp. 123–31.
  64. Ibid, pp. 130–31; Rizvi, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 439–44.
  65. Prominent leaders of the movement were the Ali brothers, Abu ’l-Kalam Azad, Hasrat Mohani, Abd ul-Bari Farangi-Mahalli and Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband; see A.C. Niemeijer, “Khilāfa”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. V, p. 7.
  66. Ibid.; on the *Khilāfat* Movement see also Ahmad, op. cit, pp. 131–40; Khaliquzzaman, op. cit, pp. 42–73; K. K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement 1915–1933. A Documentary Record* (Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1972).
  67. Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., pp. 47–9.
  68. Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 66–7.
  69. He was a lawyer from Moradabad District and member of the U.P. Legislative Council since 1912 who had settled down in Allahabad since 1916. In 1924 he presided over an annual meeting of the Muslim League in Bombay; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 115–16.
  70. Ibid.
  71. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 138; Ikram, op. cit., pp. 195–6.
  72. The *Jam’iyat al-‘Ulamā’-i Hind* was founded in 1919 at the height of the *Khilāfat* agitation by ‘ulamā’ from Deoband and the Lucknow seminaries *Farangi Mahall* and *Nadwat ul-‘Ulamā’*. Its majority faction remained in political alliance with the Congress throughout the following decades; see Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 348–56; Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam*, pp. 2–3; Friedmann, “The Attitude of the Jam’iyyat-i ‘Ulamā’-i Hind”, passim.
  73. The *Majlis-i Ahrār* was founded in 1931 by mostly Punjabi Muslims who had been active in the *Khilāfat* Movement. It was basically a religious group making extensive use of religious demagoguery; see Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 159–61; Jānbāz Mīrẓā, *Kārvān-i Ahrār*, (Lahaur: Maktabat-i Tabsira, 1975); Muhammad Rafiq Akhtar, *The Great Orator: A*

- Biography of Amir-e-Shariat Syed Ataullah Shah Bokhari*, (Multan: Aalimi Majlis Ahrar-e-Islam, 1988).
74. Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 89–102.
  75. Ibid, pp. 99–101.
  76. Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 74. He later distanced himself from the League and in 1931 chaired a *Nationalist Muslim Conference* in Lucknow which passed a resolution in favour of joint electorates.
  77. Ikram, op. cit., p. 199.
  78. Ibid, pp. 199–200; Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 59–64.
  79. Ibid, pp. 65–87.
  80. Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 105–6, 119–38.
  81. Ibid, p. 123; Ikram, op. cit., p. 181.
  82. S. I. Husain, *The Life and Times*, Vol. I, p. 12.
  83. On his biography see *ibid.*, Vols. I+II, *passim*; Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 87–8. For his political career up to 1947 see below and section 2.2, pp. 52–53. He left India for Iraq shortly after partition and did not move to Pakistan until 1957. There he turned down repeated offers to head the Pakistan Muslim League as well as ministerial and other high positions and boons. In May 1968 he left for London where he directed the Islamic Centre at Regent's Park until his death. He lies buried in Mashhad (Iran).
  84. M. W. Khan, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 187–8.
  85. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 35–7.
  86. Even the neutral scholar Wolpert refers to him as “Jinnah’s foremost supporter in the U.P. next to Liaquat Ali Khan” (op. cit., p. 144).
  87. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. II, is replete with anecdotes from different contemporaries confirming these traits of his character.
  88. See “Some Memoirs by the Raja of Mahmudabad”, in: C. H. Philips & Mary Doreen Wainwright, *The Partition of India. Politics and Perspectives 1935–1947*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 381–90; also S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 243–49. Jinnah had admonished him already as a twelve-year-old boy that he must consider himself “an Indian first and then a Muslim” (*ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 45; Wolpert, op. cit., p. 79).
  89. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 19 and 211, referring to a visit of Amir Ahmad Khan to Jinnah in London.
  90. Wolpert, op. cit., p. 140.
  91. Quoted from the full text of the letter in S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 231–3. In his reply dated 24 June the Agha Khan agreed to pay Rs. 20,000 to subsidise papers supporting the Unionist Party against Jinnah (*ibid.*, p. 235).
  92. M. W. Khan, op. cit., pp.
  93. Wolpert, op. cit., p. 142; Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 148. Chundrigar was nominated by the Muslim League as Minister of Commerce in the Interim Government of India in October 1946 and held different high offices in Pakistan, including that of Prime Minister from October to December 1957 (*ibid.*).
  94. Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 142–3; Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 221–2. Ispahani was the scion of a Calcutta commercial and financial empire and member of the Bengal Legislative Assembly 1937–47. In Pakistan he held positions such as Ambassador to the U.S. (1947–52) and Minister of Industries and Commerce (1954–5). He is also the author of *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him* (2nd revised ed., Karachi 1967).
  95. Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 83.
  96. Khaliqzaman, op. cit., p. 165. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan had been a member of the Muslim League since the early 1920s and had been loyal to Jinnah at most occasions. For example, he had opposed the election of Mian Muhammad Shafi’ as President of the Muslim League

- at a session in Lahore on 31 December 1927–1 January 1928 (M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 172). He rejoined the League with the 1937 Lucknow Pact (see below) and thereafter remained its staunch supporter (Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 172–73). On his later role see sections 2.2, p.50; 3.1, pp. 58–59, 65.
97. Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 151–2; Baxter, “Union or Partition”, pp. 46–50.
  98. Wolpert, op. cit. pp. 151–4; M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 205–6.
  99. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 49–50.
  100. M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 202.
  101. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol I, pp. 55–6; Khaliqzaman, op. cit., p. 173.
  102. Wolpert, op. cit., p. 157; S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 94–6. The Muslim Students’ Federation had been formed in 1936 and held its first plenary session in Lucknow. On its activities 1938–47 see *ibid*, pp. 97–124, and Mukhtar Zaman, *Students’ Role in the Pakistan Movement*, (Karachi: Quaid-e-Azam Academy, 1978), *passim*.
  103. S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 121.
  104. Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 207.
  105. Hasan, *Sectarianism*, p. 20; Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 80.
  106. Hasan, op. cit., pp. 20–21, according to whom the AISPC was then “under the firm control” of S. Wazir Hasan and S. Ali Zahîr. On the said campaign, which was aimed at luring Muslims away from the “reactionary” Muslim League, see Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 93–6.
  107. Resolution No. 6 of the AISPC annual session in Rae Bareilly 1937, quoted in Hasnain & Husain, *Shias and Shia Islam in India*, p. 160.
  108. A lawyer and politician who had been a member of both the Congress and the Muslim League since 1917 and 1919, respectively, and participated prominently in various political movements; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 6–8, and his autobiography, *Pathway to Pakistan*, *passim*.
  109. *Ibid*, p. 148; M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 204.
  110. Khaliqzaman, op. cit., pp. 141–2. He had been secretary of the Muslim Unity Board, a U.P. electoral alliance, since 1932.
  111. *Ibid*, p. 145; Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 145–6.
  112. Hasan, op. cit., p. 39 Fn 56; *Razâkâr* 8/37:3 (1 October 1945).
  113. Khaliqzaman, op. cit., pp. 213–16; on the 1939 events see section 1.2, pp. 21–22.
  114. Muhammad Siddiq, “Shi’a aur Muslim Lîg”, *Razâkâr* 9/7:3 (16 February 1946); Ghazipuri, “Shi’a âpnê huqûq kâ tahaffuz kyûn चाहतê hain?”, *Razâkâr* 9/31:2 (16 August 1946). The commission was formed in 1937 or 1938.
  115. See examples in section 2.2, pp. 43, 48–50.
  116. Wolpert, pp. 160, 164–5; Qureshi, op. cit., pp. 99–104. The Pirpur Report was submitted in November 1938.
  117. A lawyer born in Batala (Gurdaspur Dist.) who was member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly 1924–6 and again 1934–45. He was one of the founders of the *Majlis-i Ahrâr* and became its Secretary in 1931, when he led a civil disobedience movement against the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir. In 1946 he resigned from the party; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 109–10; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 321–2.
  118. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, p. 354; see also a quotation from Mazhar Ali Azhar’s pamphlet *Mister Jinnâh kâ Islâm* in Naqvi, *Bibliography*, Vol. I, pp. 537–8.
  119. Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 109.
  120. He was a graduate of Deoband and one of the founders of the JUH. In 1931 he became president of the *Ahrâr*; see *ibid*, p. 186.
  121. S. Da’ud Ghaznavi, who belonged to the *Ahl-i hadîth* sect, was Secretary-General of the



- Ahrâr* in 1931 together with Mazhar Ali Azhar. In 1946 he left the Congress and joined the Muslim League; see Râhî, *Tazkira-i 'ulamâ'-i Panjâb*, Vol. I, pp. 180–82.
122. Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 3–5; Qureshi, op. cit., pp. 348–55.
  123. Most important among them were Ashraf Ali Thanvi (1864–1943), who was expelled from the JUH and joined the Muslim League in 1939, and Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani, who founded the *Jam'iyat-i 'Ulamâ'-i Islâm* (JUI) in 1945; see Pirzada, op. cit., pp. 5, 8–10; Qureshi, op. cit., pp. 357–62, and p. 369, Fn 95 to chapter 3.
  124. The reasons for their stance are explained in Ziya ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, (Lahore: Progressive Books, 1962), pp. 92–121, and Friedman, "The Attitude of the Jam'iyat-i 'Ulamâ'-i Hind", passim.
  125. *Razâkâr* 2/36:4 (24 December 1939). Amir Haidar Khan headed the AISC from 1940 to 1946 when he was elected to the U.P. Legislative Assembly on a Muslim League ticket with the help of his elder brother (Author's interview with his son, Muhammad Amir Sajjad; Lucknow, 28 January 2001). He remained in India after partition and headed institutions such as the Shia Central Waqf Board and the sponsoring trust of the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn* Lucknow; see Shâdânî, *Sawânih*, pp. 60–65; *Illustrated Weekly of India*, 20 February 1972, p. 33.
  126. *Razâkâr* 2/36:4.
  127. Hasnain & Husain, *Shias and Shia Islam in India*, p. 160.
  128. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan, All India Muslim League Documents 1906–1947*, (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), Vol. II, p. 341.
  129. M. W. Khân, *Tashkil-i Pâkistân mên shî'ân-i 'Alî kâ kardâr*, Vol. I, pp. 226–8.
  130. S. I. Husain, *The Life and the Times of Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad*, Vol. I, p. 264.
  131. *Ibid.*, pp. 263–4.
  132. See below, p. 53, and p. 361, Fn 197.
  133. *Razâkâr* 3/13:1+14 (24 April 1940); 8/32:3 (24 August 1945).
  134. He was born from a middle class family in the Patna District and had been a judge at the Patna High Court 1919–20. From 1923–30 he was the first Indian Vice-Chancellor of the Patna University and from 1932–40 a member of the Governor's Executive Council of Bihar and Orissa. In 1938 he had been Indian delegate to the League of Nations; see Jain, *Muslims in India*, Vol. II, pp. 167–8.
  135. *Razâkâr* 3/13:4–7 (24 April 1940); commentary *ibid.*, p. 3.
  136. During a visit to Lucknow in January 2001 I tried in vain to find copies of Shia journals or other sources containing protocols of the 1940 All-Parties Shia Conference.
  137. Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 174; Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, p. 193. He thereafter dubbed Jinnah "the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims in India" (Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 168).
  138. Muhammad Siddiq, "Panjâb Shî'a Kânfarans aur shî'ân-i Panjâb kê farz-i mansabî", *Razâkâr* 4/4:3 (16 November 1941).
  139. Karim Bakhsh Haidari, "Shî'a aur siyâsat-i Hind", *Razâkâr* 5/17:6 (8 May 1942).
  140. Ghulam Muhammad Baltistani, "Shî'ôn ki qaumî zindagî mên tanzim ki zarûrat", *Razâkâr* 6/18:5 (1 March 1943); Muhammad Siddiq, "Anjuman-sâzî—maraz barhtâ gayâ jôn jôn dawâ ki", *Razâkâr* 6/19:3 (8 March 1943).
  141. Karim Bakhsh Haidari, "Hamâri Pûlitikâl Kânfarans ki pâlisî aur prûgrâm", *Razâkâr* 8/2:1 (8 January 1945).
  142. Karim Bakhsh Haidari, "Shî'a aur siyâsat-i Hind", *Razâkâr* 5/17:6 (8 May 1942).
  143. *Ibid.*
  144. *Ibid.*; on the Cripps Mission see Qureshi, op. cit., pp. 176–98.
  145. *Razâkâr* 4/4:3 (16 November 1941). Ihsan Ali Khan later wrote that he had never sought



- to preside over the PuSC, but that the ‘*ulamā*’ S. Muhammad Dihlavi and S. Zafar Mahdi had “obliged” him to do so (*Razākār* 6/7:3; 8 December 1942).
146. Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari, “Panjāb Shī’a Kānfarans kē liyē ēk lamha fikriya”, *Razākār* 5/18:8–9 (16 May 1942); Muhammad Ihsan Ali Khan, “Panjāb Shī’a Kānfarans kē maujūda ta’attul kē asbāb”, *Razākār* 6/7:3 (8 December 1942).
  147. Muhammad Siddiq, “Razākār kā dō-bāra ijrā”, *Razākār* 4/1:3 (24 October 1941).
  148. *Razākār* 6/7:3 (8 December 1942); 7/43:1 (8 November 1944).
  149. Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash (1907–82) had studied law in Cambridge and returned to Lahore in 1936. In 1937 he was elected to the Punjab Assembly on a Unionist Party ticket. On his further political career see below and sections 3.1, 3.6 and 5.2; also an obituary in *Razākār* 46/41:1 (1 November 1982) and Anjum, *Siyāsāt kē fir’aun*, pp. 250–59. He was elected Secretary-General of the PuSPC in 1938 and elected PuSPC President in 1943. After the death of his brother Nawab Nisar Ali Khan in April 1944 he became head of the family and heir to its huge estates (*ibid.*, p. 255; *Razākār* 7/20:1; 16 May 1944). For his family background see section 1.1, pp. 10–11).
  150. *Razākār* 6/34:3 (1 July 1943) refers to a meeting of the PuSPC Council in Lahore on 27 June 1943 which opened a permanent office to deal with preparations for the convention.
  151. Translation from *Razākār* 6/48:2 (16 October 1943). The resolution was tabled by Sardar Karim Bakhsh Haidari of Alipur (Muzaffargarh Dist.), who later shifted to unconditional loyalty to the Muslim League; see Muhammad Siddiq, “Haidari sāhib kâ ghair-zammadār bāyân”, *Razākār* 8/17:3 (1 May 1945); “Haidari sāhib kî khidmat mên iltimās”, *Razākār* 9/5:3 (1 February 1946).
  152. Quoted in *Razākār* 6/51:3 (8 November 1943).
  153. *Ibid.*; Abu’l-Kalam Azad (1888–1958) headed the Indian National Congress from late 1939 to 1946; see Jain, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 40–46, and references *ibid.*
  154. In that speech Amir Haidar Khan had said: “There is no doubt that we are a part of Islam and will remain so ... in general matters we must remain united with all Muslim sects, especially if we are confronted with a national (*qaumi*) enemy. Yet we have doubtless a special quality (*haisiyat*), and we don’t like any interference with that ...” (*Razākār* 6/51:3; 8 November 1943).
  155. *Razākār* 6/51:1 (8 November 1943); 6/52:6+10 (16 November 1943).
  156. *Razākār* 7/14:3 (1 April 1944).
  157. *Razākār* 7/16:3 (16 April 1944), quoting from *Shī’a* (Lahore) of 8 April and *Nazzāra* (Lucknow) of 24 April 1944.
  158. S. Nāsir Ali Shah Gardezi, “Qā’id-i A’zam aur shī’a tahaffuzāt”, *Razākār* 7/16:8+10 (16 April 1944).
  159. Qureshi, “The Politics of the Shia Minority”, pp. 116–18.
  160. See section 2.1, p. 41.
  161. Literally “refusers”, a pejorative term applied on Shias since the first century of Islam for not recognising the caliphate of the first three Caliphs; see Ethan Kohlberg, “Rāfida”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VIII, pp. 386–9.
  162. Referring to the “unlawful innovations” (*bid’āt*) in religion ascribed to Shias by a section of the Sunni ‘*ulamā*’; see section. 3.5, p. 96.
  163. The term *munāfiqūn* is frequently used in the Koran referring to the opponents of the Prophet Muhammad; see A. Brocket, “al-Munāfikūn”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VII, pp. 561–2.
  164. *Razākār* 7/45:1 (24 November 1944); Hasan, *Sectarianism in Indian Islam*, p. 40, Fn 69.
  165. *Madh-i sahāba* processions had been forbidden since 1940. According to *Razākār* 9/2:2 (8 January 1946) they were allowed again in late 1945, when the Congress had resumed

- charge of the U.P. provincial government, in order to create sectarian tensions and weaken the Muslim League during the 1945–6 elections.
166. The TAS was founded by Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari (1911–79), a former school headmaster from a village near Rajanpur (then Dera Ghazi Khan Dist.) who had studied at the *Dār ul-‘Ulūm* Deoband 1936–9, and his friend Dost Muhammad Quraishi (1920–74). See Bukhārī, *Ākâbir ‘ulamâ’-i Deoband*, pp. 356–60; Râhī, *Tazkira-i ‘ulamâ’-i Panjâb*, Vol. I, pp. 183–5; see also p. 380, Fn 325 to chapter 3.
  167. See a report in *Razâkâr* 8/13:6–7; Maulana Zafar ul-Mulk had led the *madh-i sahâba* in Lucknow. Another speaker was the JUH leader Husain Ahmad Madani. According to an editorial in *Razâkâr* 8/13:3 (1 April 1945), *fatwâs* declaring Shias *wâjib ul-qatl* (deserving death) were given at the meeting.
  168. Among the places affected in the years 1940–47 were Ambala, Amritsar, Biguwal, Dokoha Sadat, Kamalia, Kot Radha Krishan, Malir Kotla, Mandi Chishtian, Nurpur, Qasur, Sonipat, Shujaabad, and others; see *Razâkâr* 6/51:3 (8 November 1943); 8/3:1 (16 January 1945); 8/17:2 (1 May 1945); 8/38:3 (8 October 1945); 10/3:8 (24 December 1946).
  169. M. W. Khân, *Tashkîl-i Pākistân*, Vol. I, pp. 236–8.
  170. *Ibid.*, pp. 234–5; *Razâkâr* 8/16:3 (24 April 1945).
  171. *Razâkâr* 7/30:3 (1 August 1944).
  172. *Ibid.*
  173. He had been the President of the Indian Merchants’ Chamber in 1930 and Mayor of Bombay in 1931; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 29; Hasnain & Husain, *Shias and Shia Islam in India*, pp. 161–3.
  174. *Razâkâr* 8/16:3 (24 April 1945); for a critical examination of Lalji’s telegram by Karim Bakhsh Haidari see *Razâkâr* 8/19:4–5 (16 May 1945).
  175. *Razâkâr* 8/25:1–2 (1 July 1945).
  176. *Razâkâr* 8/22:1+10 (8 June 1945). According to the 1921 Census, Shias had made up for only 2 per cent of the Punjab’s population (see p. 343, Fn 97 and 98 to chapter 1).
  177. *Razâkâr* 8/20:3 (24 May 1945).
  178. “Qaum kô ‘ulamâ’-i shi’a kâ ahamm mashwara”, *Razâkâr* 8/27:7 (16 July 1945); commentary in *Razâkâr* 8/28:3 (24 July 1945).
  179. Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 243–6; Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 234–7.
  180. *Razâkâr* 8/32:3 (24 August 1945).
  181. Quoted from S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 258–59.
  182. *Razâkâr* 8/38:3 (8 October 1945); wording of the demands in *Razâkâr* 9/11:3 (16 March 1946).
  183. *Razâkâr* 8/39:3 (16 October 1945).
  184. *Razâkâr* 8/38:3; the editor of *Razâkâr* wrote in his comment that “the opposite was true” regarding the situation in the Punjab (*ibid.*).
  185. Report in *Razâkâr* 8/40:1–2 (24 October 1945); speeches of Husain Bhai Lalji *ibid.* p. 3–8, and of S. Muhammad Nasir in *Razâkâr* 8/41:4–6 (1 November 1945); commentary of Muhammad Siddiq, who had attended the conference, in *Razâkâr* 8/42:3 (8 November 1945).
  186. Full text of the resolution in *Razâkâr* 8/40:2 (24 October 1945).
  187. *Razâkâr* 8/43:3 (16 November 1945). A so-called *Husaini mahâz* (civil disobedience movement) had been launched by Shias of Qasur after ‘*azâdâri*’ processions had been banned there in 1938 and 1939.
  188. *Ibid.*
  189. In December 1945, Shias of Saharanpur (a town in U.P. near the provincial border of Punjab) went as far as inviting Sunnis to make recitations in praise of the first three Caliphs in *imâmbârgâhs* and Shia mosques if they wished so (*Razâkâr* 9/2:2, 8 January

- 1946, quoting from *al-Manshûr*, Delhi). Two months later Muhammad Siddiq wrote: ... “Now the workers of the Muslim League, in response to the call [of Jinnah], everywhere spread appeals that Muslims should unite and get rid off sectarianism, because it means ignorance. As a result it has become a sign of ignorance in the Muslim League even to call oneself a Shia. Our Shia brothers who have become unconditional members of the Muslim League are indulging in ... a sell-out of religion” (“Shi‘a aur Muslim Lîg”; *Razâkâr* 9/7:3; 16 February 1946).
190. *Razâkâr* 8/41:3 (1 November 1945); on Zafar Ahmad ‘Usmani see Bukhârî, *Akâbir ‘ulamâ’-i Deoband*, pp. 181–88.
191. *Razâkâr* 8/43:3 (16 November 1945).
192. *Razâkâr* 8/42:1 (8 November 1945).
193. Hasnain & Husain, op. cit., p. 163; M. W. Khân, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 252–4. Raja Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad and the Shia ‘âlim Ibn Hasan Jarchavi had also campaigned for Jinnah in Bombay during that contest; see S. I. Husain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 87.
194. These were Jinnah himself, Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad and Capt. S. ‘Abid Husain (Jhang).
195. Baxter, “Union or Partition”, p. 63.
196. *Razâkâr* 9/17:8 (1 May 1946). The number of Shias elected in the NWFP is not mentioned in the article. There were no elections in Balochistan and the Princely States of Bahawalpur and Khairpur of the later West Pakistan. See also a list of results in Aziz, *Historical Handbook*, pp. 499–509.
197. *Razâkâr* 9/9:4 (1 March 1946). He conveniently omitted those words of Jinnah’s letter which were critical of the All-Parties Shia Conference and its aims (see above, p. 43), just as has been done by Shia journals in Pakistan which have quoted the letter in the following years and decades. In *Razâkâr* 9/11:3 (16 March 1946) Muhammad Siddiq pointedly commented: “The Shias do not want to know from the Maharajkumar of Mahmudabad what Jinnah wrote to him in 1940, but rather which reply he received from the Muslim League to the demands from September 1945”.
198. Karim Bakhsh Haidari, “Shi‘a jamâ‘at aur Muslim Lîg intikhâbî natâ‘ij kî raushnî mên”, *Razâkâr* 9/17:8 (1 May 1946).
199. A number of Shia notables in the Punjab had still reservations against the Muslim League by mid-1946. *Razâkâr* 9/30:4 (8 August 1946) mentioned Qizilbash, S. Abd ul-Jalil Shah Gardezi (Multan), Mian Sultan Ali (Nangiana), Chaudhry Faqir Husain, (Amritsar Dist.), Pir S. Nasir ud-Din Shah (Lyallpur), Professor Nâsir Ali Khan (Panipat) and Mehr Talib Husain (Garh Maharaja). The journal remained a mouth-piece of criticism of the Muslim League right until partition, while at the same time remaining opposed to the Congress and its allies; see Muhammad Siddiq, “Kuch âpnê muta‘alliq”, *Razâkâr* 9/19:3 (16 May 1946); see also below, Fn 209.
200. *Razâkâr* 9/17:8 (1 May 1946). On the important Muslim League Working Committee session in Delhi see Wolpert, op. cit., pp. 261–2; Qureshi, op. cit., 246–7.
201. *Razâkâr* 9/17:8 (1 May 1946); Hasnain & Husain, op. cit., p. 162.
202. Ibid. and *Razâkâr* 9/35:3 (16 September 1946).
203. S. Ali Zahîr was later appointed member of the Constituent Assembly of India and ambassador to Iran and Iraq (1947–51). From 1951 to 1967 he was a member of subsequent provincial cabinets in the U.P., holding the Congress ticket for the Lucknow West constituency until 1969; see Jain, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 81; Hasnain & Husain, op. cit., p. 173; Wright, “The Politics of Muslim Sectarian Conflict in India”, p. 72. For Lalji’s further career see the *Illustrated Weekly of India*, 20 February 1972, p. 25.
204. *Razâkâr* 9/30:2 (8 August 1946); 9/32:1 (24 August 1946). Six other Shias besides the Raja

- had been named by the Muslim League among the 79 Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly, i.e. Jinnah himself, S. Tajammul Husain from Bihar, Shaikh Karamat Ali and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan from Punjab, Mirza Abu'l Hasan Ispahani and Prince Yusuf Mirza from Bengal (*Razākār* 9/27:3; 16 July 1946). On 22 November 1946 the Muslim League withdrew its representation in the Constituent Assembly altogether (Wolpert, *op. cit.*, p. 296).
205. *Ibid.*, p. 293; two of the four ministers nominated by the Muslim League for that government, which remained in office until June 1947, were Shias (I.I. Chundrigar and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan) (*ibid.*).
  206. Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari, “Kuch Panjāb Shī’a Kānfarans kē muta’alliq”, *Razākār* 10/10:1 (16 February 1947).
  207. Muhammad Siddiq, “Sadr-i Panjāb Shī’a Kānfarans kī khidmat mēn iltimās”, *Razākār* 9/16:2+11 (24 April 1946); answer of Ihsan Ali Khan and rejoinder by Muhammad Siddiq *Razākār* 9/23:7+3 (16 June 1946); S. Akhtar Husain Sha’iq Ambalvi, “Nawāb Hājji Ihsān ‘Ali Khān sāhib kē liyē lamha fikrīya”, *Razākār* 9/30:4+7 (8 August 1946).
  208. Anjum, *Siyāsat kē fir’aun*, p. 256; the author depicted Qizilbash as “the iron man of the Tiwana government”.
  209. Report of the session in *Razākār* 9/36:5–6 (24 September 1946). Speeches against specific acts of the Muslim League were held there by S. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, Sha’iq Ambalvi, Mir Baqir Husain Ja’fari, Jamil Husain ‘Alavi, S. Ghazanfar Ali Ferozpuri and S. Muhammad Ali Shamsi; the latter had tabled a resolution demanding to exclude Raja Ghazanfar Khan, Shaikh Karamat Ali and Major Mubarak Ali Shah from the PuSPC for one year (*ibid.*).
  210. *Razākār* 10/3:8 (24 December 1946).
  211. The first session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan took place in Karachi on 11 August 1947; see Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–6; Wolpert, *op. cit.*, pp. 337–9; see also p. 369, Fn 103 to chapter 3.
  212. The commission was headed by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani; the other members were Professor Zafar Ahmad, Pir Balaghat Ali Shah, and the Maulanas Ibrahim Sialkoti, Azad Sajjadi, Muhammad Danapuri, Zāhir Qasimi and Khwaja Hasan Nizami (*Razākār* 10/23:3).
  213. See p. 369, Fn 103 to chapter 3.
  214. Muhammad Siddiq, “Kyā ab bhī hamārē huqūq kī tahaffuz kā waqt nahīn āyā?”, *Razākār* 10/23:3 (24 July 1947); S. Abrar Husain Pawri, “Kyā Ligī shī’a āpnē farz kī taraf mutawajjih hain?”, *Razākār* 10/25:8 (8 August 1947).

### 3. SHIAS IN PAKISTAN UNTIL 1958

1. Centres of Shia population in East Punjab (including the newly created province of Haryana) had been Ambala, Ludhiana, Batala, Dokoha Sadat, Malir Kotla, Karnal and Rohtak. According to Cole, “the large Shī’i community of ... eastern Punjab went to Pakistan in its entirety” (*Roots of North Indian Shī’ism*, p. 289). The only exception was Malir Kotla in Ludhiana District (formerly Patiala State) which has remained a centre of ‘*azādārī*’ in post-1947 India; see Hasnain & Husain, *Shias and Shia Islam in India*, p. 232.
2. More than 5.3 millions of *muhajirs*, half of them peasants, were settled in West Punjab in 1947, forming 25.7 per cent of the province’s population in 1951; see Mohammad Waseem, “Partition, Migration and Assimilation: A Comparative Study of Pakistani Punjab”, in: Ian Talbot & Gurharpal Singh (eds.), *Region and Partition. Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 203–27, here 211; also Abou Zahab, “Le Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan”, pp. 145–6.

3. On some prominent 'ulamā' among the immigrants see section 3.4, pp. 79–80. More important was the high percentage of Shias among the professional elite in the federal capital Karachi and other towns. Most Pakistani Shias interviewed by the author 1999–2001 said that their community had still an edge in education and higher positions, a claim which is also confirmed by anti-Shia propaganda; see for example a quotation from 1978 in Mumtaz Ahmad, "Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism", p. 109.
4. Momen, *Introduction*, p. 282, estimated Pakistan's total Shia population to have reached 12 million in 1980, as compared to 34 million in Iran, 10 million in India and 7.5 million in Iraq. Momen put their share of the population at 14.5 per cent (ibid.); Ahmed, "Shi'is of Pakistan", p. 275, at 10–20 per cent, Keddie, *Shi'a of Pakistan*, p. 3, and Abou Zahab, op. cit., p. 143, at 15–20 per cent.
5. Hasnain & Husain, op. cit., p. 114, claim that "unlike some other Muslim groups, the percentage of Shias migrating to Pakistan after partition was quite low". However, the majority of Shia *muhājirs* settled in West Pakistan.
6. Ahmad Hasan Dani, *History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Institute for Historical and Cultural Research, 1989), pp. 331–5.
7. Ibid., pp. 338–52; Martin Sökefeld, "Jang Azādi: Perspectives on a Major Theme in Northern Areas' History", in: Imtraud Stellrecht (ed.), *The Past in the Present. Horizons of Remembering in the Pakistan Himalaya* (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 1997), pp. 61–81.
8. The revolt against Kashmir rule in and around Gilgit was led exclusively by the Gilgit Scouts and local volunteers. These also took part in the campaigns in Baltistan and the Kargil and Zaskar Districts which were later re-conquered by India. The Kashmiri garrison in Baltistan's capital Skardu was besieged and made surrender with the help of scouts from the Princely State of Chitral, which fully acceded to Pakistan only in 1955. On the Baltistan campaign see Dani, op. cit., pp. 376–401, and Muhammad Yûsuf Husainâbâdî, *Baltistân par êk nazar*, (Skardu 1984), pp. 67–142.
9. Rieck, "Sectarianism", pp. 440–41; generally on the conflict about the status of the Northern Areas see Sökefeld, *Ein Labyrinth von Identitäten in Nordpakistan*, pp. 251–330.
10. Since the late nineteenth century, the *Ahl-i hadîth* had gained a foothold in the area by making converts among the local *Nûrbakhshî* sect in Baltistan, which was also an object of intense Shia proselytising (Rieck, "The Nûrbakhshis of Baltistan", pp. 169–79). The Sunni version about the clashes of July 1946, which were triggered by a dispute about a mosque in Skardu, is given by Abd ul-Rashîd Ansârî Baltistânî, *Wâdî Baltistân kê mazhabî hâlât* (Karachi: Anjuman-i Islâmiya Baltistân, 1956) and in *Razâkâr* 9/31:10+12 (Reprint from *Zamîndâr*, Lahore, 10 August 1946). For the Shia version see Muhammad Amîn Baltistânî, *Da'wat-i ittihâd* (Lahore: Anjuman-i Imâmiya, 1957), and *Razâkâr* 9/35:5 (16 September 1946); 10/1:3 (8 December 1946); 10/2:3 (16 December 1946); 10/7:7 (24 January 1947); 10/8:1+11 (1 February 1947); 10/11:7 (24 February 1947); 10/13:9 (24 March 1947).
11. Rieck, "From Mountain Refuge to Model Area", passim; idem, "A Stronghold of Shia Orthodoxy in Northern Pakistan", passim.
12. Literally: "Chief of Memorisers of the Koran". Husain, *Matla' i anwâr*, pp. 428–33, portrays him as "doubtless the greatest Shia 'âlim in Pakistan". On his biography see also Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 243–5, and *Payâm-i 'Amal* 12/4–5 (Special obituary No., June–July 1968); also Ghulam Muhammad Khan, "Hâfiz sâhib qibla Peshâwar mên", *Razâkâr* 31/24:6, 31/25:2, 31/26:2+8 (1–16 July 1968). A collection of his sermons was edited by Afzâl Husain, *Kifâyat al-wâ'izîn*, 2 Vols. (Lahore: Khalifa Sayyid Hasan Mahdî, 1990).
13. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 279–80; Muhammad Bashîr Ansârî, *Ittihâd al-tariqain* (Karachi: Rahmatullah Book Agency, n.d.), pp. z-h (preface).
14. In mid-1948, Ansari would still brand opponents of his line as "agents of the Congress"

- (*Razākār* 11/24:8). One year later, he wrote that the situation of Shias in Pakistan would be worse than that of the Muslims in India if they had failed to support the Muslim League collectively (letter to Sha'iq Ambalvi, 18 July 1949; *Razākār* 12/30:8). Hafiz Kifayat Husain, for his part, had advocated only “conditional support” of the Muslim League; see *Razākār* 6/52:10 (16 November 1943).
15. Rizvi, *Silsilat al-dhahab*, p. 118. (The book contains autobiographical sketches from one of the founding members of the APSC and long-time chairman of its section in the Rawalpindi District).
  16. *Razākār* 11/5:3 (8 January 1948). The West Punjab Shia Political Conference apparently ceased to exist after the founding of the APSC.
  17. Rizvi, *Silsilat al-dhahab*, p. 118. This was confirmed during an interview of S. Mehrban Ali Rizvi with the author (Rawalpindi, 20 February 1999). Qizilbash is not mentioned as a speaker at the Lahore Convention of March 1948 in *Razākār*, but as a donor of Rs. 4,000 for a Shia Hostel and a Shia Vocational School at that occasion (*Razākār* 11/16:5; 1 April 1948).
  18. He remained in this office from August 1947 to July 1948 (Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 342); on his later career see below and Jain, *Muslims in India*, Vol. I, pp. 172–3.
  19. *Razākār* 11/14:1–2, 8 (16 March 1948); resolutions of the Lyallpur meeting in *Razākār* 11/15:5–6 (24 March 1948). Qizilbash was included among the 19 council members mentioned there.
  20. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 355–6. Kararvi was born in Karari (Allahabad Dist., U.P.) and had graduated from the *Sultān ul-Madāris* (Lucknow) in 1938. In 1946 he had campaigned for the Muslim League in the NWFP. In 1950 he founded the weekly *Shihāb-i Thāqib* (Peshawar) which he ran for the rest of his life. On his later activities and offices see below, Fn 62, and sections 5.3, p. 154; 6.2, p. 217.
  21. *Razākār* 11/16:6 (1 April 1948). The statutes of the SMUP were laid down in a session in Peshawar, 29–31 August 1948; see Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi (ed.), *Nizām al-'amal-i Idārat-i Shi'a Majlis-i 'Ulamā'-i Pākistān* (Peshawar, n.d.). Among the goals of the SMUP stated there were enhancing the Shias of Pakistan to follow the precepts of the *shari'a*, safeguarding of their religious, civil, cultural, social, economic and political rights, representation of Shia '*ulamā*' in the federal government, and the founding of Shia *ḍini madāris*, libraries and publishing houses (ibid., p. 5–6). Ansari explained his view of the role of the SMUP in September 1972, then still presiding over it (*Razākār* 36/36:1).
  22. This was alleged by S. Muhammad Ali Shamsi, then leader of the West Punjab Muslim Students Federation, in a speech at the APSC on 21 March. Those who had been recommended instead of Ansari were Mufti Ja'far Husain (see below) and S. Muhammad Baqir Chakralvi (*Razākār* 11/16:6).
  23. *Razākār* 11/18:7 (16 April 1948). The reporter of *Razākār* commented: “This was the most important resolution from the viewpoint of the APSC”.
  24. Shaikh Ghulam Muhammad Baltistani, “'Āl Pākistān Shi'a Kānfarans kē muta'alliq mērē ta'assurāt”, *Razākār* 11/24:9 (1 June 1948).
  25. This was claimed by Baqir Husain Ja'fari, Secretary-General of the ITHS (see below), during his first annual report read in Rawalpindi, April 1949 (*Razākār* 12/18:5; 8 May 1949). A list of the said demands, which were distributed in the form of a poster, is not given. However, resolutions of the APSC did demand separate religious education for Shias in schools (No. 5), the allocation of mosques and *imāmbārgāh*s for Shia *muhājirs* (No. 13), and the abolishment of all bans on '*azādāri*' (No. 22). One resolution (No. 14) called for the establishment of a Shia daily press (*Razākār* 11/18:7; 16 April 1948).
  26. *Razākār* 11/15:4 (24 March 1948); 11/16:6 (1 April 1948).
  27. The full text of his speech is given in *Razākār* 11/15:3–4 (24 March 1948).

28. *Razākār* 11/16:6 (1 April 1948).
29. *Ibid.*; Ansari left the APSC shortly after and joined the ITHS.
30. *Qaum* has different meanings in Urdu, ranging from “sect” to “tribe” and “nation”. The word is also generally used in the Shia press to refer to the Shias themselves.
31. Translation from *Razākār* 11/18:7 (16 April 1948) where it is reproduced as “Resolution No. 10”, but everywhere else it is always referred to as “Resolution No. 6”. The person who tabled it remains obscured. During the founding session of the *All-Pakistan Shia Board* four years later (see below), Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan told that a similar statement had already been included in an address of thanksgiving of the PuSC to the Punjab Chief Minister Sikandar Hayat Khan at its annual session in Qasur (December 1937); see *Razākār* 15/5:8 (1 February 1952).
32. *Razākār* 12/11:1 (16 March 1949); 12/18:6 (8 May 1949); Fā’izī, *Sonēhri hurūf*, p. 17.
33. S. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi (1910–76), who had been *sajjāda-nashin* and head of the municipal council in his hometown Dinanagar in East Punjab, had moved to Lahore after partition. A gifted orator, he was one of the driving forces behind the ITHS from the outset and became its Secretary-General for West Pakistan in 1955 (countrywide in 1961). In 1954 he founded the weekly *Shahid* (Lahore) which was still issued in early 1999 from Nisbet Road No. 15. On his split from the mainstream Shia movement in the 1960s see sections 4.3, pp. 123–24; 4.5, p. 138.
34. Mufti Ja’far Husain was born in Gujranwala, where he founded one of the first Shia *madrasas* in West Punjab after his return from studies in Lucknow and Najaf in 1942 (*Razākār* 6/3:1). In 1948 he was the only native Shia *mujtahid* of Pakistan. On his later career see sections 3.2, 4.5, 5.5, 6.1, 6.2; also Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 94–6; Kāzimī, *Mufti Ja’far Husain*, Fā’izī, *Sonēhri hurūf*, *passim*.
35. *Razākār* 19/14:4 (Report of the Secretary-General at the ITHS convention of March 1956). Baqir Husain Ja’fari (see above, Fn 25) told in 1949 that he himself had visited Mufti Ja’far Husain, Hafiz Kifayat Husain and Azhar Hasan Zaidi (none of whom had attended the APSC) in Lahore to urge them for action (*Razākār* 12/18:6; 8 May 1949). Shaikh Muhammad Siddiq, the editor of *Razākār*, was also among the founders of the ITHS (Interview with the author, Lahore, 27 February 1999); see also Fā’izī, *Sonēhri hurūf*, p. 18.
36. Hafiz Kifayat Husain, “Āl Pākistān Shī’a Kānfarans shī’a qaum kī tarjumān nahin. Sadr kī bayān sē mujhē mayūsi hai”, *Razākār* 11/18:1.
37. Yet *Razākār* maintained its independence from the ITHS and would often criticise its shortcomings in later years. A good reflection of the journal’s attitude towards the ITHS was given by the editor shortly before an annual convention of the ITHS in Sargodha, 20–21 February 1954 (*Razākār* 17/7:3; 16 February 1954). Since 1966 *Razākār* wrote against the ITHS; see section 4.5, p. 138.
38. *Shī’a*, founded in 1921 by Malik Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani—referred to as “father of the press” (*Bābā-i shihāfat*) by Pakistani Shias—had supported the Muslim League unconditionally in the 1940s. The journal remained antagonistic to *Razākār* until 1964, when both supported the movement of S. Muhammad Dihlavi (see section 4.3).
39. The editor of *Asad*, S. Akhtar Husain Sha’iq Ambalvi (d. 1986), had been in the service of Nawab Qizilbash since the early 1940s. He had been assistant editor of *Razākār* and a leading member of the ITHS until 1950. In March 1955 he was elected Secretary-General of the APSC (*Asad* 5/7:5) and remained in this function until 1980, when he was appointed Secretary-General of the TNFJ by Mufti Ja’far Husain (replaced in 1984 by his successor).
40. It was a Lahore District ITHS meeting which was attended by Shias of neighbouring districts, too (*Razākār* 11/27:4).
41. Among them were Sha’iq Ambalvi, Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari and the Maulanas Faiz Muhammad Makhialvi, Ahmad Bakhsh Anwar, Muzammil Husain, S. Mahdi Hasan



- ‘Alavi and Zafar Mahdi (*Razākār* 11/27:4, 11/28:7, 11/29–30:8–9; 24 June–16 July 1948). A list of participants published before the meeting included also Muhammad Bashir Ansari (*Razākār* 11/26:1; 16 June 1948).
42. Resolution No. 8, translated from *Razākār* 11/29–30:9 (16 July 1948).
  43. Ibid.
  44. He was born in Bijnor and had moved to Lahore in 1947. At that time, he was already famous for his regular *majālis* in the town and other parts of Pakistan. From 1967 until his death he was Chairman of the ITHS; see Naqvi, *Tazkira* p. 60, and a collection of his sermons, *Khatib-i Āl-i Muhammad*, (Lahore, n.d.).
  45. *Razākār* 11/29–30:8–9. On later disputes among the Shia ‘*ulamā*’ of Pakistan about the proper use of *khums* see section 4.4., pp. 125–26.
  46. *Razākār* 11/29–30:9.
  47. Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, pp. 13–20.
  48. Already at the second annual meeting of the ITHS Punjab (April 1951), landlords presided over most sessions (*Razākār* 14/17–18:7–12). In 1953 a landlord from Multan District succeeded Mufti Ja’far Husain as the Chairman of the ITHS; see section 3.2, p. 73; also section 4.1, p. 108.
  49. See above, Fn 25.
  50. Translation from Sultan Mirza Dihlavi, “Shi’a markaz-i ‘aqā’id-o-‘amal”, *Razākār* 17/6:2 (8 February 1954). On Sultan Mirza, a civil servant and judge who became famous for his book *al-Balāgh al-mubīn* (Delhi 1945) in defence of Shia doctrines, see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 307–8.
  51. With these words ITHS members would frequently refer to their organisation.
  52. *Razākār* 11/48:3 (1 December 1948); further references to the article in *Ihsān* are found in *Razākār* 12/6:3 (8 February 1949) and 12/18:6 (8 May 1949).
  53. *Razākār* 11/47:2 (24 November 1948) reports about the speeches against *Ihsān* held at *Karbālā’-i Gāme Shāh* (Lahore) on 20 November by Mufti Ja’far Husain and other ITHS leaders. On Abu Sa’id Bazmi (d. 1951), a journalist and emigrant from Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh) to Lahore who died 1951, see Muhammad Aslam, *Wafâyât-i mashâhîr-i Pākistân* (Islamabad 1990), p. 10, and *Razākār* 12/4:4 (24 January 1949).
  54. *Razākār* 12/6:3 (8 February 1949).
  55. The editorial of *Ihsān* was partially reproduced in *Razākār* 11/50:3 (16 December 1948).
  56. *Razākār* 12/6:3 (8 February 1949). According to another Sunni journal (*Tanzīm-i Ahl-i Sunnat*, 22–29 November 1949), *Ihsān* was later fully rehabilitated by a decision of the Lahore High Court (quoted in *Razākār* 13/1:9). In 1951–2 it was among those Urdu newspapers which received funds from the Education Department for distributing copies in hospitals, jails, schools and colleges (*Munir Report*, pp. 82–3).
  57. *Razākār* 12/6:3–4 (8 February 1949); 12/19:4 (10 May 1949). Choti is the ancestral village of the Leghari *sardars* who had instigated the ban. In 1946 they had built a Sunni *madrasa* near the tomb of a local saint (‘Idan La’l Shah) that was also reclaimed by local Shias. For a later report on the village see *Newsline* 5/1989, pp. 97–100.
  58. Report and list of participants in *Razākār* 12/16:1–3 (8 February 1949). The convenor was Seth Yahya Bhai, a wealthy Shia trader and philanthropist from Lahore. While most participants were residents of the Punjab, the Maulanas S. Muhammad Naqi Najafi, S. Sultan, Munawwar Ali, S. Anis al-Hasan Amrohavi, Javad al-Asghar and ‘Inayat Husain Haidari had come from Karachi. According to the head of an *Anjuman-i Shabāb-i Shi’a-i Parachinār*, Mirza Muhammad Qasim, 2,000 Shias from the Kurram Agency (NWFP) had been ready to participate but were prevented by acute troubles in Afghanistan to leave for Rawalpindi (ibid., p. 2).
  59. Ibid., p. 3; *Razākār* 19/14:4 (8 April 1956).



60. *Razākār* 12/16:4–5 (8 February 1949). Resolution No. 10 reminded the government of the fact that many Shia *muhājirs* had not yet been granted the same right to hold religious ceremonies as they had enjoyed in their places of origin; Resolution No. 20 demanded new *auqāf* and *imāmbārgāhs* for them, while Resolution No. 38 demanded recompensation for their other material losses.
61. A Karachi branch of the ITHS was founded only in January 1953 during the All-Pakistan Shia Convention in that town (see section 3.2., pp. 70–72) with Maulana Rashid Turabi as its Chairman and the advocate S. Israr Husain as its Secretary-General, followed by branches in other towns of Sindh (*Razākār* 19/14:4).
62. Their joint statement was published both in *Shi'a* and *Razākār* on 1 May 1949; Hafiz Kifayat Husain denied any achievement of Kararvi (*Razākār* 12/19:3), who was later accused of having tried to “dissolve” both the ITHS and the APSC to found another organisation led by himself; see Maqbul Husain Quraishi, “ITHS ki haqīqat par gumrah-kun tabsira”, *Razākār* 12/29:7 (1 August 1949).
63. I was unable to find out the contents of that compromise. *Shi'a*, 8 July 1949, claimed that the ITHS had yielded to the basic aims of the APSC at the Sialkot meeting. That was strongly denied by Sha'iq Ambalvi, then Acting Secretary-General of the ITHS, in *Razākār* 12/30:8–9, where he also accused Muhammad Bashir Ansari of a breach of faith by conveying contents of the compromise to *Shi'a* before the councils of both organisation had approved it.
64. *Razākār* 12/31:1, 12–13 (16 August 1949). On the *Ta'limāt-i Islāmīya Board* see section 3.2, pp. 69–70.
65. *Razākār* 12/36:7–8 (24 September 1949). Qizilbash, who had applied for membership of the Muslim League only *after* the establishment of Pakistan (Anjum, *Siyāsat kē fir'aun*, p. 252), seems to have kept his options within the Shia community open until having achieved full rehabilitation among the new ruling class; see also above, p. 364, Fn 17.
66. *Razākār* 13/12:7 (24 March 1950), and the reprint of a poster from Lahore calling for its boycott in *Razākār* 13/9:3 (1 March 1950). Among the participants were Nawab Qizilbash, some other landlords, and members of the SMUP like Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, Shaikh Javad Husain (Hangu), Safdar Husain Mashhadi (Peshawar) and Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi (Lahore).
67. *Razākār* 13/7:3–4 (16 February 1950); 13/9:3 (1 March 1950); 14/15–16:9 (24 April 1951).
68. The ITHS had planned to organise a special reception for the Shah in Lahore but was denied permission from the government (*Razākār* 13/9:3). Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, for his part, brought the ambassadors of Iran and Iraq to a reception in Lahore hosted by S. Anwar Ahmad, director of the Punjab Education Department, on that occasion (*Razākār* 14/15–16:9).
69. *Razākār* 13/12:7 (24 March 1950). Some members of the ITHS who attended the meeting despite the boycott had also suggested replacing Resolution No. 6 with the “Sialkot formula” agreed between Hafiz Kifayat Husain and Muhammad Bashir Ansari in July 1949 (*ibid.*).
70. Accounts in *Razākār* 13/22:3 (8 June 1950) and 13/26:3 (8 July 1950) do not specify the occasion for the banned procession. For an overview on Shia religious commemoration days throughout the Islamic lunar year see Momen, *Introduction*, p. 239.
71. According to *Razākār* 13/22:1, all Shia settlements in the Sialkot District were completely sealed off, and arriving passengers at Narowal railway station were submitted to enquiries about their sectarian identity. Allegedly arrested Shias were left without water, food and sanitary facilities during twenty-four hours; homes and mosques were forcefully entered by the police (*Razākār* 13/26:3).

72. *Razākār* 13/30:3 (8 August 1950).
73. *Razākār* 14/22:7 (8 June 1951). The identity of the “traitor” is not given there, and I could not find it out.
74. *Razākār* 13/29:3 (1 August 1950).
75. *Razākār* 13/32:3 (24 August 1950). Detailed arguments for the rejection of the proposed Shia Board were given *ibid.*
76. *Razākār* 14/17–18:1–2 (8 May 1951). He hailed from Sonipat near Delhi and had headed the publications department of the *Madrasat ul-Wā‘izîn* in Lucknow before moving to Multan in 1947; see Husain, *Matla’-i anwâr*, pp. 481–2; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 263.
77. *Ibid.*: see a quotation from Sonipati’s speech in section 3.4, p. 103; also Government of the Punjab (Legislative Department), *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Elections Act, 1950 (Punjab Act XIX of 1950)* (Lahore: Government Printing, 1951), p. 2.
78. *Razākār* 14/17–18:10 (8 May 1951). Amir Haidar Khan complied and also explained the circumstances of his request and Jinnah’s reply in an article in the *Muslim Review* (Lucknow), March–April 1951 (quoted in *Razākār* 14/31:3; 16 August 1951). While the more critical remarks of Jinnah regarding the Shia request for “guarantees” (see section 2.2, p. 43) were still not made public, Amir Haidar Khan blamed the Shias of Pakistan—somewhat unjustly—for not having woken up as long as the *Qā’id-i A’zam* was still alive.
79. *Razākār* 14/17–18:10 (8 May 1951). More specifically, it was demanded to appoint at least one Shia minister to the Federal Government and two Shias among the six delegates from the Punjab to the Constituent Assembly. One resolution lauded the inclusion of S. Ali Husain Shah Gardezi in the cabinet of the new Punjab Chief Minister, Mian Mumtaz Daultana (*ibid.*).
80. Quoted by Ni’matullah Jan Amritsari, “Idāra kyūn?”, *Razākār* 14/15–16:9 (24 April 1951).
81. See an address of thanksgiving by the ITHS (n.d.) and Raja Ghazanfar Ali’s reply from 18 January 1952 in *Razākār* 15/4:1 (24 January 1952).
82. *Razākār* 15/5:7 (1 February 1952).
83. *Razākār* 14/47:8; 14/48:9; 15/1:3 (16 December 1951–1 January 1952). Both Hafiz Kifayat Husain and Muhammad Bashir Ansari were arrested for a short time during that agitation, which was but one in a series of similar campaigns for the right to build Shia mosques in specific quarters of Pakistani towns; see also section 4.5, pp. 135–36.
84. *Razākār* 15/5:7–8 (1 February 1952). These statements were important, because Hafiz Kifayat Husain had been the first renowned religious leader to speak out publicly against the APSC in April 1948. On the other hand, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan defended once more the Resolution No. 6 of March 1948 (see above, p. 365, Fn 17).
85. *Razākār* 15/5:7. No approval of the draft statutes (quoted *ibid.*) during the joint session on 20 January is mentioned, however. Resolutions passed on that day included only the demand for separate *dīnīyât* and five less important demands (*ibid.*: p. 8).
86. The list included from the side of the ITHS: Mufti Ja’far Husain, Hafiz Kifayat Husain, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, Nawab Ihsan Ali Khan, S. Muhammad Ahmad Sonipati, S. Kazim Ja’fari, Karim Bakhsh Haidari, S. Muhammad Ali Shamsi, Pir S. Nawazish Ali (Jahaniyan Shah), S. Malik Mahdi Hasan ‘Alavi, S. Jamil Husain Rizvi and Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari; from the APSC: Muhammad Bashir Ansari, S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani, Professor Muhammad Sadiq Quraishi, S. Nāsir Ali Shah Gardezi, Agha Shah Zaman, Shaikh Ali Nazr Ijtihadi, Sahibzada Mir Ghulam Husain Talpur, Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, Nawab Ali Haidar Khan, Abu al-Hasan and Mirza Ahmad Ali (*Razākār* 15/5:8; 1 February 1952).
87. See section 3.3, p. 77.
88. *Razākār* 15/11:9 (16 March 1952).
89. *Razākār* 15/20:8 (24 May 1952).

90. See his account nineteen years later in *Razâkâr* 35/40:2 (24 October 1971).
91. *Razâkâr* 19/14:5 (Report on activities of the ITHS, read in March 1956). On attempts to unite ITHS and APSC in later years see sections 3.6, p. 101–02; 4.1, p. 108; 5.4, p. 158.
92. See above, pp. 65–66.
93. See section 2.2, pp. 43–53.
94. One of the first persons to speak out on the need to safeguard the constitutional status of Shias in Pakistan after August 1947 was Sardar Karim Bakhsh Haidari, “Pākistân kē shī‘ôn ki siyâsi tanzīm”, *Razâkâr* 10/26:18 (8 September 1947). On his different stance during the last years before partition see above, p. 359, Fn 151 to chapter 2.
95. Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani (1885–1949) had been a senior teacher at the Deoband seminary. In November 1945 he was elected President of the JUI which had then split from the JUH; see Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 9–11; Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 29–30; Jain, *Muslims in India*, Vol. II, p. 201.
96. Binder, op. cit., p. 98. One resolution passed at that meeting demanded the appointment of a leading ‘ālim to the office of a “Shaikh ul-Islam” with appropriate ministerial and executive powers over the qâzīs throughout the country. The JUI also planned to mobilise public opinion in Pakistan in favour of a “purely Islamic constitution” (ibid.)
97. Binder, op. cit., pp. 100–4; Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, pp. 118–19.
98. This party, which represents the Bareilvi school of thought—as opposed to the Deobandi affiliation of the JUI—was formally established on 28 March 1948, with Maulana Abu’l-Hasanat Qadiri as its president and Maulana Ahmad Sa’id Kazimi as its Nâzim-i A’lâ; see Mujeeb Ahmad, *Jam’iyyat ‘Ulama-i-Pakistan*, pp. 1–4.
99. The *Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat* (Council for Safeguarding the Finality of Prophethood) was formed in June 1952. It included also some Shias; see below, p. 68, and Fns 106 and 128 (pp. 369–70); also *Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953* (hereunder *Munir Report*), pp. 75–8.
100. A list of such organisations can be found in Pirzada, op. cit., p. 239.
101. The bill had failed to pass in 1937 because of opposition from the landholding classes (Binder, op. cit., p. 102). When it was tabled on 9 January, the provincial government had announced its intention to “Islamise” most other aspects of personal law, too. A ten-member commission was appointed to advise the Punjab government on that matter, including the Shias Shaikh Karamat Ali and Pir ‘Ashiq Husain (*Razâkâr* 11/6:3).
102. Binder, op. cit., p. 100.
103. The first Constituent Assembly, which also acted as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan until its dissolution in October 1954, had only three ‘ulamâ’ among its seventy-six nominal members (Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, Muhammad Akram Khan, ‘Ubaidullah Baqi). On its functioning see Callard, *Pakistan. A Political Study*, pp. 77–118.
104. Binder, op. cit., p. 96; *Munir Report*, passim.
105. Binder, op. cit., passim. Other and probably more serious obstacles were the conflicting interests of East and West Pakistan and the weak institutional base of the Constituent Assembly itself; see ibid., pp. 345–61; Callard, *Pakistan*, pp. 77–85, 101–23.
106. See below, Fn 128. The ITHS is also mentioned among the fourteen religious organisations which took part in the “All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention” against the Ahmadis in Karachi, 16–18 January 1953 (*Munir Report*, p. 78).
107. Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations of Pakistan*, p. 46 (clause No. 4). The full text of Liaqat Ali’s speech on that occasion is given ibid., pp. 47–51. No mention of the *shari’a* is made in the “Objectives Resolution” (Binder, op. cit., p. 153).
108. Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, p. 46 (clauses No. 5, 7 and 8); Binder, op. cit., p. 142.

109. The twenty-five-member BPC, formed on the same day when the “Objectives Resolution” was passed and chaired by Tamiz ud-Din Khan, had only one Shia member, Shaikh Karamat Ali; see list of members in Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 53–4; after his death in 1951 he was replaced by S. Ali Husain Shah Gardezi (ibid., p. 86).
110. Binder, op. cit., pp. 155–6.
111. Ibid., p. 157; *Razākār* 12/31:1. S. Sulaiman Nadvi (1894–1953), the director of the *Nadwat ul-‘Ulumā’* Academy in Lucknow, was made its chairman, but he did not arrive in Pakistan until the end of 1950. The other four members were Mufti Muhammad Shafi’, Professor Abd ul-Khalīq, Dr Muhammad Hamidullah and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari.
112. Binder, op. cit., pp. 159–82 and 383–429 (Appendices A and B).
113. Binder, op. cit., pp. 183–207; Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan. A Religio-Political Study*, pp. 24–5. The full text is given in Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 52–83.
114. These were laid down in a brief section “Directive Principles of State Policy” (ibid., pp. 54–5).
115. Binder, op. cit., p. 213.
116. Ihtisham ul-Haqq (1915–80) who hailed from Attara (U.P.) and had graduated from the *Dār ul-‘Ulūm* Deoband was one of the founders of the JUI in 1945. He moved to Karachi in 1947 and was active in the establishment of religious institutions, such as the mosque in Jacob Lines and the *Dār ul-‘Ulūm* in Tando Allahyar (Sindh), and in politics. In the 1970s he became a supporter of the Pakistan People’s Party; see Bukhārī, *Ākābir ‘ulamā’-i-Deoband*, pp. 257–64; also below, Fn 336 (p. 381), and sections 5.3, p. 154, 6.1, p. 204.
117. Quoted fully in Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, pp. 27–30; Urdu original in Kāzimī, *Mufti Ja’far Husain*, pp. 18–20. On the participants see Binder, op. cit., pp. 213–16, and an account of Ihtisham ul-Haqq in *Musāwat* (Lahore), 26 February 1979, quoted in *Razākār* 43/10–11:3. According to Pirzada, 19 of the 31 delegates were members of the JUI (op. cit., p. 18).
118. Shaukat Ali, op. cit., p. 29 (point No. 9).
119. Ibid., p. 31; Binder, op. cit., p. 216.
120. See sections 3.5, pp. 86–98; 4.2, pp. 103–12.
121. Binder, op. cit., p. 281; for the full text see Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 84–156.
122. Binder, op. cit., pp. 259–68; *Munir Report*, pp. 75–80.
123. Namely (2b) the prohibition of drinking, gambling and prostitution in all their various forms; (2c) elimination of bank interest (*ribā*) as soon as it may be possible to do so; (2d) promotion and maintenance of Islamic moral standards; and (2e) proper organisation of *zakāt*, *auqāf* and mosques; clause (3) called for setting up an organisation for making the teachings of Islam known to the people, and for *amr bil-ma’rūf* and *nahy ‘an al-munkar*; see Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, p. 87.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., p. 88. The Urdu word *millat*, which is used here in the English original text (italics added), stands both for “nation” and “community of faith”.
126. Ibid., pp. 88–90. An important element of that procedure was thought to be “a Board consisting of not more than five persons well-versed in Islamic Laws” whom the Head of State would appoint for a period of five years.
127. Binder, op. cit., pp. 282–92.
128. *Munir Report*, pp. 130–32. Seven more members, including the Shia ‘ālim Muhammad Isma‘il (see below, p. 395; Fn 216 to chapter 4)) were co-opted on 18 January. On 22 January a three-member deputation of the “Action Committee”, including Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, met Prime Minister Khwaja Nazim ud-Din (*Munir Report*, pp. 132–3).
129. Binder, op. cit., p. 282.

130. See detailed reports in *Razâkâr* 16/4 (24 January 1953) and 16/5 (1 February 1953). The All Pakistan Shia Convention was initially scheduled for 9–11 January but then postponed to 10–12 January 1953 (*Razâkâr* 16/4:1).
131. *Razâkâr* 16/4:1 mentions one Major Hasan, patron of Maulana Rashid Turabi's journal *al-Muntazar*, as the organiser. A Karachi branch of the ITHS, headed by Rashid Turabi, was founded only on the sidelines of the said convention (*Razâkâr* 19/14:4).
132. S. Ibn Hasan Jarchavi, born in Jarcha (Bulandshahr District, U.P.), had received religious education and degrees from the Islamia College Lahore and the Aligarh University. From 1931–8 he had taught at the *Jâmi'â Milliyya* College in Delhi, thereafter serving Raja Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad in different functions. This had also provided him with better access to Jinnah than perhaps any other Shia 'âlim, and he was invited by the latter to attend a session of the Muslim League Working Committee in April 1946 (*Razâkâr* 16/4:8; see also section 2.2, p. 52). From 1948 to 1951 Jarchavi had been principal of the Shia Degree College in Lucknow. He became the first professor of Shia theology at the Karachi University and founded an Institute of Islamic and Cultural Research in Karachi; see Husain, *Matla'-i anwâr*, pp. 43–6; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 42; also obituaries in S. La'îq al-Hasan Rizvi Sabzawâri Jârchawî, *Jârcha. Sawânih-i 'Allâma Ibn Hasan Rizvî ... Sabzawâri Jârchawî*. (Lahore, 1981), pp. 6–45, and *Razâkâr* 37/29:1+3 (1 August 1973). Muhammad Amir Sajjad of Mahmudabad in an interview with the author (Lucknow, 28 January 2001) has downplayed Ibn Hasan Jarchavi's significance as a Shia 'âlim but conceded his political influence on his late father.
133. His presidential address is reproduced fully in *Razâkâr* 16/4:8–9. No Shias had been appointed to the federal cabinet since the resignation of Isma'il I. Chundrigar and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan in May and July 1948, respectively. Shia members of the Constituent Assembly had also resigned or died by early 1953.
134. The number of "10 million Shias" in Pakistan has been frequently given by Shia leaders in the 1950s without any proof for their claim; see also above, Fn 4 (p. 363).
135. Translated from *Razâkâr* 16/5:2.
136. These were Article 1, clause 5 (Preamble), Article 2, clauses 2, 2a and 4 (Directive Principles of State Policy), and Article 3 (Procedure for Preventing Legislation Repugnant to the Holy Quran and the Sunna); see *Razâkâr* 16/5:2 and Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 86–88.
137. Taken from the "Objectives Resolution" (see quotation above, p. 68). As explained later by Ibn Hasan Jarchavi when meeting the prime minister with a Shia delegation, Shias were afraid that their 'azâdârî processions on public roads and places might be termed as "contrary to public morality" (*Razâkâr* 16/8–9:1; see also section 3.5, pp. 90–96).
138. See above, Fn 123. Special provisions for Shias were demanded in connection with clauses (2d), (2e) and (3). In addition, it was required that clause (8) would mention that no religious instruction would be given in schools on matters disputed among the sects, and the government would be obliged to provide for all children instruction of the tenets of their own sect (*Razâkâr* 16/5:2).
139. Translated from *Razâkâr* 16/4:3 (24 January 1953).
140. *Razâkâr* 16/8–9:1 (1 March 1953).
141. *Navâ-i Waqt*, 21 February 1953, quoted in *Razâkâr* 16/8–9:3; *ibid.* quotations from the Lahore daily *Zamîndâr*, 20 February, critical of the Shia demands. The editor of *Razâkâr* dismissed such objections, arguing that there would be only two important *mazâhib* within Islam, Sunnis and Shias, whereas differences between Sunni groups like Deobandis, Barelvîs and *Ahl-i hadîth* were only theological without constitutional relevance (*ibid.*). He quoted from a statement of Maududi in the *Jl organ Tarjumân ul-Qur'ân* 38/3–4 (June–

- July 1952) to support his thesis and also reminded of the “22 Principles” of January 1951 (see above).
142. Quoted in *Razākār* 16/7:3 (16 February 1953). The term *tashayyuʿ*, which means “party-building” in Arabic, is generally used to refer to the Shias, who were first known as the *shīʿat ʿAlī* (“party of Alī”).
  143. Martial law had to be imposed in Lahore on 6 March 1953 after the movement had taken a violent turn there and in other towns of the Punjab; see Binder, op. cit., p. 292, and *Munir Report*, pp. 151–86.
  144. Binder, op. cit., p. 296.
  145. Maududi and Abd us-Sattar Niyazi, a leader of the JUP, were even sentenced to death in May 1953 because of their alleged instigation of violence, but later pardoned and released in April 1955; see Nasr, *Vanguard*, pp. 139–41.
  146. *Razākār* 16/21:1 (1 June 1953). According to Ibn Hasan Jarchavi, members of the Working Committee from different parts of Pakistan had pledged to collect the following amounts: Karachi: Rs. 50,000; Punjab: Rs. 35,000; NWFP: Rs. 8,000; Sindh and Balochistan: Rs. 10,000; Bahawalpur State and Khairpur State: Rs. 2,500 each; East Bengal: Rs. 2,000 (ibid.).
  147. *Razākār* 19/14:5 (Report of the ITHS Secretary-General, March 1956). Another “annual conference” had been scheduled in Karachi in the fall of 1954, but had to be annulled because of the general political crisis of the country (ibid.).
  148. He was *sajjâda-nishîn* of Qitalpur near Kabirwala (Multan) and an uncle of S. Fakhr Imam, a renowned politician of Jhang (Speaker of the National Assembly, 1985–6).
  149. *Razākār* 19/14:5 (8 April 1956); a list of participants given there does not include Jarchavi.
  150. *Razākār* 17/6:2 (8 February 1954). Already in January 1952 the APSC had appointed its Chairman for the Sindh province (Sahibzada Mir Ghulam Husain Talpur) as one of 12 delegates to the *All-Pakistan Shia Board* (*Razākār* 15/5:8; 1 February 1952).
  151. Binder, op. cit., pp. 345–61. In October 1955, the “One Unit scheme” was enacted, which abolished the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Karachi, NWFP, Balochistan and the Princely States of Kalat, Bahawalpur and Khairpur in favour of the one province “West Pakistan”. ITHS and APSC followed suit to abolish their old provincial divisions, with S. Ali Husain Shah Gardezi becoming chairman of the ITHS for West Pakistan (*Razākār* 19/14:7).
  152. Callard, *Pakistan*, pp. 118–19.
  153. Ibid., p. 142. The other Shia members of that cabinet were M.A.H. Ispahani from Bengal and Col. (ret'd.) S. ʿAbid Husain from Jhang (ibid., p. 343).
  154. Ibid., p. 45.
  155. These were Ismaʿil I. Chundrigar and S. ʿAbid Husain, who was replaced in October 1955 by S. Amjad Ali; see Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan*, p. 267.
  156. Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 121; Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, p. 45, considers the 1956 constitution “basically a handiwork of Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali”.
  157. The full text is reproduced in Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 247–332.
  158. On his biography see Salim, *Iskandar Mirza*, passim, and Mirza, *From Plassey to Pakistan*, pp. 131–254.
  159. Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, p. 43.
  160. Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 250–51.
  161. Ibid., p. 253.
  162. Ibid., p. 301.
  163. Ibid.
  164. Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, pp. 44–5.
  165. However, in an article “Pas che bâyard kard?” Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari expressed dissatisfaction with Article 198 because it mentioned only “personal law”. He feared that “God beware, a group like the *Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Sunnat* might come to power and create a

- situation like in Saudi Arabia”, because the constitution would protect only “personal” rights of minorities (*Razākār* 19/11–12:4).
166. A report on the session in Abbasnagar Bagh (outside the Mochi Gate of Lahore’s Old City) in *Razākār* 19/13:1–3 (1 April 1956) gives a list of 42 Shia *anjumans* from all over Pakistan which had sent their young *razākārs* to take part in a large camp of tents; a *qaumi bazār* was arranged with bookstalls of different publishing houses and other Shia organisations (*Razākār*, the daily *Safīna*, *Idāra Ma’ārīf al-Islām*, *Imamia Mission Pakistan*, AWSM, and others); see also a commentary in *Razākār* 19/14:3 (8 April 1956).
  167. *Razākār* 19/14:7 (8 April 1956); on that resolution see section 3.1, p. 64.
  168. *Razākār* 19/14:8–10 (8 April 1956); 19/16:11 (24 April 1956).
  169. See section 3.5, pp. 86–98.
  170. “Religious lessons” or “religious instruction” in schools; hereunder the Urdu term is used for convenience.
  171. See sections 4.5, p. 144; 5.5, pp. 168–69.
  172. See Resolution No. 5 of the APSC from 21 March 1948 (*Razākār* 11/18:7) and Resolution No. 7 of the ITHS from 20 June 1948 (*Razākār* 11/29–30:9).
  173. *Razākār* 11/36:2 (1 September 1948); 12/28:6 (24 July 1949).
  174. Shias found 120 objectionable points in the two volumes of *Āsān tarikh* (“Easy history”) written by Maulvi Abu Kamal Mahmud Rajhvi alone, which was withdrawn from schools in Punjab in 1952 (*Razākār* 15/39:9; 16 October 1952). Already in 1950 some of its most controversial parts had been removed after Shia protests (*Razākār* 13/17:3; 1 May 1950).
  175. Resolution No. 19 of 16 April 1949 (*Razākār* 12/16:4; 24 April 1949).
  176. Resolution No. 33 of 17 April 1949 (*Razākār* 12/16:5); on such degrees see section 3.4, p. 84.
  177. Hakim Muhammad Hasan Ja’fari, “Kyā mushtaraka nisāb-i dīniyāt qaum-i shī’a kī āwāz hai?”, *Razākār* 17/3:6 (16 January 1954).
  178. See section 5.8, p. 189.
  179. *Razākār* 13/17:3 (1 May 1950).
  180. Binder, op. cit., p. 197.
  181. *Razākār* 14/15–16:12 (24 April 1951). I could not find out their identity.
  182. *Razākār* 17/3:6 (16 January 1954).
  183. *Razākār* 14/15–16:12 (24 April 1951).
  184. Ibid. (letter dated 23 March 1951).
  185. *Razākār* 17/3:6. According to that source, Ansari sent his syllabus 50–60 days after the ITHS delegation had submitted its own.
  186. He was then one of the leading members of the Gardezi family of Shia landlords in Multan; see also above, Fn 109 (p. 370) and 151.
  187. Statement of Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani made at the joint session of ITHS and APSC on 20 January 1952 (see section 3.1, pp. 65–66). ‘Irfani also claimed that ITHS and APSC had agreed on a common syllabus, but Gardezi had “done nothing” to make good his promise (*Razākār* 15/5:7; 1 February 1952).
  188. See section 3.1, p. 65–66.
  189. Literally: “see’ing” i.e. reciting in the original Arabic wording from the book, as opposed to memorising (*hifẓ*).
  190. S. Ahmad ‘Alī Shāh Kāzimī, *Mas’ala-i dīniyāt kī haqīqat kā inkishāf*, [undated pamphlet, probably from early 1954], pp. 3–4; the resolutions are quoted in English in that Urdu pamphlet.
  191. Ibid., p. 4.
  192. *Razākār* 17/8:2 (24 February 1954). The six Sunnis were the Maulanas Ahmad Ali, Abu al-Hasanat, Ghulam Murshid, Muhammad Ali, ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi, Da’ud Ghaznavi and Muhammad Ilyas (ibid.).



193. Kâzimi, *Mas'ala-i dīniyât*, pp. 5–6. These included Books from the Shias Sadiq Ali 'Irfani, Mazhar Ali, Mirza Yusuf Husain and Muhammad Bashir Ansari; the latter and Hafiz Kifayat Husain also submitted collections of translated verses from the Koran (ibid.).
194. Ibid., p. 6. Muhammad Bashir Ansari accompanied him to the first two of the meetings.
195. *Razâkâr* 17/8:2 (24 February 1954).
196. See their letters in *Razâkâr* 16/45:3 and 16/46:8 (16 and 24 December 1953) and critical comments on them by Muhammad Hasan Ja'fari in *Razâkâr* 17/3:6–7 (16 January 1954); also Sultan Mirza Dihlavi, "Mushtaraka nisâb-i dīniyât", *Razâkâr* 17/12:1–2 (24 March 1954).
197. *Razâkâr* 17/13:3+9 (1 April 1954); 17/15:1 (16 April 1954).
198. Muhammad Siddiq, "Ab aur chahte kyâ hô?", *Razâkâr* 17/13:3, and idem, "Mafâd-i qaumi aur shakhsīyât", *Razâkâr* 17/30:3 (16 August 1954), criticised Hafiz Kifayat Husain just like the others. S. Shakil Husain Rizvi, "Mushtaraka nisâb-i dīniyât kâ zammadâr kaun hai?", *Razâkâr* 17/25:2 (1 July 1954), put the entire blame on Muhammad Bashir Ansari.
199. His statement on the issue is quoted in *Razâkâr* 17/36:2 (1 October 1954).
200. *Razâkâr* 17/30:5 (16 August 1954).
201. Ibid. and *Razâkâr* 19/14:7 (8 April 1956). One of the Sunni members of the commission, Mufti Muhammad Shafi, was also in favour of separating the Shia and Sunni curricula; see section 4.5, p. 141.
202. Apparently this did not apply to the Shia majority area of the Kurram Agency; see Bangash, *Political and Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, p. 177.
203. See section 4.1, p. 108.
204. See sections 1.1, pp. 3–4; 1.2, pp. 20–22; 1.3, pp. 25–26. S. Bashir Husain Bukhari (Sargodha) in a 1956 article attributed "95 per cent of Shia *tabligh* activities in pre-1947 India" to preachers trained at the *madâris* of Lucknow, especially the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izīn* (*Razâkâr* 19/41:4; 1 November 1956).
205. It had been founded in 1924 by S. Husain Bakhsh Gardezi implementing a decision made at the AISC annual session in Multan 1921. After his death his nephew S. Muhammad Abd ul-Jalil Gardezi took charge of the *madrasa* (*Razâkâr* 1/5:3; 1 December 1938). Complaints about its neglect started already in 1939 (*Razâkâr* 2/29:15; rejoinder *Razâkâr* 2/31:15); see also Karim Bakhsh Haidari, "Kuch Madrasat Bâb ul-'Ulûm Multân kâ muta'alliq", *Razâkâr* 21/13:5; 1 April 1958) and S. Muhammad Sibtain Naqvi, "Madâris-i shī'a-i Pākistan kâ dūsrâ daur", *az-Zahrâ*, Dhû al-Qa'da 1400H (September 1980), pp. 25–31, here p. 25–6.
206. It was founded 1939 by the Nangiana family of notables; see ibid., pp. 26–7, and Munawwar Husain, *Jâmi' al-fatâwî*, pp. 36–7.
207. He had studied in Lucknow and Lahore before returning to his home village Chakrala (Mianwali Dist.); from 1925–45 he stayed at Chak No. 38 Khanewal (Multan Dist.) and later in Budh Rajhbana (Jhang Dist.), where his teaching activities were sponsored by a lady from the Sial family (Râhî, *Tazkira-i 'ulamâ'-i Panjâb*, Vol. II, pp. 642–3; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 276–7; a list of his fourteen most important disciples ibid.).
208. He was born in Talagang (Attock Dist.) and moved to Khushab in 1932 (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 252; list of eleven prominent disciples ibid.).
209. *Razâkâr* 6/3:1+3 (8 November 1942); 6/4:10 (16 November 1942); Fâ'izî, *Sonehrî hurûf*, pp. 15–16.
210. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 203–4. *Durr-i Najaf*, founded in 1908, was one of the first Shia journals in the Punjab. It was still being published in 2001.
211. He was renowned both for his asceticism and his emphasis on strict observance of tenets of the *sharī'a* which was then quite unusual for hereditary *pīrs*. The foundation of some



- of the first Shia *madâris* in West Pakistan in the Sargodha area (former Shahpur Dist.) is mainly attributed to his influence on local landlords; see his biography in Munawwar Husain, *Jâmi' al-fatâwî*, pp. 15–55, and Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 228.
212. A famous preacher and *munâzir*, who had studied in the Sunni *Dâr ul-'Ulûm* of Deoband from 1891 to 1903 and later at the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn* Lucknow; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 231–2.
  213. He had graduated from *madâris* in Rampur and Lucknow, including the *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn*, from where he was sent for *tabligh* to Dera Ghazi Khan before moving to Khairpur; see also below, Fn 253, and Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 112.
  214. He had graduated from *madâris* in Multan, Meerut and Lucknow and also studied medicine and practised as a physician. In 1970 he became Friday preacher at the *Jâmi' Masjid Shâh Gardezi* in Multan. In 1984 he was proposed to succeed Mufti Ja'far Husain as the leader of the TNFJ (see section 6.3, p. 220), and he was still a member of the TJP Supreme Council in the late 1990s; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 205–6.
  215. He had a reputation of exemplary modesty and piety; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 334–5, including a list of his most important disciples.
  216. He settled down in the Suraj Miyani (“Shia Miyani”) suburb of Multan in 1941 where he founded the *Jâmi'at Makhzan ul-'Ulûm* in 1951 (see below, Fn 254), earning the title *Ustâz al-'Ulamâ'* through his teaching and writing activities (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 246–48). His nephew S. Sajid Ali Naqvi from the same village in the Pindi Gheb Tehsil became leader of the TNFJ in 1988 (see section 7.1, p. 239).
  217. He served in different *dîni madâris* before founding the *Jâmi'at 'Ilmiya Bâb al-Najaf* in his home village in 1955 (see below). From 1964 to 1965 he was principal of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* Lahore and in 1971 he succeeded Dhakko (see section 4.4, *passim*) as principal of the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm Muhammadiya* Sargodha; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 107–8, and section 5.6, pp. 176–77.
  218. He became co-founder and first principal of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* Lahore after his return from Najaf in 1954 (see below). From 1964 to 1973 he continued his studies in Najaf and Qom, thereafter founding a *Dâr ul-Tabligh ul-Islâmî* in Kot Addu; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 58–9.
  219. He became teacher at the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* Lahore in 1956 and its principal from 1965 until his death; see Bukhârî, *Muhsin ul-Millat*, *passim*; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 155–58 and *Misbâh ul-Qur'ân* 1/1990 (Special obituary No.). On his other important activities see sections 5.6, p. 179; 6.1, pp. 202, 205; 6.2, p. 238; 6.3, p. 220.
  220. He became principal of the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm Muhammadiya* Sargodha after his return from Najaf in 1960 and later one of the most controversial but also highly respected Pakistani Shia '*ulamâ'*'; see sections 4.4 and 5.6, *passim*.
  221. See for example Muhammad Siddiq, “Shi'iyân-i Panjâb kî qaumi zindagî kâ jâ'iza”, *Razâkâr* 2/36:3–4 (24 December 1939); Malik Muhammad Sharif, “Hamârê '*ulamâ'*-i dîn”, *Razâkâr* 9/25:5–6 (1 July 1946).
  222. Karim Bakhsh Haidari, “Pâkistân kê shi'ôn kî siyâsi tanzîm”, *Razâkâr* 10/26:18.
  223. Prominent examples of the latter were Hafiz Kifayat Husain (see section 3.1, pp. 56–57), S. Safdar Husain Mashhadi, Mirza Yusuf Husain and Jawad Husain (see below).
  224. The overall population of Karachi according to the 1961 Census was already 2,048,745. In an interview with the author (6 January 2001) S. Ja'far Naqvi estimated the Shia population of Karachi to be 20 per cent, the majority of them *muhâjirs*.
  225. He moved to Karachi from Moradabad (U.P.), where he had served as a lecturer of Arabic and Persian in a government highschool, in 1950 and served as *muhtamim* of the *Jâmi'at Imâmiya* from 1953 until his death; a prolific writer of books and articles, he became known as *Adib-i A'zam*; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 167–8.

226. See section 4.3, pp. 117–18.
227. He was born in Yazd and had moved to Madras in 1923. Before migrating to Karachi in 1947 he was a professor of Arabic and Persian at different universities of British India (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 366–67). His writings include *Fundamentals of Islam according to the Qur'an as presented by Mohammad and the Ale Mohammad* and *Genuineness of the Holy Qur'an in its text and its Arguments* (Karachi: The Pakistan Herald Press, 1972 and 1974).
228. See above, p. 371, Fn 132.
229. He was born in Hyderabad (Deccan) and had received an M.A. degree in philosophy apart from his religious studies in Najaf and learning of the art of *zâkiri* from different teachers. In 1940 he was elected to the Legislative Assembly of the Hyderabad State. He had to resign 1942 after differences with the Nizam of Hyderabad but was successful as a political activist of the Muslim League (“*Khâtib-i Pâkistân*”). In 1949 he moved to Karachi where he edited the journal *al-Muntazar* from 1950–53. Since the 1960s he was considered the best speaker at *majâlis* in Karachi, if not in all Pakistan; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 122–23; Amir Husain Chaman, *Minbar kâ dûsra nâm*. ‘*Allâma Rashîd Turâbî kê fann-o-shakhsyat par pehlî, wâhid aur maqbûl kitâb*, (Karachi, Islamabad: Print Media Publications, 2000), passim.
230. See p. 424, Fn 38 to chapter 6.
231. He was born in Amritsar and became famous as a *munâzir* and writer of polemical literature; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 53–4.
232. See section 3.1, pp. 56–57.
233. Ibid., See *ibid.*, p. 60, and above, Fn 44 (p. 366).
234. He was born in Lucknow and moved to Lahore in 1950, where he became one of the most active promoters of Shia *dinî madâris* and the publishing of Shia religious literature; he is also the author of *Matla’-i anwâr*, a collection of biographies of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ in India and Pakistan; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 337–8.
235. He was born in Saharanpur (U.P.) and taught at the Punjab University Lahore after graduating from the *Madrasat ul-Wâ’izin* Lucknow. From 1940 to 1947 he was Secretary-General of the PuSC and from 1949 to 1951 manager of the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Muhammadiya* Sargodha, thereafter moving to Daska (Sialkot Dist.); see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 321–3; also below, p. 83, and sections 2.2, p. 45; 3.1, p. 59.
236. He was born in Bombay and moved to Peshawar after studies in Lucknow, Najaf and Qom in 1940 on orders of Ayatollah Abu al-Hasan Isfahani. From 1961 until his death he edited the monthly *al-Hujjat*; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 153–4.
237. See below, p. 395, Fn 216.
238. See section 3.1, p. 57.
239. He was born in Lucknow where he had studied at *Sultân ul-Madâris*, *Madrasat Nâzimiya* and *Madrasat ul-Wâ’izin*. From 1933 to 1936 he served as *qâzî* in Parachinar and thereafter until 1946 in Darya Khan (Mianwali Dist.). From late 1946 until October 1947 he was sent to Skardu (Baltistan). After a short stay in Lucknow he migrated to Pakistan in 1948, settling down in Mianwali from 1950 to 1974, when he became principal of a newly-founded *Madrasat ul-Wâ’izin* in Lahore (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 394–96). On his activities in the 1960s and 1970s see sections 4.3, 5.2, 5.5, and 5.8, passim.
240. He was born in Mubarakpur (Azamgarh Dist., U.P.) and graduated from the *Madrasat ul-Wâ’izin* Lucknow in 1928. After numerous *tablighî daurât* he settled down in Hangu (NWFP) in 1944 where he became actively engaged in favour of the Muslim League (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 96–97).
241. He was born in Shahjipur (Azamgarh Dist., U.P.) and studied in Benares, Lucknow and Najaf. After teaching in different *dinî madâris* he founded the *Jâmi’at Husainiyya* in Jhang in 1964 (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 161).

242. See section 3.1, p. 58, and above, Fn 20 (p. 364).
243. He was born in Shikarpur (Bulandshahr Dist., U.P.) and graduated from the *Madrasat Nāzimiya* Lucknow in 1946. In the following years he made *tablighi daurât* in Sindh, settling down as a school teacher in Hyderabad in 1953 and editing the monthly *al-Ma'rifat* (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 111).
244. Naqvi's *Tazkira* includes biographical notes on some 100 further '*ulamâ*' born in the "Indian provinces" as well as a list of 150 names of '*ulamâ*' "who did not supply biographical information despite repeated requests" (ibid., pp. 11–16). According to Naqvi, 55 per cent of these were *muhajirs* (personal communication to the author). The number of participants at the 1964 Karachi '*ulamâ*' convention (some 200–250) can also serve as a rough indicator; see section 4.3, pp. 116–17.
245. On the *zâkirs* as rivals of the '*ulamâ*' see below and section 4.4, pp. 124–33; also Schubel, *Religious Performance*, pp. 90–106.
246. See section 6.1, pp. 204–06.
247. See a pamphlet of Darul Uloom Mohammadia Sargodha, *Introduction*, (Lahore: Nami Press, n.d. [1964?]), p. 3.
248. One argument brought forward repeatedly was that since the Shia minority was defined only by its religious allegiance, it would altogether disappear before long if it did not take care for keeping alive the tradition of religious learning.
249. See above, Fn 21 (p. 364).
250. Resolution No. 7 of the April 1949 convention in Rawalpindi (*Razâkâr* 12/16:4); another resolution (No. 26) called on the *Madrasat Bâb ul-'Ulûm* Multan to start immediately with the training of preachers and *muballighûn* (ibid.:5).
251. See the source quoted in Fn 247, p. 3. The list of sponsors was headed by the landlords Pir S. Nawazish Ali Shah, Pir S. Qalandar Husain Shah and Mian Sultan Ali Nangiana, while Pir S. Fazl Shah (see above, Fn 211) was named as the "patron" (ibid., pp. 4–5). A large abandoned Hindu temple was still in place on that *madrasa*'s premises during a visit of the author in January 2001.
252. *Razâkâr* 17/45:3 (8 December 1954).
253. *Razâkâr* 13/47:3 (16 December 1950); its founder was S. Khadim Husain Naqvi (see above, Fn 213).
254. Its founder, S. Gulab Ali Shah Naqvi, had started giving lessons in local mosques and *imâmbârgâhs* since 1941. Construction of the original *madrasa* building took place from 1951 to 1958; see a pamphlet *Jâmi'at Makhzan ul-'Ulûm al-Ja'fariya Shi'a-Miyâni Multân Pâkistân 41 tâ 1993 khidmât kê musalsal bâwan sâl*, p. 2. A huge new building was still under construction in 2001.
255. It was founded by Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash and financed by the *waqf* donated by his grand-uncle Nasir Ali Khan in 1892 (see section 1.1, p. 10). Its location was changed from *Karbalâ'-i Gâme Shâh* to the Nawab Palace in Empress Road in 1959, but returned to the original premises in 1974, when the *madrasa* in Empress Road was renamed *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn* (see section 5.5, p. 166). The manager of the *Jâmi'at Imâmiya* Lahore throughout three decades was Sha'iq Ambalvi.
256. Also known as *Madrasat ul-Wâ'izîn Pâkistân*, it was founded on the initiative of S. Zafar Hasan Amrohavi, Muhammad Bashir Ansari, S. Musayyab Ali Zaidi, Dr S. Nadim ul-Hasan Naqvi and S. 'Inayat Husain Jalalvi with financial help from Nawab Qizilbash; see a pamphlet *Jamia Imamia, the cradle of learning and knowledge*, (Karachi, n.d.), pp. 1, 12.
257. Founded on the initiative of Khwaja Hajji Muhammad Tufail of Narowal and Shaikh Akhtar 'Abbas, the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* started working in the premises of the Husainiya Hall near Mochi Darwaza of Lahore's Old City; in 1957 it was moved to the Wasanpura quarter; on its later expansion see sections 4.4, p. 127; 5.5, p. 172.

258. It was founded on the initiative of Pir S. Fazl Shah; see Munawwar Husain, *Jāmi‘ al-fatāwī*, pp. 40–41.
259. *Razākār* 18/23:1 (1 June 1955); 20/46:11 (8 December 1957). This *madrasa* was important because of the reputation of its founder, Maulana Husain Bakhsh (see above, Fn 217).
260. *Razākār* 11/49:11 (8 December 1948); 13/15:10 (16 April 1950).
261. *Razākār* 12/37:3 (1 October 1949).
262. *Razākār* 17/28:10 (24 July 1954); 21/6:4 (8 February 1958); its founder, Hafiz Saifullah Ja‘fari from Ludhiana (1925–80), had been a Sunni Deobandi ‘*ālim* who had converted to Shi‘ism only one year before. He became famous as *Saif ul-Munāzirīn*. See Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 143–5; also obituaries in *Razākār* 44/32:4 (24 August 1980); 44/34–35:3 (8–16 September 1980).
263. *Razākār* 18/11:2 (16 March 1955).
264. *Razākār* 20/2:10 (8 January 1957).
265. Appeals for *chanda* (which has also the meaning of “annual subscription”) were usually made at the annual sessions of each *madrasa*, which were always presided over by local notables (S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi, personal communication).
266. See section 4.4, pp. 125–26.
267. See section 6.2, pp. 209–10.
268. *Fitra* is the term for *zakāt* paid at the ‘*Īd ul-Fitr*, traditionally the equivalent of 3 kg wheat per head.
269. See section 4.4, p. 125.
270. Ever since the 1950s, the Shia press in Pakistan has been replete with such appeals, often in very sentimental language.
271. *Razākār* 18/28:6b (24 July 1955).
272. He quotes in Arabic: “*Man bakā ‘alā al-Husain au abkâ au tabākâ wajibat lahu al-janna*”.
273. Translated from ‘Ata Muhammad, “Hamārī dinī darsgāhēn aur un kī maqāsīd”, *Razākār* 20/10:9.
274. It was still being published in 2001. Its editors during the first years were S. Sibti-i Ahmad, Khan Ghulam Shabbir Khan and Mulazim Husain Asghar.
275. Translated from Ghulam Shabbir Khan, “Fiqh-i ja‘fariya aur hamārī zammadāriyān”, *al-Muballigh* 1/4:2 (May 1957).
276. Ibid.
277. See sections 4.4, pp. 124–33; 5.6, pp. 171–80.
278. Most noteworthy among them were Hafiz Kifayat Husain and Mufti Ja‘far Husain. In fact there was hardly any Shia ‘*ālim* in Pakistan who would not read *majālis* in Muharram.
279. See sections 3.5, p. 96; 4.4, p. 132.
280. The call for “revolutionary change” frequently occurs in editorials of *Razākār* since its foundation in 1938 and other Shia journals, mostly in the sense of overcoming religious laxity and political apathy of the Shia community.
281. The term *dimāghī ‘ayyāshī kām* has been used frequently in the Shia press for denigrating the *zākirs*. Its literal meaning is approximately “luxury of the brain”.
282. This statement stands in obvious contradiction to the following text, although such idealists have also existed. A prominent example seems to have been Pir S. Fazl Shah (see above, Fn 211).
283. The same English expression (“mishanarī sistam”) is used in the Urdu text.
284. Translation from Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari, “Pas cheh bāyad kard?”, *Razākār* 19/11–12:4–5.
285. Muhammad Siddiq, “Ansārī sāhib zindabād”, *Razākār* 22/3:3–4 (16 January 1959). However, these preachers—financed mainly by the Khojas of Karachi—were sent to existing Khoja Twelver-Shia communities in Africa and were later also criticised for leading a comfort-

- able life in luxury; see idem, “Ithnâ-‘ashari muballighûn-i Afriqâ ki khidmat mên”, *Razâkâr* 23/18:3 (8 May 1960).
286. See sections 4.4, pp. 129–30, 5.6, p. 174.
287. The *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* started its first three-month course for preachers in June 1955 (*Razâkâr* 18/28:6b; 24 July 1955).
288. *Razâkâr* 18/18:8 (8 May 1955); 18/19:3 (16 May 1955); on S. Ali Naqi see Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, p. 152; Schubel, *Religious Performance*, pp. 79–84.
289. Lists of books and pamphlets published by the *Imamia Mission* can be found in its monthly journal *Payâm-i ‘Amal* (started from February 1957) which in the 1960s became the Shia monthly with the largest circulation in Pakistan.
290. *Razâkâr* 19/33:10 (1 September 1956). It was supervised during its first year by the same Muhammad Latif Ansari whose plea is quoted above (*Razâkâr* 20/40:3). The initiative faltered under the new atmosphere created by the Ayub Khan regime; see section 4.1, p. 105.
291. For an early survey of the *dinî madâris* set up by different denominations in Pakistan see Hafiz Nazr Ahmad, *Jâ‘izat-i madâris-i ‘arabiya islâmîya-i maghribî Pâkistân* (Lâhaur: Muslim Academy, 1972), passim.
292. The writer is referring to the exams for reaching the grade “Maulvi Fâzil” (see below, Fn 294) which were held at these schools under supervision of the government’s Secondary Schools Board and were equivalent to entry exams for universities (*al-Muballigh* 3/12:2–3; January 1960). From 1949 to 1959 it was compulsory for students of *dinî madâris* to make such exams under government supervision (Interview of the author with Nusrat Ali Shahani, Lahore, 21 January 2001).
293. Translated from *Razâkâr* 17/45:3 (8 December 1954).
294. The degree “Maulvi Fâzil”, first introduced by the Oriental College of the Punjab University (Lahore) in the 1920s, was equivalent to a B.A. degree in Arabic, such as could be obtained on completing the fourteenth class of a degree college.
295. see section 1.3, p. 29–30.
296. Translated from S. Bashir Husain Bukhari, “Hamâre dinî madâris aur un ki zammadâri-yân”, *Razâkâr* 19/41:4 (1 November 1956).
297. *Razâkâr* 28/47:3 (16 December 1965); *al-Hujjat* 1–2/1966, pp. 27–36.
298. *Razâkâr* 28/47:3.
299. “Najaf-i ashraf mên Pâkistânî talaba”, *Razâkâr* 18/24:2 (24 June 1955). According to that letter from Maulana Husain Bakhsh (Jara), Muhsin al-Hakim had then wondered whether Pakistanis had no love for religion (*ibid.*). The number seems too small, given my own information obtained from the Northern Areas (see below, Fn 301), but has been confirmed by S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi.
300. Muhammad Siddiq, “Najaf-i ashraf aur ham”, *Razâkâr* 14/7:3 (16 February 1951); idem, “Najaf-i ashraf kê Pâkistânî talaba”, *Razâkâr* 15/47:3 (16 December 1952).
301. In the early 1990s I collected the names of some 350 Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ from the Northern Areas alone said to have studied in Iraq until 1978, most of them in the 1950s and 1960s; see Rieck, “A Stronghold of Shi’a Orthodoxy” pp. 392–3.
302. After a visit at the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Muhammadiya* Sargodha in December 1954, Hafiz Kifayat Husain expressed his hope that it would “soon reach equality with the *madâris* of Lucknow” (*Razâkâr* 18/4:2; 24 January 1955). On the later ambitions of the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* Lahore see sections 5.6, p. 172; 6.2, p. 216.
303. Karim Bakhsh Haidari, “Dinî madâris ki tanzim”, *Razâkâr* 18/11:2 (16 March 1955); “Dinî darsgâhôn ki tanzim”, *Razâkâr* 19/52:1 (24 December 1956).
304. Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari, “Pas cheh bâyard kard?”, *Razâkâr* 19/11–12:4–5 (16–24 March 1956).

305. See above, Fn 296.
306. ‘Ata Muhammad, “Hamâri dînî darsgâhên aur un kî maqâsid”, *Razâkâr* 20/10:9 (8 March 1957).
307. Ibid.
308. Ghulam Shabbir Khan, “Dînî darsgâhôn kâ nisâb”, *al-Muballigh* 1/5:2–3 (June 1957). He was referring to Haidari’s article in *Razâkâr* 19/52:1 (see above, Fn 303).
309. *al-Muballigh* 1/5:2–3 (June 1957).
310. S. Nasir Husain Naqvi, “Shi’a ‘arabî madâris kâ daur-i jadid”, *Razâkâr* 21/19:5 (16 May 1958), referring to a detailed report of the convention in *al-Muballigh* 2/4 (May 1958). I could not obtain a copy of that number.
311. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 361–2.
312. See *Hauza-i ‘Ilmiya Jâmi’at ul-Muntazar kâ ta’âruf*, p. 8.
313. See sections 4.4, p. 126; 6.1, pp. 202–03; Fn 169 to chapter 6 (p. 430).
314. See sections 1.2, pp. 18–19; 2.2, p. 47; Fn 187 to chapter 2, p. 360; also Crooke, *The North-Western Provinces of India*, pp. 263–4.
315. See section 3.2, pp. 67–68.
316. See section 1.2, p. 17.
317. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 125–37.
318. See section 6.4, pp. 231–32.
319. The *Ahl-i hadîth* were the first denomination to set up a supervisory body for their *dînî madâris* in Pakistan (*Wafâq ul-Madâris us-Salafiya*) in 1955; see Tariq Rahman, “Madressahs in Pakistan. A phenomenal growth”, *Dawn*, 10 April 2000.
320. The Bareilvi school of thought, named after Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly (1856–1921), emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century mainly as a reaction to Deobandi and *Ahl-i hadîth* attacks against the prevalent customs of saint-worshipping; see Sanyal Usha, *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India. Ahmad Riza Khan Bareilwi and his Movement, 1870–1921* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), and Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 296–313. Ahmad Riza Khan in his writings expounded some doctrines close to those of Shias, like the creation of the Prophet Muhammad from light and his omnipresence and unique knowledge of the unknown (‘*ilm ul-ghaib*) (ibid., pp. 300–1).
321. See section 1.2, pp. 14, 22–23.
322. See section 3.2, p. 69; further examples of goodwill in sections 4.5, p. 141; 5.5, p. 163; 6.1, p. 204; 7.2, pp. 255–56.
323. On its foundation in 1944 see section 2.2, p. 47.
324. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 161–2. The TAS had attracted members of the *Majlis-i Ahrâr* already at the time of its foundation.
325. Some leading members of the TAS hailed from the Dera Ghazi Khan District (then including the present-day district of Rajanpur), namely Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari, Dost Muhammad Quraishi, Abd us-Sattar Taunsavi, Ahmad Khan Patafi from Jampur and Qa’im ud-Din ‘Abbasi from Rajanpur (Author’s interview with Akhtar Rahi, Islamabad 10 March 1999; see also Râhî, *Tazkira-yi ‘ulamâ’-i Panjâb*, Vol. I, pp. 183–5; Vol. II, p. 564).
326. Translated from *Razâkâr* 14/17–18:2 (1–8 May 1951). Yet Shia candidates won four seats in the Jhang District in 1951; below, Fn 418 (p. 384–85).
327. In 1952 that district also comprised Bhakkar and Layyah, which became district headquarters of their own right in 1982.
328. Literally “refusal”, a derogative term for Shi’ism since the first century of Islam; see Ethan Kohlberg, “Râfida”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VIII, p. 3869.
329. Translation from *Da’wat*, 18 August 1952, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 15/32:1. The ban for Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari to enter the district was lifted three months later; see *Razâkâr* 15/44:11 (24 November 1952).

330. *Munir Report*, pp. 78–80. (This was just one month before Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari wrote the article quoted above).
331. Bashir Husain Bukhari, “Mas’ala-i ‘azādārī aur ham”, *Razākār* 18/35:7 (24 September 1955). Apparently the meeting took place before the month of Muharram 1372H (21 September–20 October 1952).
332. See quotations from the *Da’wat* editorial “Sabb-o-shatm”, 13 November 1952, in *Razākār* 15/43:3 (16 November 1952); also “Kitāb-o-sunnat ki ta’bīr” in *Razākār* 16/7:3 (16 February 1953); other journals allegedly “trying to outdo each other in enmity to Shias” at that time were the JAH organ *al-I’tisām* (Gujranwala) and *al-Shams* (Sargodha), *al-Siddiq* and *Tulū’-i Islām* (Lahore) (*Razākār* 16/8–9:3; 1 March 1953).
333. *Razākār* 16/36:3 (8 October 1953).
334. On 18 and 30 August 1954 the TAS had organised days in memory of the second and third Caliphs in Dera Ismail Khan, apparently only for provoking the Shias; they were followed by congregations in Sunni mosques of the town on 8–10 Muharram (7–9 September 1954) (*Razākār* 17/31–33:43). Besides, Section 144 PPC (ban on assemblies) was imposed in Layyah Tehsil because of a new anti-Shia movement launched by Maulvi Abd us-Sattar Taunsawi (*Razākār* 17/37–38:24; 8–16 October 1954).
335. *Razākār* 18/34:3 (16 September 1955).
336. Muhammad Siddiq, “Karāchi kā ghamnāk aur ‘ibratnāk hāditha”, *Razākār* 18/35:3. According to that account, rumours had been spread that Shias would “kill a Sunni child on ‘Āshūrā’ every year”. Maulana Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi was named as one of the preachers who allegedly had “poisoned the atmosphere of Karachi since some years” (*ibid.*).
337. *Razākār* 18/33:3 (8 September 1955).
338. See calls for the convention in *Razākār* 18/34:1+3 and 18/35:7 (16 and 24 September 1955). The APSC was opposed because it held an annual convention on 28–30 October that year in Lahore (report in *Asad* 5/21:2–19).
339. Report in *Razākār* 19/2:1+12 (8 January 1956).
340. See section 3.2, pp. 73–74.
341. *Razākār* 19/14:8 (8 April 1956), referring to Resolution No. 7.
342. *Razākār* 19/26:7 (8 July 1956); 20/9:3 (1 March 1957).
343. See detailed reports about the situation in Dera Ismail Khan, where the Shias decided to refrain from Muharram processions that year (*Razākār* 19/33:8; 1 September 1956), and in Sargodha, where Section 144 PPC was imposed on the entire district during the month of Muharram (*Razākār* 19/34:4; 8 September 1956). During a Muharram speech in Sargodha, Khalid Mahmud denounced Shias as “the firewood of hell” and derided their *mātām* ceremonies as “the punishment for their denial of the first three Caliphs” (*ibid.*). Short reports from ‘Āshūrā’ in other places are given in *Razākār* 19/34:3.
344. *Razākār* 19/34:2 (8 September 1956).
345. *Razākār* 19/38:3 (8 October 1956). The meeting, convened by Dr Muhammad Abdullah Khan Jatoti (*Nāzim-i A’lā* of the TAS), took place in the office of the JAH and was presided over by Maulana Ahmad Ali, Vice-Chairman of the JUI. Also present were the Chairmen of the JUP (S. Abu’l-Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad), the JAH (S. Muhammad Da’ud Ghaznavi) and the TAS (Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari), the Bareilvis Maulana Abd us-Sattar Niyazi and S. Khalil Ahmad (*Hizb al-Ahnaḡ*, Lahore), Maulana Jamil Ahmad Thanvi, two leading instructors of the Deobandi *Jāmi’at Ashrafiya* in Lahore (Abd ur-Rahman and Zia ul-Haqq), and the TAS propagandists Manzur Ahmad and Khalid Mahmud. Notably absent were representatives of the *Jamā’at-i Islāmī*.
346. Literally “*tabarrā*-playing”, a derogative expression.



347. I.e. the wives of the Prophet Muhammad, especially ‘A’isha, who is criticised by Shias for having sided with the rivals of Ali Ibn Abi Talib after the Prophet’s death.
348. Translated from *Razākār* 19/38:3 (8 October 1956). Resolution No. 4 seems to deliberately ignore the fact that the said freedoms were *not* granted absolutely in the constitution; see above, p. 90, and section 3.2, pp. 68, 74.
349. For such arguments from Muhammad Siddiq see *Razākār* 19/38:3 (8 October 1956); 20/22:3 (8 June 1957); 21/32:3 (8 September 1958). During a meeting of all Shia *anjumans* in the Barkat Ali Islamiya Hall Lahore in 1957 a detailed resolution was passed demanding punishment for any Shia who would abuse venerable religious figures during processions (Statement of Muzaffar Ali Shamsi in July 1963, *Razākār* 26/36:4. He was probably referring to the All-Parties Shia Convention in December that year; see section 3.6, pp. 98–99). See also quotations from Muhammad Siddiq in section 4.2, p. 113, and from a press conference of S. Muhammad Dihlavi in February 1964, section 4.3, p. 120.
350. See section 1.2, p. 23.
351. *Razākār* 19/42:12 (8 November 1956); 19/45:2 (1 December 1956). Its Shia members were Hafiz Kifayat Husain, Nawab Ihsan Ali Khan, Major Mubarak Ali Shah and Muzaffar Ali Shamsi from the ITHS, Nawab Qizilbash, S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, Muhammad Bashir Ansari and Mirza Ahmad Ali from the APSC and Muhammad Isma‘il as a neutral member (*Razākār* 19/46:9; 8 December 1956).
352. *Razākār* 20/9:3 (1 March 1957).
353. *Ibid.* and *Razākār* 20/22:3 (8 June 1957). Siddiqi would become more reconciled with Shia viewpoints since the late 1960s; see sections 4.5, p. 140; 5.2, p. 149; 5.5, p. 163.
354. *Razākār* 20/9:3.
355. Muhammad Siddiq, “Mas’ala-i sabb-o-shatm kâ wâhid hall”, *Razākār* 20/22:3 (8 June 1957).
356. Translated from *Razākār* 20/24:3 (24 June 1957).
357. *Ibid.*
358. Muhammad Siddiq, “Tanzimwâlon kî fitna-angîzi aur un k̄ khatarnâk ‘azâ’im”, *Razākār* 20/11:3 (16 March 1957).
359. *Ibid.*; six years later, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi confirmed that the government of Khan Sahib had granted thirty-three new licences for ‘*azâdârî*’ processions in 1956 (*Razākār* 26/36:5; 24 September 1963).
360. *Razākār* 20/11:3 (16 March 1957), referring to Resolution No. 3.
361. *Razākār* 20/12:3. (24 March 1957). Durrani was a retired inspector of schools from the Dera Ghazi Khan area (S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi; personal-communication).
362. The term “life-blood” (literally “live artery”, *râg-i hayât*) has become almost a standard expression of Shia religious leaders in Pakistan when referring to the ‘*azâdârî*’ processions.
363. *Razākār* 20/22:2 (8 June 1957).
364. *Ibid.*; see also section 4.4, p. 128.
365. List of the members in *Razākār* 20/22:2 (8 June 1957).
366. Muhammad Siddiq, “Ânêwâlâ Muharram aur ham”, *Razākār* 20/23:3 (16 June 1957).
367. Translated from a quotation in *Razākār* 20/21:3 (1 June 1957). Obviously the argument is based on the Koran, Sura Âl ‘Imrân, Verse 169: “And reckon not those who are killed in the way of God as dead; nay, they are alive and are provided sustenance from their Lord.”
368. *Ibid.* and *Razākār* 20/12:3 (24 March 1957).
369. *Razākār* 20/31:1–2 (16 August 1957) mentions Ahmadpur East and Sitpur (see below), Kotli Lodhran (Sialkot Dist.), Jhund (Campbellpore Dist.), Pindi Sayyidpur (Jhelum Dist.), Khangarh (Multan Dist.) and Lahore. Attacks on a *Chihlum* procession at Mufti Baqir (Lahore) with 25 injured followed in September that year; see *Razākār* 20/37:1 (1 October 1957); 21/17:1 (1 May 1958).



370. Ibid. The procession was organised by Shia *muhâjirs*. According to Muhammad Siddiq, who visited the area with a delegation shortly after, such an atmosphere had been created in and around Sitpur, “that it was considered a crime to be Shia” (*Razâkâr* 20/33:3; 1 September 1957).
371. *Razâkâr* 20/31:1; 20/32:2; 20/33:3 (16 August–1 September 1957).
372. *Razâkâr* 21/44–5 (8–16 December 1958).
373. *Razâkâr* 20/32:1–2 (24 August 1957). However, the Sunni police officer in charge of Ahmadpur East was lauded during that meeting for having prevented worse with swift action (ibid.).
374. Ibid.; this statement was still made an issue during the inquiry about the 1963 sectarian riots in Lahore; see *Razâkâr* 26/36:5 (24 September 1963) and section 4.2, p. 112.
375. See quotations from a speech of Information Minister Hasan Mahmud in Ahmadpur East on 16 August 1957 in *Razâkâr* 20/32:3 (24 August 1957).
376. Literally “the great majority”, a term frequently used by different Sunni groups in Pakistan to refer to the Sunnis of the country collectively.
377. Quoted in *Razâkâr* 20/39:3 (translation).
378. Interestingly, that same argument has been put forward thirty-seven years later by S. Ali Khamenei, the “Spiritual Guide” of the Islamic Republic of Iran, when forbidding self-injury during Muharram processions; see S. Ali Khâmenê’i, ‘*Âshûrâ*’: *bâyânât-e rahbar-e mu’azzam-e enqelâb-e eslâmî wa-esteftâ’ât-e âyât-e ‘uzâm pîramûn-e ‘azâdârî-ye ‘âshûrâ*’ (Qom: Daftar-e Tablighât-e Eslâmî-e Houze-ye ‘Elmiye, 1994).
379. On the opposition of some twentieth century Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ to certain ‘*azâdârî*’ ceremonies see Werner Ende, “The Flagellations of Muharram and the Shi’ite ‘Ulamâ’”, in: *Der Islam* (Berlin, New York) 55(1978)1, pp. 19–36.
380. Translated from the quotation in *Razâkâr* 20/32:2 (24 August 1957).
381. See section 3.5, pp. 98–99.
382. Schubel, *Religious Performance*, pp. 78–80; *Razâkâr* 25/19–21 (1 June 1962; “Ta’rikh-i ‘Azâdârî No.”), passim.
383. Plenty of historical evidence in support of these arguments is given by Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 283–352; see also Hollister, *Shi’a of India*, pp. 177–9; Cole, *Roots of North Indian Shi’ism*, p. 88; Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 703, Fn 46. In some towns like Multan most *ta’ziyas* in Muharram were still taken out by Sunnis in the 1990s; see Hussain Chaudhry, “The Ritual of Remembrance”, *Newsline* 6/1991, pp. 59–60.
384. Muhammad Siddiq, “Ek nâyâ fitna”, *Razâkâr* 20/40:3 (24 October 1957).
385. *Razâkâr* 20/45:3 (1 December 1957).
386. *Razâkâr* 21/13:3 (1 April 1958). More than thirty years later it was still mentioned as a “proof of Shia misdeeds” in the biography of the founder of the *Sipâh-i Sahâba*; see Qâsimî, *Sawânih-i hayât ... Haqq Nawâz Jhangvî*, pp. 42–3.
387. He became president of the JUP from June 1970 to July 1972; see Mujeeb Ahmad, *Jam’iyyat ‘Ulama-i-Pakistan*, pp. 50–52 and 229.
388. Translated from *Razâkâr* 20/47:3 (16 December 1957).
389. See an editorial “Kyâ yehî Islâm kî khidmat hai?”, weekly *Himâyat ul-Islam* (Lahore), 20 September 1957, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 20/37:2 (1 October 1957); Muhammad Siddiq, “Islâmiyân-i Pâkistân kê liyê lamha fikrîya”, *Razâkâr* 20/47:3 (16 December 1957); idem, “Êf afsôs-nâk khabar”, *Razâkâr* 21/7:3 (16 February 1958).
390. *Razâ-i Mustafâ* (Gujranwala), 28 Muharram 1378h, quoted in *Razâkâr* 21/30:3 (24 August 1958).
391. Salim, *Iskandar Mirza*, p. 271; on Qizilbash’s alliance with President Mirza which facilitated his appointment see ibid., p. 242.

392. See section 1.1, pp. 10–11. On ‘*azādārī* traditions in Lahore and other Shia centres of Pakistan during the 1950s, see S. M. H. Husain, *Nuqūsh-i rāh*, passim.
393. *Razākār* 21/21:4 (1 June 1958).
394. *Razākār* 21/21:6. In an article of *Da‘wat* it was promised that “not a trace of sectarian rioting” would remain if such a ban was pronounced (*ibid.*).
395. See congratulations to Qizilbash for that step in *Da‘wat*, 19 May 1958, quoted in *Razākār* 21/21:6.
396. *Razākār* 21/19:2 (16 May 1958); 21/22:3 (8 June 1958).
397. *Razākār* 21/24–25:2 (1 July 1958).
398. *Razākār* 21/32:3 (8 September 1958).
399. *Razākār* 21/32:4.
400. *Razākār* 21/31:3 (1 September 1958) reports only assaults on ‘*azādārī* processions in Jhang and Kohdarra (Sialkot Dist.).
401. *Razākār* 21/32:4. Its Shia members were Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Azhar Hasan Zaidi, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi and Sha‘iq Ambalvi; Sunni members were the JI chairman Maududi and the Maulanas Ahmad Ali, Da‘ud Ghaznavi, Sahibzada Faiz ul-Hasan, ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi and Abu’l-Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad (*ibid.*).
402. See section 4.1, p. 103.
403. See section 4.2, pp. 110–11.
404. These elections never took place. Not even a time-schedule was published before the proclamation of martial law in October 1958.
405. Worst affected was the Jhang District, see section 3.4, p. 96; on the 1951 precedent see *ibid.*, pp. 88–89.
406. Protocol in *Razākār* 20/48:4–7 (24 December 1957).
407. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5, 7.
408. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
409. *Ibid.*, p. 5. Among the opponents present were Karim Bakhsh Haidari, Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari and S. Muhammad Ali Zaidi (Lahore) from the ITHS and Malik Fath Sher, Hakim Muhammad Hasan Ja‘fari (Gujranwala), Khan Ghulam Qadir Khan (Khanewal), and S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari from the APSC.
410. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6. Other prominent speakers in support of the demand were Maulana Muhammad Isma‘il and Muzaffar Ali Shamsi.
411. *Ibid.*, p. 6 (translation of Resolution No. 1, para 6).
412. See section 3.1, pp. 60, 65. The only exception had been draft rules for a “Shia Muslim League” which were set up by Muzaffar Ali Shamsi at the time of the formation of the *All-Pakistan Shia Board* in January 1952 and which included the demand for reserved seats (*Razākār* 15/5:7; 15/8:9). Such a “Shia Muslim League” had never materialised, however.
413. See section 2.2, p. 49.
414. *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 48.
415. (I could not find any source giving numbers and/or names of Shias elected into these two assemblies in 1951 and 1953).
416. By 1953 these had resigned or died; see section 3.2, p. 71, and Fn 133 to chapter 3 (p. 371).
417. See section 3.2, p. 69, and Fn 109 to chapter 3 (p. 369–70).
418. These were S. Ghulam ‘Abbas (Jalalpur Pirwala; Multan Dist.); S. Ali Husain Gardezi (Multan); Pir S. Naubahar Shah (Qitalpur; Multan Dist.); Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash and S. Jamil Husain Rizvi (Lahore); S. Manzur Husain Shah Bukhari, Chaudhry Muhammad Siddiq and Chaudhry Khadim Husain (Sheikhupura Dist.); Mian Dost Muhammad Bhatti (Pindi Bhattiyan; Gujranwala Dist.); Major S. Mubarak Ali Shah and Col. S. ‘Abid Husain (Shah Jiwana; Jhang Dist.); Mehr Nawazish Ali Khan Sial (Garh Maharaja; Jhang Dist.); S. Altaf Husain Shah (Chiniot; Jhang Dist.); S. Nazr Husain

- (Koranga; Lyallpur Dist.); Chaudhry Muhammad Hasan (Jaranwala; Lyallpur Dist.); Malik Fath Sher (Mianwali); S. Nazr Husain Shah (Layyah; Mianwali Dist.); Chaudhry Sultan Khan (Chakri; Campbellpore Dist.); S. Murid Husain (Sialkot); Shaikh Hidayat Ali Wakil (Narowal; Sialkot Dist.); Malik Faiz Husain (Bajwa; Sialkot Dist.); S. Hasan Ali Shah (Shergarh; Montgomery Dist.); see *Razâkâr* 14/16:14 (24 April 1951).
419. Callard, *Pakistan*, pp. 61–2.
  420. Literally “workers of the people” (*qaumi karkunôn*), a term frequently applied for the rank and file members of Shia communal organisations.
  421. Translation from Sha’iq Ambalvi, “Hamâra das-sâla nâkâmiyân aur us kâ sabab”, *Asad*, 18 January 1958, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 21/4:3.
  422. He had been elected in March 1956 but had delegated most of his duties in the ITHS to Muzaffar Ali Shamsi when he became a minister in the Government of West Pakistan shortly after. See *Razâkâr* 24/14–15:11 (8–16 August 1961); see also Fn 83 to chapter 5 (p. 407).
  423. *Razâkâr* 21/1:2. The article also mentions a joint statement of 13 Shia personalities (no names given), the secretary of a *Shia Municipal Society*, and the secretary of a *Ja’fariya Welfare Corps*.
  424. *Razâkâr* 21/1:2 (1 January 1958). All these arguments were rejected by the editor, especially the warning of similar demands from “other Muslim sects”. He insisted that there were only two major sects (*firqât*) in Islam, Sunnis and Shias, all other being their “branches” (*ibid.*).
  425. *Razâkâr* 21/13:3 (1 April 1954). A printed poster of the TAS containing that demand was shown at the meeting of the APSC on 16 March 1958 (see below). For later attempts to impose a *Nâmûs-i sahâba*-bill see section 7.2, pp. 251–52, 254.
  426. *Asad*, 18 January 1958, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 21/4:3 (24 January 1958).
  427. *Razâkâr* 21/12:3, 8 (24 March 1958).
  428. *Asad*, 26 March 1958, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 21/17:6 (1 May 1958). Ambalvi had been known as the most loyal political lieutenant (opponents would call him “lackey”) of Qizilbash since fifteen years.
  429. *Ibid.*; Qizilbash had served in the cabinet of Feroz Khan Noon since 16 December 1957; from 18 October to 11 December 1957 he had already been a minister in the cabinet of Ismail I. Chundrigar (*Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan*, p. 268).
  430. *Razâkâr* 21/17:6 (1 May 1958).
  431. *Ibid.*
  432. See section 3.4, p. 97.
  433. Speech of Shamsi on *’Id al-Fitr* (4 April 1958), quoted in *Razâkâr* 21/17:1–2. See also section 3.4, p. 95.
  434. See sections 4.3, p. 122; 4.5, pp. 136 and 139.
  435. See section 5.3, pp. 152–4.
4. THE AYUB KHAN ERA, 1958–1968
1. Khalid bin Sayeed, “Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan”, in: *Middle East Journal* 13(1959)4, pp. 389–406, here pp. 398–401.
  2. These were Amjad Ali and Ghulam Ali Talpur (*Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan*, p. 268). Qizilbash had been the third Shia minister of that cabinet until he became Chief Minister; see section 3.6, p. 102.
  3. Statement of Sha’iq Ambalvi in front of the Lahore Inquiry Commission (see section 4.2, p. 112. August 1963 (*Razâkâr* 26/32:3). See also Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era*, pp. 3–4, for a list of the federal cabinets in the period 1958–68.

4. Mirza, *From Plassey to Pakistan*, pp. 240–54; Salim, *Iskandar Mirza*, 295–310.
5. See section 3.5, p. 100.
6. *Razākār* 22/2:3 (16 January 1959), quoting from Martial Law Rules No. 7, 37 and 51.
7. One early example of open defiance of the orders quoted above was the publication of the book *Khilāfat-i Mu'āwiya wa-Yazīd* of Mahmud Ahmad 'Abbasi shortly before the Muharram of 1379H (July 1959); see *Razākār* 22/27:3 and further reviews in *Razākār* 22/28:3; 22/41:7; 22/42–46:6; 24/16–20:5; 25/11:5); on Sunni rejoinders to that book see Sayyida 'Andlīb Zahrā Kāmūnpūrī, *Ahl-i sunnat aur khilāfat-i Mu'āwiya wa-Yazīd*, (Lahore: Maktabat Imamiya, 1963). It took the government four years to ban that book which was considered by Shias as one of the most provocative ever published in Pakistan.
8. On 10 March that year (21 Ramadan 1380H, death anniversary of the Imam Ali) there were attacks on Shia processions in Karachi (*Razākār* 24/11:3; 24/12:7).
9. On some incidents in Dera Ismail Khan, Kot Addu, Mailsi and Peshawar on the 10 Muharram 1381H (23 June 1961) see *Razākār* 24/26:3. In Sadda (Kurram Agency) fire was opened on a Muharram procession in 1961, leading to fighting that spread to other villages (Bangash, *Political and Administrative Development*, p. 184). On 10 Muharram 1382H (12 June 1962) sectarian clashes were reported only from Karachi (*Razākār* 25/22–23:2).
10. See section 4.2, pp. 109–10.
11. Ziring, op. cit., p. 14
12. Anjum, *Siyāsat ke fir'aun*, pp. 256–58.
13. Ibid., p. 259.
14. See sections 4.3, p. 121; 4.5, pp. 139–40.
15. Anjum, op. cit., p. 258; on Mumtaz Husain Qizilbash see also an obituary in *Razākār* 28/12:6–7 (24 March 1965).
16. S. 'Abid Husain, the head of a branch of the Shah Jiwna sayyid family, had been a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and held several ministerial posts in the 1950s; on his career and that of his daughter 'Abida Husain see Anjum, op. cit., pp. 311, 318–24.
17. See for example his speech on *Īd al-Fitr* 1379H (29 March 1960) in *Razākār* 23/15:3.
18. He was apparently referring to Shia rivals of the ITHS in the first place, but possibly also to politicians who backed Sunni extremists.
19. Translation from *Razākār* 24/14–15:11 (8–16 April 1961).
20. See for example Muhammad Siddiq, "Islām—amn-o-salāmati kā paighām", *Razākār* 22/1:3 (1 January 1959); idem, "Mazhabī āzādī kā sahīh mafhūm", *Razākār* 22/2:3 (8 January 1959). It is noteworthy that the editor of *Razākār* had never been afraid of criticising any powerful person since the foundation of the journal in 1938.
21. For example Muhammad Siddiq, "Hamārē dīni madāris aur un kī tanzīm kī zarūrāt", *Razākār* 23/5:3 (1 February 1960); Karim Bakhsh Haidari, "Nawā-i talkh", *Razākār* 27/1:3 (1 January 1964).
22. Nasr, *Vanguard*, pp. 152–5; Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 24–8; Mujeeb Ahmad, *Jam'iyat 'Ulama-i-Pakistan*, pp. 32–3; Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, pp. 69–73, 85–7.
23. A good account of Ayub Khan's attitude towards the religious leaders is given ibid., pp. 51–73.
24. *Razākār* 22/16:1 (24 April 1959); 22/17:3 (1 May 1959).
25. Malik, "Waqf in Pakistan", pp. 74–6; Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 78–80. By September 1960, already 800 *auqāf* were covered by the new regulations (*Razākār* 23/37:1; 1 October 1960). Their annual income in 1960–61 was Rs. 2.086 million and in 1965–6 Rs. 3.97 million (Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 97).
26. On the Punjab Waqf Ordinance of 1952 see Muhammad Siddiq, "Ham aur hamārē auqāf", *Razākār* 15/1:3 (1 June 1952). It was not implemented before the 1959 Waqf Ordinance went into effect.

27. Ibid.; Muhammad Siddiq, “Qânûn-i auqâf aur shî‘a”, *Razâkâr* 15/3:3 (16 January 1952); see also the written promise of Jinnah from 1940 (section 2.2., p. 43). For initial reactions in 1959 see *Razâkâr* 22/16:1 (24 April 1959); 22/17:3 (1 May 1959).
28. See *Razâkâr* 24/14–15:8 (8–16 April 1961) and section 4.3, pp. 117, 119.
29. See sections 4.3, pp. 123–24; 5.5, pp. 166, 169–70.
30. See section 1.1, p. 7; also the list of Shia deputies in Fn 418 to chapter 3, pp. 384–85.
31. Khalid bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, pp. 95–7.
32. By 1962 the Auqaf Department had nationalised 247 *dînî madâris* (Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 95). On attempts to nationalise the *Dâr ul-‘Ulûm Muhammadiya* Sargodha, which were averted by Qizilbash and other Shia notables, see *al-Muballigh* 12/6:2–3 (July 1968).
33. Malik, op. cit., pp. 167–9; on the Shia response see section 4.4, p. 126.
34. Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, pp. 65–9; Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 26–8.
35. *Razâkâr* 27/21:3 (16 July 1964); 27/22:3 (24 July 1964).
36. At that time, five Shias were members of the West Pakistan Assembly, all of whom were apparently absent at the day the bill was passed. But even the Law Minister Ghulam Nabi Memon had then hinted at possible contradiction of the law with Shia personal law and asked the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ for a written comment (*Razâkâr* 27/21:3; 27/22:3).
37. Ziring, op. cit., pp. 15–18.
38. Among the tasks of the commission were named “to examine the progressive failure of parliamentary government in Pakistan ... and to determine the causes and the nature of the failure”; see Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, p. 395; full text of the report *ibid.*, pp. 395–534.
39. Ibid., pp. 395–6.
40. *Razâkâr* 23/20:3 (24 May 1960); Pirzada, op. cit., p. 25, referring to a report in the JUI organ *Tarjumân-i Islâm* (Lahore), 27 May 1960.
41. This seems to be an error; the relevant article in the 1956 constitution was No. 18, see Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, p. 251, and section 3.2, p. 74.
42. Literally: “what I follow and my companions”, referring to a *hadîth* attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. With other words: Sunni Islam, abiding to the example of both the Prophet and the *sahâba*.
43. That would apparently imply a ban on conversion from Sunni Islam to Shi‘ism, too.
44. Translated from *Razâkâr* 23/22:3 (8 June 1960).
45. See section 3.2, pp. 71–72.
46. *Razâkâr* 23/20:3 (24 May 1960). I could not find out anything about the outcome of that discussion.
47. See Articles 10–12 on “freedom of religion” of Part II (“Fundamental Rights”) in Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 539–40; Article 17 forbade discrimination in public services on the ground of religion etc. (*ibid.*, p. 541). Part II (“Principles of Policy”), Article 1, included the same explanation about “Qur’an and Sunnah as interpreted by any Muslim sect” as Article 198 of the 1956 constitution (*ibid.*, p. 543; see section 3.2, p. 74).
48. Malik, “Legitimizing Islamization—The Case of the Council of Islamic Ideology in Pakistan”, pp. 253–55; Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 45. On its later functions see *ibid.*, pp. 49–66; list of members 1962–84 with explanations *ibid.*, pp. 431–42.
49. Ibid., pp. 45–8.
50. Ibid., p. 48. The only Shia member of its research staff from 1964 to 1995 was Dr S. Ali Raza Naqvi, a *muhâjir* from Amroha (U.P.) and author of a *Standard Dictionary Persian to Urdu*. No Shia scholar has been employed at the Islamic Research Institute after 1995.
51. Malik, op. cit., pp. 45–57.
52. Ibid., p. 431; *Razâkâr* 25/31:1 (16 August 1962).
53. *Razâkâr* 27/14:3 (8 April 1964).

54. *Razâkâr* 28/44:3 (24 November 1965).
55. See section 4.5, p. 138.
56. See section 3.6, pp. 101–02.
57. See section 4.4, pp. 125–26.
58. Shias of Multan city and its suburb Shia Miyani had held Friday congregational prayers in turns at both places since 1955, but after a quarrel between locals and *muhâjirs* in 1962 the latter had termed the prayers in Shia Miyani as invalid (*bâtîl*). The controversy was going on for several months in the fall of that year, with both sides asking for *fatwâs* from S. Muhsin al-Hakim (Najaf) and S. Ahmad Ali (Lucknow); see *Razâkâr* 25/38:4; 25/40:5+8; 25/42:3+9; 25/47:1+8 (8 October–16 December 1962).
59. They were also blamed for indulging in mutual rivalries; see Muhammad Siddiq, “Hamârî qaumî anjumanôn kî farâ’iz”, *Razâkâr* 24/6:3 (8 February 1961); idem, “Qâbil-i taqlîd”, *Razâkâr* 24/39–40:3 (16–24 October 1961); for similar criticism already in the 1940s see section 2.2, p. 44.
60. Hafiz Kifayat Husain, “Zarûrî ittîlâ’”, *Razâkâr* 25/16:1 (24 April 1962); Muhammad Siddiq, “Ek zarûrî mashwara”, *Razâkâr* 25/16:3; idem, “Bi-ghair tahqîq kê chanda nâ dijiyê”, *Razâkâr* 25/18:3 (8 May 1962).
61. Report in *Razâkâr* 24/14–15:8–13 (8–16 April 1961). On the March 1956 convention see section 3.2, pp. 74–75.
62. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi was later reviled for having publicly insulted and threatened Hafiz Kifayat Husain; see *Razâkâr* 35/25–26:1 (1–8 July 1971); 35/40:2 (24 October 1971). According to S. Ja’far Naqvi (Karachi), the dispute started because Shamsi wanted to make money from ITHS publications and Hafiz Kifayat Husain objected (Interview with the author, 6 January 2001).
63. *Razâkâr* 24/5:3+5 (1 February 1961). In February 1960 Hafiz Kifayat Husain had still led an ITHS delegation to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi of Iran; see *Razâkâr* 23/9–10:1 (1 March 1960).
64. See his keynote speech at the 1961 ITHS convention in *Razâkâr* 24/14–15:9–10 (8–16 April 1961) and his obituary in *Razâkâr* 39/22:3 (8 June 1975). On his political career see also Anjum, op. cit., pp. 311–15.
65. See section 4.5, p. 135.
66. According to his own account, he had since 1956 been performing most functions of the ITHS Secretary-General in the place of Justice S. Jamil Husain Rizvi who had been elected to that post in the same year (*Razâkâr* 24/14–15:11). On Rizvi see section 5.4, p. 158.
67. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, “Tanzîm kê nâm par intishâr nâ phailâ’iyê”, *Razâkâr* 24/39–40:19 (16–24 October 1961); see also section 4.3, p. 115.
68. *Razâkâr* 25/42:4 (8 November 1962); Shamsi repeated his resignation with the same result at an ITHS Council meeting in Rawalpindi in August 1964, at that time “ordered” by S. Muhammad Dihlavi himself to stay in office (*Razâkâr* 27/27–28:5; 1–8 September 1964).
69. See sections 4.3, p. 121; 4.5, p. 138.
70. *Razâkâr* 24/14–15:8. The need to have a Shia daily newspaper has been repeated again and again at meetings of the Shia organisations since the 1940s; see also section 6.1, p. 206.
71. Ibid.; there had been a small hostel for Shia students in Lahore run by the AWSM since 1938. The new building was ready only in mid-1972, see *Razâkâr* 36/24:1 (24 June 1972); *Payâm-i ‘Amal* 16/5:27 (July 1972).
72. *Razâkâr* 26/4:1+5 (24 January 1963); 26/5:2–3 (1 February 1963).
73. *Razâkâr* 26/16:3 (24 April 1963).
74. *Razâkâr* 23/15:3 (16 April 1960). In British India there had been four official holidays in Muharram which had been cut down to one after 1947. A two-day holiday was reinstalled in 1978 under Zia ul-Haq.

75. *Razâkâr* 27/1:1 (1 January 1964), quoting from the report on the 1963 Lahore incidents (see below).
76. *Razâkâr* 24/32:3 (24 August 1961). Among them were the ‘ulamâ’ Khwaja Muhammad Latif Ansari, Hafiz Saifullah and Nâsir Husain; the latter two were sentenced to 6 months of prison each (ibid.).
77. Abd ul-Qadir Hisari, “Irshâdât-i rasûl”, *Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Hadîth*, 28 July 1961, quoted in *Razâkâr* 24/30:3 (8 August 1961); see also Muhammad Siddiq, “Mazmûn rawash”, *Razâkâr* 24/30:3; “Phîr vôhî sharr-angîzî”, *Razâkâr* 25/29:3 (1 August 1962); idem, “Ghamm-i Husain aur hafrôza Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Hadîth”, *Razâkâr* 25/32:5 (24 August 1962).
78. Muhammad Siddiq, “Mudîr-i hafrôza Tanzîm-i Ahl-i Hadîth Lahaur kî afsôs-nâk rawash”, *Razâkâr* 24/30:3. Accusations of *pîr-parastî* and *qabr-parastî* were directed mainly at the Barelvis, the majority Sunni denomination in Pakistan.
79. See section 4.1, p. 108. The article in *Da‘wat* quoted below constructed a rather far-fetched link between both issues; see Muhammad Siddiq, “Mudîr-i Da‘wat kî nirâlî mantiq”, *Razâkâr* 26/6:3.
80. Translation from Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari, “Mâtamî julûsôn kê liyê shî‘a hazrât kî ‘alaihadda hadd-bandî”, *Da‘wat*, 1 February 1963, quoted in *Razâkâr* 26/24:3 (24 June 1963) and (partially) in *Razâkâr* 26/6:3 (8 February 1963).
81. For the demographic distribution of Shias in Pakistan, see sections 1.1, pp. 7–8; 3.1, pp. 55–56. By 1963—and still today—Shia-majority areas were confined to Baltistan and the Gilgit Agency, the Kurram Agency of the NWFP, and scattered villages in the northern and western districts of the Punjab from Sialkot and Rawalpindi down to Rajanpur. Even in cities like Lahore, Karachi and Multan there were only a few quarters with a Shia majority in 1963.
82. See references in Fn 383 to chapter 3 (p. 383).
83. *al-Muballigh* 7/4:32 (May 1963); *Razâkâr* 26/15:3 (16 April 1963); 26/16:3+7 (24 April 1963).
84. *Razâkâr* 26/28:3 (24 July 1963).
85. *Razâkâr* 26/38:3 (8 October 1963).
86. Ibid. and *Razâkâr* 26/28:2 (24 July 1963); on the 1957 precedent see section 3.5, p. 96.
87. Report of the Inquiry Committee, quoted in *Pakistan Times*, 23 December 1963 (Urdu translation in *Razâkâr* 27/1:1; 1 January 1964).
88. Official figures according to *Pakistan Times*, 4 June 1963, including Sunni attackers injured by police action; Muzaffar Ali Shamsi later spoke of up to 250 injured Shias (statement in front of the Inquiry Committee, 16 August 1963; *Razâkâr* 26/36:9).
89. According to the eye-witness Sha‘iq Ambalvi, higher-ranking police-officers had done their best, but the rank-and-file policemen were afraid to interfere (*Razâkâr* 26/32:3; 24 August 1963).
90. *Razâkâr* 26/22:3 (8 June 1963) mentioned only incidents in Narowal, Chiniot and Quetta apart from Lahore and Theri. *Pakistan Times* (4 June 1963 and after) reported on the latter two incidents, but apart from that only on peaceful processions in a number of other towns, including Quetta.
91. *Razâkâr* 26/22:3. Section 144 PPC (ban on assemblies) was imposed in the entire Khairpur District thereafter. A detailed account of the violence in Theri, Lahore and Narowal was published fifty years later by the Blog *Sharaabtoon* under the title “The Most Unfortunate Incident: The Theri Massacre and Fifty years of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan”; URL: <http://sharaabtoon.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-most-unfortunate-incident-theri.html>.
92. *Razâkâr* 26/25:3 (1 July 1963).
93. *Razâkâr* 26/24:3 (24 June 1963). In Narowal, another hot-spot of sectarian tensions, the local Shias had refrained from taking out a procession after being advised so by the police. Likewise, there had been no procession in Theri (ibid.).



94. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi explicitly denied any responsibility of the government, the Lahore administration or the police when interrogated by the Inquiry Commission (*Razākār* 26/31:9; see below). Both he and Qizilbash would be attacked years later for their alleged “silence” regarding the Muharram 1963 events; see *Razākār* 36/30–31:5 (8–16 August 1972); 26/45:1 (1 December 1972).
95. *Razākār* 26/24:4 (24 June 1963); 26/28:3 (24 July 1963).
96. Translation from Raja Lehrasb Ali Khan, “Firqawārāna fasādāt kyūn?”, *Razākār* 26/24:2 (24 June 1963).
97. Address at a public rally in Sargodha, 4 June (*Dawn*, 5 June 1963; also quoted in *Razākār* 26/23:3).
98. See section 4.1, p. 106. In December 1963, under heavy pressure from the Sunni ‘ulamā’, Pakistan was renamed an “Islamic Republic” and all existing as well as future laws were brought within the purview of the principle barring legislation repugnant to the Koran and the Sunna; see Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, pp. 78–9.
99. Muhammad Siddiq, “Jaltê par têt”, *Razākār* 26/23:3 (16 June 1963), quoting from an editorial of Kausar Niyazi in his weekly *Shihâb* (Lahore). Such accusations were repeated by some witnesses and officials during the inquiry on the Lahore riots; see *Razākār* 26/36:7–8 (24 September 1963).
100. The groups participating were JUI, TAS, *Majlis-i Ahrâr*, *Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubbuwat*, *Anjuman-i Tauhid-o-Sunnat* and *Hizbullâh* (*Razākār* 26/24:3; 24 June 1963).
101. *Ibid.*; the latter three persons had been leading activists of the Anti-Ahmadiya movement of 1952–3, see *Munir Report*, *passim*.
102. *Razākār* 26/25:3 (1 July 1963).
103. *Razākār* 26/28:2 (24 July 1963); see also section 3.5, p. 91.
104. It was appointed on 5 June and headed by Abd ul-Rashid Khan, then Commissioner of the Dera Ismail Khan Division (*Pakistan Times*, 6 June 1963).
105. *Razākār* 26/29:1+5 (1 August 1963). On Mian Ghulam Qadir see also Mujeeb Ahmad, *Jam’iyyat ‘Ulama-i-Pakistan*, pp. 49–50.
106. According to Mian Ghulam Qadir, the number of Muharram processions in Lahore had increased from two to twelve since 1947 (*Razākār* 26/29:1). Kausar Niyazi in his editorial in *Shihâb* (see above, Fn 99) had reminded of the fact that the route of the main procession in Lahore had been fixed in the late nineteenth century when the population of the city was only 250,000 and that it was narrow and difficult and passing near centres of sectarian tensions (*Razākār* 26/23:3). By 1963 it took twenty-two hours for the 3.5 miles from the *Qizilbash Haveli* in the Old City to *Karbalâ’-i Gâme Shâh* (*Razākār* 27/1:1; see also a report on the 1962 procession in *Razākār* 25/22–23:2).
107. *Razākār* 26/29:1 (1 August 1963).
108. *Ibid.* (author’s translation); incidentally, some extremists in Multan allegedly shouted slogans in favour of the Caliph Yazid shortly after and threatened to celebrate a “*Yaum-i Yazid*” when being prevented by the police from disturbing a joint Sunni-Shia procession on the ‘*Id Milâd an-Nabî*’ (4 August 1963); see *Razākār* 26/38:3 (8 October 1963).
109. The full protocol is reproduced in *Razākār* 26/36:3–11 (24 September 1963). He was then still referred to as *Mujâhid-i Millat* by that journal. In *Razākār* 26/32:3+7 (24 August 1963) a resumé of the statements of Sha’iq Ambalvi, Secretary-General of the APSC, in front of the commission on 18 August is given.
110. *Razākār* 26/36:7 (24 September 1963). This way of investigation was ridiculed in an editorial of *al-Irshâd* (Karachi), “Fasādât ki tahqîq yâ ‘aqâ’id kî?”, reprinted in *Razākār* 26/35:6 (16 September 1963).
111. *Razākār* 26/36:7.



112. Ibid. pp. 8–9; likewise, he denied that the participants of the attacked procession had carried any arms other than some 40–50 chains used for self-flagellation.
113. *Razâkâr* 26/29:1 (1 August 1963); 26/30:3 (8 August 1963).
114. Muhammad Siddiq, “Dil-âzâr litrachar kî zabtî kâ mutâlaba”, *Razâkâr* 26/33:3 (1 September 1963). The practice of reprinting old *munâzara* literature is still *en vogue* with extremists of both sides in present time. See Naqvi, *Bibliography*, Vol. II, pp. 309–402; Naqvi, *Kitâbiyât ‘alaih-i imâmiya*, passim; see also section 6.4, pp. 233–34.
115. Translation from Muhammad Siddiq, “Êk zarûrî wazâhat”, *Razâkâr* 26/31:3 (16 August 1963).
116. *Razâkâr* 26/40:3 (24 October 1963).
117. See section 4.3, p. 117.
118. *Pakistan Times*, 23 December 1963; Urdu translation and comment in *Razâkâr* 27/1:1–2 (1 January 1964).
119. *Pakistan Times*, 23 December 1963; see also above, Fn 106.
120. *Pakistan Times*, 23 December 1963; *Razâkâr* 27/1:1–2.
121. Ibid., p. 2.
122. However, one Maulvi Qazi Fazlallah, whom Shias considered the main responsible for the Theri massacre, was assassinated in 1971; see Fn 292 to chapter 5 (p. 417).
123. See sections 4.3, p. 123; 4.5, pp. 135–36.
124. See section 3.6, p. 102.
125. On some of the suggestions brought forward in 1962 see *Razâkâr* 25/6:6 (February 1962); 25/9–10:9 (1–8 March 1962); 25/16:4 (24 April 1962).
126. See section 4.1, p. 104.
127. See *ibid.*, p. 108.
128. See Hasan Baltistani, “Karâchî mên qaumi mashâghil aur us par tanqîd kê silsila mên chand ma‘rûzât”, *Razâkâr* 22/35:4 (24 September 1959), referring to criticism of some articles “Qaumi qiyâdat” (presumably in the weekly *Shi‘a*), and a rejoinder of Muhammad Siddiq, *Razâkâr* 22/36:3.
129. This was obvious from an article of Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, “Tanzîm kê nâm par intishâr nâ phailâ‘iyé”, in which he ridiculed such ideas and rejected accusations that ITHS had achieved nothing during the last fourteen years (*Razâkâr* 24/39–40:19; 16–24 October 1961).
130. See sections 1.3, p. 25; 2.2 p. 44; 3.4, p. 84.
131. The traditional garment of Shia ‘*ulamâ*’, here in the sense of the ‘*ulamâ*’ themselves.
132. I.e. “Representative of the [Hidden] Inam”; on that concept of the role of the Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ see Momen, *Introduction*, p. 193.
133. Literally: “Sign of God in both worlds”.
134. I.e. “Proof of Islam and the Muslims”. That title has been quite unfamiliar among Pakistani Shia ‘*ulamâ*’ prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution.
135. He is referring to Hafiz Kifayat Husain; for a more specific identification of his and other ‘*ulamâ*’s alleged shortcomings see Haidari’s article quoted below.
136. Translation from Karim Bakhsh Haidari, “Hamâre qaumi idâra kî na‘î sadârat”, *Razâkâr* 24/5:5 (1 February 1961).
137. Literally: “singers of odes”, i.e. panegyrics.
138. I.e. a *sûfi* master, who derives his influence mostly from his “spiritual power” as perceived by his followers and disciples.
139. On alleged *ghulûw* (exaggeration) in Shia religious practice in Pakistan see sections 4.4, pp. 128–29; 5.6, p. 176.
140. See section 3.3, pp. 77–78.
141. Until 1958 special passports for pilgrims wishing to visit the holy sites in Saudia Arabia,

- Iran, Iraq and Syria were issued in all district capitals without many formalities. Thereafter, more and more bureaucratic obstacles were gradually created for pilgrims; see Ghulam Shabbir Khan, “Ziyārāt-i ‘atabāt-i ‘āliyāt par nā-rawā pābandiyān aur Pākistānī zā’irīn ki hālāt-i zār”, *Razākār* 41/25:3 (1 July 1977).
142. These are the following collections of Shia *ahādith*: 1) *al-Kāfi fī ‘ilm ad-dīn* of Muhammad al-Kulainī (d. 939); 2) *Man lā yahduruhu al-faqīh* of Ibn Bābūya (d. 991); 3) *Tahdhīb al-ahkām* of Shaikh Muhammad al-Tūsī (d. 1067); 4) *al-Istibṣār* of the same author; see Momen, *Introduction*, p. 174.
  143. Translation from Karim Bakhsh Haidari, “Nawā’-i talkh”, *Razākār* 27/1:3 (1 January 1964).
  144. *al-Muballigh* 1/5:2 (June 1957). On Karim Bakhsh Haidari see also section 3.4, pp. 79, 85–86.
  145. See sections 3.4, pp. 82–83; 4.4, pp. 127–31.
  146. On top of such critics of the ‘*ulamā*’ was Muhammad Siddiq, the editor of *Razākār*; see “Dīnī madāris kā jā’iza”, *Razākār* 23/13:3 (1 April 1960); “Ithnā-‘asharī muballighūn-i Afriqā ki khidmat mēn”, *Razākār* 23/18:3 (8 May 1960); “Āpnā jā’iza”, *Razākār* 25/47:3 (16 December 1962); see also section 4.4, pp. 127–28.
  147. *Razākār* 27/4:1 (24 January 1964). Almost the entire class of ‘*ulamā*’ with degrees from the large *madāris* of Northern India, Iraq and Iran had participated, including Mufti Ja’far Husain, Hafiz Kifayat Husain and most other ‘*ulamā*’ mentioned in section 3.4, pp. 78–80. Prominent absentees were only Rashid Turabi (see Fn 229 to chapter 3, p. 376), who at that time was about to surpass Dihlavi’s popularity as a preacher, and Agha Mirza Mahdi Pooya (see Fn 227 to chapter 3, p. 376), who was principally opposed to Shia communal demands (Author’s interview with S. Ja’far Naqvi, Karachi 6 January 2001).
  148. He was elected Vice-Chairman of the MAUSP (see below) at the 1964 Karachi Convention and would accompany S. Muhammad Dihlavi during all his tours to different towns and districts in Pakistan (*Razākār* 35/35:4; 16 September 1971); see also references in Fn 239 to chapter 3, p. 376).
  149. *Razākār* 35/35:4 (obituary for S. Muhammad Dihlavi); Mirza Yusuf Husain did not give names, but prominent ‘*ulamā*’ in Hyderabad at that time were Habib ul-Hasan Najafi, Hashmat Ali and S. Thamar Husain Zaidi; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 100, 111.
  150. *Razākār* 35/35:4.
  151. See the full text in *Razākār* 26/46–47:3 (16 December 1963). The invitation was signed by S. Thamar Hasan Zaidi and Hashmat Ali from Hyderabad and thirteen ‘*ulamā*’ from Karachi, among them Muhammad Naqi Lakhnawi, S. Zafar Hasan Amrohavi and S. Anis ul-Hasan Amrohavi.
  152. The 1953 All-Pakistan Shia Convention had been held at the same premises, see section 3.2, pp. 70–71. The residence of S. Muhammad Dihlavi (Ferdowsi Colony) was nearby.
  153. S. Ibn Hasan Najafi, born 1928 in Lucknow, had learned in Najaf during his childhood and moved to Lahore in 1953, where he was a close collaborator of the weekly *Razākār*. Since 1958 he lived in Karachi, serving for the Publications Department of the government and later teaching at Karachi University. He had worked for the *Yādgār-i Murtazāvi Institute* and later became director of the *Khorasan Islamic Centre* in Karachi. In 1958 he earned fame with an Urdu translation of *Asl al-shi’a wa-usūlūhā* from Muhammad Husain Āl Kashif ul-Ghita; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 43–4.
  154. *Razākār* 27/2–3:3–4 (8–16 January 1964).
  155. *Razākār* 27/4:5–6 (24 January 1964).
  156. *Razākār* 27/4:1. Zaidi, “Mutālabāt aur Khatib-i A’zam”, p. 81, mentions “the elimination of objectionable contents from schoolbooks” as the fourth principal demand of the conference.
  157. *Ibid.*; S. Ibn Hasan Najafi was elected *Nāzim-i A’lā* of the Action Committee (*ibid.*) and Mirza Yusuf Husain Vice-Chairman.

158. Literally: “Leader of the Ja‘farite (i.e. Twelver Shia) people”.
159. On his biography see Jauhar & Rizâ, *Khatib-i A‘zam*, [a collection of obituaries and other articles published by his sons], passim; Husain, *Matla‘-i anwâr*, pp. 465–7; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 257–8; Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. II, pp. 101–3. His father S. Aftab Husain had been a teacher of Arabic and Persian at the Delhi Arabic School and had established a Shia *madrasa* there with the help of the Nawab Hamid Ali Khan of Rampur (ibid.).
160. In his article “Mêrê dôst” (Jauhar & Rizâ, *Khatib-i A‘zam*, pp. 108–14) Hajji Da‘ud Nâsir recalls how he had repeatedly invited S. Muhammad Dihlavi to speak at *majâlis* in Bombay, but the latter had refused to accept any payment for them. When he was finally obliged to accept Rs. 25,000 for his services, he immediately donated them to a fund for Khoja Twelver Shia mosques.
161. Jauhar & Rizâ, op. cit., p. 41; *Razâkâr* 1/2:3 (8 November 1938).
162. Jauhar & Rizâ, op. cit., p. 44.
163. Ibid., pp. 44–5, 76–8.
164. He was the former head of the Muslim League in Bombay who moved to Karachi after 1947. He later set up a trust for Shia religious publications. Dihlavi shortly before his death dedicated his private library to another trust headed by Hasan Ali Pirbhai (ibid., p. 76).
165. Jauhar & Rizâ, op. cit., pp. 111–12.
166. He was mentioned in protocols of ITHS conventions only on rare occasions; see *Razâkâr* 12/7:2 (16 February 1949); 19/13:1 (1 April 1956); 24/16:3 (24 April 1961).
167. According to his son S. Ahmad Jauhar, he even retreated from preaching to a large extent in the 1950s (Jauhar & Rizâ, op. cit., p. 45). Most of Dihlavi’s writings remained unpublished manuscripts, except for a treatise on the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam, *Nûr ul-‘Asr*, (Karachi: Ferdowsi Colony, 1972.).
168. Both Muzaffar Ali Shamsi and Sha‘iq Ambalvi were present (*Razâkâr* 35/23:2; 16 June 1971), but since only ‘*ulamâ*’ were allowed to speak at the convention, S. Azhar Hasan Zaidi made such a proclamation for the ITHS and Maulana Mushtaq Ahmad of Multan on behalf of the APSC (*Razâkâr* 31/19:3; 24 May 1968).
169. Muhammad Bashir Ansari, “1964 Karâchi kanwenshan kâ haqîqat”, *Razâkâr* 36/36:1 (24 September 1972); in that article Ansari also claimed that he himself had suggested the name of *Majlis-i ‘Amal ‘Ulamâ‘-i Shi‘a-i Pâkistân*.
170. *Razâkâr* 27/9–10:8 (1–8 March 1964).
171. Literally: “its pillars (*arkân*)”.
172. The example of Aligarh (see sections 1.2, p. 18; 2.1, p. 33) has been brought forward on countless occasions to argue for separate Shia *dîniyât*.
173. He is making allusions to the way the Auqaf Department made use of the income of *auqâf* for its own purposes; see Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 78–81, 103–4.
174. Translation from *Razâkâr* 27/9–10:3 (1–8 March 1964).
175. Zaidi, “Mutâlabât aur Khatîb-i A‘zam”, p. 86 (no exact date is given there and in other sources available to the author).
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid. and *Razâkâr* 27/29:9 (press conference of S. Muhammad Dihlavi in Rawalpindi, 27 August 1964).
178. Protocols and commentary in *Razâkâr* 27/27–28:3+5; 27/29:7–8 (1–16 September 1964). Zaidi, “Mutâlabât”, p. 86, writes about “30,000 participants”, perhaps confusing that gathering with some other Shia convention.
179. See his inaugural speech on 28 August 1964; *Razâkâr* 27/27–28:5. S. Ajmal Husain was a medical doctor and nephew of Justice S. Jamil Husain (see section 5.4, p. 158). On his contribution to the movement in 1968 see section 4.5, p. 144.

180. These were S. Muhammad ‘Abbas and Nawab Nasrullah Khan from the Kurram Agency (where Rs. 5,000 had been collected for the event), Col. (retd.) Ali Ahmad Shah (former President of Azad Kashmir), Mir Ghulam Husain Khan Talpur (Khairpur), Pir S. Qalandar Husain Shah (Sargodha), Malik Ibrahim Khan Bangash (Hangu), the MNA S. Asghar Ali and the ITHS chairman S. Mubarak Ali Shah (*Razâkâr* 27/29:7–8).
181. *Ibid.*; the board was appointed only in January 1965 and comprised three sections: 1) *Dîniyât* section: Mirza Yusuf Husain, S. Maqbul Ali, S. Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, Muhammad Latif Ansari, S. Qamar ‘Abbas, S. Mahdi Hasan ‘Alavi 2) *‘Azâdârî* section: Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, Col. S. Afaq Husain, Sha‘iq Ambalvi, Muhammad Siddiq, Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi, Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani; 3) *Auqâf* section: Dr S. I‘jaz Husain (East Bengal), S. Ali Naqi (Karachi), Shaikh Abd ul-‘Aziz Akhtar (Rahimyar Khan), Khaqan Babar, S. Muhammad Ali Zaidi, S. Husain Naqvi (all Lahore), Sardarzada S. Zafar ‘Abbas (Jhang), S. Ghazanfar Ali Shah Bukhari (Sargodha); see *Razâkâr* 28/5:7.
182. *Razâkâr* 27/29:8 (16 September 1964); see section 4.1, p. 107, and Fn 47 to chapter 4, p. 387.
183. *Razâkâr* 27/29:8.
184. *Razâkâr* 27/27–28:3 (1–8 September 1964).
185. See below and Fn 181. More than half of the members of his Advisory Board were affiliated either to the ITHS or the APSC.
186. *Razâkâr* 27/27–28:5.
187. *Razâkâr* 27/33:3 (16 October 1964).
188. *Pakistan Times*, 25 October 1964, p. 7.
189. *Razâkâr* 27/35:3 (1 November 1964), referring to a joint session of Shia *anjumans* in Lahore on 25 October.
190. *Razâkâr* 27/36:1 (8 November 1964).
191. *Razâkâr* 27/35:3 (1 November 1964); 27/39:3 (1 December 1964). No confirmation of this meeting or list of participants could be obtained from daily press sources. Possibly it took place on the sidelines of a visit of Princess Ashraf Pahlavi of Iran in Lahore on 11 November (*Pakistan Times*, 12 November 1964).
192. Zaidi, “Mutâlâbât”, p. 86; for the full text of the memorandum see *Razâkâr* 28/1:1 (1 January 1965).
193. *Ibid.*
194. Mrs. Jinnah—a Shia like her late brother—had been named the candidate of the “Combined Opposition Parties” on 18 September 1964. Ayub Khan was re-elected president for a five-year term by the “Basic Democrats” on 2 January 1965; see Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era*, p. 39.
195. Thus goes the account of Mirza Yusuf Husain, who was present at the meeting; see *Razâkâr* 27/42:1 (24 December 1964). The editor of *Razâkâr* repeatedly claimed that the President had termed the Shia demands “reasonable” (*ma‘qûl*) (*Razâkâr* 28/3:3; 16 January 1965; *Razâkâr* 28/28:3; 24 July 1965), but this was not included in the verbatim quotation given by Mirza Yusuf Husain.
196. *Razâkâr* 27/42:1 (24 December 1964).
197. *Razâkâr* 27/39:3 (1 December 1964).
198. Author’s interview with S. Khurshid ‘Abbas Gardezi, (Multan, 1 March 1999). Mushtaq Husain had been employed with the Cooperative Department and later made his living as a private businessman. He was also Friday preacher at the mosque of Suraj-Miyani (“Shia-Miyani”), a suburb of Multan, and Secretary-General of the local *Anjuman-i Yâdgâr-i Husain*. On his later role see sections 4.5, pp. 139–42; 5.3, p. 151; 5.4, p. 159; 5.5, p. 162.
199. *Razâkâr* 28/34–35:1–2 (8–16 September 1965) mentions a pamphlet *Mâr-i âstin* (“Snake in the sleeve”) with heavy accusations against the said “traitors” published in Karachi in

- January 1965. Shortly after an independent branch of the ITHS was set up in Karachi; see also section 4.5, p. 138.
200. Ali Ahmad Khan Ja'fari, born in Agra (U.P.), was professor at the Islamia College Lahore. He had previously been in the service of Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash and his elder brother Nisâr Ali Khan.
  201. *Razâkâr* 29/25:3 (24 June 1966). Dihlavi hesitated almost two months until deciding about the five Shia delegates.
  202. These were the Chief Secretary of the Government of West-Pakistan, the Home Secretary, the Chief Administrator of the Auqaf Department, Sardar Abd ul-Rashid, and the Secretary of Education, S. Muhammad Sharif; see *Razâkâr* 28/7:3 (16 February 1965).
  203. Zaidi, "Mutâlâbât", pp. 86–7; see also below.
  204. *al-Muballigh* 9/3:4–6 (April 1965); *Razâkâr* 28/13:3 (1 April 1965).
  205. *Razâkâr* 28/29:3 (1 August 1965) contains the first reference to the term. In the following year, the *Shia Mutâlâbât* ("Demands") Committee was to become a new organisation of its own, comprising hundreds of branches; see section 4.5, pp. 133–35.
  206. *Razâkâr* 28/29:3.
  207. *Razâkâr* 28/33:1 (1 September 1965).
  208. S. Baqir Ali, "Markazî Idârat-i Tahaffuz-i Huqûq-i Shî'a kî aghrâz-o-maqâsid aur kârkardagi", *Razâkâr* 29/39:6 (8 October 1966); see also *Razâkâr* 30/7–8:8 (16–24 February 1967); 30/43:3 (16 November 1967).
  209. *Razâkâr* 36/18:6 (8 May 1972).
  210. The Indian attack along the border with West Pakistan, concentrating on the Lahore front-line, started on 6 September.
  211. *Razâkâr* 29/25:3 (24 June 1966).
  212. *Razâkâr* 28/43:3 (16 November 1965). Already in September 1965, Dihlavi was quoted with the complaint: "The Imam Zain ul-'Abidin remembered the calamities of Damascus with the words: '*al-Shâm, al-Shâm*'; I am crying '*al-Lahaur, al-Lahaur*' out of distress because of the situation in Lahore" (*Razâkâr* 28/34–35:1; 8–16 September 1965).
  213. See section 4.5, pp. 133–35.
  214. See section 4.5, pp. 133–45.
  215. See section 3.4, pp. 81–82.
  216. He was born in Kapurthala (Jullundhur Dist., East Punjab). His father had been an 'âlim of the *Ahl-i hadîth* sect and he had studied at Sunni seminaries, including the *Dâr ul-'Ulûm* Deoband. During his stay as Friday preacher in Toba Tek Singh he converted to Shi'ism around 1935. Thereafter he participated in dozens of *munâzarât* between Shia and Sunni 'ulamâ', becoming famous as the *Muballigh-i A'zam* ("Greatest Preacher"). From 1956 onwards he published the fortnightly *Sadâqat* from his residence in Gojra (Lyallpur Dist.). In 1964 he moved to Lyallpur (later Faisalabad) where he founded the *Madrasat Dars-i Âl-i Muhammad*; see Husain, *Matla'-i anwâr*, pp. 482–83; Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 264–8; *Payâm-i 'Amal* 20/6:9–13 (August 1976). On his role in propagating Shaikhiya doctrines in the 1970s see section 5.6, pp. 176–78.
  217. Momen, *Introduction*, pp. 179–80. *De facto*, the amount of *khums* paid to the 'ulamâ' has always been left at the discretion of the believers themselves. In Sunni Islam there is no tradition of this tax except in the case of war booty. See also Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, "Al-Khums: The Fifth in the Imami Shi'i Legal system", in: *Journal of Near East Studies* 39(1980), pp. 276–89; Norman Calder, "Khums in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence from the Tenth to the Sixteenth Century A.D.", in: *BSOAS* 45(1982)1, pp. 39–47.
  218. Muhammad Isma'il, "Bâyân-i khums", part I-IV, *Sadâqat*, 23 October–30 November 1959; referred to in *Razâkâr* 22/41:3 (8 November 1959); 22/45:3 (8 December 1959).

219. On the collection and disbursement of *khums* in pre-1856 Lucknow see Cole, *Roots*, pp. 198–204.
220. Most Pakistani Shias interviewed by the author on the subject have confirmed that. According to Murtaza Pooya, only among the Khoja Twelver Shia community of Karachi (and Khoja migrants to Africa) this obligation has been observed fairly faithfully (Interview with the author, 13 November 2000); see also sections 6.2, p. 215; 7.1, pp. 247–48.
221. *Razākār* 22/42:3 (16 November 1959). The editor of *Razākār* had refused to print a rejoinder of Gulab Ali Shah, considering its language “detrimental to the dignity of the ‘*ulamā*’”, but mentioned that polemics and counter-polemics had been published in other Shia journals.
222. Nasir Husain, “Barāhîn-i khums”, *al-Muballigh* 3/11:4–6 (December 1959); see also the editorials *ibid.*, p. 2 and *al-Muballigh* 4/1:1 (February 1960).
223. *al-Muballigh* 3/12:2 (January 1960). According to that source the *madrassa* had received only Rs. 2,720 *khums* since its foundation ten years earlier.
224. Muhammad Siddiq, “Mu’addabāna darkhwāst”, *Razākār* 22/44:3 (1 December 1959); *idem*, “Ākhirī hall”, *Razākār* 22/45:3 (8 December 1959).
225. *Razākār* 22/44:3. (He suggested instead referring to Pakistani authorities like S. Muhammad Baqir Chakralvi or S. Zain ul-‘Abidin, then Friday preacher of Multan).
226. S. Hasan Ali Shah Kazimi, “Najaf-i ashraf sê i’lân-i haqq”, *Razākār* 24/37:6 (1 October 1961), quoting from answers of Muhsin al-Hakim to Maulana S. Nawaz Hasan Hamadani in *Shi’a*, 1 September 1961.
227. *Razākār* 24/37:6 (1 October 1961).
228. *Razākār* 24/41:1 (1 November 1961).
229. See section 5.6, p. 178.
230. One of the first was from S. Gulab Ali Shah, *Tibyân ul-khums* (Multan 1961); he also wrote *Furû-i dîn mên zakât-o-khums kâ maqâm* (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 247); another was from S. Ibn Hasan Najafi, *Mas’ala-i khums*, (Karachi: al-Mashhad Printing Press, 1964). Mirza Yusuf Husain, *Kitâb ul-khums*, (Lahore: Insaf Pres, n.d.), quoted *fatwās* of Muhsin al-Hakim and twelve renowned Pakistani ‘*ulamā*’ refuting Muhammad Isma‘il’s position (Naqvi, *Bibliography*, Vol. II, pp. 29–30).
231. See section 3.3, p. 86.
232. Details of the new draft syllabus with requirements for the degrees of “Maulvî”, “Maulvî Alim”, “Fâzil”, “Maulvî Fâzil”, “Imâd ul-Afâzil” and “Sultân ul-Afâzil” were given in *al-Muballigh* 4/2:4–6 (March 1960). According to the 1960–61 annual report of the *Anjuman-i Muhammadiya* Sargodha, syllabi were unified after the April 1960 meeting (Supplement to *al-Muballigh* 5/2 [March 1961] p. 6.).
233. *al-Muballigh* 6/1:2 (February 1962); 6/2:31 (March 1962). On the committee and its recommendations see Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 170–75.
234. See the booklet *Hauza-i ‘Imiyya Jâmi’at ul-Muntazar kâ ta’âruf*, pp. 8–9. That source also conceded that the activities of the *Majlis-i Nazârat* “did not make the required progress”. One reason may have been that Shaikh Muhammad Husain Najafi of Sargodha, i.e. the controversial Dhakko (see below), was made Secretary of the *Majlis-i Nazârat* in 1962 (*ibid.*, p. 8).
235. Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 167–9.
236. See section 3.3, pp. 84–85.
237. *al-Muballigh* 3/12:2–3 (January 1960); Supplement to *al-Muballigh* 5/2, p. 6 (March 1961).
238. Author’s interview with Nusrat Ali Shahani (Lahore 21 January 2001).
239. *al-Muballigh* 8/9:2 (October 1964).
240. See references in Fn 219 to chapter 3 (p. 375).
241. He succeeded Shaikh Akhtar ‘Abbas, who had left in 1964 for eight years of advanced

- religious studies in Najaf and Qom, and the interim principal Maulana Husain Bakhsh of Jara (1964–5).
242. The *Jāmi'at ul-Muntazar Trust* was founded in 1966. Its leading members were Sufi Muhammad Anwar, Hajji Muhammad Husain Rizvan, Hajji Sharif Husain, Hajji Amir Ali, Seth Nawazish Ali, Khwaja Muhammad Ashraf, and Khallu Karamat Ali (*Misbāh ul-Qur'ān*, 1/1990, pp. 19, 25).
  243. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 19.
  244. The *Jāmi'at us-Saqlain* Rawalpindi, founded in 1962, was later enlarged and renamed *Madrasat Āyatullāh al-Hakim*; see Fn 200 to chapter 5 (p. 413).
  245. The *Jāmi'at Husainiyya* Jhang was founded in 1964 by S. Zamir ul-Hasan Najafi (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 161).
  246. The *Dars-i Āl-i Muhammad* of Lyallpur was founded in 1964 by Muhammad Isma'il with a special emphasis on the art of *munāzara*; see *Razākār* 27/23:7 (1 August 1964); 28/47:3 (16 December 1965).
  247. On Dhakko see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 296–98; Naqvi, “Controversy”, pp. 141–44; Dogar, *Maulānā Muhammad Husain Dhakko sê 150 su'āl*, pp. 13–16.
  248. *al-Muballigh* 8/9:30 (October 1964). However, his initial career was facilitated in the first place by the *sayyids* of his hometown Jahanian Shah, who had made the most important financial contributions to the *Dār ul-'Ulūm* Sargodha through *auqāf* (Interview with S. Iqbal Husain Kermani, Lahore 31 January 2001).
  249. See section 3.4, pp. 81–82.
  250. *Masā'ib* is a terminus for the sufferings of the *ahl al-bait*, especially of the Imam Husain.
  251. “Traditions” (*riwāyāt*) in the sense of *ahādīth*, i.e. events and sayings handed down from the life of the *ahl al-bait*.
  252. Literally “exaggeration”, a terminus in Shi'ism for excessive veneration of the Imams; see S. H. M. Jafri, *Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam*, (London, New York: Longman, 1979), pp. 300–4; M. G. S. Hodgson, “Ghulāt”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. II, pp. 1093–5.
  253. Literally “delegation”, i.e. the belief that God delegated some of his powers to the Imams; see Naqvi, “Controversy”, pp. 135–6.
  254. Translated from Ghulam Shabbir Khan, “Islāh-i majālis aur hamārī dhammādārī”, *al-Muballigh* 5/8:2–3 (September 1961).
  255. For a discussion of the above-mentioned questions of Shia doctrine and religious practice in Pakistan see Naqvi, “Controversy”, pp. 140–43, 149; Dogar, *150 su'āl*, pp. 36–74; *idem.*, *'Allāma Mirzā Yūsuf Husain Lakhnavī sê 300 su'āl*, pp. 31–47. See also Naqvi, *Bibliography*, Vol. I, pp. 121–83, for annotated references to literature on Shia doctrines (*'aqā'id*) in Pakistan and India. The inclusion of *'Alī waliyu'llāh* in the call for prayer and the formula *Yā 'Alī madad* have been less controversial and have been opposed only by Dhakko and a small number of his supporters.
  256. S. Murtaza Husain, “Shi'ōn kā 'ilmī māhāul aur us kā mustaqbal”, *Razākār* 16/22–23:8 (16 June 1953).
  257. Muhammad Husain [Dhakko], *Ahsan ul-fawā'id fi sharhi 'l-'aqā'id*, (Sargodha: Maktabat al-Hamadāni, 1964). The 47 chapters of the book deal with Shia beliefs on God, human beings and their nature, the hereafter, prophets and Imams, and related subjects.
  258. Dhakko, *Ahsan ul-fawā'id*, pp. 139–42, 421–48.
  259. S. Zamir ul-Hasan Rizvi Najafi, *Ma'ālim al-sharī'a fi'l-naqd wa'l-tabsira 'alā 'aqā'id al-shi'a*, (Ahmadpūr Siyāl: Jāmi'at ul-Ghadīr, n.d.).
  260. S. Muhammad 'Arif Naqvi, *Kāshif ul-haqā'iq fi jawāb tafwiz ahsan ul-fawā'id*, (Jhang: Dār ul-'Ulūm Husainiyya, n.d.).
  261. Literally: “one who is cutting short”; the word also means “sinner” or “guilty” in Urdu.



262. I.e. those who can only grasp the “husk” (*qashr*) of religious knowledge; see Naqvi, “Controversy”, p. 142.
263. Dogar, *150 su’âl*, pp. 16–17.
264. Muhammad Husain Dhakko, “Islâh al-majâlis wa’l-mahâfil”, parts I–X, *al-Muballigh* 9/8–9–10/8; also published as a book, (Sargodha: Maktabat al-Muballigh, 1967).
265. I.e. heavenly reward for pious deeds.
266. Translated from *al-Muballigh* 9/10:5–6 (November 1965).
267. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–8.
268. Dogar, *150 su’âl*, p. 40.
269. *al-Muballigh* 10/3–4:4–5 (April–May 1966).
270. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.
271. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 8.
272. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
273. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
274. Translated from *al-Muballigh* 10/2:4 (March 1966).
275. *Ibid.*; in that and the remaining five parts of his series Dhakko was mainly elaborating on “the conditions of true *zâkirs*” as he wanted them to perform.
276. Dogar, *150 su’âl*, p. 41.
277. *Ibid.*, p. 39; Muhammad Husain Dhakko, *Usûl al-shari’a*, 2nd ed., p. 58.
278. In 1965, Muhammad Isma’il had founded the *Dars-i Âl-i Muhammad* (see above, Fn 216) and Zamir ul-Hasan had become chief instructor of the *Jâmi’at Husainiyya* in Jhang; Mirza Yusuf Husain in 1974 became principal of a newly-founded *Madrasat ul-Wâ’izîn* in Lahore, which was also supported by Ansari (see Fn 143 to chapter 5, p. 410).
279. See Naqvi, “Controversy”, p. 144; Muhammad Bashir Ansari, *Haqâ’iq ul-wasâ’it*, Vol. I, pp. 19–23, 46–48.
280. See Muhammad Husain Dhakko, *Usûl al-shari’a fi ‘aqâ’id al-shi’a*, (Sargodha: Maktabat al-Muballigh, 1967), *passim*. According to the 2nd edition (Sargodha 1972), p. 71, the preface to the first edition was written in September 1966.
281. *Ibid.*, pp. 150–226.
282. *Ibid.*, pp. 414–423.
283. Literally: “investigators”; *Muhaqqiq* is also an honourable title of some leading Shia authorities of former centuries; see Momen, *Introduction*, p. 317.
284. I.e. the school of thought which believes in *tafwiz*.
285. See D. MacEoin, “Shaykhiyya”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. IX, pp. 403–5.
286. The founder of the Shaikhiya school of thought in Shi’ism (1753–1826); see *ibid.* and A. Bausani “al-Ahsâ’i”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. I, p. 304; Momen, *Introduction*, pp. 225–30.
287. On some early preachers of Shaikhiya doctrines in British India see Naqvi, “Controversy”, pp. 137–9.
288. He is probably referring to Abd ul-’Ali al-Haravi (1861–1922) and his disciple S. Muhammad Sibtain Sirsavi; see Naqvi, “Controversy”, p. 139; on these two ‘*ulamâ*’ see also Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 179–81.
289. Translated from Dhakko, *Usûl al-shari’a*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 424–5.
290. *Ibid.*, pp. 426–32.
291. Dhakko referred to his conflict with the preachers as one between “truth” (*haqq*) and “falsehood” (*bâtîl*) in his preface to *Usûl al-shari’a* (2nd. ed., pp. 3–9). In his 1986 interview with Dogar, he was still defending that position vigorously (Dogar, *150 su’âl*, p. 50).
292. Muhammad Hasnain Sâbiqî, *Jawâhir ul-asrâr fi manâqib an-nabî wa’l-a’imma al-athâr*, (Talagang: Maktabat Hamadâni, n.d.).
293. Muhammad Bashir Ansari, *Haqâ’iq ul-wasâ’it*, (Rawalpindi, n.d.).



294. Mirza Yusuf Husain, *Haqâ'iq ul- 'aqâ'id*, (Mianwali, n.d.).
295. S. Muhammad 'Arif Naqvi, *Asrâr ul-sharî'a fî 'aqâ'id-i ithnâ- 'ashariya*, (Jhang, n.d.).
296. See references in Naqvi, *Bibliography*, Vol. I, p. 127.
297. *Nawâsib* (sg. *nâsibî*) is a derogatory term used by Shias for those who are blamed for "hating" the Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the *ahl al-bait*, i.e. generally Sunni extremists.
298. Muhammad Bashir Ansari, *Haqâ'iq ul-wasâ'it*, Vol. I, p. 410; quoted in Naqvi, "Controversy", p. 144.
299. Naqvi, "Controversy", p. 143–4.
300. See section 5.6, pp. 175–80.
301. Naqvi, "Controversy", p. 149.
302. See section 4.5, *passim*.
303. See sections 4.3., p. 117; 4.5., pp. 144–45.
304. *al-Muballigh* 8/8:33–34 (September 1964) mentioned Dhakko's "excellent speech" at the August 1964 Rawalpindi Convention, and the journal regularly published articles in support of the Shia *Mutâlâbât* Movement during the following years. However, *Razâkâr*, the mouth-piece of the movement in these years, hardly ever mentioned Dhakko in its reports on SMC activities and deliberately kept silent on the controversy provoked by him.
305. See section 5.6, p. 173.
306. See section 4.5, pp. 142–43. For example, in November 1967 the APSC chose Sargodha to hold its first countrywide convention since seven years (*Razâkâr* 30/43:3). An article in the July 1968 issue of *al-Muballigh* praised Qizilbash and the APSC Vice-Chairman S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari for their role in foiling attempts to nationalise the *Dâr ul- 'Ulûm* (*al-Muballigh* 12/6:2–3).
307. Zaidi, "Mutâlâbât aur Khatib-i A'zam", p. 87. The term was first used for five Shia representatives named by Dihlavi for negotiations with the government; see section 4.3, p. 123.
308. Supportive of Dihlavi were the weeklies *Razâkâr* and *Shi'a* (both Lahore), *Durr-i Najaf* (Sialkot) and *Shihâb-i Thâqib* (Peshawar), the fortnightly *al-Muntazar* (Lahore), and the monthlies *Payâm-i 'Amal*, *Ma'ârif al-Islâm* (both Lahore), *al-Hujjat* (Peshawar), *al-Ma'rifat* (Hyderabad) and *al-Muballigh* (Sargodha). The APSC organ *Asad* (Lahore) and the fortnightly *al-Irshâd* (Karachi) kept their distance from Dihlavi's movement, while Muzaffar Ali Shamsi's weekly *Shahid* (Lahore) became outright opposed in 1966.
309. A quarter in Baghdad were frequent altercations between local Shias and Sunnis have taken place since the tenth century; see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. IV, pp. 652–3.
310. Translated from *Razâkâr* 29/4:3 (24 January 1966).
311. See section 3.1, pp. 59–62.
312. *Razâkâr* 29/11:3 (16 March 1966). His statement came in reply to a suggestion from Zakir Husain Mashhadi to merge the APSC with the ITHS into a *Tahaffuz-i Huquq-i Shi'a Conference* while alternating its leading positions between the Chairmen and Secretary-Generals of both organisations.
313. S. Muhammad Riza Rizvi, "Muzaffar 'Ali Shamsi âpnê alfâz kê â'ina mên", *Razâkâr* 29/28:5 (16 July 1966).
314. See Fn 39 to chapter 3 (p. 365). Mutual polemics between Sha'iq Ambalvi and Muhammad Siddiq, the editor of *Razâkâr*, were frequent in their respective editorials throughout the following decade.
315. *al-Muballigh* 10/3–4:76. Ja'fari was one of the five representatives appointed by Dihlavi in January 1965, see section 4.3, p. 123.
316. The names of those '*ulamâ*', which are prohibited from entering certain districts for periods from 30 to 90 days on orders of the respective D.C.s, are regularly being published in the Pakistani press shortly before Muharram.
317. Muhammad Siddiq, "Ulamâ'-i kirâm par pâbandiyân", *Razâkâr* 29/21:3 (24 May 1966).

318. S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi and Muhammad Siddiq gave details of such problems in Multan and Lahore in *Razākār* 29/22:1, 3 (1 June 1966); see also *Razākār* 29/40:3 (16 October 1966); 30/3:3 (16 January 1967).
319. Protocols in *Razākār* 29/34–35:1–12 (1–8 September 1966); *al-Muballigh* 10/8:27–30 (September 1966); *al-Muntazar* 8/14–15:14–22 (5–20 September 1966); *Payam-i ‘Amal* 10/8:25–30 (October 1966).
320. *Razākār* 29/34–35:1, 12 (1–8 September 1966).
321. *Razākār* 29/28:3 (16 July 1966).
322. Translated from *Razākār* 29/34–35:2 (1–8 September 1966).
323. *Razākār* 29/34–35:11.
324. Translated from *Razākār* 29/34–35:6; on S. Ibn Hasan Jarchavi see section 3.2, p. 71.
325. *Razākār* 29/34–35:6; list of members *ibid*.
326. See a complete list of members in *Razākār* 29/38:6 (1 October 1966).
327. *Ibid*; its members included Prince ‘Abbas Mirza and S. Ibn Hasan Jarchavi (Karachi); S. Abd ul-Jalil Gardezi, S. Ali Husain Shah Gardezi and Pir S. Naubahar Shah (Multan); S. Mubarak Ali Shah and S. Ghulam ‘Abbas (Jhang).
328. *Ibid*; its members were S. Muhammad Dihlavi, Prince ‘Abbas Mirza, S. Hatim ‘Alavi, S. Zafar Hasan Amrohavi and S. Israr Husain.
329. The reference is to the last three journals mentioned in Fn 308 (see above).
330. Translated from *Razākār* 29/34–35:7.
331. *Ibid* (translation).
332. Among them the demands to lift bans against ‘*ulamā*’ and *zākirs* during Muharram (No. 5), to issue pilgrims’ passports without demanding financial security (No. 10) and to stop the seizure of Shia “objectionable literature” (No. 11); see *Razākār* 29/34–35:7+10 (1–8 September 1966).
333. On the CII see section 4.1, p. 107.
334. Muhammad Nāsir Qasimi, “Islāmī Mushāwaratī Kaunsil kā hāliya faisla”, *Razākār* 29/45:1 (24 November 1966); the CII recommendations of 1966 are reproduced in Mirza Yusuf Husain, “Ēk shubha kā izāla”, *Razākār* 36/47:1 (16 December 1972).
335. *Razākār* 29/43–44:1 (8–16 November 1966).
336. *Razākār* 31/42–43:7 (16–24 November 1968). Mufti Ja‘far Husain had been appointed to replace Hafiz Kifayat Husain in November 1965.
337. Muhammad Siddiq, “Kānfarans ki pālisi wāzih hō gā’ē”, *Razākār* 30/11:3 (16 March 1967). The same argument had been fielded by Mirza Yusuf Husain at the SMC Council meeting in Jhang (*Razākār* 29/43–44:1).
338. *Razākār* 30/15:3 (16 April 1967).
339. See section 4.1, p. 104.
340. Resolution No. 2 of the Multan Convention explicitly denounced Shamsi for a press statement appearing on 28 August (*Razākār* 29/34–35:7). In *Shahid* of 5 September he had claimed that no members of the Gardezi family had participated, drawing angry rejoinders (*Razākār* 29/37:1); see also *Razākār* 29/39:1 (8 October 1966).
341. S. Muhammad Baqir, “Markazi Idārat-i Tahaffuz-i Huqūq-i Shi’a ki aghrāz-o-maqāsīd aur kār kardagi”, *Razākār* 29/39:6+8 (8 October 1966); “Idāra ki kaunsil kē ijlās kā bāykat” (“Call for boycott of the ITHS Council meeting”), signed by S. Israr Husain, S. ‘Inayat Husain Jalalvi, S. Zafar ‘Abbas Zaidi and S. Ali Husain ‘Āmir Ja‘fari, *Razākār* 29/40:7 (16 October 1966).
342. Muhammad Siddiq, “Idāra ki kaunsil kā ijlās”, *Razākār* 29/39:3. His argument was that all office holders had been elected for only one year seven years ago and none of them had since paid his annual membership fee of Rs. 2. (The last “annual session” of the ITHS had taken place in April 1961, however; see section 4.1, p. 108).

343. Yet he continued to play some role until his death in 1976; see sections 5.4, pp. 157–58, 164; 5.8, p. 191.
344. Protocol in *Razākār* 30/7–8:1+8 (16–24 February 1967).
345. Lists of newly founded SMCs were regularly published in *Razākār* since early 1966; the series continued until November 1967. In July that year, S. Mushtaq Husain claimed that there were 250 SMCs with 10,000 *razākars* “ready for marching” (Supplement to *Razākār* 30/28).
346. On S. Mushtaq Husain see section 4.3, p. 123. He remained in that function until 1975.
347. Translated from *Razākār* 30/7–8:8 (Resolution No. 3).
348. Ibid. (Resolution No. 4).
349. *Razākār* 30/11:3 (16 March 1967). Khaqan Babar was a son of the Shia *Ahrār* leader Mazhar Ali Azhar (see section 2.1, p. 41).
350. *Razākār* 30/11:3 (16 March 1967); see also section 4.3, pp. 123–24.
351. S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, Supplement to *Razākār* 30/28:a (24 July 1967).
352. General Musa mentioned the meeting (without giving the exact date) in his autobiography *Jawan to General*, p. 206. It was also attended by Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad, ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi and the ministers Muhammad Ali Hoti and S. Ahmad Sa’id Kermani.
353. Ibid. and *Razākār* 30/22:3 (8 June 1967); editorial “Shi’a mutālabāt—ākhirī manzil mên”, *Payām-i ‘Amal* 11/5:4–6 (July 1967).
354. *Razākār* 30/23:3 (16 June 1967).
355. An advocate and MNA from Sialkot close to the APSC, who had already in 1949 mediated between the APSC and its Shia rivals; see section 3.1, p. 63.
356. On the Raja of Mahmudabad see section 2.1, pp. 38–40.
357. Mufti Muhammad Shafi’ (1897–1976) was born in Deoband and graduated from the *Dār ul-‘Ulūm* of that town in 1916. He became a leading member of its teaching staff rising to the position of Grand Mufti in the 1930s. In 1945 he was among those founding members of the JUI who supported the Muslim League. In 1947 he moved to Karachi where he founded a *Dār ul-‘Ulūm* and became known as the “Grand Mufti of Pakistan”; see Bukhārī, *Ākābir ‘ulamā’-i Deoband*, pp. 189–95; Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, p. 9.
358. ‘Ala ud-Din Siddiqi (1907–77) was born in Lahore and had graduated from both *dīni madāris* and secular colleges in his hometown. He was an activist of the Muslim League in the 1940s and made an academic career, becoming Head of the Department of Islamic Studies and later Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University. From 1964 to 1970 he was Chairman of the CII; see Rāhī, *Tazkira-yi ‘ulamā’-i Panjāb*, Vol. I, pp. 385–7; Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 432–3.
359. Maulana Abd ul-Hamid Badayuni (1898–1970) had been a long-term activist of the Muslim League, who played a prominent role during the Pakistan Movement in the 1940s. He became President of the JUP in January 1969.
360. Maulana Kausar Niyazi (1934–94) was the pen-name of Hayat Khan, a long-time member of the JI and editor of the weeklies *Kausar* and later *Shihāb* (Lahore). After 1967 he became a supporter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who made him Minister of Religious Affairs in 1972. In 1994, shortly before his death, he was appointed Chairman of the CII by Benazir Bhutto; see Muhammad Ishāq Bhattī, *Nuqūsh-i ‘azmat-i rafta*, (Lāhaur: Maktabat-i Quddūsiya, 1999), pp. 495–521; Chaman, *Mēri yādgar mulāqātēn*, pp. 215–34; also his obituary in *Herald* 4/94, pp. 96a-b.
361. Dr Fazl ur-Rahman (1919–88) was director of the Islamic Research Institute from 1961 to 1968, when he had to resign under the pressure of the orthodox Sunni ‘ulamā’ and even leave the country; see Ahmad, “Activism of Ulama in Pakistan”, p. 267.
362. *Razākār* 30/26:3 (8 July 1967). The Raja of Mahmudabad could not attend and was replaced

- by S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari (ibid. and *Razākār* 31/44:3; 1 December 1968). This meant that four of the five Shia participants were affiliated to the APSC or close to it.
363. Account of the recommendations from S. Muhammad Dihlavi, 19 November 1968 (*Razākār* 31/44:3); see also below, p. 166 (wording of the official statement of 1 November 1968).
364. *Razākār* 30/32:1 (24 August 1967).
365. Supplements to *Razākār* 30/28 and 30/29 (24 July and 8 August 1967); see also Mushtaq Husain's commentary in *Razākār* 30/43:3 (16 November 1967). Sha'iq Ambalvi, for his part, had written in a derogatory way about Dihlavi's movement in *Asad* in early June; see *Razākār* 30/23:3 (16 June 1967).
366. *Razākār* 30/24:3 (24 June 1967).
367. See quotations from the report about a meeting of Sunni parties in Multan, 24 July 1967, in *Razākār* 30/32:1 (24 August 1967).
368. Report in *al-Muntazar* 9/13 (2 August 1967), pp. 13–29. It was organised by leaders of the TAS and the *Majlis-i Ahrār* like Abu Zarr Bukhari, son of Ata'ullah Shah Bukhari. Speakers included Abd ul-Sattar Taunsavi, Muhammad Ali Jullundhri, Ghulamullah, Chaudhry Ghulam Rasul and Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari (ibid.).
369. The "Sunni Conference" was denounced as a "fraud" in the Bareilvi journal *Sawād-i A'zam* (Lahore), 1 September 1967, for "usurping the name of a holy organisation" of the Bareilvis in pre-partition India; quoted in *Razākār* 30/36:3. On the "All-India Sunni Conference" founded in 1925 see Mujib Ahmad, *Jam'iyyat 'Ulama-i-Pakistan*, pp. XIX–XXVIII.
370. Mufti Mahmud (1909–80) was born in a village near Dera Ismail Khan (NWFP) and graduated from different Deobandi *dīnī madāris* in Northern India until 1941. Since 1951 he taught at the *Madrasat Qāsim ul-'Ulūm* in Multan where he became head instructor and *Shaiikh ul-Hadīth*. A leading member of the JUI since 1948, he was elected to the National Assembly for the first time in 1962 as an independent candidate (Bukhārī, *Akābir 'ulamā'-i Deoband*, pp. 374–5). For his further political career see Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, passim, and (especially concerning his attitude towards Shias) below, pp. 155, 182–83, 186–87, 190, 194, 199, 208–09.
371. Kausar Niyazi's participation was most surprising, since he had been a member of the board which approved the Shia demands (see above). His speech at the "Sunni Conference" was also in contradiction to positions taken by him in later years; see excerpts in *al-Muntazar* 9/13:25.
372. Ibid., p. 27–8; see also sections 3.5 and 4.2, passim.
373. *al-Muntazar* 9/13:28–29 (2 August 1967).
374. Translation from *Razākār* 30/33:3 (1 September 1967).
375. Musa, *Jawan to General*, p. 206.
376. Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era*, pp. 94–6; Tariq Ali, *Pakistan. Military Rule or People's Power?* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), pp. 145–53.
377. *Razākār* 30/42:3 (8 November 1967).
378. *Razākār* 31/2:1 (8 January 1968).
379. Detailed reports on the events in Hyderabad are given in *Razākār* 31/7–8:1–3 (16–24 February 1968).
380. *Razākār* 31/10:1 (8 March 1968).
381. *Asad*, 18 February 1968, quoted in *Razākār* 31/10:3.
382. Namely with his press statement of 24 October 1964 (see section 4.3, p. 121), when sending an APSC representative to the Joint Waqf Administration Board on 24 August 1965 (ibid., p. 124), and when pre-empting the SMC Convention in Lahore in June 1967 (see above) with false promises; see *Razākār* 30/43:3 (16 November 1967).
383. *Razākār* 31/23:1 (24 June 1968).
384. *Razākār* 31/25:3 (8 July 1968).

385. *Razākār* 31/26:4+5 (16 July 1968). He had fallen ill there and stayed only in Dhaka. It was his first and only trip to East Pakistan since starting his campaign in 1964.
386. Report on the session in *Razākār* 31/26:4–5 (16 July 1968).
387. *Razākār* 31/36:1–2 (1 October 1968); 31/38–39:5–6 (16–24 October 1968).
388. *Razākār* 30/43:3 (16 November 1967) made allusions about “a political Mullah” in the service of Qizilbash, and *Razākār* 31/42–43:1 (16–24 November 1968) wrote of “a *malang*” who had been fielded as a counterweight to Dihlavi by his opponents. I was not able to find hints about the identity of these persons.
389. These included some who had been former protégés of Qizilbash and would become so again some years later, like Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi and Muhammad Bashir Ansari. Ansari is even reported to have incited Mushtaq Husain Naqvi “to give a good trashing to the traitors” during the latter’s speech at Mochi Gate on 25 October (*Razākār* 31/40:1). He also spoke out against Qizilbash at the Rawalpindi Convention on 3 November (*Razākār* 31/42–43:6).
390. Report in *Razākār* 31/38–39:5–6 (16–24 October 1968); 31/40:2+8 (1 November 1968). Bangash has pointed to the fact that the Shias of the Kurram Agency enthusiastically supported the SMC although its three central demands were already fulfilled in their home area (*Political and Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, pp. 176–77.).
391. *Razākār* 31/42–43:1+2 (16–24 November 1958).
392. Report in *Razākār* 31/40:1+8 (1 November 1968). It claims that 15–20,000 people attended the meeting.
393. Such accusations had been made since the time of the stalled Hyderabad Convention of February 1968; see *Razākār* 31/7–8:3 (16–24 February 1968).
394. *Razākār* 31/42–43:3 (16–24 November 1968).
395. *Ibid.*
396. Quoted from *Pakistan Times*, 2 November 1968.
397. See reports in *Razākār* 31/42–43:3–8; *Payām-i ‘Amal* 12/10:24–9 (December 1968); *al-Muntazar* 10/19:6–9 (20 November 1968).
398. *Razākār* 31/42–43:5. The meeting of a five-member delegation with the Governor took place as scheduled and was satisfactory; see also Musa, *Jawan to General*, p. 207.
399. See section 3.1, pp. 64–65.
400. *Razākār* 31/42–43:7. He was dubbed “*Khatib-i Āl-i Yazid*” or something like that instead of “*Khatib-i Āl-i Muhammad*”.
401. *Ibid.*
402. *Ibid.*
403. *Razākār* 31/44:1–2, 4–6 (1 December 1968).
404. *Razākār* 31/42–43:8; he was accused under Section 13 of the Public Order Ordinance of 1960 but released on bail shortly after. The process against him on different sedition cases would continue for years, however.
405. S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, “*Mudir-i Asad ki zûd-pêshmânî*”, *Razākār* 31/46:2 (16 December 1968).
406. *Ibid.*
407. *Razākār* 31/45:1 (8 December 1968).
408. Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era*, pp. 99–106. A detailed account is given by Tariq Ali, *op. cit.* (Fn 376), pp. 156–216.

## 5. THE YAHYA KHAN AND BHUTTO ERA, 1969–1977

1. *Razākār* 33/21:3 (8 June 1969).
2. Burki, *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan*, pp. 219–21; Lawrence Ziring, “Militarism in Pakistan:

- The Yahya Khan interregnum”, in: W. H. Wiggins (ed.), *Pakistan in Transition* (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975), pp. 198–232, here p. 200.
3. *Razākār* 33/12–13:3 (1–8 April 1969). The largest number of new licences for processions was issued in the Multan District (ibid.).
  4. See section 5.7, p. 181.
  5. Ibid., pp. 181–82.
  6. *Razākār* 33/27:1 (24 July 1969); 33/33:3 (8 September 1969). The delegation was scheduled to speak to the Governor of West Pakistan who had excused himself on short notice.
  7. The latter meeting took place on the sidelines of the third annual session of the SMC Council in Rawalpindi (13–14 September 1969).
  8. *Ma’rifat* (Hyderabad) 1/1970, quoted in *Razākār* 34/2:3 (author’s translation).
  9. *Razākār* 34/6:1–2, 4 (8 February 1970). A first session of the board was originally scheduled for 16 March 1970, but later postponed because that date corresponded to 7 Muharram that year (*Razākār* 34/11–12:3; 16–24 March 1970).
  10. Then Vice-Principal of the *Dār ul-‘Ulūm Muhammadiya* Sargodha (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 361–2).
  11. A professor at the Islamia College Lahore hailing from Batala (East Punjab).
  12. A migrant from Dhaka to Karachi.
  13. Then General Editor of the District Gazetteers Service East Pakistan (*al-Muballigh* 14/2–3:64; March–April 1970).
  14. Ibid.; its Sunni members were Dr Ishtiaq Husain Quraishi (Vice-Chancellor, Karachi University), Dr Siraj ul-Haqq (Head of Islamic Studies, Dhaka University), Mr. Abd ul-Bâri (Head of Islamic Studies, Rajshahi University), Mr. A.F.M. (retd. Director of Public Instruction, Dhaka), Mr. Ahmad Husain (Officer on Special Duty, Education Department of East Pakistan), and Maulana Abd ul-Quddus (Head of *Dīniyât* Department, Peshawar University).
  15. *Razākār* 34/14:3 (8 April 1970). The members of the 1967 board, whose recommendations had been accepted by the government in November 1968, had approved only separate chapters on Shia *dīniyât* in a common textbook; see section 4.5, p. 140.
  16. *Razākār* 34/20:2 (24 May 1970).
  17. Ibid.; on the 1966 CII recommendations see section 4.5, p. 138.
  18. *Razākār* 34/17:1–2 (1 May 1970).
  19. *Razākār* 34/20:3 (24 May 1970).
  20. *Razākār* 37/16:3 (24 April 1973).
  21. He was at that time preparing to contest the December 1970 National Assembly elections on a ticket of the Muslim League (Qayyum group), but later withdrew his candidature due to poor chances; s. *Razākār* 35/5–6:2 (1–8 February 1971).
  22. *Razākār* 34/25:7 (1 July 1970); 34/27:8 (16 July 1970).
  23. Muhammad Siddiq, “Hamārê mutālabât aur Shī’a auqâf”, *Razākār* 36/22:3 (8 June 1972).
  24. Only the shrines of Shah Yusuf Gardezi (Multan) and Sakhi Sarwar (Dera Ghazi Khan Dist.) in Punjab and some smaller shrines in Sindh were declared Shia shrines, and Sunnis stopped to visit them (S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi, personal communication). For a report on the Sakhi Sarwar shrine see *Herald* 6/1993, pp. 101–6.
  25. Farzand Raza, *Dīni batên*, Vols. I–VI, (Karachi: Hasan Ali B. Ibrahim Trust, n.d.).
  26. Zakir Husain Faruqi, *Dīniyât*, (Lahore: Imamia Mission Pakistan, n.d.).
  27. *Razākār* 34/27:8 (16 July 1970); 34/29:5 (1 August 1970).
  28. Muhammad Siddiq, “Shī’a dīniyât kô sarkârî madâris mên bi-lâ ta’khîr râ’ij kiyâ jâ’ê”, *Razākār* 35/21–22:3 (1–8 June 1971).
  29. See reports in *Razākār* 33/25 (8 July 1969) and most subsequent issues of that year. On the

- events in Iraq during that time see Majid Khadduri, *Socialist Iraq. A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968* (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1978), p. 68.
30. In August 1969 the attempt of a Jewish extremist to burn down the *Masjid al-Aqsâ* in Jerusalem had shaken the entire Muslim world. It had been the catalyst for the convening of a conference of heads of states from 25 Islamic countries in Rabat where the “Organisation of Islamic Conference” (OIC) was founded. The second OIC summit was held in March 1974 in Lahore.
  31. *Razâkâr* 33/36:1–2, 6 (1 October 1969). The convention was followed by the 3<sup>rd</sup> annual session of the SMC Council on September 13–14; see *Razâkâr* 33/33:1+3 (8 September 1969); *al-Muntazar* 11/15–16:37–40 (20 September–5 October 1969).
  32. Translation from S. Shâhid Ali Naqvi, “Shi’a siyâsi jamâ’at kî tashkil, hâlât kâ ahammtarîn taqâzâ”, *Razâkâr* 33/28:1.
  33. Translation from *al-Muntazar* 11/14 (5 September 1969), pp. 21–23. The other signatories were S. Afzal Haidar, S. Muhammad Taqi Shah, S. Muhammad Zamir Zaidi and Ghulam Rabbani Mirza.
  34. *Razâkâr* 33/37:3 (8 October 1969).
  35. Among them were the editors of *Razâkâr* (Muhammad Siddiq), *Shi’a* (Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani) and *Durr-i Najaf* (Bashir Husain Bukhari). The journal *al-Muntazar* (Lahore), founded already in 1959, became a mouth-piece of the SPP in late 1969 and remained so for some years.
  36. In a statement printed in *al-Muntazar* 11/15–16:41 (20 September–5 October 1969) Dihlavi termed the formation of a political party of the Shias “the greatest necessity of the time”.
  37. *Razâkâr* 33/43:7 (24 November 1969); Muhammad Siddiq later claimed that he had been aware of the “socialist” aims of the SPP founders from the outset, but had kept silent because they were part of the *Mutâlâbât* Movement which was then passing through a difficult stage. He had only warned the SMC leaders about their intentions, but Dihlavi, who “often failed in his knowledge of human nature”, had not listened to his advice (*Razâkâr* 34/25:3; 1 July 1970).
  38. Report in *al-Muntazar* 11/17:18–21 (20 October 1969).
  39. Among them only S. Afzal Haidar made a distinguished career later. He became senior advocate at the Supreme Court of Pakistan, member of the CII, and for a short time Minister of Justice in the Punjab Government. See also his publications, Syed Afzal Haidar, *The Bhutto Trial*, Vols. I+II, (Lahore: National Commission on History and Culture, 1996), and idem., *Velayat-e-Faqih*.
  40. See sections 2.2, pp. 51–52; 3.6, p. 100.
  41. *Nidâ-i Qaum* (Lahore), 5 June 1970, quoted in *Razâkâr* 34/26:3; 34/30:1. On the *fatwâ* of Muhsin al-Hakim, in which he had denounced “any connection with the Communist Party” as *harâm* and “support for *kufr*”, see Joyce N. Wiley, *The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi’as* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 36.
  42. Muhammad Siddiq, “Guzârish-i ahwâl-i wâqi’i”, I–III, *Razâkâr* 34/25:3, 34/26:3, 34/27:3 (1–16 July 1970).
  43. *Razâkâr* 34/32:8 (24 August 1970). Already on 24 February 1970, Dihlavi had been one of 113 (mostly Sunni) ‘*ulamâ*’ who had signed a *fatwâ* declaring socialism as *kufr* and cooperation with socialists as *harâm*. Other Shia signatories of that *fatwâ* were Mufti Ja’far Husain and S. Ibn Hasan Jarhavi (Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, p. 32; Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 101).
  44. Report on the meeting in Hyderabad on 19 June in *Razâkâr* 34/25:5 (1 July 1970).
  45. He had been one of the driving forces behind the SPP’s foundation in 1969 and was sometimes referred to as its “patron”. See his article “Pâkistân mên shi ‘ôn kâ mustaqbal”, *al-Muntazar* 11/15–16:32–3 (20 September–5 October 1969).



46. *Razākār* 34/26:3 (8 July 1970), quoting from *Asad*, 18 October 1969.
47. *Razākār* 34/30:1 (8 August 1970).
48. Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi moved closer to the PPP in the following years and was rewarded with membership in the CII in 1974; see Malik, *Islamisierung in Pakistan*, p. 433.
49. *Razākār* 34/6:3 (8 February 1970), quoting from article 7 of the JUI manifesto.
50. *Razākār* 34/43:1 (16 November 1970).
51. See section 3.2, p. 69.
52. *Razākār* 34/6:3. His denial came in August 1970 in reply to a questionnaire which Muzaffar Ali Shamsi had sent to different party leaders (*Razākār* 34/32:3).
53. *Mashriq* (Lahore), 16 June 1970, quoted in *Razākār* 34/24:3.
54. Muhammad Siddiq, “Kô’i shî’a jamâ’at-i islâmi kârkun nahin ban saktâ”, *Razākār* 34/24:3. On the different grades of membership of the JI see Nasr, *Vanguard*, p. 70.
55. *Razākār* 34/32:3 (24 August 1970); 34/33:4 (1 September 1970). At that time even Bhutto had started to talk of “the socialism of the *khulafâ’-i râshidûn*” (*Razākār* 34/32:1).
56. *Mashriq*, 16 August 1970, quoted in *Razākār* 34/32:3 (24 August 1970).
57. See section 3.2, p. 69.
58. See Muhammad Siddiq, “Maulâna Maudûdî sâhib kâ bâyan”, *Razākār* 34/32:3; Raja Lehrasb Ali Khan, “Hoshyâr! Ey mard-i ‘âqil, hoshyâr!”, *Razākār* 34/33:1–2, 4; Abd ul-‘Aziz Akhtar, “Qur’ân-o-sunnat ki kô’i ta’bîr kisi musallama islâmi firqa par us ki marzi ki khilâf musallat nahin ki jâ sakti”, *Razākār* 34/34–35:6; Kazim Ali Rasâ, “Maudûdî sâhib kê nâm”, (ibid.:6); Muhammad Bashir Ansari, “Shî’iyân-i Pâkistân kê liyê khatra ki ghanti”, *Razākār* 34/42:1.
59. Mirza Yusuf Husain, “Maulânâ Maudûdî sâhib jawâb dên”, *Razākār* 34/45–46:4 (1–8 December 1970). Maududi’s book *Khilâfat sê mulûkiyat tak* (“From caliphate to monarchy”), published first in the JI organ *Tarjuman ul-Qur’ân* in 1966, had drawn numerous rejoinders by Sunni authors who attributed some of its contents to Shia influences; see *Razākār* 31/25:3 (8 July 1968); *Razākār* 33/2:3 (8 January 1969); see also Nasr, *Maududi an the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, p. 119.
60. On 2 August, 1970, the JI organ *Jasârat* (Lahore) had published positive comments of Shamsi about Maududi on its front page (*Razākār* 34/42:7; 8 January 1970).
61. Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 30–33; on Mufti Mahmud see Fn 370 to chapter 4 (p. 402).
62. Muhammad Siddiq, “Shî’a-sunni ittihâd ki zarûrat”, *Razākār* 34/40:3 (24 October 1970). According to that article, Sialvi had called on the Sunnis of the Jhang District not to vote for Shias, but at the same time allied himself with some Shia candidates in the Sargodha District. On his 1957 *fatwâ* against Shias see section 3.5, pp. 96–97.
63. He was a descendant of Wajid Ali Shah, the last King of Awadh (deposed 1856).
64. Protocol in *Razākār* 34/42:6–8 (8 November 1970). Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi was also present and successfully tabled a resolution demanding to have the Shia interpretation of Koran and Sunna included in a new constitution.
65. Ibid., p. 7. In 1957 he had opposed the idea; see section 3.6, p. 101.
66. S. Muhammad Dihlavi, “Shî’a kis kô wôt dên?”, *Razākār* 34/42:4 (8 November 1970).
67. The SPP is not mentioned in the list of contestants in Iftikhar Ahmad, *Pakistan General Elections* 1970 (Lahore: Punjab University, 1976), pp. 40–52. According to Sa’adat Ali Mirza, who had been convenor of the SPP in Lahore City but later disagreed with the “un-Islamic” theories of other SPP members, almost all branches of the SPP had been dissolved by October 1970; see his pamphlet *Izhâr-i haqîqat* quoted in *Razākār* 34/39:3 (16 October 1970).
68. *Razākār* 34/47:4–6 (16 December 1970).
69. Iftikhar Ahmad, *Elections* 1970, p. 79. The JUI (Hazarvi group) won six NA-seats from the



- NWFP and one from Balochistan; the JUP won four seats from Punjab and three from Sindh, while the JI won only one seat each from Punjab and the NWFP and two from Sindh (ibid.).
70. *Report on the General Elections in Pakistan 1970–71*, quoted in Nasr, *Vanguard*, p. 167. PA seats distribution among religious parties was as follows: Punjab: JI 1; JUI(H) 2; JUP 4; Sindh: JI 1; JUP 7; NWFP: JI 1; JUI(H) 4; Balochistan: JUI(H) 3.
  71. Bhutto himself had fuelled fears about the fanaticism of the religious parties among the Shias and other minorities; see Shah, *Religion and Politics*, p. 103; see also section 5.7, p. 187.
  72. *Chattân* (Lahore), 21 December 1970, quoted in *Razâkâr* 35/5–6:1 (1–8 February 1971).
  73. Quoted from Sha'iq Ambalvi, "Shi'a 'ulamâ'-i kirâm aur qaumi karkunôn kô dhâmkiyân", *Asad*, 24 January 1971 (reprinted in *Razâkâr* 35/7:3; 16 February 1971).
  74. See S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, "Hâliya ilekshan aur shi'a firqa", *Razâkâr* 35/5–6:1–2, 5, 7 (1–8 February 1971). Data in this paragraph are taken from that article which was written in reply to the editorial of *Chattân* referred to above (Fn 72).
  75. These were S. Nazim Husain, Ahmad Bakhsh Fahim and S. Mumammad Raziyy Shah Gardezi. Other Shias voted into the Punjab Assembly in 1970 were S. Irshad Husain Shah (Muzaffargarh Dist.; Pakistan Democratic Party); S. Muhammad Shah (do); Ghulam 'Abbas Quraishi (Muzaffargarh Dist.; Council Muslim League); Pir Nawazish Ali Shah (Sargodha Dist.; Council Muslim League); Capt. Ahmad Nawaz Shahbani (Mianwali Dist.; Convention Muslim League); S. Muhammad Taqi Shah (Jhang Dist.; Independent); S. Altaf Husain (do); Khan Nawazish Ali Khan (do); Chaudhry Muhammad Aslam (Rawalpindi Dist.; Independent); Ghulam 'Abbas Bukhari (Multan Dist.; Qayyum Muslim League).
  76. These were Dr Mubashir Hasan (Lahore), Dr Mahmud 'Abbas Bukhari (do), S. Nâsir Ali Rizvi (Multan Dist.) and S. 'Abbas Husain Gardezi (do); the fifth Shia MNA was Malik Sadiq (Jhelum Dist.; Independent).
  77. Namely Makhdum S. 'Ata ur-Rahman (Qayyum Muslim League), who was voted into the NWFP Provincial Assembly from Dera Ismail Khan.
  78. The first session of the (rump) National Assembly took place on 14 April 1972. The Provincial Assemblies of West Pakistan were convened for the first time on 23 March that year.
  79. See section 5.6, pp. 171–72.
  80. Muhammad Siddiq, "Qaumî ittihad kaisê hô?", *Razâkâr* 35/12:2 (24 March 1971); S. Jamil Husain Rizvi, "Mujawwaza ittihad-i qaumi ke muta'alliq wazâhatî bâyan", *Razâkâr* 35/19:1 (16 Mai 1971).
  81. Ibid.
  82. Report on the session in *Razâkâr* 35/37:1–4 (1 October 1971).
  83. He was born in Patiala State (East Punjab) where he had been a local leader of the Muslim League. In 1947 he narrowly escaped arrest and killing on the orders of the Maharaja of Patiala and moved to Lahore. In 1951 he was elected to the Punjab Assembly from Mandi Bahauddin (Gujrat Dist.) and in 1955 named to the West Pakistan Assembly. He held the portfolios of law and rehabilitation in the West Pakistan cabinet of Dr Khan Sahib (1956–7). After the imposition of martial law in 1958 he was appointed Advocate General of West Pakistan. From 1960 until his retirement in 1965 he was Judge at the High Court of West Pakistan. He was appointed to the CII from 1974 to 1977 and again in 1981. From 1950 until his death he was repeatedly elected President of the AWSM Pakistan; see obituaries in *Mâhnâmah-i Anjuman-i Wazifa* (Lahore), August 1997, pp. 11–14, and *Razâkâr* 45/33–34:3 (1–8 September 1981). See also his memoirs, *Pakistan Story*, (Lahore: Ziya Husain Rizvi, 1973), dealing mainly with events in Patiala State 1947.
  84. See section 5.8, pp. 188–95.
  85. See section 5.5, p. 170.

86. *Razākār* 35/37:3–4 (1 October 1971).
87. See sections 5.5, p. 162; 5.7, pp. 181, 183; 5.8., p. 191. Jamil Husain Rizvi once referred to Mushtaq Husain as “my *lāthī* (stick)”; see *Razākār* 36/19:5 (16 May 1972).
88. These were Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani (Punjab), Maulana Hashmat Ali (Sindh), Shaikh Jawad Husain (NWFP), S. Husain Naqvi (Balochistan) and S. Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abidi (East Pakistan); see *Razākār* 35/37:2–3; other SMC office-holders elected on that occasion *ibid*.
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 4. The initiative came from Gardezi himself, who pledged a donation of Rs. 10,000 immediately. A detailed list of donations can be found in *Razākār* 36/20:3 (24 May 1972).
91. *Razākār* 35/37:4 (1 October 1971).
92. *Razākār* 35/40:1–2 (24 October 1971); 35/42:1–2 (8 November 1971).
93. The text of the 1973 constitution is reproduced in Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 837–1030. An interim constitution had been enacted by the National Assembly during its first session in April 1972 (text *ibid.*, pp. 675–794).
94. Dr Mubashir Hasan, a Khwaja born in Panipat (East Punjab), was a close associate of Bhutto since 1967, when the PPP was founded at his Lahore residence. As Minister of Finance he became also head of the institution which supervised the nationalisation of industries. He resigned in October 1974 when Bhutto formed a new cabinet; see his book *The Mirage of Power. An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years 1971–1977* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), *passim*.
95. Part II (Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy), Articles 20–22, 33; see Mahmood (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 849, 853. On such safeguards in previous constitutions see sections 3.2, pp. 73–4; 4.1, p. 107 and Fn 47 to chapter 4 (p. 387). However, in Part IX (Islamic Provisions), Article 227 did not contain the explanation that Koran and Sunna would be applied on the personal law of each sect “as interpreted by that sect” (*ibid.*, p. 956). Such a clause was added only in 1980; see section 6.2, p. 214.
96. Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, p. 849.
97. This point has been stressed by Keddie, *The Shi’a of Pakistan*, pp. 8–9.
98. See section 5.7, pp. 180–88.
99. Rieck, “Sectarianism”, p. 440.
100. Keddie, *The Shi’a of Pakistan*, pp. 8–9. This has been confirmed by most Shias interviewed by the author.
101. See section 5.2, pp. 150–51.
102. See below, pp. 169–71. A resolution in this sense was first passed at a meeting of the District SMC Lahore on 18 July 1971 (*Razākār* 35/28:1). Later resolutions specified the *auqāf* of Alireza-Abad, Mominpura and *Karbalā-i Gāme Shāh* (all in Lahore and surroundings) as those “usurped” by Nawab Qizilbash; see *Razākār* 36/44:4 (24 November 1971); 36/45:8 (1 December 1972).
103. See his article “Hoshyār! Ey mard-i ‘āqil, hoshyār!”, *Razākār* 34/33:1–2 (1 September 1970).
104. Translation from his article “Sadr muhtaram ki khidmat mên,” *Razākār* 36/3:3 (16 January 1972), which also referred to Shia *auqāf* and ‘*azādāri*. (The term “sect” (*firqa*) is used in Urdu without any negative connotations).
105. *Razākār* 36/21:1 (1 June 1972).
106. Report on the convention in *Razākār* 36/30–31:1–5 (8–16 August 1972); see also *Razākār* 37/38:2 (quoting from a speech of Mirza Yusuf Husain in Lahore, 17 September 1973).
107. *al-Muballigh* 16/8:1 (August 1972); *Razākār* 36/30–31:1. Qizilbash’s version is given in a pamphlet of the APSC, *Mudīr-i muhtaram-i haftrōza Razākār kē nām khatib-i millat Maulānā Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi kâ khatt* (“A letter of ... Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi to the editor of *Razākār*”, 12 December 1972), pp. 5–6.

108. *Razākār* 36/30–31:1. Some boys distributing posters were caught and admitted that they had been sent by Sha'iq Ambalvi, the manager of the *Jāmi'at Imāmīya* Lahore (ibid., p. 5).
109. Ibid., pp. 2–3. The account also mentions the order of the procession: The Shias of the Kurram Agency and other Pashtun Tribal Areas marched on top, followed by those from the Campbellpore, Mianwali and Gujrat Districts in military formation and led by retired army officers. Then came the volunteers from other districts of the Punjab, and at the end those from Azad Kashmir, the Northern Areas and Sindh.
110. *Razākār* 36/30–31:4; According to Jamil Husain Rizvi, Bhutto expressed his surprise that the *diniyāt* matter had not been settled under a Shia president (Yahya Khan) and a Shia minister (Qizilbash) entrusted with its solution; see Zafar Hasan Amrohavi, “Shi'a nisāb-i diniyāt kē silsila mēn chand zarūri bātēn”, *Razākār* 37/6–7:2 (8–16 February 1973).
111. *Razākār* 36/30–31:4. The NWFP provincial government from May 1972 until February 1973 was headed by the JUI leader Mufti Mahmud. In Balochistan there was at that time a coalition government of the JUI with Baloch nationalists headed by Sardar 'Ata'ullah Mengal. When the latter was deposed by Bhutto in February 1973, Mufti Mahmud stepped down as Chief Minister of the NWFP in protest; see Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 66–73.
112. *Razākār* 36/30–31:4 and *Nawā-i Waqt*, 9 August 1972, quoted in *Razākār* 36/30–31:6+8.
113. Namely Jamil Husain Rizvi, Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, Mirza Yusuf Husain and Muhammad Bashir Ansari, the latter two representing the MAUSP.
114. *Razākār* 36/30–31:5–6.
115. *Razākār* 36/32:1 (24 August 1972); list of the actual participants ibid.
116. Ibid.; Pirzada had wanted to call it off and only gave in after strong protest by the SMC delegates.
117. Letter of Shabih ul-Hasnain (see Fn 107), pp. 5–6.
118. Speech of Mirza Yusuf Husain in Lahore, 17 September 1973, quoted in *Razākār* 37/38:2.
119. *Razākār* 36/36:3 (24 September 1972). On the June 1970 decision see section 5.2, p. 151.
120. *Razākār* 36/36:3.
121. After the August 16 conference had taken place despite the APSC boycott, Qizilbash had been worried to be “left out of the picture”. On his request Pirzada asked Jamil Husain Rizvi to withdraw two of the five SMC members of the commission, although their names had already been published in the press; Rizvi had refused; see Muhammad Siddiq, “Pānj kē bejā sāt kyūn?”, *Razākār* 36/36:3.
122. Ibid.
123. *Razākār* 36/37–38:1 (1–8 October 1972). The inclusion of the hard-line anti-Shia Maulana Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari in the commission was remarkable. He held provocative speeches on both first sessions and was intractable opposed to separate textbooks; see Safdar Husain Mashhadi, “Judāgāna shi'a nisāb-i diniyāt”, *al-Hujjat* 12/2–3:9–16 (November 1972), here p. 10.
124. Ibid., p. 11–12.
125. M. Siddiq, “Ghalat-fahmiyōn kē izāla kē liyē wazāhat”, *Razākār* 36/46:3 (8 December 1972).
126. See Mirza Yusuf Husain, “Ek shubah kā izāla”, *Razākār* 36/47:1+4 (16 December 1972); S. Murtaza Husain, “Nisāb-i diniyāt kē muta'alliq wāzih i'lān”, *Razākār* 36/48:1 (24 December 1972).
127. Safdar Husain Mashhadi, “Judāgāna shi'a nisāb-i diniyāt”, *al-Hujjat* 12/2–3:12. The Shia ‘*ulamā*’ named for this committee were Muhammad Bashir Ansari, Ibn Hasan Najafi, Mufti Ja'far Husain and S. Murtaza Husain.
128. *Razākār* 36/44:1; (24 November 1972; reprint of an editorial from *al-Irshād*, Karachi, n.d.).
129. *Razākār* 36/46:3 (8 December 1972).
130. Ibid. and *Razākār* 36/44:1. Jamil Husain Rizvi made it clear that the demand was not to

- employ Shia teachers (“Zarûrî wazâhat”, *Payâm-i ‘Amal* 16/8:35). At that time it was decided that the “oriental teachers”, whether Shia or Sunni, would teach both Sunni and Shia *dîniyât* (*Razâkâr* 36/44:1).
131. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi’s weekly *Shahîd* on 20 October 1972 listed the names of the seven “signatories of a joint *dîniyât* syllabus” followed by an appeal “to eliminate the rotten elements from the body of the *qaum*”; reproduced in *Razâkâr* 37/1:4 (1 January 1973).
  132. *Razâkâr* 36/44:2 (24 November 1972). On these recommendations see section 4.5, pp. 138, 140.
  133. See section 4.5, p. 138.
  134. See statements of Ghulam Rabbani Mirza against ‘Abbas Haidar ‘Abidi and Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi in *Musâwat*, 22 August 1972, quoted in *Razâkâr* 36/36:3. Two days later Shâhid Ali Naqvi, another founder of the SPP, resigned from his post as Secretary-General claiming that “in the present time, while the progressive forces are trying to create an egalitarian society, there is no need to adhere to a special Shia organisation” (*Pakistan Times*, 25 August 1970, quoted in *Razâkâr* 36/36:3).
  135. On ‘Abbas Haidar ‘Abidi (1932–94) see Chaman, *Mêri yâdgâr mulâqatên*, pp. 253–66; he was succeeded in 1975 by S. Sikandar Husain Shah (d. 1991) as Chairman of the SPP (*Razâkâr* 39/27:4).
  136. *Durr-i Najaf*, 1–8 January 1973, p. 8, quoted in *Razâkâr* 37/8:1 (24 February 1973). The statement was strongly resented because it implied an equal status of the *sahâba* and the Shia Imams.
  137. “Maujûda nisâb-i dîniyât kô pûrî shî‘a qaum mustaradd kar chukî hai”, *Mashriq*, 19 November 1972, quoted in a rejoinder of Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, *Razâkâr* 36/44:2–4, 8 (24 November 1972).
  138. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
  139. Translation from Safdar Husain Mashhadi, “Bigare dilôn kâ islâh” (“Reform of corrupted hearts”), *al-Hujjat*, n.d., reprinted in *Razâkâr* 37/13:2 (1 April 1973).
  140. *al-Irshâd*, n.d., quoted in *Razâkâr* 36/44:1 (24 November 1972).
  141. Namely during the session on 13 October 1974, in Lahore (see below and *Razâkâr* 38/40:1).
  142. Muhammad Siddiq, “Kuch shî‘a auqâf kê muta‘alliq”, *Razâkâr* 37/16:3 (24 April 1973).
  143. *Ibid.*; the *Jâmi‘at Imâmiya* Lahore was duly renamed *Madrasat ul-Wâ‘izin* in April 1974, with Mirza Yusuf Husain becoming its principal. See *Razâkâr* 38/22:1 (8 June 1974); 44/34–35:5 (8–16 September 1980); also Fn 255 to chapter 3 (p. 377). Shortly after he and Muhammad Bashir Ansari wrote to Zafar Hasan Amrohavi, the *muhtamim* of the *Jâmi‘at Imâmiya* Karachi, asking him to send back all books which the two had donated to his *madrassa* in the 1950s because they were needed in Lahore (*Razâkâr* 38/22:1).
  144. *Razâkâr* 37/13:2 (1 April 1973), quoting from *al-Muntazar*, 20 March 1973; Muhammad Siddiq, “Nawâb Qizilbâsh khamûsh kyûn hai?”, *Razâkâr* 37/17:3+8 (1 May 1973).
  145. Mirza Yusuf Husain, *Millat-i Ja‘fariya kê liyê bishârat-i ‘uzmâ*, (Lâhaur: Majlis-i ‘Amal ‘Ulamâ-i Shî‘a-i Pâkistân, 1973). The pamphlet referred to a meeting of the MAUSP on 10 April 1973 where a resolution in support of the September 1972 decision had been signed by leading representatives of the APSC and ITHS; see a list of 20 signatories *ibid.*, p. 4, and *Razâkâr* 37/19:1 (16 May 1973).
  146. “Bishârat-i ‘uzmâ”; *Razâkâr* 37/19:1. On later statements of the ITHS and the APSC organ *Asad* see Muhammad Siddiq, “Bishârat-i ‘uzmâ’ aur hâmiyân-i ittihâd,” *Razâkâr* 37/22:3 (8 June 1973).
  147. *Razâkâr* 37/27–28:3 (16–24 July 1973).
  148. See above, Fn 143. Already in September 1973, Mirza Yusuf Husain had joined those ‘ulamâ’ who gathered regularly in Qizilbash’s palace in Lahore (*Razâkâr* 37/35:2–3; 16 September 1973).

149. *Razākār* 37/27–28:4 (16–24 July 1973).
150. Ibid., p. 5. At that time, only Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi and the PPP-MNA S. ‘Abbas Husain Gardezi spoke in favour of patience with the government.
151. Ibid., p. 8; *Razākār* 38/21:1 (1 June 1974).
152. *Razākār* 37/27–28:8.
153. *Razākār* 37/32:3 (24 August 1973); 37/36:3 (24 September 1973).
154. Muhammad Siddiq, “Mas’ala-yi judāgāna shī’a nisāb-i dīniyāt”, *Razākār* 38/12:2 (24 March 1974); *Payām-i ‘Amal* 17/11–12:80–81 (January–February 1974).
155. Jamil Husain Rizvi, “Husainī mahāz kyūn?”, *Razākār* 38/37:2 (1 October 1974).
156. Ibid.
157. Munir D. Ahmed, “Ausschluß der Ahmadiyya aus dem Islam. Eine umstrittene Entscheidung des pakistanischen Parlaments”, in: *Orient* 16(1975)1, pp. 112–43, here pp. 126–8.
158. Ibid., p. 128; “Wazīr-i A’zam zindabād”, *al-Muntazar* 16/18:3–5 (20 September 1974); “Qādiyāni mas’ala hamēsha kē liyē hall kar diyā gayā hai”, ibid., pp. 10–13; “Shī’a mutālaba-i dīniyāt aur hukūmat”, *Payām-i ‘Amal* 18/8:3–5 (October 1974), here p. 4.
159. See sections 5.7, p. 186; 6.4, p. 233.
160. *Razākār* 38/33:1 (1 September 1974).
161. *Razākār* 38/38:2 (8 October 1974). A call for participation in the *Husainī mahāz* published ibid. (p. 1) used almost exactly the same wording as the call for the establishment of *Mutālābāt* Committees from January 1966 which is partially reproduced in section 4.5, p. 134.
162. The Shia participants were: Jamil Husain Rizvi, Murtaza Husain, ‘Abbas Husain Gardezi, Mushtaq Husain Naqvi and Khwaja Ali Muhammad from the SMC; Mirza Yusuf Husain, Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammad and Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi from the MAUSP; Nawab Qizilbash, S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, Agha Shah Zaman and Sha’iq Ambalvi from the APSC; Azhar Hasan Zaidi, Mahdi Hasan ‘Alavi, Muhammad Ali Zaidi and Muzaffar Ali Shamsi from the ITHS; Pirzada was assisted by the Federal Minister of Trade, the Punjab Minister of Education (Dr Abd ul-Khalīq) and some high-ranking officials of the Education Department (*Razākār* 38/40:1; 24 October 1974).
163. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
164. Ibid., p. 2; On demand of the APSC and ITHS delegates, Pirzada also distributed copies of that letter.
165. The latter provision was included after strong insistence of Mushtaq Husain Naqvi; see ibid.
166. See section 5.2, p. 151.
167. *Nawā-i Waqt*, 14 October 1974, quoted in *Razākār* 38/39:1–2 (translation).
168. Ibid.
169. *Razākār* 38/42:1–2, 8 (8 November 1974).
170. Muhammad Siddiq, “Qizilbāsh waqf”, *Razākār* 38/32:1. According to Riza Ali Khan Qizilbash, 900 of 1,020 acres were distributed, and the family henceforth had to supplement expenses for *majālis* and Muharram processions from their private property. They filed a legal case which was won in 1991, but the land was not returned to the *waqf* (Interview with the author, Lahore 6 February 2001).
171. *Razākār* 38/32:1 (24 August 1974). The article drew a rejoinder from Sha’iq Ambalvi in *Asad*, 2 September, replied by Muhammad Siddiq, “Mudīr-i Asad kī diyānat mulāhaza hō!”, *Razākār* 38/34:2.
172. Quoted in *Razākār* 38/37:2 (translation).
173. On the SMUP see section 3.1., p. 58; its leading office-holders had not changed since its foundation in 1948.

174. *Razâkâr* 37/35:2–3 (16 September 1973). Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi took up residence there and was involved in reorganising the APSC (*Razâkâr* 38/21:1).
175. *Asad*, 10 June 1974, quoted in *Razâkâr* 38/25:3 (1 July 1974).
176. *Razâkâr* 38/21:1 (1 June 1974). On the amendments of SMC statutes in July 1973 see above, p. 166.
177. For example, the advertisement of Hadi Ali Shah against the *dîniyât* compromise in November 1972 (see above, p. 165) had also complained about Rizvi's "statement-mon-gering" (*bâyân-bâzi*) on the *Qizilbash Waqf* (*Razâkâr* 36/44:4).
178. *Razâkâr* 38/45:1; (Muhammad Bashir Ansari had not participated in the meeting on 13 October).
179. Muhammad Siddiq, "Nawâb [Qizilbash] pâlisi sê ta 'alluq rakhnewâlê 'ulamâ' ki afsôs-nâk rawash", *Razâkâr* 38/46:3, mentions their pamphlet *Shi'a judâgâna dîniyât kâ hashr—S. Jamil Husain Rizwi ... ki hîla-sâziyôn kâ natîja* (printed by the Qizilbash Waqf Fund) and several SMC rejoinders to it.
180. Translation from *Razâkâr* 38/40:3 (24 October 1974).
181. Muhammad Siddiq, "Judâgâna shi'a waqf bôrd kâ mutâlaba aur 'ulamâ'", *Razâkâr* 38/45:2 (1 December 1974).
182. *Razâkâr* 38/48:2 (24 December 1974)
183. *Ibid.*
184. *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2.
185. See section 5.8, p. 189.
186. See section 5.8, 189–195.
187. See section 4.4, pp. 129–33.
188. See below. The reference is to followers of the Iraqi Shia 'âlim Muhammad al-Khalisi; see Werner Ende, "Erfolg und Scheitern eines schiitischen Modernisten: Muhammad ibn Muhammad Mahdi al-Hâlîsî (1890–1963)", in: Udo Tworuschka (ed.), *Gottes ist der Orient, Gottes ist der Okcident*. [Festschrift für Abdoljavad Falaturi], (Köln, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1991), pp. 120–30.
189. Muhammad Siddiq, "Shi'iyat ke tahaffuz ki zarûrat", *Razâkâr* 35/25–26:3 (1–8 July 1971); idem, "Dîn kâ zawâl kyûn?", *Razâkâr* 35/29–30:3 (1–8 August 1971); Anonymous, "Wâ'izîn-o-zâkirîn tawajjuh farmâ'en", *al-Muballigh* 17/12–18/1 (Jan.-Feb. 1974), pp. 16–20.
190. *Al-Muntazar* 12/10:15–17 (5 July 1970) lists S. Muhammad Dihlavi, S. Muhammad Yar Shah, Maulana Nasir Husain and some leading 'ulamâ' of Multan and Hyderabad as signatories of a declaration of support for Shari'atmadari; see also Muhammad Siddiq, "Intihâ'i afsôs-nâk", *Razâkâr* 34/37:3 (1 October 1970); idem, "Dîn kâ zawâl kyûn?", *Razâkâr* 35/29–30:3.
191. These were S. Safdar Husain Najafi, the director of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar*, S. Murtaza Husain and S. Ali al-Musavi from Skardu (Baltistan). See Agha S. Ali al-Musavi, "Allâma Sayyid Safdar Najafi, mêrê 'azîz dôst", *Misbâh ul-Qur'ân* 1/1990, pp. 24–30, here p. 27; see also section 6.1, p. 202.
192. See his editorial "Marja'-i 'âlam-i tashayyû' kê intikhâb mên nâ-pasandida mudâkhalât", *al-Irshâd*, (n.d.), quoted in *Razâkâr* 34/37:3 (1 October 1970). The article claimed that a majority of the leading Shia 'ulamâ' of India and Pakistan would support Khomeini as the new *marja'*.
193. *Razâkâr* 34/44:2 (24 November 1970). Muhammad Bashir Ansari was among the supporters of al-Khu'i while Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi pleaded for Muhammad Kazim Qommi (*ibid.*).
194. *Razâkâr* 35/40:3. It was coinciding during the first five months with the campaign for general elections (see section 5.3, pp. 154–56.).
195. Muhammad Siddiq, "Dîn kâ zawâl kyûn?", *Razâkâr* 35/29–30:3; S. Zafar Hasan Amrohawi,

- “Marja’ al-taqlid kis kô manê jâ’ê?”, *Razâkâr* 35/36:3 (24 September 1971); idem, “Marja’ i taqlid kâ faisla”, *Razâkâr* 35/40:3 (24 October 1971).
196. Ibid.; according to Murtaza Pooya, especially those Pakistani Shias who used to pay *khums* became *muqallids* of Khu’i (Interview with the author, 13 November 2000). For the majority of the country’s Shias the question of *taqlid* had little relevance at all; see Keddie, *Shi’a of Pakistan*, p. 11.
  197. *Hauza-i ‘Ilmiya Jâmi’at ul-Muntazar kâ ta’âruf*, p. 5. See appeals for donations in *Razâkâr* 34/41:2 (1 November 1970); *Razâkâr* 35/5–6:7 (1–8 February 1971); S. Ali al-Musavi told about his house-to-house begging tours to rich Shias of Lahore together with Safdar Husain Najafi in *Misbâh ul-Qur’ân*, 1/1990, pp. 25–6 (see above, Fn 191).
  198. *Razâkâr* 41/16:3 (24 April 1977). By that time 86 students had graduated from the *Jâmi’at ul-Muntazar* (ibid.). For its further expansion see *Hauza-i ‘Ilmiya Jâmi’at ul-Muntazar kâ ta’âruf*, pp. 6–7. On S. Safdar Husain see references in Fn 219 to chapter 3 (p. 375).
  199. According to *Payâm-i ‘Amal* 17/1–2:65 (March–April 1973) he had the intention of qualifying able Shia students to the rank of *mujtahids* in that institution, also named *Jâmi’at ush-Shi’a*. That ambition could not be achieved, however, even in the coming decades.
  200. It was actually the renamed *Jâmi’at us-Saqlain* (founded 1962) which was enlarged with funds from the Ayatollah’s son, S. Mahdi al-Hakim, who later sought refuge in Pakistan from the Iraqi regime. After some years of closure it was reopened in 1977 on the initiative of Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Golpayegani (*Razâkâr* 41/41:3). Among its teaching staff was S. Sajid Ali Naqvi, the later leader of the TNFJ/TJP (see section 7.1, p. 239).
  201. See above, Fn 143 (p. 410). Its principal and vice-principal until 1988 were Mirza Yusuf Husain and S. Muhammad ‘Arif Naqvi, respectively.
  202. It was founded in 1974 by Shaikh Muhsin Ali Najafi from Manthoka (Baltistan) and had branches in nine other towns in Pakistan twenty-six years later; see its brochure *Jamiatu Ahlil Bait Islamabad 1974–2000*, pp. 3–4. From 1976–81 it published a monthly *az-Zahrâ’*. See also Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 255–6.
  203. *al-Muballigh* 15/12:16 (January 1972). According to other versions he had to leave because he had become too controversial. He was succeeded by Maulana Husain Bakhsh of Jara (Dera Ismail Khan); see also below, Fn 240 (p. 415).
  204. For some early examples see Muhammad Siddiq, “Hamâre ‘ulamâ’-o-zâkirîn”, *Razâkâr* 34/2:2 (quoting excerpts of a pamphlet of Malik Mumtaz Husain, Sialkot, from *Shi’a*, 24 November 1969); statements of Maulana Shams ul-‘Abbas Ayyubi (Quetta) quoted in *Razâkâr* 35/27:2 (16 July 1971).
  205. No special person is referred to.
  206. Translation from Muhammad Siddiq, “Shi’a ‘awâm kê liyê lamha fikriya”, *Razâkâr* 36/27–28:3.
  207. See a comparable editorial from 1976 quoted in section 5.8, pp. 192–93.
  208. See section 5.5., pp. 166, 169–70.
  209. Rizvi tried to mediate between Dhakko and Muhammad Bashir Ansari since early 1974 (*Payâm-i ‘Amal* 18/3:44–46.). In late 1975 Rizvi invited Dhakko to read a *majlis* in his house and later stated that he had not heard a word from Dhakko contradicting his own “purely Shia beliefs” (Letter to Muhammad Isma’il, quoted in *Razâkâr* 40/3:4). On Mushtaq Husain’s views see his November 1975 article “Yeh jaghra ‘ilmî sê ziyâda shakmî hai”, *Razâkâr* 39/43:4–5 (written as a rejoinder to an article of Zafar Hasan Amrohavi quoted in Fn 218).
  210. Muhammad Siddiq, “Ijtihâd”, *Razâkâr* 37/48:1 (24 December 1973).
  211. Mirza Yusuf Husain, *Mudîr-i Razâkâr kê ‘aqâ’id-i bâtila*, quoted in *Razâkâr* 38/5–6:3 (1–8 February 1974). The pamphlet was printed by Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, although the latter later denied his involvement.



212. Ibid.; he had quoted from Muhammad Husain Āl Kashif ul-Ghita, *Asl al-shī'a wa-usūluhā*, transl. S. Ibn Hasan Najafi, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Lahore: Insaf Press, 1968), pp. 86–90.
213. S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, “Afsōsnāk ghūghā-ārā'i”, *Razākār* 38/10:2 (8 March 1974).
214. An article in *Zulfiqār* (Peshawar), 1 July 1974, referred to a “front” in numerous Shia journals against the fees taken for *majlis-khwānī*; see Ya'qub Ali Razi, “Majālis-i tabligh kā mu'āwaza”, reprinted in *Razākār* 38/26:1 (8 July 1974).
215. The reference is probably to cases when preachers do not keep appointments for certain *majālis* because they have received more lucrative offers elsewhere.
216. The contrasting of '*ulamā-i haqq*' and '*ulamā-i sū*' was frequently applied by both camps of the conflict; see for example Dhakko's introduction to *Usūl-i shari'a*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 7–8, and Sarhaddi (ed.), *Majmū'at radd al-muqassirīn*, p. 7.
217. Translation from Muhammad Siddiq, “Azādāri kā mukhālif kaun hai?”, *Razākār* 38/18:3 (8 May 1974).
218. See his articles “Ākhir yeh jhagrā kaisē khatm hōgā”, *Razākār* 39/36:1 (24 September 1975); “Us jhagrē kō khatm kijiyē!”, *Razākār* 39/43:1 (16 November 1975); “Ākhir yeh jhagrā kaisē khatm hōgā!” [again], *Razākār* 39/46:1 (8 December 1975).
219. Translation from *Razākār* 38/18:3 (8 May 1974).
220. See for example Sha'iq Ambalvi, “Khudā rā qaum kī hālāt rahm kijiē”, *Asad*, 18 July 1974, reproduced in *Razākār* 38/29:3; Muhammad Siddiq, “Mutahārīb gurūhōn kē 'ulamā' kī khidmat mēn dardmandāna apīl”, *Razākār* 39/18–19:3 (8–16 May 1975); Zafar Hasan Amrohawi, “Ākhir yeh jhagrā kaisē khatm hōgā!”, *Razākār* 39/36:1 (24 September 1975); S. Iqtidar Husain Kazimi, “Shī'a kā dushman shī'a”, *Razākār* 39/37:7 (1 October 1975); Akhtar Husain, “Aqā'id kē mabāhis aur un kē natā'ij”, *Razākār* 39/45:4 (1 December 1975).
221. See section 5.5, p. 170.
222. See a short notice about the foundation of a *Shī'a Jam'iyat al-'Ulamā'-i Pākistān* during the annual session of the *Dars-i Āl-i Muhammad* in Lyallpur in *Razākār* 37/40:7 (24 October 1973). Muhammad Isma'il was its Chairman, S. Mahbub Ali Shah Senior Vice-Chairman and Taj ud-Din Haidari Second Vice-Chairman; see also below, Fn 240.
223. *al-Muballigh* 18/7, back page (August 1974). Eight '*ulamā*' were named as Vice-Chairmen, including Naṣir Husain (Khushab), S. Gulab Ali Shah (Multan) and Hafiz Saifullah Ja'fari (Nowshera Virkan, Gujranwala Dist.).
224. Naqvi, “Controversy”, pp. 143–4.
225. Abd al-Reza Ibrahimī Kermani was the son of Abu'l-Qasim Khan Ibrahimī, the fourth *khalīfa* (successor) of Muhammad Karim Khan Kermani, who was one of three main disciples of S. Kazim Rashti (the other two being Hasan Gauhar and Ali Muhammad “al-Bāb”, founder of the Babiya sect). He was murdered shortly after the victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979.
226. Iḥqāqī was born in Karbala as a son of Ayatollah Mirza Musa al-Uskū'i al-Hā'irī (1279–1364H), the third *khalīfa* of Hasan Gauhar (see Fn 225). He lived in Kuwait since the 1960s. A list of his representatives in Pakistan can be found in Mirza Hasan al-Hā'irī al-Iḥqāqī, *Ahkām-i Shī'īyān*, transl. Muhammad Hasnain Sābiqī, (Chakwāl: Dār at-Tabligh al-Ja'fariya, 1992), Vol. I., pp. “wāw”–“yā” (preface). It includes both the son and the main disciple of Muhammad Isma'il, Zia Husain Zia and Abd ul-Hasan Sarhaddi, Taj ud-Din Haidari (Gujranwala), S. Bashir Husain Bukhari (Sargodha) and S. Sikandar Husain Shah (Lahore; head of the SPP 1975–92). See also Mirzā Mūsā al-Uskū'i al-Hā'irī, *Iḥqāq ul-haqq*, (Najaf: Matba'at an-Nu'mān, 1385H/1965).
227. Dr Rasa (d. 1994) was a homoeopathist from Hyderabad (Deccan) who had moved to Pakistan after 1947. He was the only representative of Kermani in Pakistan, but his branch of the Shaikhiya was more influential in Pakistan than the Iḥqāqī branch until 1975 (S. Husain 'Arif Naqvi, personal communication).



228. Sabiqi was born in Talagang (Attock Dist.) and had taught at Shia *dīni madāris* in Khairpur, Sargodha, Ahmadpur Sial and Faisalabad. In 1976 he founded his own *Jāmi'at us-Saqlain* in Multan, also editing a journal *al-Saqlain*. His writings include *Jawāhir al-asrār*, a rejoinder to Dhakko's *Usūl-i shari'a*, see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 291–3, and references in Naqvi, *Bibliography*, Vol. II, p. 737.
229. Naqvi, "Controversy", p. 145; *Razākār* 38/39:1 (16 October 1974).
230. *Razākār* 38/40:3 (24 October 1974).
231. S. Muhammad Husain Zaidi Barsati, "Hōshyār! Qaum-i shi'a hōshyār!", *Razākār* 38/41:1–4. For more articles on the Shaikhiya from the same author see *Razākār* 38/44:4, 38/45:6, 39/5:4. He also wrote a number of books and pamphlets, such as *Shaikhiyat kyā hai aur Shaikhi kaun hai*, (Chiniot, Idāra Intishārāt Haqā'iq ash-Shi'a, 1986), *al-'Aqā'id al-haqqiya wa'l-farq baina'l-shi'a al-haqqiya al-ja'fariya al-ithnā'ashariya wa'l-shaikhīya al-munharifa az-zāilla al-muzilla*, (Chiniot, do, 1996), and *Tabsira al-mahmūm 'ala islāh ar-rusūm wa-izāh al-mauhūm* (Chiniot, do, 1996) in support of Dhakko.
232. Dr Rasa lost both lawsuits two years later; see *Razākār* 41/4:3 (24 January 1977).
233. See section 4.4, pp. 131–32.
234. See above, Fn 188 (p. 412). On allegations that Khalisi was a "Wahhabi" see below, p. 201; also Ende, op. cit. (Fn 188), p. 129, Fn 28; Dogar, *Maulānā Muhammad Husain Dhakkō sē 150 su'āl*, pp. 97–9.
235. See section 4.4, pp. 131–32.
236. He later published a pamphlet, *Ek mukhlisāna tahrik aur us kā injām* (Sargodha, n.d.), giving the details of that failed attempt, including his correspondence with the said 'ulamā'. Later he became a follower of the Shaikhiya himself (see above, Fn 226).
237. See Sarhaddi (ed.), *Majmū'at radd al-muqassirīn*, pp. 28, 32, 36. On Muhammad Bashir Ansari's position see his letter (dated 10 October 1975) to Kazim Ali Rasa in the latter's book *Guldasta-i muwaddat*, (Karachi: Kitābkhāna Ibrāhīmī Kirmānī, 1976), p. 8. He claimed that the believers had always "different grades of belief" and "even Abu Dharr and Salman al-Farisi could not have agreed totally in that matter". On the question of *taqlid* in the *usūl ad-dīn* see also Momen, *Introduction*, pp. 174–5.
238. *Asad*, 18 July 1974, quoted in *Razākār* 38/29:3; Anonymous, "Agar 'ulamā'-i shi'a nē maidān-i 'amm mēn munāzarat kiya tō injām-i Gulistān kyā hōgā?", *al-Muballigh* 19/3:2 (April 1975); S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, "Yeh jhagrā 'ilmī sē ziyāda shakmī hai", *Razākār* 39/43:4–5 (16 November 1975); Muhammad Siddiq, "Hōshmandī kā taqāzā", *Razākār* 40/8:3 (24 February 1976).
239. *Razākār* 39/21:3 (1 June 1975).
240. Quotations from his statement in *Razākār* 39/21:3; see also Sarhaddi (ed.), *Majmū'at radd al-muqassirīn*, pp. 9, 17. Maulana Husain Bakhsh, who had headed the *Dār ul-'Ulūm Muhammadiyah* Sargodha since November 1971, became principal of the *Dār ul-'Ulūm Husainiya* Jhang in May 1975. Later he also assumed the presidency of Muhammad Isma'il's "Shia JUP" (*Razākār* 39/47:1; see above, Fn 222).
241. *Razākār* 39/36:2 (24 September 1975); Naqvi, "Controversy", pp. 145–6.
242. I.e. pertaining to the "hidden meaning" of holy scriptures.
243. Literally: "shortening", i.e. belittling the status of the *ahl al-bait*; see section 4.4, p. 129.
244. Translation from *Razākār* 39/41:3 (1 November 1975).
245. Ibid., pp. 3, 6, quotes statements against Shaikh Ahsa'i and S. Kazim Rashti from Shari'atmadari, Khomeini, S. Abdullah Shirazi, S. Abu'l-Qasim al-Khu'i, S. Abd ul-A'la Sabzwari, S. Nasrullah Mustanbat, S. Mirza Hasan al-Musavi al-Bojnurdi and S. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.
246. See statements in that sense from S. Muhammad 'Arif (*Razākār* 39/41:1; 1 November 1975),

- from Mirza Yusuf Husain (*Razâkâr* 40/40:6; 24 October 1976) and from Muhammad Bashir Ansari (*Razâkâr* 41/4:3; 24 January 1977).
247. *Razâkâr* 39/43:3, 8 (16 November 1975).
248. *Razâkâr* 39/43:1. For Muhammad Isma‘il’s version of the meeting, see Sarhaddi (ed.), *Majmû‘at radd al-muqassirîn*, pp. 18 and 24.
249. Sha‘iq Ambalvi, “Muddâ‘i sust, gawâh chust”, *Asad*, 26 November 1975, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 39/47:1 (16 December 1975).
250. On Muhammad Isma‘il’s campaign against the alleged misuse of *khums* in former years see section 4.4, pp. 124–25.
251. Translation from Sarhaddi (ed.), *Majmû‘at radd al-muqassirîn*, pp. 2–3.
252. On *khums* he is quoting from the Koran, Surat al-Anfâl, Verse 41. The quote on *zakât* is recurring in many Suras, see Muhammad Fu‘âd Abd ul-Bâqî, *al-Mu‘jam al-mufahras lil-alfâz al-Qur‘ân al-karîm*, (al-Qâhira: Matba‘at Dâr al-Kutub al-Misri, 1364 h), pp. 331–2.
253. Namely by depriving them of their due from the *zakât*; see also section 4.4, pp. 124–26.
254. Translation from Sarhaddi (ed.), *Majmû‘at radd al-muqassirîn*, pp. 7–9.
255. *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 39.
256. *Ibid.*, p. 10. As late as 1987 Safdar Husain Dogar, after conducting a long interview with Dhakko, made him swear on the Koran that he was not the paid agent of any state or party; see Dogar, *150 su‘âl*, pp. 110–11.
257. Sarhaddi (ed.), *Majmû‘at radd al-muqassirîn*, p. 14, referring to *Usûl al-shari‘a*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., pp. 267–74.
258. Dogar, *150 su‘âl*, p. 82.
259. *Ibid.*, pp. 82–108.
260. See an 81-page pamphlet of Muhammad Hasnain Sabiqi, *Khâlisîyat-nâma*, (Khairpur Miras: Muntazar Shi‘a Organisation, n.d. [1986]), and comments of Dhakko on it in Dogar, *150 su‘âl*, pp. 91–109.
261. See section 4.4, pp. 129–30.
262. Dhakko had elaborated on that subject already in the first two chapters of his *Usûl al-shari‘a*, (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 37–48).
263. Dogar, *150 su‘âl*, p. 30.
264. Dogar, *150 su‘âl*, p. 64. Khalisi had recommended to omit the formula *ashhadu anna ‘Alîyan waliyu’llâh* in the call for prayer already in the 1940s; see Ende, op. cit., p. 124. See also section 5.7, p. 186.
265. Naqvi, “Controversy”, p. 149. During my interviews with Pakistani Shias 1999–2001 I heard some strong criticism of Dhakko, but also acknowledgements of his sincerity and high intellectual calibre. According to Nusrat Ali Shahani, Dhakko’s speeches at *majâlis* would then still attract large audiences (Interview with the author, Lahore, 21 January 2001).
266. Text of the agreement and list of its signatories (including Dhakko, Muhammad Isma‘il and Muhammad Bashir Ansari) in Dogar, *150 su‘âl*, p. 46. A detailed account of the meeting was given in a pamphlet of Kazim Husain Asîr Jarahvi, *al-Haqq ma‘a ‘Alî*; it is quoted with ridiculing comments from Muhammad Siddiq in *Razâkâr* 40/30–31:3 (8–16 August 1976).
267. *Razâkâr* 40/27:7 (16 July 1976).
268. *al-Qâ‘im* 11/1990, p. 14, quoting from an earlier interview with Safdar Husain Najafi.
269. Kâzim ‘Alî Rasâ, *Guldasta-i muwaddat*, (see above, Fn 237). See quotations from letters of Ansari in that pamphlet with comments from Mumtaz Husain Naqvi and Muhammad Siddiq in *Razâkâr* 40/28:1 (24 July 1976) and 40/32:3+8 (24 August 1976).
270. Letter of Ansari from 5 May 1975; Rasâ, *Guldasta-i muwaddat*, pp. 3–4. Ansari had also asked to provide him with a list of the writings of Ahmad Ahsa‘i and S. Kazim Rashti (letter from 3 March 1975; *ibid.*, pp. 5–6).

271. Translated from a letter of Ansari to S. Manzur Husain Bukhari, quoted in *Razâkâr* 40/37:3 (1 October 1976).
272. See sections 5.7, p. 186; 5.8, pp. 193–94.
273. Mumtaz Husain Naqvi, “Âkhir yeh tazâdd kyûn?”, *Razâkâr* 40/28:1 (24 July 1976); Muhammad Siddiq, “Maulânâ Muhammad Bashîr sâhib kâ tâza farmân”, *Razâkâr* 40/37:3 (1 October 1976).
274. Quoted in *Razâkâr* 41/4:3 (24 January 1977). In his declaration Ansari also announced a series of articles to be published by him in the fortnightly *Zulfiqâr* (Peshawar) on “The judgement between Shi’ism and Shaikhiya”.
275. Mirza Yusuf Husain, “Dr Rasâ aur haqîqat-i hâl”, *Razâkâr* 40/40:6 (24 October 1976).
276. Naqvi, “Controversy”, pp. 147–49; see also above, Fn 226 (p. 414).
277. See section 6.3, pp. 219–221.
278. See sections 6.2, pp. 207; 6.3, p. 219; also Fn 186 to chapter 6 (p. 431).
279. Muhammad Husain Dhakko, *Islâh ul-rusûm az-zâhira bi-kalâm al-’itra at-tâhira*, (Sargodha: Maktabat as-Sibtain, 1995); for reactions to that book see Naqvi, “Controversy”, p. 149.
280. Schubel, *Religious Performance*, pp. 90–99.
281. See section 4.2, p. 110.
282. Ibid., p. 131, and sections 4.3, p. 123; 4.5, pp. 135–36.
283. Sarhaddî (ed.), *Majmû’at radd al-muqassirîn*, p. 7 (see the quotation from that pamphlet in section 5.6, p. 178).
284. See section 5.2, p. 148.
285. *Razâkâr* 33/12–13:3 (1–8 April 1969); 33/15:8 (24 April 1969); 33/34–35:1 (16–24 September 1969); 34/5:3 (1 February 1970). Hasan Mujtaba and Mazhar Zaidi described the event twenty-five years later as “a watershed in Jhang’s sectarian violence”; see “A Tale of Two Cities”, *Newsline* 9/1994, pp. 35–37. See also the version of the *Sipâh-i Sahâba* in Qâsimî, *Sawânih-i hayât-i Maulânâ Haqq Nawâz Jhangwî*, pp. 47–51.
286. It was still visible on the gate in 1994; see a photo in *Newsline* 9/1994, p. 35.
287. Ghazi Ghulam Mustafa, “Jhang kâ qazîya nâ-murziya”, *Razâkâr* 34/4:1–2 (24 January 1970); Muhammad Siddiq, “Rût kî tabdilî mas’ala kâ hall nahîn hai”, *Razâkâr* 34/5:3 (1 February 1970).
288. Other complaints concerned stone-throwing on a procession in another quarter of the town and the cancellation of some licences by the D.C. (*Razâkâr* 34/13:1; 1 April 1970).
289. *Razâkâr* 36/10–11:5–6 (8–16 March 1972). The procession on 17 May was led by Mushtaq Husain Naqvi.
290. See section 5.4, p. 156. For a Shia interpretation of their electoral defeat also Muhammad Siddiq, “Islâm-pasandôn kî ‘ibratnâk shikast kyûn?”, *Razâkâr* 35/5–6:3+7 (1–8 February 1971).
291. *Razâkâr* 35/11:3 (16 March 1971) reported one dead and 40 injured.
292. A noteworthy incident was, however, the assassination (on 4 June) of one Qazi Fazlallah, who was considered by Shias as the main responsible for the murderous arson of Theri in 1963 (see section 4.2, p. 110). S. Danyal Shah, the brother the former licence-holder for processions in Theri (killed in 1963), was arrested as a suspect, and Shias feared a plot to get rid of processions in Theri for good; see *Razâkâr* 35/42:2 (8 November 1971).
293. See a detailed report on the events and their aftermath in *Razâkâr* 36/10–11:5–6 (8–16 March 1972).
294. *Razâkâr* 36/18:3 (8 May 1972).
295. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
296. *Razâkâr* 37/9:1–2 (1 March 1973); cases were filed against him and 27 other participants of the procession thereafter.

297. Muhammad Siddiq, “Intihâ’i afsôsnâk”, *Razâkâr* 37/23:3 (16 June 1973); see also *Razâkâr* 37/27–28:5 (16–24 July 1973).
298. After Shia-Sunni clashes in Parachinar in August 1970 a number of Shia notables had been arrested and sent to the Dera Ismail Khan jail; see *Razâkâr* 34/31:3 (16 August 1970); *al-Muballigh* 14/8:2 (September 1970). Bangash, *Political and Administrative Development*, pp. 185–86, refers to a conflict over the size of the minaret of a Sunni mosque in Parachinar in 1971 (1970?) which spread to other villages. Thereafter local Shia organisations were banned for some years by the Political Agent; see *Razâkâr* 38/42:2 (8 November 1974).
299. See complaints of S. Riza Husain and Hajji Nur Ali Khan at the SMC Council meeting in Multan (15–16 July 1973) in *Razâkâr* 37/27–28:5 and similar remarks in *Razâkâr* 37/30:3 (8 August 1973). On later attacks on Shias in the Kurram Agency see sections 6.2, p. 218; 6.3, pp. 229; 8.2, *passim*).
300. Rieck, “Sectarianism”, p. 442.
301. Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan. A Religio-Political Study*, pp. 121–55; Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 174–202.
302. Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 30–33.
303. *Ibid.*, pp. 58–65.
304. See section 5.5, p. 162.
305. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–7. In August 1972 Mufti Mahmud appointed a commission chaired by himself to formulate recommendations for such legislation. Its other members were Shams-ul-Haqq Afghani (then professor at the Islamic University Bahawalpur), Muhammad Yusuf Binori (founder of a large Deobandi *madrâsa* in Karachi), Abd ul-Ghani Khattak (Chairman of the Peshawar High Court Bar Association), and Amirzada Khan (provincial Minister of Law); see Muhammad Siddiq, “Hanafi stêt kyûn?”, *Razâkâr* 36/32:2+8 (24 August 1972).
306. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
307. See section 5.5, pp. 167–68.
308. One of them was Chaudhry Harun ar-Rashid of Hafizabad (Gujranwala Dist.) who told about his recent conversion during a session of the SMC Council in December 1974 (*Razâkâr* 38/48:2). By June 1976 he had become Provincial Chairman of the SMC Punjab (*Razâkâr* 40/22:2).
309. *Payâm-i ‘Amal* 18/9:27 (November 1974); *Razâkâr* 40/22:2 (8 June 1976).
310. See section 5.5, pp. 168–69.
311. *Razâkâr* 38/48:2 (24 December 1974).
312. *Razâkâr* 39/10–11:7 (8–16 March 1975).
313. *Razâkâr* 39/24:2 (24 June 1975).
314. In Chakwal a *Chihlum* procession was shot at on instigation of one Qazi Mazhar Husain (*Razâkâr* 39/10–11:7; 8–16 March 1975), the author of anti-Shia pamphlets like *Ham mâtam kyun nahîn kartê hain* and *Shi’a dîniyât kâ ghair-munsifâna sâzish* (*Razâkâr* 40/9:1; 1 March 1976). In Karachi *Chihlum* processions were stone-pelted (*Razâkâr* 39/14:1; 8 April 1975).
315. *Asad*, 6 March 1975, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 39/14:1 (8 April 1975).
316. *Ibid.*
317. *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 April 1975.
318. Its Sunni signatories were Ihtisham ul-Haqq Thanvi, Abd ul-Ghaffar Salafi, Sa‘adat Ali Qadiri, Mustafa al-Azhari (MNA), Muhammad Shafi‘ Okarvi (MNA), Hasan Musanna Nadvi, S. Abd ul-Qadir Gailani, Mufti Faqir Muhammad, Zahîr ul-Qasimi, Salimullah Khan, Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmâni and Dr Tanzil ur-Rahman; Shia signatories were S. Nasîr ul-Ijtihadi, ‘Aqil Turabi, ‘Abbas Kumaili, S. Tauqir Husain Zaidi and S. Ahmad Jauhar (son of the late S. Muhammad Dihlavi); see *Dawn*, 16 May 1975.

319. This amendment was introduced on the insistence of S. Nasir ul-Ijtihadi; see *Razâkâr* 39/21:1 (1 June 1975); *al-Muballigh* 19/7:12–13 (August 1975).
320. *Dawn*, 16 May 1975, with some additions translated from the complete Urdu text (given in *Razâkâr* 39/21:1 and in *al-Muballigh* 19/7:9–13). The important point 11 was omitted in *Dawn*.
321. *Dawn*, 22 May 1975.
322. *Ibid.* (The order remained almost without practical consequences, as has been the case with similar former or later orders).
323. *Dawn*, 21 May 1975; *Razâkâr* 39/24:2 (24 June 1975).
324. Translated from *Razâkâr* 39/23:1 (Resolution No. 2).
325. *Ibid.* (Resolution No. 3).
326. *Razâkâr* 39/26:1 (Resolution No. 1). The same argument was made in a commentary of the SPP to point 11 of the said “Code of Ethics”: If the Sunnis were allowed to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet, why should not Shias do the same, apart from celebrating the birthdays of his *ahl al-bait*? And why should not Sunnis also perform ‘*azâdârî* for the Imam Husain, as had indeed been a regular practice in the subcontinent for centuries? (*al-Muballigh* 19/7:12–13).
327. *Razâkâr* 39/26:1 (Resolution No. 4).
328. S. Muhammad Riza Rizvi, “Zâbita-i akhlâq ki bât”, *Razâkâr* 39/22:5 (8 June 1975).
329. None of the leading ‘*ulamâ*’ or notables had been included. S. Nasir ul-Ijtihadi (1931–90) was a popular preacher whom even Mirza Yusuf Husain branded as a “dangerous political opportunist”; see Dogar, ‘*Allâma Mirzâ Husain Lakhnawî sê 300 su’âl*, p. 28; also section 5.8, p. 193, and Fn 260 to chapter 6 (p. 435). For a sympathetic portrait of Ijtihadi see Chaman, *Mêri yâdgâr mulâqâtên*, pp. 157–70.
330. See section 5.8, p. 189.
331. *Razâkâr* 41/9–10:3 (1–8 March 1977). Literal translation: “There is only one God and Muhammad is the messenger of God; Ali is the friend of God, the heir of the messenger of God and his direct successor”. Momen, *Introduction*, p. 178, translates *waliyu’llâh* “the guardian of the religion of God”.
332. *Razâkâr* 41/9–10:3 (1–8 March 1977).
333. *Razâkâr* 40/8:3 (24 February 1976). Similar petitions were filed at the High Courts of Karachi and Peshawar.
334. Reply of Mufti Mahmud to a questionnaire of Shahid Hasan Zaidi, *Payâm-i ‘Amal* 20/5:27–28 (July 1976). See also an open letter of Mirza Yusuf Husain to Mufti Mahmud, referring to a speech of the latter in Lahore on 29 March 1976 (*Razâkâr* 40/14:3; 8 April 1976).
335. Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi, “Fâtih-i Têksilâ ki ashk-fashâ’i”, *Razâkâr* 41/7:2 (16 February 1977).
336. Decision of Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Iqbal on writ petition No. 159/76, quoted in *Razâkâr* 40/42–43:2 (8–16 November 1976). On Shia misunderstandings about the new wording see section 5.8, pp. 193–94.
337. See section 5.8, pp. 190–91.
338. *Razâkâr* 40/42–43:3 (8–16 November 1976).
339. Nasr, *Vanguard*, pp. 182–3; Shah, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 208–23.
340. See sections 6.1, p. 199; 6.2, pp. 208–09.
341. *Jang*, 21 February 1977, quoted in Jum’a Khan, “Mufti Mahmud nê 1977 mên sach bolâ! 1979 mên jhût kyûn bolâ?”, *Razâkâr* 43/30–31:4 (8–16 August 1979).
342. Nasr, *Vanguard*, p. 183.
343. For the change of mind of the SMC in August 1977 see section 5.8, pp. 194–95.
344. Muhammad Siddiq, “Mufti Mahmud âpnê asli rôp mên”, *Razâkâr* 43/26–27:3 (8–16 July 1979).

345. S. Wazarat Husain, founding member and long-time Secretary-General of the TNFJ, has stated that “no Shias took part in the anti-Bhutto demonstrations of 1977” (Interview with the author, 8 January 2001). Many other Shias interviewed have given similar statements.
346. See section 5.8, p. 194.
347. Agha Murtaza Pooya (b. 1941), a son of Mirza Mahdi Pooya (see Fn 227 to chapter 3, p. 376), had entered politics at that time. He later founded the daily newspaper *The Muslim* (published from Islamabad May 1979–November 1998) and a *Hizb-i Jihād* prior to the 1988 elections. From 1990 to 1996 he was Director of the state-funded Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad; see Richard H. Curtiss, “Agha Murtaza Pooya, a journalist-scholar”, *The Muslim*, 4 October 1996.
348. Interview with the author, 13 November 2000; Pooya, too, had no doubts that the great majority of Shias was still pro-Bhutto in 1977 (and throughout the following 10–15 years). On the shift of the mainstream Shia organisation TNFJ to Islamism in the mid-1980s see section 6.3, pp. 222–29.
349. On the role of the JUI in the movement see Pirzada, *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam*, pp. 150–204; on that of the JUP see Mujeeb Ahmad, *Jam’iyyat ‘Ulama-i-Pakistan*, pp. 131–46; on that of the JI see Nasr, *Vanguard*, pp. 183–7.
350. See section 6.1, pp. 197–98.
351. See section 5.5, p. 170.
352. See his report at the SMC Council meeting in Lahore (14–15 December 1974) in *Razākār* 38/48:1 (24 December 1974).
353. Dogar, ‘*Allāma Mīrzā Husain Lakhnawī sê 300 su ‘āl*’, pp. 78–9. For the wording of the complete Shia *kalima* see section 5.7, p. 186.
354. Ibid.
355. *Razākār* 39/23:1 (16 June 1975).
356. S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, “Shi’a dīnīyât kê musannif ‘ulamâ’ kī mazhaka-khīz qalābāzī”, *Razākār* 39/45:1 (1 December 1975).
357. Ibid. and “Mushtê ba’d az jang”, *Razākār* 39/45:4+8 (1 December 1975); S. Muhammad Ja’far, “Hô kyâ gayâ hai?”, *Razākār* 39/48:1 (24 December 1975; reprinted from *al-Irshād*, Karachi, 16 November).
358. Muhammad ‘Abbas, *Kutub-i dīnīyât mên tarmīm-o-tansikh kê chand namūnê*, undated pamphlet [1975?]. These changes mainly concerned Ali Ibn Abi Talib and his achievements, which were subtly played down with some omissions and unwarranted mentioning of other *sahāba* in certain historical accounts (ibid., pp. 3–8).
359. *Payām-i ‘Amal* 18/10:3–4 (December 1974).
360. See sections 5.2, p. 150; 5.5, pp. 168–69. These problems were still unresolved in November 1988 when Benazir Bhutto formed her first government. See a pamphlet of the TNFJ and the Wafāq-i ‘Ulamā’-i Shī’a-i Pākistān, *Hamāre mutālabāt*, n.d., pp. 5–6, urging Benazir to “correct the mistake of her father and give peace to his soul”.
361. See section 5.7, p. 184.
362. *Razākār* 39/23:1 (16 June 1975).
363. See section 5.6, pp. 176–80.
364. *Payām-i ‘Amal* 19/10:4 (December 1975).
365. *Razākār* 40/8:3 (24 February 1976); see also above, Fn 209 (p. 413).
366. Reports in *al-Muballigh* 20/2:2–8; 20/3:2–10; *Razākār* 40/11:1; 40/18:2–3; 40/15:1–2; 40/21:3+5.
367. S. Mushtaq Husain Naqvi, “Dāstān-i dard”, *Razākār* 40/18:2 (8 May 1976).
368. Ibid.; Mushtaq Husain mentions one unnamed leader who let himself drive to a police station and demanded to be arrested. When he was told that he would first have to vio-

- late the ban against approaching an *imâmbârgâh*, for example, he just drank a cup of tea with the officers and then proceeded to the Government Resthouse (ibid.).
369. *al-Muballigh* 20/2:2–3 (reprint from *Asad*, 24 March 1975); *Razâkâr* 40/21:3.
370. *Razâkâr* 40/15:2. The SMC Council meetings of December 1974 and June 1975 had taken place in Rizvi's house in Lahore, Fane Road No. 11.
371. *Shahîd*, 28 March 1975, quoted in *Razâkâr* 40/18:2.
372. See his obituary in *al-Muballigh* 20/5–6 (June–July 1976), cover page.
373. See a protocol in *Razâkâr* 40/22:1–4 (8 June 1976), here p. 1.
374. Ibid.; by contrast, too few councillors from the Punjab, the NWFP and Balochistan had shown up at an SMC Council meeting in Hyderabad on 4 May 1975, and it had to be repeated with the same agenda in Lahore on 1 June (*Razâkâr* 39/18–19:1).
375. *Razâkâr* 40/22:2–3.
376. Ibid., p. 3.
377. Ibid., p. 4.
378. Translation from Muhammad Siddiq, “Nawâ-i talkh. Kuch qaum kî zabûn-hâlî kē muta‘alliq”, *Razâkâr* 40/34–35:3 (8–16 September 1976). See also his comparable editorial of July 1972 quoted in section 5.6, p. 173.
379. *Razâkâr* 40/34–35:3.
380. *al-Muntazar* 17/5–6:23 (20 May 1975); see also advertisements of that organisation in subsequent issues of *al-Muntazar*.
381. Report on his press conference (14 October 1975) in *Razâkâr* 39/37:6+8. The same organisation shortly after published huge posters against Maulana Muhammad Isma‘il because of his Shaikhiya leanings; see Naqvi, “Controversy”, p. 146.
382. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, [a biography of the ISO leader Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi], pp. 44–45; see also an Urdu pamphlet distributed by the ISO Central Office (Imamia Hostel, Reti Gan Road, Lahore) in 1974, *Imâmiya Styûdants Arganaizêshan Pâkistân*, p. 5. From 1978 to 1988 the ISO has regularly reported on its activities in its monthly organ *Râh-i ‘Amal* (Lahore), replaced since 1989 by the monthly *al-‘Ârif* (Lahore).
383. *Misbâh ul-Qur‘ân*, 1/1990, pp. 14–15, 27–8; T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, pp. 47–62; on the early years of the ISO see also Abou Zahab, “The Politicization of the Shia Community”, pp. 99–102.
384. See sections 6.1, pp. 202, 204, 206; 6.2, pp. 212–13; 6.3, pp. 221–22, 229.
385. See section 5.5, 169–70.
386. *Razâkâr* 40/42–43:1 (8–16 November 1976).
387. See Muhammad Siddiq, “Kalima kî bahs”, *Razâkâr* 41/9–10 (1–8 March 1977), and rejoinders to Ansari from Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi, “Jenâb-i Fâtih-i Têksilâ ... kâ haqq-o-sadâqat sê farâr”, *Razâkâr* 41/1:3 (1 January 1977); idem, “Fâtih-i Têksilâ ... kî ashk-fishânî”, *Razâkâr* 41/7:2 (16 February 1977).
388. See section 5.7, pp. 186–87, and an article of Mirza Yusuf Husain in *Razâkâr* 41/35:2 (16 September 1977); also *Payâm-i ‘Amal* 21/8:36–38 (October 1977), quoting from his correspondence with officials of the ministry in August and September 1977.
389. They are listed in Ghulam Shabbir Khan, “Ziyârât-i ‘atabât-i ‘aliyât par nâ-rawâ pâbandi-yân aur Pâkistânî zâ‘irîn kî hâlât-i zâr”, *Razâkâr* 41/25:3 (1 July 1977).
390. Ibid., pp. 3–4. The article written by the convenor of an “All-Pakistan Pilgrims Welfare Committee” in Sargodha gives a short account of the changing rules for pilgrims to Iran and Iraq since 1947. It was also distributed as a pamphlet (*al-Muballigh* 22/1–2:2).
391. *al-Muntazar* 19/1:3–4 (5 March 1977). Others included S. Safdar Husain Najafi and Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi. On the initiative of Murtaza Pooya see section 5.7, p. 188.
392. S. Mumtaz Husain Khawar, “Mutawaqqa‘ intikhâbât aur millat-i ja‘fariya”, *al-Muballigh* 21/7–8:5–7 (August–September 1977).



393. *Razâkâr* 41/23–24:3+8. Both Ijtihadi and Zaidi, whom Bhutto and Kausar Niyazi had selected to replace Jamil Husain Rizvi and Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, were popular preachers, but without knowledge of *fiqh* and legal affairs. The decision was not implemented because of Bhutto's ouster. Instead, Mufti Ja'far Husain was re-appointed to the CII by Zia ul-Haqq; see section 6.1, p. 198.
394. *Nawâ-i Waqt*, 11 August 1977, reprinted in *Razâkâr* 41/32:4.
395. Muhammad Siddiq, "Ânêwalê ilekshan aur shi'a", *Razâkâr* 41/33–34:3–4 (1–8 September 1977).
396. S. Ahmad Jauhar, "Âl pârtiz shi'a kanwenshân aur maujûda sûrat-i hâl", *Razâkâr* 41/40:1–2 (24 October 1977).
397. See sections 6.1, pp. 199, 205; 6.2., pp. 208, 210, 217.
398. See section 6.1, pp. 205–07. The SMC, like the APSC, ITHS, and other Shia organisations of the pre-1979 era was never formally dissolved, however.

#### 6. THE ZIA UL-HAQQ ERA, 1977–1988

1. Keddie, *Shi'a of Pakistan*, pp. 12–13.
2. D. Khalid, "The Final Replacement of Parliamentary Democracy", pp. 26–7.
3. According to Murtaza Pooya, the success of the PNA movement in Pakistan did encourage the '*ulamâ*' in Iran and frighten the Shah (Interview with the author, 17 November 2000). Haidar, *Velayat-e-Faqih*, concedes that Khomeini was "watching with interest the 1977 movement in Pakistan" (p. 74), but assumes that he "must have gained tremendous experience from the tumultuous year of 1977 that the people of Pakistan spent in a self-defeating movement, which lacked the backing both of an ideology and men of dependable character" (p. 76). A detailed account of the preparations of Khomeini and his supporters for a confrontation in 1977 is given by Amir Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah. Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1985), pp. 222–51.
4. A good reflection of Zia's self-view is given by the apologetic account of Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, pp. 195–210; see also Parveen Shaukat Ali, *Politics of Conviction. The Life and Times of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq* (London: The London Centre for Pakistan Studies, 1997), *passim*.
5. Murtaza Pooya, interview with the author, 13 November 2000. Pooya also claimed that Ayatollah Khamenei, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1981 and later Khomeini's successor, felt very close to Zia ul-Haqq, and even tried to persuade him "to go for the leadership of the Muslim world".
6. That was true especially with respect to Zia's close alliance with both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. On difficulties of adjusting this line with friendly relations to Iran see Harrop, "Pakistan and Revolutionary Iran", pp. 110–26; see also section 6.3, p. 226.
7. Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan*, p. 181; Shah, *Religion and Politics*, p. 222. (Ironically, Sunday was reintroduced as the weekly holiday in 1997 by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who otherwise repeatedly allied himself with the Islamist lobby; see sections 7.1, p. 246; 7.2, p. 262).
8. The twelve-member CII, approved by the Federal Government on 4 June 1977, was meant to comprise the PNA leaders Maududi, Mufti Mahmud and Ahmad Shah Nurani and to be assisted by six eminent scholars from other Islamic countries, including an unnamed *mujtahid* from Iran; see *Dawn*, 5 June 1977; *Razâkâr* 41/23–24:3+8 (16–24 June 1977).
9. *Dawn*, 30 September 1977. For a list of members see Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 434.
10. *Dawn*, 2 October 1977. That ban was extended several times and partially lifted in 1984.
11. *Dawn*, 3 October 1977.
12. *Dawn*, 14 November and 28 November 1977.
13. *Dawn*, 29 November 1977.



14. *Payām-i ‘Amal* 21/11:36–37 (January 1978); the others were S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, S. Nasir ul-Ijtihadi, S. ‘Abbas Haidar ‘Abidi, S. Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, Murtaza Pooya, S. Mahbub Ali Shamsi, Ghazanfar Ali Shah and Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani.
15. *Ibid.*; the others concerned implementation of the well-known “three demands”, problems of pilgrims and Shia mosques.
16. See sections 5.7, p. 187; 5.8, p. 194.
17. *Jasarat* (Karachi), 10 January 1978, quoted in *Razākār* 42/10–11:4 (8–16 March 1978).
18. Muhammad Siddiq, “Pākistān aur Islāmī â’in”, *Razākār* 42/10–11:3+8.
19. Bhutto stood accused for murdering a political opponent by the Lahore High Court since 11 October 1977. On 18 March 1978 a death sentence was pronounced against him, which was later upheld. He was executed on 4 April 1979.
20. Quoted in S. Mumtaz Husain Khawar, “Ham kab khāb-i ghaflat sê bidār hōngē”, *Razākār* 42/16:3 (24 April 1978); see also *Razākār* 42/14–15:3 (8–16 April 1978). The conference was organised by a “Council for Safeguarding the Rights of the Sunnis” (*Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Huqūq-i Ahl-i Sunnat*); see *Dawn*, 11 March 1978.
21. *Razākār* 42/14–15:3; the reference was to Martial Law Order No. 33 of 28 February 1978 which had extended the ban on political activities.
22. Zia named the sixteen-member Advisory Council on 14 January, including the later Foreign Minister Agha Shahi as a Shia member. On 5 July 1978 Zia appointed a twenty-one-member cabinet, followed by a twenty-four-member cabinet on 21 August (see below).
23. *Dawn*, 1 May 1978; *Razākār* 42/21:3 (1 June 1978). Shia ‘*ulamā*’ invited to that board were Mirza Yusuf Husain (MAUSP), S. Murtaza Husain (SMC), Shaikh Jawad Husain (SMUP) and S. Mahdi Hasan ‘Alavi (ITHS). Sunni members included such hard-liners as Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari (TAS) and Zia ul-Qasimi (later a leader of the *Sipāh-i Sahāba*).
24. Separate *diniyāt* were first abolished in classes 6–8 and since 1979 in classes 9–10 (S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi, personal communication).
25. *Payām-i ‘Amal* 22/4:32 (June 1978); *Razākār* 42/24:3 (24 June 1978). Maududi had been among those Sunni religious leaders who had long since approved to separate *diniyāt* for Shias. The SMC also recalled the position of Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ in favour of them (see section 4.5, p. 141).
26. S. Naubahar Shah, son of the late SPP leader S. Sikandar Husain Shah, has even claimed that separate *diniyāt* were abolished “with consent of the Shias” (Interview with the author, 23 January 2001). Nosheen Ali, “Outrageous state”, paragraph 42 (no page numbers in online edition) quotes a Shia leader (Abbas Husain) with the words: “...a separate curriculum for Shias was eventually introduced ... in the 1970s. But the person who was grading the Shia section of the *Islāmīyāt* syllabus remained Sunni, so Shias were easily singled out for discrimination. In the exam that one has to take to join the Civil Service, Shia youth particularly suffered as the rate of failure increased. And so, access to government jobs decreased. It was at this point that Punjabi Shia youth told the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan: we are suffering because of your policies. So finally, Shias themselves got rid of the separate curriculum that they had worked so hard to introduce.” Note: The TNFJ, founded in April 1979 (see below) was renamed *Tahrik-i Ja’fariya Pakistan* (TJP) only in 1993 (see section 7.1, p. 278).
27. *Dawn*, 3 March and 4 March 1978.
28. *Dawn*, 16 March 1978.
29. *Razākār* 43/10–11:1 (8–16 March 1979); on special Shia rules for *hudūd* see below, Fn 55; for *zakāt* see section 6.2, p. 210.
30. According to Muhammad Husain Akbar, the influence of Safdar Husain Najafi, (see below) had been decisive for bringing about the conference; see *Misbāh ul-Qur’ān*, 1/1990, p. 57; also Bukhārī, *Muhsin ul-Millat*, p. 48.

31. See report in *Razâkâr* 42/22:1–2, 4 (8 June 1978).
32. But not in the 1973 constitution before the amendment of its Article 203 in 1980; see section 6.2, p. 214, and Fn 95 to chapter 5 (p. 408).
33. Translation from *Razâkâr* 42/22:4 (8 June 1978).
34. *Razâkâr* 42/22:1.
35. Muhammad Siddiq, “Fiqh-i ja‘fariya kânfarans aur Maulâna Muhammad Bashîr”, *Razâkâr* 42/34–35:3+8 (8–16 September 1978).
36. The *majlis* was held on the occasion of the death of Ansari’s wife. The only noteworthy supporter of his claim to leadership was then S. ‘Irfan Haidar ‘Abidi, a popular *zâkir* from Sindh. See *Razâkâr* 42/32:4 (24 August 1978); on I. H. ‘Abidi see section 6.2, p. 217.
37. For example, *Razâkâr* 42/40:5 (24 October 1978) reported the meeting of a delegation of his *Shi‘a Islâmî Jam‘at* with A. K. Brohi, then Minister of Education.
38. S. Muhammad Raziyy (1913–99), a grandson of the famous *mujtahid* Najm ul-Hasan (see section 1.3, p. 26), was a great orator and scholar of Arabic literature born in Lucknow. After completing his studies in Najaf (1939–1941) he became chief instructor at the *Madrasat Nâzimiya* Lucknow. In 1948 he moved to Karachi, where he was Secretary-General of the *Jâmi‘at ‘Arabiya* for some time and founded a Husaini Highschool. He remained sympathetic to Zia ul-Haqq throughout his rule and was appointed to his *Majlis-i Shûrâ* in 1982; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 303–4; Chaman, *Mêri yâdgâr mulâqâtên*, pp. 125–42.
39. Nasr, *Vanguard*, p. 191; that cabinet was dissolved on 21 March 1979.
40. K. M. Arif, *Working with Zia. Pakistan’s Power Politics 1977–88* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 287–9.
41. Among them were Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, Muhammad Bashir Ansari, Mirza Yusuf Husain, Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi and ‘Aqil Turabi (S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi, personal communication; see also *The Frontier Post*, 1 October 1992). The Pakistani Shia press had mainly appealed to the Shah to make concessions to the religious leadership in the framework of the existing regime; see for example Sha‘iq Ambalvi, “Shi‘iyan-i Pâkistân marâjî-i ‘uzâm kê sâth hain”, *Asad* 10–18 August 1978, quoted in *Razâkâr* 42/30–31:2 (8–16 August 1978).
42. S. Nasir Husain Naqvi (transl.), “Hukûmat-i Islâmî yâ wilâyat-i faqih”, parts I+II, *al-Muballigh* 16/1: 8–15 (February 1972); 16/2:7–14 (March 1972).
43. Bukhârî, *Muhsin ul-Millat*, p. 162; Agha S. Ali al-Musavi, “Allâma S. Safdar Najafi, mêrê ‘azîz dôst”, *Misbâh ul-Qur‘ân* 1/1990, pp. 24–30, here page 27; see also section 5.6, p. 172.
44. The 1975 invitation was conveyed by Seth Nawazish Ali, one of the main sponsors of the *Jâmi‘at ul-Muntazar* and later managing trustee of the *Misbâh ul-Qur‘ân Trust*, during a visit to Najaf; see Seth Nawazish Ali, “Allâma S. Safdar Husain Najafi, chand yâdên—chand bâtên”, *Misbâh ul-Qur‘ân*, 1/1990, pp. 18–23, here pp. 20–21.
45. See section 6.2, p. 216.
46. Muhammad Ali Naqvi was born near Lahore in 1950 and assassinated in 1995. His father, S. Amir Husain, who had taught in the *Jâmi‘at Imâmiya* Lahore and served as a preacher among Khoja Twelver Shia emigrants in East Africa, was related to Safdar Husain Najafi through marriage of his sister. Muhammad Ali had been one of the founders of the ISO and its Central Chairman 1976–7. Although working as a medical doctor since 1978, he remained very much involved in the activities of the ISO until his death. See his biography from T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, passim.
47. See sections 6.2, pp. 212–13; 6.3, pp. 221–22, 229; from late 1978 onwards, the ISO organ *Râh-i ‘Amal* (Lahore) has strongly reflected the “Iranian” line, which has been upheld by its successor, the monthly *al-‘Arif* (Lahore), since 1989.
48. Interview with Hafiz S. Muhammad Sibtain Naqvi, chairman of the *Wafâq* 1991–94, in *al-Qâ‘im* May–June 1992, pp. 7–9.; see also an interview with Hafiz Riyaz Husain, *al-Qâ‘im*, Wafâq-i ‘Ulamâ‘-i Shi‘a-i Pâkistân Number, n.d. [1986], pp. 5–18., here p. 6.

49. He was born in Alipur (Muzaffargarh Dist.) in 1941. Being a nephew of the pioneer of Shia *dinī madāris* S. Muhammad Yar Shah, he had joined the *Jāmi'at ul-Muntazar* since 1957, interrupted only by a stay in Najaf for attending *dars-i khārij* from 1963 to 1969. Thereafter he became vice-principal of the *Jāmi'at ul-Muntazar* and its principal after the death of Safdar Husain Najafi in December 1989; see his interview quoted above and Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 127–8.
50. See section 6.2, p. 218.
51. *Wafāq-i 'Ulamā'-i Shi'a-i Pākistān kē aghrāz-o-maqāsīd*, Lahore, n.d. [1979].
52. I could not find out anything about that organisation, presumably a “paper organisation” on the lines described in section 5.8, pp. 192–93, or a leftover from the AISPC (see section 1.3, p. 30).
53. S. Jamil Husain Rizvi, “Qaum kē itihād kē muta'alliq”, *Razākār* 42/48:4 (24 December 1978). On the 1971 merger initiative see section 5.4, pp. 157–58.
54. These ordinances were: Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979; The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance 1979; The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance 1979; and The Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance 1979; see Haydar, “Politicization”, pp. 78, 92. For details on these laws and their implementation see Kennedy, *Islamization of Laws*, pp. 41–3, 55–66, 71–4.
55. According to the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*, only three fingers of the left hand can be amputated in that case instead of the whole hand as in Hanafi *shari'a* law; see Qureshi, “The Politics of the Shia Minority in Pakistan”, p. 126.
56. *Razākār* 43/10–11:1 (8–16 March 1979).
57. “Nizām-i Hanafi?”, *Hurriyat* (Karachi), 13 February 1979, quoted in *Razākār* 43/10–11:1 (8–16 March 1979). Such benches were disbanded in 1980 and a “Federal Shariat Court” was established instead; see Kennedy, *Islamization*, pp. 35–37.
58. *al-Muballigh* 23/1–2:10–11 (February–March 1979); *Razākār* 43/10–11:1.
59. See section 5.3, p. 154. Ihtisham ul-Haq had also switched his allegiance from opposition to support of the PPP some years earlier.
60. On the 1951 ‘*ulamā*’ conference see section 3.2, p. 69.
61. *Musāwāt* (Lahore), 26 February 1979, quoted in *Razākār* 43/10–11:3 (8–16 March 1979).
62. *Nawā-i Waqt*, 7 March 1979, quoted in *Razākār* 43/10–11:3.
63. Its members were the same persons as in December 1977 (see above, p. 199, and Fn 14, p. 423) plus Mufti Ja'far Husain; only S. Hadi Ali Shah was replaced by S. Nusrat Ali Shah (*Payām-i 'Amal* 23/2:25).
64. *Razākār* 43/10–11:3.
65. *Razākār* 43/14–15:8. Other resolutions demanded amendments of the February 10 ordinances and the addition of a paragraph to the 1973 constitution which would assure that Islamic laws would be applied on each sect according to its own interpretation of Koran and Sunna.
66. *Ibid.*
67. The Bhakkar Tehsil (1979 still part of the Mianwali Dist.) is one of the few areas in Pakistan with a majority of Shia population apart from Gilgit-Baltistan and the Kurram Agency.
68. S. Wazarat Husain, born 1928 in Saharanpur (U.P.), had migrated to Bhakkar in 1947 and had started practicing as a lawyer in 1959. In the 1960s he had headed the “Council Muslim League” in the Bhakkar Tehsil. In 1973 he mobilised donations from Shia dignitaries to build the *Qasr-i Zainab*, a replica of the tomb of Zainab in Damascus visited by Shia pilgrims from all over Pakistan, in the town. Since 1979 he has remained in the forefront of Shia communal organisations, becoming Senior Vice-President of the TJP in 1998 (Interview with the author, 8 January 2001).

69. Hafiz Riyaz Husain, “‘Allāma S. Safdar Najafi, qaumī khidmāt”, *Misbāh ul-Qur’ān* 1/1990, pp. 11–17, here p. 15; Bukhārī, *Muhsin ul-Millat*, p. 48. Both sources refer to a convention of Shia *anjumans* from all over Pakistan in Gujranwala shortly after the *Fiqh-i Ja’fariya* Conference in Sargodha (see above, p. 200) where the decision to set up a TNFJ under the leadership of Mufti Ja’far Husain was taken.
70. Khadim Husain Leghari, “Shi’iyyān-i Haidar-i karrār kā ijtīmā’-i ‘azīm”, *Razākār* 43/17:1+4, wrote about estimates “up to one million participants”. S. Wazarat Husain claimed participation of “7–800,000” (Interview with the author, 8 January 2001) S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi, who had also attended the convention, estimated that only 25–30,000 Shias had gathered in Bhakkar (personal communication, November 2000). I was not able to find reports from neutral sources.
71. Translation: “What do the Shia masses want? One centre, one message!”
72. Translated from *Razākār* 43/16:1 (24 April 1979). The speech was also published as a pamphlet by the *Majlis-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i Ja’fariya* Bhakkar (1979).
73. *Razākār* 43/17:1 (1 May 1979). S. Muhsin Naqvi, a famous poet and *zākir* from Bhakkar, was murdered in 1995.
74. Translated from *Payām-i ‘Amal* 23/4:24 (June 1979). The 15 resolutions are also reproduced in *Razākār* 43/16:3 (24 April 1979).
75. See section 3.1, p. 59.
76. See section 4.5, pp. 138, 144.
77. See section 5.5., p. 164. Moreover, in August 1977 both Mufti Ja’far Husain and the SMC leadership had opted for supporting the PNA; see section 5.8, pp. 194–95.
78. See section 6.2, pp. 216–27.
79. T. R. Khān, *Safir-i inqilāb*, pp 98–99.
80. *Musāwī* can also be translated “just” or “suitable”.
81. *Payām-i ‘Amal* 23/4:25 (June 1979). On the Shia *azān* see 5.8, p. 188.
82. *Payām-i ‘Amal* 23/4:26; according to *Razākār* 43/17:4 promises for much more donations were made at that day, including Rs. 70,000 from Shias of Sargodha, Rs. 40,000 from Multan and Rs. 15,000 from Islamabad. Most of these never materialised, and the project was never followed up; see section 6.2, pp. 211–12.
83. T. R. Khān, *Safir-i nūr*, p. 73. All of its members were ‘*ulamā*’. A list of the original TNFJ Supreme Council members could not be obtained, but according to S. Wazarat Husain there was little or no difference to its composition as given in Fn 186 (p. 431).
84. T. R. Khān, *Safir-i nūr*, p. 73; its other members were Hafiz Riyaz Husain and Sha’iq Ambalvi (Lahore), S. Imdad Husain Shah Hamadani (Sargodha), Col. (retd.) Muhammad Khan (Chakwal), and S. Iqtidar Ali Mazhar (retd. Secretary of Information Department NWFP; Peshawar).
85. Author’s interview with S. Wazarat Husain, 8 January 2001. According to S. Hamid Ali Musavi, the statutes were passed only at a session of the TNFJ Executive Committee in Sialkot on 20 October 1982 (Interview in *al-Qā’im* 5/1985, p. 13).
86. *Dastūr al-‘Amal Tahrīk-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i Ja’fariya-i Pākistān* (Gujranwala: Shu’ba-i Nashr-o-Ishā’at-i Tahrīk-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i Ja’fariya-i Pākistān, n.d. [1980?]), p. 2. The wording is reminiscent of Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was finalised in November 1979.
87. *Dastūr al-‘Amal*, p. 2.
88. See sections 6.3, pp. 219–20. 7.3, pp. 270–72.
89. *Nawā-i Waqt*, 27 April 1979; T. R. Khān, *Safir-i nūr*, p. 74.
90. Ibid.; the other Shia leaders attending the talks were Qizilbash, S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari and Sha’iq Ambalvi (APSC); Jamil Husain Rizvi and Sadiq Ali ‘Irfani (SMC); S. Mahbub

- Ali Shamsi and S. Kazim Ali Shah (ITHS); S. Ghazanfar Ali Shah, Murtaza Pooya, S. Nasir ul-Ijtihadi, S. 'Abbas Haidar 'Abidi; S. 'Inayat Ali Shah and 'Aqil Turabi (*Razâkâr* 43/18–19:1; 8–16 May 1979).
91. Ibid. and T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 75–6.
  92. Ibid., p. 76.
  93. According to the report in *Dawn*, 6 May 1979, Mufti Ja'far Husain had withdrawn his resignation during the meeting. Although he did not attend any session of the CII after expiry of the April 30 ultimatum, he never entirely removed the misunderstanding until a June 1980 interview with *Nawâ-i Shî'a*; see quotations from that interview and a commentary from Muhammad Siddiq in *Razâkâr* 44/25:1+3 (1 July 1980).
  94. *Nawâ-i Waqt*, 7 May 1979; the demand was repeated at numerous press conferences throughout 1979 and the following years.
  95. *Dawn*, 5 May 1979; according to Mirza Yusuf Husain he was still a member of the CII when joining an official 'ulamâ' delegation to Iran in February 1980 (see below and Dogar, 'Allâma Mirzâ Yûsuf Husain Lakhnâwî sê 300 su'âl, p. 27); see also *Razâkâr* 44/25:3.
  96. *Dawn*, 1 June 1979. Sunni participants included Pir Karam Shah, Zafar Ahmad Ansari, Zia ud-Din Ahmad, Abd ul-Khaliq Ishaq, Muhammad Taqi 'Usmani, Abd ul-Quddus Hashimi and Muhammad 'Umar.
  97. Mirza Yusuf Husain, "Daura-i Irân-o-'Irâq kâ maqsad", *Razâkâr* 44/17:3 (1 May 1980). According to that account, the Committee remained inactive from July to October 1979.
  98. On 25 May it had been announced that such an ordinance would be issued "within a few days"; see *Dawn*, 26 May 1979. On the meaning of the 'ushr tax, see below.
  99. U.S. Embassy Report, 9 July 1979, reproduced facsimile in *Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den*, Vol. 46, "Pakistan-2" (Tehrân: Dâreshjûyân-e Mosalmân Pîrû-ye Khatt-e Emâm, 1980), p. 87. After the formation of a Central Zakat Council to supervise zakât collection and disbursement, arrangements for the constitution of District and Tehsil Zakat Committees were finalised on 1 July and rules for local zakât bodies were approved on 19 July (*Dawn*, 2 July and 20 July 1979).
  100. *Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den*, Vol. 46, (Pakistan-2), p. 88; *Mashriq* (Lahore), 3 July 1979, quoted in *Razâkâr* 43/26–27:8 (8–16 July 1979).
  101. Ibid. and *Razâkâr* 43/30–31:1 (8–16 August 1979).
  102. *Dawn*, 7 July 1979.
  103. *Razâkâr* 43/33:1 (1 September 1979); *Payâm-i 'Amal* 23/8:15–16 (October 1979).
  104. Among them were the ITHS Chairman S. Azhar Hasan Zaidi and the former SPP Chairman 'Abbas Haidar 'Abidi; see *Razâkâr* 43/34–35:6 (8–16 September 1979).
  105. *Hurriyat* (Karachi), 9 June 1979, quoted in *Razâkâr* 43/24:4 (24 June 1979).
  106. See section 5.7, p. 187; 5.8, pp. 194–95.
  107. Jum'a Khan, "Mufti Mahmûd Yazîd kê sâth yâ Husain kê tarafdâr?", *Amn* (Karachi), 13 June 1979, quoted in *Razâkâr* 43/26–27:1–2; Muhammad Siddiq, "Mufti Mahmûd âpnê aslî rūp mên", *Razâkâr* 43/26–27:3 (8–16 July 1979).
  108. Jum'a Khan in the article quoted above mentioned the civil law left by the British, martial law and law of *shari'a* courts in some areas and cases; so did Mirza Yusuf Husain (see Fn 22); S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini later referred to the customary law in the Tribal Agencies as a fourth different kind of law implemented in Pakistan (T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 125).
  109. *Sadâ-i Baltistân* (Karachi), 16 June 1979, quoted in *Razâkâr* 43/25:4; the reference is to a press conference of Mufti Ja'far Husain in Karachi.
  110. Mirza Yusuf Husain, "Nûrânî Miyân kî nâ'î mantiq", *Razâkâr* 43/36:1.
  111. Interview with Mufti Ja'far Husain in *Nawâ-i Shî'a*, June 1980, quoted in *Razâkâr* 44/25:1; interview with S. 'Arif Husain by Abu'l-Intisar (*Razâkâr*), Chiniot 29 December 1984, reproduced as a pamphlet *Haqiqat-i hâl*, p. 13.

112. Khalid, “The Final Replacement of Parliamentary Democracy”, pp. 16–38.
113. On the inauguration speech of Zia ul-Haqq see *Dawn*, 10 October 1979; text of the joint declaration of the seminar, which called, among other things, for the application of *ijtihād* in matters of Islamic law, in *Dawn*, 12 October.
114. *Ibid.*
115. Mirza Yusuf Husain, “Daura-i Irān-o-‘Irāq kâ maqsad”, *Razākār* 44/17:3 (1 May 1980). Those who attended were Mufti Ja‘far Husain, Mirza Yusuf Husain, S. Muhammad Razi, Ibn Hasan Najafi, Najm ul-Hasan Kararvi, S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari, Jamil Husain Rizvi, Murtaza Pooya, Muhammad Murtaza (Islamabad), Dr Sibti ul-Hasan (Rawalpindi), Muhammad Rafiq Bangash (Peshawar) and S. Badshah Husain (Parachinar); also the Ministers for Religious Affairs (Mahmud A. Harun) and Railways (General S. Jamal Mian) and the CII Chairman Muhammad Afzal Cheema (*ibid.* and Dogar, 300 *su’āl*, p. 20).
116. S. Muhammad Razi claimed at that meeting that there was “no *mujtahid* in Pakistan” (Dogar, 300 *su’āl*, p. 22). Yet the same ‘*ālim* always used to refer to himself as “Muhammad Razi Mujtahid”, even when answering on the telephone (Author’s interview with Murtaza Pooya, November 2000).
117. At a press conference on 17 April 1980, he claimed that he had rejected the proposal because he knew the rulings of the Shia *marāji’* on *zakāt* well (*Razākār* 44/17:3). Later he spoke of an attempt by Zia ul-Haqq to bribe him with that offer for travelling on government expense (Interview with *Nawā-i Shī’a*, June 1980, quoted in *Razākār* 44/25:1; 1 July 1980). By contrast, Mirza Yusuf Husain claimed that Mufti Ja‘far Husain had tacitly agreed (Dogar, 300 *su’āl*, p. 24).
118. *Ibid.*, pp. 25–6.
119. *Ibid.*, pp. 26–7.
120. Mirza Yusuf Husain, “Daura-i Irān-o-‘Irāq kâ maqsad”, *Razākār* 44/17:3.
121. Dogar, 300 *su’āl*, pp. 16, 27.
122. *Razākār* 44/17:3 (1 May 1980); *Razākār* 44/25:1 (1 July 1980). Members of the TNFJ Supreme Council had been appointed by Mufti Ja‘far Husain himself; see section 6.1, p. 206.
123. T. R. Khān, *Safir-i inqilāb*, pp. 101, 105; *Razākār* 44/21:2 (1 June 1980).
124. See section 4.3, p. 117.
125. I‘jaz Husain Mirza, “Mufti sāhib qibla kî mukhālafat kyūn?”, *Razākār* 44/17:6 (1 May 1980); interview with Mufti Ja‘far Husain in *Nawā-i Shī’a*, June 1980, quoted in *Razākār* 44/25:1.
126. Apart from Mufti Ja‘far Husain, he is possibly referring to the TNFJ Supreme Council.
127. Translation from Jamshid Ali Baluch, “Bê-bāk tabsira”, *Razākār* 44/21:2+4.
128. Interview in *Nawā-i Shī’a*, June 1980, quoted in *Razākār* 44/25:1.
129. The editor of *Razākār* even reported that Mufti Ja‘far Husain came to his office several times and apologised for his failure to answer all letters because of his duties such as writing, holding *majālis* and administrating *dīni madāris*, only to be told that he should have thought about that when accepting leadership in Bhakkar. The Mufti then allegedly replied that “everybody has his shortcomings”; see Muhammad Siddiq, “Kuch rahbar-i millat kē muta‘alliq”, *Razākār* 44/18–19:3+6 (8–16 May 1980).
130. Among them were Mirza Yusuf Husain (MAUSP), Jamil Husain Rizvi and Ali Muhammad Khwaja (SMC), S. Hadi Ali Shah Bukhari (APSC) and Lt. Col. (retd.) S. Fida Husain (ITHS); see I‘jaz Husain Mirza, “Mufti sāhib qibla kî mukhālafat kyūn?”, *Razākār* 44/17:6 (1 May 1980).
131. Haydar, “Politicization”, p. 82.
132. *Dawn*, 21 June 1980; Haydar, “Politicization”, pp. 79–80, gives the date mistakenly as 30 June. The provisions of this ordinance relating to ‘*ushr* did not come into force until 1983 (see below).
133. Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 143–50.

134. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 77. On Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, who was executed together with his sister on 9 April 1980, see Chibli Mallat, *The Renewal of Islamic Law. Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf, and the Shi'i International*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
135. Mujahid Husain, "Firqawarâna jang kâ ghâz", p. 241.
136. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 102. The total number of participants at the Islamabad Convention, including local Shias from the capital and Rawalpindi, has generally been estimated as having reached at least 150,000.
137. Mujahid Husain, "Firqawarâna jang", p. 242.
138. Fâ'izî, *Sonehri hurûf*, pp. 42–3. *Dawn*, 3 July 1980, reported that Zia had told Mufti Ja'far Husain that Shias would be free to make their own arrangements for the collection, administration and disbursement of *zakât*.
139. Its text is included in a pamphlet of Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi, *Yaddâsht jisê Jenrâl Muhammad Ziyâ' ul-Haqq ... ki khidmat mên ... 3 July 1980 kô pêsh kiyâ*, pp. 5–6. Other members of the delegation included Haidar Ali Mirza (Shia Youth League), Asghar Ali Shamsi (SPP) and Khaqan Babar (APSC) (*ibid.*, p. 4).
140. *Ibid.*, p. 3. Shabih ul-Hasnain even claimed that due to the influence of the MAUSP delegation policemen were disarmed to prevent bloodshed during the convention (*ibid.*, p. 4); see also Dogar, *300 su'âl*, pp. 17–18.
141. Muhammad Husain Shad of Shorkot (Jhang Dist.) was killed by a teargas shell and became famous as the "First Martyr for the *fiqh-i ja'fariya*".
142. Fâ'izî, *Sonehri hurûf*, pp. 43–5; according to T. R. Khân, Mufti Ja'far Husain himself had ordered the siege of the Secretariat (*Safir-i nûr*, p. 79; *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 103).
143. Mujahid Husain, "Firqawarâna jang", pp. 242–43; Munir D. Ahmed writes that at least one Corps Commander is said to have threatened to occupy the military General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, should any action against the demonstrators be taken ("Shi'is of Pakistan", p. 282; see also Haydar, "Politicization", p. 92 Fn 23). Four months earlier a conspiracy to assassinate Zia ul-Haqq during the 23 March Pakistan Day parade had been pre-empted. Among the ringleaders arrested was the Shia Major General (retd.) Tajammul Husain Malik, founder of an "Islamic Revolution Party" (1979). He was released after Zia's death in October 1988; see Tajammul Hussain Malik, *The Story of my Struggle*, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991), pp. 233–7; Burki & Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military*, p. 160.
144. Fâ'izî, *Sonehri hurûf*, p. 45. Mufti Ja'far Husain was accompanied by Safdar Husain Najafi, S. Gulab Ali Shah, the advocate S. Shabbir Husain Naqvi (then Secretary-General of the TNFJ), and Lt. Col. (retd.) S. Fida Husain Naqvi (*ibid.*).
145. Reproduced facsimile in T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 83.
146. Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan's Politics. The Zia Years*, (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1991), p. 114.
147. Mujahid Husain, "Firqawarâna jang", p. 243.
148. *Dawn*, 16 September 1980. The announcement had been preceded by several days of discussions with prominent scholars and '*ulamâ*' from all sects where unanimous agreement was reached.
149. Quoted from Qureshi, "The Politics of the Shia Minority", pp. 127–8 (*italics added*). His source is Circular 3750 CD2(6) Section 1(3) issued by the Minister of Finance, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad (*Dawn*, 20 June 1982).
150. *Dawn*, 18 September 1980; Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, p. 956.
151. See sections 3.2, p. 74, and Fn 47 to chapter 4 (p. 387).
152. *Dawn*, 18 September 1980; *Pakistan Penal Code (Act No XLV of 1860), 1983 Edition*, (Lahore: Law Times Publications), p. 87.
153. *Razâkâr* 45/8:2 (Resolution No. 2). It was argued that existing clauses in Chapter 25 PPC



- were sufficient. Other points of criticism were that the term *sahāba* was not explained clearly and the wording “by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation”, which would give the police a tool to intimidate Shia preachers. At that time lawsuits had already been filed against some Shia preachers for violating the ordinance.
154. *Razākār* 45/8:2 (Resolution No. 1).
  155. Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 139–40.
  156. Interview with Mufti Ja'far Husain, 30 July 1982, quoted in *Razākār* 46/30–31:5; *Wafāq-i 'Ulamā'-i Shī'a-i Pākistān kā tīsra sālāna tārīkhī ijtimā'*, mukhtasar rūpūr, 22–23 Mārch 1984, p. 50; Mayer, “Islamization and Taxation in Pakistan”, p. 73. (The regulation was abolished after 1983).
  157. *Ibid.*, pp. 73–5.
  158. Resolution No. 1 of the Third Annual Convention of the *Wafāq-i 'Ulamā'-i Shī'a* (Lahore, March 1984) claimed that taxation of Shia landlords was 50 per cent higher for lands from 2.5 to 12.5 acres, 100 per cent for 12.5 to 25 acres, 150 per cent for 25 to 150 acres and 200 per cent for lands above 150 acres; see *Wafāq-i 'Ulamā'-i Shī'a-i Pākistān kā tīsra sālāna tārīkhī ijtimā'*, mukhtasar rūpūr, pp. 50–51. According to S. Iqbal Husain Kermani (himself a Shia landlord) the figures were much exaggerated (Interview with the author, 1 February 2001).
  159. *Razākār* 45/20:3–4 (24 May 1981); 45/25–26:2 (1–8 July 1981). For details on these funds and their distribution during the first five years see Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 118–36.
  160. *Razākār* 45/20:3, quoting from criticism of his appointees for the NWFP in *Shihāb-i Thāqib* (Peshawar), 8–16 April 1981.
  161. *Wafāq-i 'Ulamā'-i Shī'a-i Pākistān kā tīsra sālāna tārīkhī ijtimā'*, pp. 41–42; see also Fā'izī, *Sonehrī hurūf*, p. 58.
  162. For such an appeal from Mufti Ja'far Husain of December 1980 see *Razākār* 45/1–2:8; also a strong-worded appeal from Shaikh Akhtar 'Abbas of March 1985 in *Wafāq-i 'Ulamā'-i Shī'a-i Pākistān kē chōthē sālāna ijtimā' kī tafsīlī rūpūr*, (Lahore, 1985), p. 9.
  163. Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 140; Shirazi, *System of Zakāt in Pakistan*, p. 39. Only in December 1999 the Supreme Court of Pakistan decreed that Sunnis as well as Shias had the right to apply for exemption from *zakāt* deduction.
  164. Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 181.
  165. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
  166. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
  167. Mujahid Husain, “Firqawarāna jang”, pp. 243–4; see also section 6.4, pp. 231, 236.
  168. Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 252–64.
  169. The *Wafāq ul-Madāris ash-Shī'a*, formed at a session in the *Jāmi'at ul-Muntazar* on 29–30 March 1979, was the first effective organisation for supervising all Shia *dīni madāris* and unifying their curricula. In April 1981 Safdar Husain Najafi was elected its chairman; see *Hauza-i 'Ilmiya Jāmi'at ul-Muntazar kā ta'āruf*, p. 9; for its predecessors *ibid.*, p. 9, and section 4.4, p. 126.
  170. The decision was taken on 12 September 1982 (Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 201). A notification from the University Grants Commission sent to directors of *dīni madāris* was dated 17 November 1982 (reproduced *ibid.*, p. 445). It acknowledged, among others, the degree “Sultān ul-Afāzīl” issued by the *Wafāq ul-Madāris ash-Shī'a* as equivalent to the M.A. in Arabic and Islamic Studies for the purpose of teaching Arabic and Islamic Studies in colleges and universities and for pursuing higher studies in these subjects.
  171. See sections 6.3, p. 223; 6.4, p. 231.
  172. In the 1980s Iranian Cultural Centres were working in Islamabad, Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta and Multan. In the 1990s some of these centres and their staff have become the target of terrorist or mob attacks.



173. During a visit to Qom and Mashad, March 1994, I was told that some 1,000–1,500 Pakistani *tulabâ* were studying at Iranian religious schools at that time. Presumably the number was smaller in the 1980s.
174. A delegation of the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* visiting Iran had asked Khomeini to dispatch a *mujtahid* qualified to give lessons of *dars-i khârij* to Lahore already in April 1979. Ayatollah Husain Nuri came to inspect the *madrasa* but was not ready to stay in Pakistan; another Iranian cleric even asked “whether there was electricity in Pakistan”; see Seth Nawazish Ali, “‘Allâma S. Safdar Husain Najafi, chand yâdên—chand bâtên”, *Misbâh ul-Qur'ân*, 1/1990, pp. 20–21, and Agha S. Ali al-Musavi, “‘Allâma S. Safdar Najafi, mērê ‘aziz dôst”, *ibid.*, pp. 26–7.
175. See complaints from early 1984 in *Wafâq-i 'Ulamâ'-i Shi'a-i Pâkistân kâ tîsra sâlâna târikhî ijtimâ'*, pp. 18–21, blaming the government for expelling Ayatollah Taheri “following her master's voice” (i.e. the U.S.). Yet he came back every year for delivering lectures up to 1996 (Author's interview with Nusrat Ali Shahani, 21 January 2001).
176. Muhammad Siddiq mentioned diatribes against Mufti Ja'far Husain sent to him for publication in *Razâkâr* before September 1980 by Mirza Yusuf Husain, Ali Ghazanfar Kararvi, Sajjad Husain Bukhari and Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi (*Razâkâr* 44/33:1).
177. Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi, *Yâddâsht* (see above, Fn 139), p. 2.
178. Fâ'izî, *Sonehrî hurûf*, p. 57.
179. Interview with Sha'iq Ambalvi in *al-Qâ'im*, April 1985, pp. 9–24, here pp. 22–3. On reason may have been that Mufti Ja'far Husain had made the same Ambalvi, who had been his friend since four decades, Secretary-General of the TNFJ at that time.
180. Fâ'izî, *Sonehrî hurûf*, p. 59; Kâzimî, *Mufti Ja'far Husain*, p. 75.
181. *Ibid.*, quoting from an interview with Safdar Husain on 22 August 1983.
182. List of all members in Malik, *Islamisierung*, p. 435.
183. Many Shias had protested against the appointment of Kararvi for lack of qualification (*Razâkâr* 45/29–30:4). Talib Jauhari (b.1939) hailed from Bihar and had been a college lecturer in Karachi as well as the principal of the *Jâmi'at Imâmiya* there; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 308.
184. No successor for Jamil Husain Rizvi was found for at least one year. Anyhow the SMC had become more or less obsolete since the Bhakkar Convention. Chairmen of what had remained from the SMC in the 1980s and 1990s included his son S. Talib Haidar Rizvi, S. 'Abbas Husain Gardezi (Multan) and S. Mazhar 'Abbas Zaidi (Karachi).
185. He died on 24 September 1982; see obituaries in *Razâkâr* 46/37:2 (1 October 1982); 46/41:2 (1 November 1982). Muzaffar Ali Khan left no male heir. His daughter Afsar Riza Qizilbash entered the National Assembly as a member of the Muslim League in 1985 on one of the reserved seats for women and became a minister in the Junejo government 1985–8. In 1988 she contested and lost the NA elections on a PPP ticket; see Anjum, *Siyâsat kê fir'aun*, pp. 259–60.
186. A list of members of the TNFJ Supreme Council published shortly after its session in Gujranwala on 15 June 1982 was as follows: Safdar Husain Najafi, Hafiz Riyaz Husain and Akhtar 'Abbas (Lahore); Taj ud-Din Haidari (Gujranwala); Sajid Ali Naqvi (Rawalpindi); Muhammad Husain Dhakko and Nasir Husain Najafi (Sargodha); Malik I'jaz Husain (Khushab); S. 'Ashiq Husain (Ahmadpur Sial); S. Gulab Ali Shah (Multan); S. Muhibb Husain (Bahawalpur); Thamar Husain Zaidi (Hyderabad); Talib Husain Jauhari and S. Raziyya Ja'far Naqvi (Karachi); Husain Bakhsh and Ghulam Hasan (Jara); S. 'Abid Husain Shah (Parachinar); Jawad Husain (Hangu); Mirza Muhammad Alim (Peshawar); Agha Tawassuli (Quetta); Kifayat Husain (Muzaffarabad, AJK); Ghulam Haidar (Gilgit); Ghulam Muhammad and S. Ali Musavi (Skardu); taken from a TNFJ pamphlet, *Islâmâbâd shi'a kanwenshan kî dôsrî sâlgirah aur hukûmat kê wa'da-ifâ'î kâ hâl*, (Lahore 1982).

187. In August 1980 Khomeini had called for the overthrow of three regimes allied to the West in the region, including that of Pakistan; Radio Tehran had dubbed Zia ul-Haqq a “stooge of the Americans” (*Dawn*, 4 September 1980; *Kuwait Times*, 10 September 1980). Such polemics cooled down somewhat after Iraq’s attack on Iran in September that year.
188. Fā’izī, *Sonehrī hurūf*, pp. 51–5 (including the text of a press conference he gave in Qom).
189. Press conference of Mufti Ja’far Husain on 22 December 1981, *Nawā-i Waqt*, 23 December 1981.
190. Ibid. On the *Majlis-i Shura*, which held only ten sessions from January 1982 to July 1984, see Shah, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 273–74. Among the Shia ‘*ulamā*’ appointed as members were S. Muhammad Raziyy and Shabih ul-Hasnain Muhammadi, but no TNFJ members.
191. Muhammad Siddiq, “Tanzīm-i nau kī zarūrat”, *Razākār* 45/48:3 (24 December 1981); Shuja’ Malik, “Wafāqī tanzīm kī zarūrat”, *Razākār* 46/10–11:4 (8–16 March 1982); S. Asif Husain Shirazi, “Tanzīm-i nau kī zarūrat”, *ibid.*, pp. 4+6; S. Ali Shah Bukhari, “Shī’a qiyādat kā fuqdān”, *ibid.*, p. 6.
192. *Razākār* 46/13–14:3–5. Its convenor was ‘Aqīl Turabi, a member of the *Tahrīk-i Istiqlāl* of Air Marshall (retd.) Asghar Khan. On his activities see also Qureshi, “Politics of the Shia Minority”, pp. 128–30.
193. He was born in Khairpur in 1950 and had obtained a degree in political science from Karachi University. Since the late 1970s he became one of the most popular *zākirs* in Pakistan. During the 1980 Islamabad Convention he gave full support to the TNFJ. He died in a road accident in 1998; see Chaman, *Mēri yādgar mulāqātēn*, pp. 268–81; see also Fn 196.
194. Interview with *Sang-i Mil* (Multan), 9 April 1982, quoted in *Razākār* 46/21:2 (1 June 1982).
195. See section 5.3, pp. 152–54.
196. According to T. R. Khān, the government tried to prop up the *Imamia Council* as a possible alternative to both rivalling wings of the TNFJ in 1984 (*Safīr-i nūr*, p. 119). However, Mujahid Husain writes that ‘Irfan Haidar ‘Abidi was a long-time supporter of the PPP, who called Zia ul-Haqq a “second Yazid” (“Firqawarāna jang”, p. 254).
197. Interview with Hafiz Riyaz Husain, *al-Qā’im*, Wafāq-i ‘Ulamā’-i Shī’a-i Pākistān No., n.d. [1986], p. 11; see also section 6.1, pp. 199–200.
198. *Fihrist-i marākiz-i dīniyāt zīr intizām-i Wafāq-i ‘Ulamā’-i Shī’a-i Pākistān*, (Lahore, n.d. [1985]). At that time the districts with the largest number of such centres were Sargodha (106), Muzaffargarh (76), Baltistan (74), Gilgit (66), Dera Ghazi Khan (62), Bhakkar (54), Kohat (39), Layyah (39) and Jhang (30) (*ibid.*, p. 5.).
199. Translated from *Wafāq-i ‘Ulamā’-i Shī’a-i Pākistān kā tīsra sālāna tārikhī ijtīmā’*, *mukhtasar rūpūrt*, 22–23 Mārch 1984, p. 9.
200. By 1985 it had 1,423 regular members; see a pamphlet *Wafāq-i ‘Ulamā’-i Shī’a-i Pākistān, ēk kārwan rawān dawān*, Lahore n.d. [1985], p. 3.
201. Bangash, *Political and Administrative Development*, p. 181. S. ‘Arif Husain linked the attack to the activities of American relief teams, alleging a conspiracy “to cut of the Shia centres in Pakistan from the influence of the Iranian revolution”; see T. R. Khān, *Safīr-i nūr*, pp. 58–60.
202. Bangash, *op. cit.*, pp. 187–99; see also section 6.3, pp. 229–30.
203. Mujahid Husain, “Firqawarāna jang”, p. 246.
204. *Dawn*, 20 January 1983.
205. See Burki & Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military*, p. 167; on the background of the clashes see ‘Ali Akbar Shāh, *Jaltī Masjidēn*, *passim*. The Iranian Consul General in Karachi, Muhammad Ali Sadeq Niyarki, was accused of taking sides too openly and had to leave Pakistan (*Kuwait Times*, 5 March 1983; Ahmed, “The Shi’is of Pakistan”, pp. 284–5). On

- 15 April a planned protest march of 100,000 Shias was called off at the eleventh hour, but 2,000 Shias defied the ban.
206. For an account of his final months see Fâ'izî, *Sonehri hurûf*, pp. 67–71; Kâzimi, *Mufti Ja'far Husain*, pp. 41–50.
207. Interview with Jang, 10 July 1983, reproduced in Fâ'izî, *Sonehri hurûf*, pp. 60–66. The MRD agitation started on 14 August and lasted for several months; see Burki & Baxter, op. cit., pp. 167–9.
208. *al-Qâ'im* 5/1985, p. 14, and 2/1986, p. 8 (Interviews with S. Hamid Ali Musavi and S. Sajid Ali Naqvi). T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 85, mistakenly gives the date as 18 October. Invitations for the meeting were sent by S. Wazarat Husain, whose initiative to hold a convention in Bhakkar had been the starting point of the TNFJ in 1979 (see section 6.1, p. 204).
209. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 87; *Dastûr al-'Amal Tahrik-i Nifâz-i Fiqh-i Ja'fariya-i Pâkistân*, pp. 3–4 (Article 4). All members of the Executive Committee had been named by Mufti Ja'far Husain. Likewise the TNFJ Leader had been entitled to name 30 members of the Central Council, while the others were to be elected from amongst the provincial and lower level TNFJ units in Punjab (40), Sindh (20), NWFP (15), Balochistan (10), Northern Areas (8) and AJK (2) (ibid.).
210. Ibid., p. 86. According to Sha'iq Ambalvi, 30 of the missing members were actually named by Safdar Husain Najafi; see his interview in *al-Qâ'im* 4/1985, pp. 19–24, here p. 20.
211. Haydar, "Politicization", p. 87. Among those present were Mirza Yusuf Husain, Ahmad Hasan Nuri, and S. Sajid Ali Naqvi (leader of the TNFJ from 1988).
212. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 99–100; interview with Musavi in *al-Qâ'im* 5/1985, pp. 6–19, here pp. 8–9.
213. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 96–8, provides details to support this view, among them an alleged private statement of Zia that he had "deflated the Shia balloon" (p. 98).
214. See detailed quotations in Haydar, "Politicization", pp. 87–90.
215. See section 4.4, pp. 131–33; 5.6, pp. 175–80.
216. Naqvi, "Controversy", pp. 147–48.
217. Burki & Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military*, pp. 168–9.
218. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 88.
219. Each group of the TNFJ, which split into two factions on 10 February 1984, later claimed that it had been the first to set the date for the election of a new leader. S. Wazarat Husain confirmed his own claim in an interview with the author, 8 January 2001.
220. Haidar, "Politicization", p. 87.; T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 98–9.
221. On his biography see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 205–6.
222. See T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 88–9; interview with Sha'iq Ambalvi, *al-Qâ'im* 4/1985, pp. 19–24, here p. 22.
223. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 89. Sha'iq Ambalvi claimed that Safdar Husain Najafi had strongly desired to become leader of the TNFJ at that time, but had not dared to accept his nomination because 600 supporters of Mufti Ja'far Husain had gathered outside the premises of *Qasr-i Zainab* in Bhakkar and threatened to revolt in case of his election (*al-Qâ'im* 4/1985, p. 23).
224. See T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 90–91; interview with S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini, *al-Qâ'im* 5/1985, pp. 25–32, here p. 27.
225. See his detailed biography *Safir-i nûr*, passim; also Zâkir Husain, *Husainî Husain kî rah par*; Kâzimi, *Shahîd 'Allâma 'Arif Husain al-Husainî*. The al-'Arif Academy (Lahore) has also published four volumes of his speeches, *Guftâr-i sidq* (1992), *Payâm-i nûr* (1995), *Sukhan-i 'ishq* (1996) and *Âdâb-i kâr-wân* (1997).
226. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 28–31; on his family background since the early sixteenth century see ibid., pp. 23–7.
227. Ibid., pp. 39–42.

228. Ibid., pp. 44–9; allegedly Husaini was once arrested by the SAVAK and ordered to sign a declaration that he would refrain from all activities against the Shah, which he refused (ibid., p. 45).
229. Ibid., pp. 49–57. Apart from such activities in Parachinar, he also tried to organise demonstrations in front of the Iranian consulate in Peshawar, which were prevented by the police (ibid., p. 57).
230. Ibid., pp. 78, 80; Mujahid Husain, “Firqawarâna jang”, p. 261.
231. See section 6.2, p. 218.
232. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 58–59.
233. Ibid., pp. 60–70; Husaini set up an “*‘Alamdâr* Foundation” and a “Martyrs Foundation” in Parachinar in 1980. In 1983 he organised a campaign of civil disobedience against the Political Agent, forcing him to dissolve a managing committee which had channelled development funds to certain tribal chieftains (ibid., pp. 64–66). On details of the dispute see Bangash, *Political and Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, pp. 209–10.
234. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 100–1.
235. Ibid., pp. 95, 107, 111. During Husaini’s first press conference in Bhakkar after his election Dhakko sat at his side. Thereafter some friends had advised Husaini to remove Dhakko from the photograph taken at the occasion to avoid being identified with him, which he refused (ibid., p. 92). In mid-1985 Husaini said that it had taken him one and a half years to convince his people that he was both a Shia and a supporter of ‘*azâdârî*’ (ibid., p. 113).
236. Ibid., pp. 105–7; T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, pp. 108–10.
237. Ibid., p. 113; *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 114–15.
238. *Haqîqat-i hâl*, p. 2. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 108, also admits that Husaini did not have more supporters among the ‘*ulamâ*’ than Musavi at the beginning.
239. He gave a detailed account of fourteen of such initiatives in *Haqîqat-i hâl*, pp. 3–8; see also *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 108–10. According to these accounts, Musavi always avoided a meeting or set the condition that Husaini first acknowledge him as the Leader of the TNFJ. For Musavi’s version see *al-Qâ’im* 5/1985, pp. 15–16.
240. *Safir-i nûr*, p. 112. The event is also mentioned by ‘Abid ‘Askari in an obituary for Safdar Husain Najafi, giving the latter the credit for having changed Husaini’s mind. The meeting took place in the house of Seth Nawazish Ali on 28 February 1985 (*al-Qâ’im* 5/1990, pp. 46–7).
241. *Safir-i nûr*, p. 105; *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 112.
242. Ibid., pp. 205–33.
243. Translation from a pamphlet *Sayyid al-shuhadâ’ Imâm Husain ... kê chaudasau-sâla jashn-i wilâdat kê mauqî’ par qâ’id-i millat-i ja’fariya kê paighâm* (Peshawar, 3 Sha’ban 1404H), pp. 4–6.
244. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, pp. 119, 214–16. The *Yaum-i Murbadâb Amrikâ* was observed in Pakistan for the first time on 16 May 1986 and abandoned after the death of Husaini (ibid., p. 216), but the *Yaum al-Quds* with demonstrations against Israel has remained a regular event ever since 1984 and has sometimes also been observed by the *Jamâ’at-i Islâmî* and other Sunni groups (see section 7.3, p. 267).
245. See section 6.4, pp. 231–34.
246. Ahmed, “The Shi’is of Pakistan”, p. 285. The JI leader Maududi had met with Khomeini already in 1963 and had been arrested in early 1964 after the JI organ *Tarjumân ul-Qur’ân* had severely criticised the Shah (Nasr, *Vanguard*, pp. 154, 253). In 1978 Maududi had been among the first Pakistani party leaders to back the Iranian revolution, and the JI had sent a delegation to Khomeini in early 1979 congratulating his victory (Ahmed, “Shi’is of Pakistan”, p. 285). See also the report about the visit of two representatives of Khomeini

- to Maududi and other JI leaders in 1979 in Chaman, *Mêri yâdgar mulâqâtên*, pp. 48–53. In his biography on Maududi, however, Nasr has emphasised the different approaches of both men; see Nasr, *Mawdudî*, references on p. 217.
247. On continuous attempts by Iranian leaders since 1979 to pose as the “vanguard of Islamic unity” see Buchta, *Iranische Schia und Islamische Einheit*, pp. 51–113, 245–74.
  248. See text of the inaugural speech of S. Wazarat Husain at the session in Bhakkar, 10 February 1984 (Urdu pamphlet published by the TNFJ), p. 7.
  249. *Haqîqat-i hâl*, p. 14. (The convention did not take place during that year).
  250. Ibid., pp. 5–6; T. R. Khân, *Safîr-i nûr*, pp. 110–11.
  251. Ahmed, “Shi’is of Pakistan”, pp. 282–3.
  252. *al-Wafâq* (Lahore), No. 7, November 1984, pp. 17–19; Harrop, “Pakistan and Revolutionary Iran”, pp. 122–3.
  253. *al-Muntazar* 26/23:3–4 (20 January 1985); 27/5:16 (20 April 1985); 27/6–7:2 (5–20 May 1985).
  254. A pejorative word for “Wahhabi”, also used to refer to the Saudi Arabian regime (Najd is the heartland and birthplace of the Wahhabi movement). Likewise “Najdiyyat” stands pejoratively for “Wahhabism” or the Saudis.
  255. Sabra and Shatila are two Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut where massacres were committed in September 1982.
  256. Translation from T. R. Khân, *Safîr-i nûr*, pp. 118–19.
  257. *Haqîqat-i hâl*, p. 14; *Safîr-i nûr*, p. 126.
  258. Harrop, “Pakistan and Revolutionary Iran”, pp. 114–17.
  259. T. R. Khân, *Safîr-i nûr*, pp. 120–21. Thus the Pakistani press reported that Husaini had called Zia ul-Haq a “true follower of Islam”, and had said that after the wish of Iran’s President Khamenei it was the duty of every follower of the *fiqh-i ja’fariya* to cooperate with the President in the task of promoting Islam in the country (*Dawn*, 12 December 1984).
  260. *Safîr-i nûr*, pp. 122. On 7 December Zia received a Shia delegation comprising Mirza Yusuf Husain, Nasir Husain (Sargodha), Jawad Husain (Hangu), Talib Jauhari, ‘Abbas Haidar ‘Abidi and Nasir al-Ijtihadi; the latter even said, Zia should remain president for life, while the others complained about unfulfilled promises; see Dogar, *Allâma Mîrzâ Yûsuf Husain Lakhnâwî sê 300 su’âl*, pp. 27–30.
  261. Ahmed, “Shi’is of Pakistan”, p. 282.
  262. *Safîr-i nûr*, p. 123. At the same time, the TNFJ(H) decided to cooperate with the MRD in its campaign for full restoration of democratic rights but not to become a formal member (ibid., pp. 246–8).
  263. Ahmed, “Shi’is of Pakistan”, p. 284; Keddie, “Shi’a of Pakistan”, p. 10; see also a speech of Musavi of August 1980, reproduced in a pamphlet of S. Riza Husain Shah, *Asl rûdâd nâm-nihâd ittihâd kânfarans mun’aqida Asadâbâd nazd-i Dîna, Zala’ Jhelum, bi-târikh 30 Âgast 1986*, pp. 8–9.
  264. Several sympathisers of Husaini interviewed by the author have termed the Musavi-Junejo Accord a hoax which was later disclaimed by the government (among them Murtaza Pooya, 13 November 2000). S. Wazarat Husain said it only concerned ‘*azâdârî*’ (Interview 8 January 2001).
  265. T. R. Khân, *Safîr-i nûr*, pp. 128–9. Karachi was left out because of the recent sectarian clashes there.
  266. Ibid., pp. 129, 143–4.
  267. Ibid., p. 141.
  268. Ibid., pp. 129, 135–6. (The account, although partisan, seems credible in that respect).
  269. Ibid., pp. 130–4.

270. Ibid., pp. 136–7; *ibid.*, pp. 137–9 reproduction of a message from Husaini to *zākirs*, preachers and *‘azādārs* of 17 July 1985, harping strongly on a sentimental Shia chord.
271. Ibid., pp. 143–50. An ultimatum was delivered at the Second Annual Convention of the TNFJ(H) in Malir (Karachi) on 10 April 1986. On 22 April the government promised to release all Shias arrested in Quetta, and Husaini made a triumphant visit to the town two days later (*ibid.*).
272. *Dawn*, 18 July 1985; it was headed by the Minister of Law, Iqbal Ahmad Khan, and included the Shia members Mrs. Afsar Riza Qizilbash (MNA), Riyaz Husain Naqvi (Secretary-General of the TNFJ-M); the advocate Saghir Husain Naqvi, and Brig. (retd.) Sher Ali Khan.
273. T. R. Khān, *Safir-i nūr*, p. 126; *Dawn*, 27 July 1985.
274. Kennedy, *Islamization of Laws*, pp. 88–9; Shah, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 286–91.
275. T. R. Khān, *Safir-i nūr*, pp. 161–6.
276. *Dawn*, 1 May 1986; Kennedy, *Islamization of Laws*, pp. 89–91.
277. *Safir-i nūr*, p. 279; the offer was conveyed through Iran’s ambassador in Islamabad.
278. *Le Monde*, 15 January 1986; Qasimi, *Sawānih-i hāyāt-i Maulānā Haqq Nawāz Jhangwī*, pp. 420–21. The TNFJ(H) organised the popular receptions for Khamenei under the name of *Tahrik-i Wahdat-i Islāmi* (“Movement for Islamic Unity”), a camouflage which was later criticised even by its Secretary-General Wazarat Husain; see his interview in *al-Qā’im*, Wafāq-i ‘Ulamā’-i Shī’a-i Pākistān Number, n.d. [1986], pp. 25–9, here p. 28.
279. Harrop, “Pakistan and Revolutionary Iran”, pp. 125–6; Husaini met Khamenei during a reception at the residence of Iran’s ambassador and explained his rebuttal of Zia ul-Haqq (*Safir-i nūr*, p. 279).
280. See above, Fn 271. On 21 April 1986, General (retd.) Muhammad Musa, the newly appointed Governor of Balochistan, received a TNFJ(H) delegation led by Sajid Ali Naqvi (*Safir-i nūr*, p. 146).
281. See section 6.4, p. 237.
282. T. R. Khān, *Safir-i nūr*, pp. 153–9. On his relations with Sunni ‘*ulamā*’, whom he regularly approached during his tours in Pakistan, see *ibid.*, pp. 170–92. T. R. Khān claims that Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman, who led the more moderate faction of the JUI (as opposed to that of Samī’ ul-Haqq), had cordial relations with Husaini (*ibid.*, p. 192).
283. Ibid., pp. 250–51.
284. Ibid.; members of the commission were S. Safdar Husain Najafi, Shaikh Muhsin Ali, S. Sajid Ali Naqvi, S. Sharaf ud-Din Musavi, S. Wazarat Husain, General (retd.), S. Tasawwur Husain, Muhammad Husain Hasani, S. Shamim ‘Abbas Bukhari, S. Ali Naqi, and S. Thāqib Naqvi. The text of the manifesto titled “Our Way” is reproduced in Muhammad ‘Uthmān and Mas’ūd Ash’ar (eds.), *Pākistān kī siyāsī jamā’atēn* (Lahore: Sang-i Mīl Publications), pp. 774–811. For an analysis see Haydar, “Politicization”, pp. 83–84; see also Husaini’s explanations of the manifesto in Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Shia movement”, *passim*.
285. Haydar, “Politicization”, p. 84; Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Shia movement”, p. 812. Yet it demanded “effective representation” of all recognised Islamic schools of thought, as well as unhindered observance of Muharram and the right to proselytise for one’s faith (Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 696).
286. He was referring to accusations of Sunni radicals that Shias consider the Koran to be falsified (see section 6.4, p. 233).
287. Translation from *Safir-i nūr*, pp. 257–62; the full text of Husaini’s speech *ibid.*, pp. 256–65.
288. Translation from the pamphlet *6 Jūlay Mochī Darwāza Lahaur mēn Qur’ān-o-Sunnat Kānfārāns kiyūn zarūrī hai*, pp. 2–3.

289. See section 7.1, p. 240.
290. One of them was Husaini's right-hand man Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi who served as a doctor in Iran for some months in 1986/87; see T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, pp. 88–9.
291. Interview with S. Wazarat Husain, *al-Qâ'im*, Wafâq-i 'Ulamâ'-i Shî'a-i Pâkistân Number, n.d. [1986], pp. 26–9.
292. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 118.
293. See section 7.1, pp. 240–41.
294. Bangash, *Political and Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, pp. 191–5; Mujahid Husain, "Firqawarâna jang", p. 247.
295. Bangash, op. cit., pp. 194–5.
296. Martin Kramer, "Islam's Enduring Feud", *Middle East Contemporary Survey* Vol. XI (1987), pp. 153–79, here pp. 172–4. Pakistani Shias had also been among the demonstrators which clashed with Saudi security forces.
297. Harrop, "Pakistan and Revolutionary Iran", pp. 119–21; see also section 6.4, p. 237.
298. Kramer, "Islam's Enduring Feud", pp. 175–6.
299. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, pp. 217–18. A "Hajj seminary" in the Faletti's Hotel of Lahore on 24 June 1988 was the last conference which Husaini attended before his death (ibid.).
300. Ibid., pp. 135–36; *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 268–72. These conferences took place in Multan (8 March 1988), Faisalabad (18 March 1988) and Dera Ismail Khan (17 June 1988).
301. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 317–18, quoting a warning from Murtaza Pooya at that time. According to Pooya, the Iranian leadership, too, had advised Husaini to moderation, especially after the 1987 visit of Khamenei to Pakistan (Interview with the author, 13 November 2000).
302. See section 7.1, p. 241.
303. According to Mujahid Husain, a plan to assassinate Zia ul-Haq on that occasion had been vetoed by Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi ("Firqawarâna jang", p. 260). Incidentally, Dr Naqvi had been jailed in Saudi Arabia since some weeks at that time, and some Shias had approached Zia during the funeral prayers for Husaini and asked him to help Dr Naqvi and other TNFJ members get released, which he did (*Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 224).
304. See the account of Mohammad Yousaf & Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap. Afghanistan's Untold Story* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992), p. 14.
305. M. Yusuf, "The War Within", *The Star* (Karachi), 15 September 1988.
306. See section 8.3, pp. 311–12.
307. See Zulfikar A. Khalid, "Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Relationship 1947–1990: Military Security and Economic Factors", in: *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad) 13(1989)1, pp. 53–78. Most Pakistani Sunnis of the Deobandi and *Ahl-i hadîth* denominations also had high notions of the way the *sharî'a* was implemented in Saudi Arabia and paid reverence to the Saudi monarchy as custodian of the holiest places of Islam.
308. I.e. "Leader of all Muslims world-wide". On the propagation of that claim see Karl-Heinrich Göbel, *Moderne Schiitische Politik und Staatsidee nach Taufiq al-Fukaikî, Muhammad Gawâd Mugniya, Rûhullâh Humaini (Khomeyni)* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1984), p. 239; Buchta, *Iranische Schia und Islamische Einheit*, pp. 70–71.
309. Mujahid Husain, "Firqawarâna jang", p. 257.
310. See sections 1.2, pp. 20–21; 2.2, pp. 47–48; 3.5, pp. 86–98; 4.2, pp. 108–11; 5.7, pp. 180–88.
311. Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan", pp. 705–13; Abou Zahab, "Le Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan", passim.
312. See sections 6.1, p. 199; 6.2, pp. 208–09.
313. In July 1986 Fazl ur-Rahman was elected convenor of the MRD for one year (*Dawn*, 23 July 1986). During the 1988 and 1990 NA elections his faction of the JUI was opposed to the



- PPP, but the alliance was revived during the second government of Benazir Bhutto 1993–6; see section 7.2, p. 250.
314. Jalalzai, *Sectarianism*, pp. 149–51. Sami' ul-Haqq was first Secretary-General of the Darkhwasti faction, and since 1995 he headed a JUI faction of his own.
  315. For example, by submitting the “private Shariat bill” in 1985 (see section 6.3, p. 226), which was opposed by the JUI-F, and through a close alliance with the *Sipāh-i Sahāba* ever since that organisation was formed (see below).
  316. A. A. Shāh, *Jaltī Masjidēn*, p. 102. According to that source, its first chairman was Maulana Salimullah Khan and its Secretary-General Maulana Isfandiyar Khan. According to *Herald* 8/1991, p. 95, the latter was the founder and chairman, while its Secretary-General was Mufti Wali Hasan of the *Jāmi'at Binōriya* in Korangi (Karachi), which has since grown to become the largest Deobandi *madrasa* in Pakistan (see a report in *Newsline* 6/2000, pp. 81–6).
  317. A. A. Shāh, *Jaltī Masjidēn*, pp. 103–25. Among the slogans raised at an ‘*Azmat-i Sahāba* Conference in February 1983 were “Khomeini *murābād!*” and “Shias, your death is coming!” (ibid., pp. 122–23). See also a pamphlet *Sāniha-i Karāchi aur Sawād-i A'zam kā asli chehra* (Lahore: Idārat-i Sawād-i A'zam-i Imāmīya, n.d. [1983?]).
  318. Qāsimī, *Sawānih-i hayāt-i Maulānā Haqq Nawāz Jhangvī shahīd*, p. 26; see also quotations from Balakōtī, *Amīr-i 'Azimat* (another detailed biography of Jhangvī), in Zaman, “Sectarianism”, pp. 699–703.
  319. Ibid., p. 699; Qāsimī, *Sawānih-i hayāt*, pp. 36–9. The mosque, which had formerly been a stage for the famous *Majlis-i Ahrār* leader ‘Atā’ullah Shah Bukhari, was later named after Haqq Nawaz.
  320. Sadiq Jafri & Shams Malik, “The Jhang Saga”, *The News*, 2 March 1991.
  321. According to Qāsimī, Haqq Nawaz made it “a condition” for accepting the office of a preacher that he would be given full freedom “to take the enemies of the *sahāba* to task” (*Sawānih-i hayāt*, p. 89).
  322. Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 706; Abou Zahab, “Le Sipah-e Sahaba”, pp. 146, 149.
  323. Mujahid Husain, “Firqawarāna jang”, p. 255. Most important among them were the Sial family and the *sayyids* of Raju'a and Shah Jiwna; see Anjum, *Siyāsāt kē fir'aun*, pp. 304–25.
  324. Qāsimī, *Sawānih-i hayāt*, pp. 81–6.
  325. See an interesting quotation from Balakōtī, *Amīr-i 'Azimat*, pp. 20–23, in Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 700. On resentment of Sunni radicals against the influence of Shia ‘*azādārī*’ processions on ordinary Sunnis see also section 4.2, pp. 109–10.
  326. Husain, “Firqawarāna jang”, p. 252.
  327. This seems to refer to Shia criticism of the wives of the Prophet, especially of ‘A’isha.
  328. Qāsimī, *Sawānih-i hayāt*, pp. 91–3 (abbreviated translation). These, of course, were only “headlines” which would be expounded in great detail during sermons; some more far-fetched allegations about Shia beliefs are listed ibid., p. 284; see also Abou Zahab, “Le Sipah-e Sahaba”, pp. 154–5, and *Maulānā Haqq Nawāz Jhangvī kī pandrah ta'rikh-sāz taqīrīn* (Lahore: Idārat-i Nashriyāt-i Islāmī, 1991), passim.
  329. A good example of such literature is Nu'mānī, *Irānī inqilāb, Imām Khumainī aur shī'iyat* (published in Pakistan in 1983); see also comments on that book in Rizvi, *Socio-Intellectual History*, Vol. I, pp. 394–7.
  330. Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 704; see also Nu'mānī, op. cit., pp. 19–21.
  331. Abou Zahab, “Le Sipah-e Sahaba”, p. 154.
  332. Mujahid Husain considered the language of Ghulam Husain Najafi's book *Sahm-i mas'mûm fī jawāb nikāh Umm Kulthûm* peculiarly insulting. This and other books of the same author were translated into Arabic by the *Sipah-i Sahāba* and distributed in Saudi Arabia and



- other Arab countries (“*Firqawarâna jang*”, p. 256). Generally on Shia polemical literature in Pakistan see Naqvi, *Bibliography*, Vol. II, pp. 121–40, 309–402.
333. Qâsimî, *Sawânih-i hayât*, pp. 94–103. (No dates are given in that source regarding the said measures against Haqq Nawaz).
  334. *Ibid.*, pp. 108–9; Haqq Nawaz was “Patron” of the SSP, while Shaikh Hâkim was elected its Chief and Muhammad Yusuf Mujahid its Secretary-General. “*Anjuman*” was dropped as part of the name in 1992 to avoid the abbreviation “ASS”. The 6<sup>th</sup> of September is being celebrated as a national holiday (“Defence of Pakistan Day”) since 1966.
  335. Qâsimî, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–9.
  336. Zaman, “Sectarianism”, pp. 701–2.
  337. Qâsimî, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–5.
  338. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–11.
  339. He had headed the TAS, which was lauded by Haqq Nawaz and other SSP leaders as “the only organisation in Pakistan having wholeheartedly confronted Shia provocations”, since the death of Nur ul-Hasan Bukhari (January 1984). Maulana Taunsavi remained a staunch supporter of the SSP, although some of his associates resented the “upstart” Haqq Nawaz (Qâsimî, *op. cit.*, pp. 275–6).
  340. He was the son of Maulana Ghulamullah Khan from Rawalpindi, to whom Qâsimî refers as the founder of that organisation (*op. cit.*, p. 280). According to other sources, the *Jam’iyat-i Ishâ’at al-Tauhîd wa’l-Sunna* was founded by Maulana Muhammad Tahir in Panjpir (Swabi Dist., NWFP); see Rieck, “Sectarianism”, p. 445, Fn 131.
  341. A Naqshbandi *sûfi* and *sajjâda-nishin* from Kundian (Mianwali Dist.). In 2000 he was still the Chairman of that organisation (S. Husain ‘Arif Naqvi; personal communication).
  342. Details in Qâsimî, *Sawânih-i hayât*, pp. 113–36. Only in June 1987 he was arrested near Layyah and kept in the Mianwali jail for some weeks (*ibid.*, pp. 137–61, 241–52).
  343. Zaman, “Sectarianism”, pp. 702–3 (italics in the original).
  344. *Ibid.*, p. 701 (italics in the original).
  345. See section 3.4, pp. 81–83, and Rieck, “A Stronghold of Shia Orthodoxy in Northern Pakistan”, pp. 388–91.
  346. Malik, *Islamisierung*, pp. 252–64. See also a table on the growths of *dînî madâris* in the Punjab 1975–94 in Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 710.
  347. *Ibid.*, pp. 705–9; Abou Zahab, “Le Sipah-e Sahaba”, pp. 151–4; Mujahid Husain, “*Firqawarâna jang*”, p. 255.
  348. Saudi Arabia alone spent \$26 billion on aid and soft loans for Iraq in the 1980s. See Andreas Rieck, “Iraq and Saudi Arabia: from Rivalry to Confrontation”, in: Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow & Thomas Koszinowski (eds), *Iraq: Power and Society* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), pp. 319–39, here p. 328.
  349. S. Iqbal Husain Kermani has pointed to the fact that the SSP have, in their speeches and writings, elevated the Caliph Mu’awiya almost to the status of one of the *khulafâ’-i râshidûn*. Since Mu’awiya was the first ruler who introduced hereditary monarchy in Islam, that would have been a perfect indirect way of defending the Saudi monarchy against Iranian propaganda (Interview with the author, 31 January 2001). See also section 4.2, p. 110.
  350. It has been observed that especially large numbers of such *madâris*—as compared with the density of population—have been built in Balochistan and the Seraiki belt of southern Punjab, as if to create “a wall blocking off Iran from the centres of Shia population in Pakistan”; see Talat Aslam, “The Madrassah Factor”, *Herald* 9/1992, p. 34.
  351. On such accusations from the TNFJ Leader Husaini see section 6.3, pp. 226–27. They have been repeated in countless articles on the sectarian problem by Pakistani journalists in the 1990s.

352. See his interview in *The Scenario* (Islamabad), May 1998, pp. 13–14; also his article “The IJI: its founding, farewell and final rites”, *The Muslim*, 19 October 1992, p. 7. Pooya had also advised ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini to scale down his attacks on Zia in May 1988 (T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 318).
353. See Feroz Ahmed, “The Rise of Muhajir Separatism in Pakistan”, in: *Journal of Asian and African Affairs* 1(1989)2, pp. 97–129; idem., *Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 89–159.
354. According to Qâsimî, defending himself against charges at courts was the “second most important occupation” of Haqq Nawaz since the mid-1980s (*Sawânih-i hayât*, pp. 289–92).
355. Ibid., p. 248, accuses the D.C. of Mianwali, Tahir Zaidi (“a fanatical Shia”), of having caused all kinds of problems for Haqq Nawaz when he was jailed in that district in 1987; see also below, p. 238.
356. This attitude of opportunist negligence became even more wide-spread in the last two decades; see section 7.2, pp. 250, 255, 259; section 8.1, pp. 278, 283–84, 286, 290, 296.
357. See above; after the JUI-F, the JI had parted ways with Zia in 1984 (Nasr, *Vanguard*, pp. 195–6).
358. See section 6.3, p. 226.
359. Qureshi, “The Politics of the Shia Minority”, pp. 130–31; *Dawn*, 23 June and 4 August 1985.
360. Dr Israr Ahmad had been Secretary-General of the JI’s student wing in the early 1950s, but left the party in 1957 after differences with Maududi. In the 1980s he gained prominence through religious sermons on Pakistan TV, but later became opposed to Zia ul-Haqq. On his biography and ideas see Muhammad Ishâq Bhattî, *Bazm-i arjmandân* (Lâhaur: Maktabat Quddûsiya, 1999), pp. 527–600.
361. Keddie, *Shi’a of Pakistan*, p. 17. He also claimed that the Imams Hasan and Husain had participated in Yazid’s campaigns against Constantinople (*Dawn*, 16 September 1986). Later he argued for a ban of all processions on ‘Āshûrâ’ and *Milâd an-Nabî* because they were a “constant source of sectarian disturbances and bloody clashes” (*Dawn*, 8 October 1986).
362. Keddie, *Shi’a of Pakistan*, p. 18; *Dawn*, 18 and 26 September 1986. Eleven *imâmbârgâhs* were burnt in Lahore on that day, but there were no killings, and compensation was paid immediately after (Murtaza Pooya, interview with the author, 14 November 2000).
363. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 152–3. (‘Abbas was the flag-bearer of Imam Husain in Karbala. Black flags are traditionally hoisted not only on *imâmbârgâhs*, but on many Shia houses in Pakistan).
364. Mujahid Husain, “Firqawarâna jang”, mentions *al-Mukhtâr* (an armed organisations of the TNFJ [Musavi group] set up in 1986 which remained by and large passive) and *al-‘Abbas* (p. 248) and plans to transform the ISO into a military organisation (p. 262). A rare admission that the ISO kept weapons was made by Amanullah Khan Sial in an interview with *The News* (International Weekend Magazine), 15 March 1991, p. 39. See also Fn 59 to chapter 7 (p. 444).
365. For example, in the case of repeated attacks on Shias in the Kurram Agency (see sections 6.2, p. 218; 6.3, p. 229) and in Gilgit 1988 (see below).
366. *Dawn*, 24 January 1987. According to informed sources, he had also ordered to report on the Shias’ ratio in the population and in government services of the province (ibid.).
367. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 160–61.
368. This point has been stressed by Pooya; see his 1992 article quoted in Fn 352.
369. *Dawn*, 9, 10 and 17 July 1987; *Dawn*, 2 February 1988.
370. Qâsimî, *Sawânih-i hayât*, p. 421. For a detailed account of the Zia regime’s “complaisance towards Shias” as viewed by the SSP see ibid., pp. 418–32.

371. On Zahir see Jāwêd Jamil Daskavî, *‘Allāma Ihsân Ilāhî Zahir* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1990); on some of his writings see Ende, “Sunni polemical writings”, pp. 226–7.
372. *Dawn*, 25 March 1987; Zahir died on 30 March in Saudi Arabia where he had been flown for treatment.
373. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 163–4, referring also to a meeting of Zahir with Husaini shortly before his assassination. The government later withheld a video tape of the JAH convention where the bomb had exploded from Zahir’s relatives (*Herald* 9/1989, p. 23).
374. See section 6.3, pp. 227–28.
375. List of participants in Qâsimî, op. cit., pp. 165–6, 174–8. The convention was chaired by Maulana Khan Muhammad of the *Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubûwat* and held in the office of that group.
376. See section 6.3, pp. 225–26.
377. Qâsimî, op. cit., pp. 210–37, 252.
378. See section 6.3, pp. 229–30.
379. *Dawn*, 15 October 1987. On the 1983 precedent from the *Sawâd-i A’zam* see A. A. Shâh, *Jalî masjîdên*, pp. 122–8.
380. Rieck, “Sectarianism”, p. 442; Wolfgang Holzwarth, *Die Ismailiten in Nordpakistan. Zur Entwicklung einer religiösen Minderheit im Kontext neuer Außenbeziehungen* (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1994), pp. 87–92.
381. Rieck, “Sectarianism”, pp. 443–4.
382. *Newsline*, March–April 1992, p. 61; Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 711; Abou Zahab, “Le Sipah-e Sahaba”, p. 150. On the electoral achievements of his successors since 1990 see sections 7.2, p. 251; 8.1, pp. 278, 284, 286, 296.
383. *Ibid.*, pp. 250–52, and tables pp. 260–61.

## 7. THE INTERIM DEMOCRATIC DECADE, 1988–1999

1. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 329–30. Khomeini himself had wished to have Husaini buried in his *madrasa*.
2. *Ibid.* He was greeted with slogans “Murderer!” and was not allowed to lay down flowers on Husaini’s corpse. See also Fn 303 to chapter 6 (p. 437).
3. S. Muhammad Saqlain Kazimi, “‘Allāma Sayyid Safdar Husain Najafî kî zindagî kê châr pahlî”, *al-Qâ’im* 4–5/1990, pp. 36–9, here p. 38. That election was only per interim; he was formally elected only 30 days later (Author’s interview with S. Wazarat Husain, 8 January 2001).
4. See section 7.3, pp. 271–73.
5. See Fn 216 to chapter 3 (p. 375).
6. Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 133.
7. See section 6.3, p. 219.
8. Interview of Sajid Ali Naqvi in *al-Qâ’im* 2/1986, pp. 7–14, here p. 10.
9. The chief witness in the Husaini murder case has stated that Captain Majid Gilani (see below) showed them Sajid Ali’s house in the Trunk Bazar of Rawalpindi, explaining that he and two Maulvis from Multan and Quetta (probably S. Iftikhar Husain Naqvi and Ya’qub Ali Tawassuli) would also have to be killed; see T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 379.
10. Tahrîk-i Ja’fariya Pākistân, *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagî Ripûrt*, p. 8; Wazarat Husain was elected one of three Vice-Presidents of the organisation (then renamed TJP) in 1995 and Senior Vice-President in 1998 (Interview with the author, 8 January 2001).
11. On Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi see section 6.1, p. 7, Fn 46.
12. S. Iftikhar Husain Naqvi, born 1951 near Muzaffarabad (Multan Dist.), had studied at the *Jâmi’at Makhzan ul-‘Ulûm* Multan after his matric exam and in Najaf from 1969 to 1976.

Thereafter he taught at *Makhzan ul-‘Ulûm* (1977–8) and at the *Jâmi‘at Ahl ul-Bait* Islamabad before opening a *Madrasat Âyatullâh Khumainî* in Mari (Mianwali Dist.) in 1981; see Naqvi, *Tazkira*, pp. 64–5. He was put in charge of TNFJ international relations in 1990 and appointed provincial chairman of the TJP in Punjab in 1993. In 1996 he became Central Secretary-General of the TJP.

13. Ya‘qub Ali Tawassuli, a Hazara from Quetta, was born in 1943 and studied in Najaf 1956–76 (Naqvi, *Tazkira*, p. 371). He had been provincial chairman of the TNFJ in Balochistan since its foundation in 1979 and remained so throughout Sajid Ali’s term. From 1988 to 1993 he was also Senior Vice-President of the TNFJ.
14. Munir Husain Gilani, hailing from Lahore, was a member of the PPP. From July to October 1993 he was Minister of Education in the caretaker government of Moin Qureshi (see below). He later created a pro-PPP “Islamic Democratic Front”.
15. Dawn, 20 August 1988. In that statement Sajid Ali declared himself “strongly shocked” by the loss of “a great soldier of the *shari‘a*”. However four month later, during a visit to Gilgit, he declared that Zia’s era “symbolised the worst form of dictatorial and tyrannical rule” (*The Muslim*, 24 December 1988); see also below, p. 245.
16. Haydar, “Politicization”, p. 85. The PPP backtracked from a promise made to its former MRD allies to contest elections jointly and preferred to do it alone in 1988; see Lamb, *Waiting for Allah*, pp. 53–4.
17. A list of TNFJ candidates for thirty-three NA-seats was published in *The Muslim*, 16 October 1988, including twenty-five in Punjab, four in Sindh, three in the NWFP, and one in Balochistan. S. Iftikhar Husain Naqvi contested the NA elections from Jhang and Layyah, Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi from Chiniot. Most candidates apparently were not ‘ulamâ’.
18. TNFJ candidates received only 42,216 out of 19,591,265 votes (0.22 per cent); see *Newsline*, 9/1993, p. 42. On the general effects of the scattered Shia electorate see also section 5.4, pp. 156–57.
19. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 144. On the failed attempt of the *Shia Political Party* 1969–1970 see section 5.3, pp. 152–54.
20. Haydar, “Politicization”, p. 85.
21. The “mollifying” effect of this change on the TNFJ was clearly admitted by T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, pp. 144–5.
22. For example, with the “Jerusalem Day” (see section 6.3, p. 223), which was still observed annually by the TJP throughout the 1990s; see also below, Fn 82 and 84.
23. They are reproduced in T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 340–65; 399–411.
24. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Headway made in Hussaini murder probe”, *The Muslim*, 8 October 1988; T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 334. Siraj had been sentenced to death already in 1965 for murder but had later been pardoned, and he had since been involved in numerous other murder cases. In June 1989 he was promised pardon as chief witness; see his testimony *ibid.*, pp. 369–83.
25. See above, Fn 9.
26. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 373–6. The author portrays Majid Gilani (born 1958 in a family of Barelvi *pîrs* in Jhang) as a rakish and arrogant man “not following any religion”, whose quick promotion to a sensitive post in the army had remained mysterious (*ibid.*, pp. 385–7).
27. *Ibid.*, p. 385, leaves it to the reader to decide which countries had an interest to kill Husaini in the light of his political stance. The author also quotes from Siraj’s testimony about Majid Gilani’s meeting with a foreigner in Islamabad, whom Gilani referred to as “one of the people who want to have the Maulvis killed and will pay for it”. In addition to 1 million Rs. in cash the killers were allegedly promised a trip to the U.S. (*ibid.*, p. 378).

28. Ibid., 366–8, 373–5.
29. Ibid., p. 384. According to *Herald* 8/1989, p. 41, Siraj had surrendered to the police only six days earlier.
30. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 336, 391.
31. Ibid., pp. 393–4, 432.
32. Nawaz Sharif had been Chief Minister of the Punjab since 1985. After his defeat against Benazir Bhutto in the 1988 National Assembly elections he had concentrated on his stronghold in the Punjab, where the so-called “Islamic Democratic Alliance” (*Islâmî Jumhûrî Ittihad*, IJI) comprising his faction of the *Pakistan Muslim League* (PML), the MQM, and several religious parties like JL, JUI-S, JUP, JAH and Murtaza Pooya’s *Hizb-i Jihâd* had won the 1988 provincial elections.
33. Maqbool Malik, “Courting Trouble?”, *Herald* 8/1989, pp. 40–42; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A General in Distress”, *Newsline* 8/1989, pp. 60–62.
34. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 395–415.
35. Ibid., p. 417. ‘Awan had been accused of implication in the murder of leaders of the JI student wing *Islâmî Jam‘iyat-i Tulabâ*’ and had fled to Sindh.
36. *Herald*, November 1989, pp. 18–20.
37. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 418; text of the Supreme Court judgement in *The Nation*, 27 October 1989.
38. *Frontier Post*, 13 May 1990; see also below, Fn 51.
39. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, p. 418.
40. Ibid., p. 419, mentions one Bawa Nafis al-Hasan of Qasur and one Nazir Husain Shah who made public statements in favour of Fazl-i Haqq in Lahore but were humiliated by members of the TNFJ and ISO; see also T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 146.
41. S. A. Jafri, “The General in his Labyrinth”, *Herald* 10/1991, pp. 50–51; Kaleem Omar, “Marked Man”, *Newsline* 10/1991, p. 38. Akhundzada was arrested one year later (13 October 1992) but released on bail 20 days later (*Frontier Post*, 13 November 1992). Seventeen months later a Peshawar court ordered the arrest of Sajid Ali Naqvi for alleged involvement in the murder (*The News*, 19 April 1994). The cases against Akhundzada and Sajid Ali were withdrawn only on 31 March 1997. On the Fazl-i Haqq murder trial see also Tahrîk-i Ja‘fariya Pâkistân, *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagî ripûrt*, pp. 50–54.
42. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 434–5.
43. *The Muslim*, 25 February 1992. Gilani also implicated him in the 1988 assault on Shias around Gilgit (see section 6.4., p. 268).
44. T. R. Khân, *Safir-i nûr*, pp. 435–7.
45. Ibid., p. 439. Taslim Riza Khan sees a connection between this verdict and the appointment of Moïn Qureshi as the head of an interim government with the blessing of the U.S. and the Pakistan Army on 18 July (see below, Fn 87). See also a brief account of the entire trial in Tahrîk-i Ja‘fariya Pâkistân, *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagî ripûrt*, pp. 45–50.
46. *Dawn*, 20 December 2011; the surviving accused were Hashim Khan, Badi‘ uz-Zaman and Sajid.
47. *Dawn*, 26 May 1989. The Bareilvi scholar Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadiri, born 1951 Jhang, had studied both general and Islamic law at the Punjab University, where he received a PhD in 1986. He had earned fame through lectures on TV in the 1980s, and in 1984 had founded a modernist religious academy in Lahore, the *Idârat-i Minhâj ul-Qur‘ân*. In 1990 his *Pâkistân ‘Awâmi Tahrîk*, which propagated “a thorough socio-economic and political revolution based on the teachings of the Koran and the Sunna”, had 60,000 registered members (*Newsline*, 8/1990, p. 51). In recent years, Qadiri has gained worldwide prominence through a 600-page *fatwâ* condemning the terrorism of *Al-Qa‘ida* and declaring that all suicide

- bombers would be “punished in hellfire” (March 2010), and by organising a “Long March” of hundreds of thousands of supporters to Islamabad to press for electoral reforms in Pakistan (January 2013).
48. Translated from the TNFJ pamphlet *I’lāmīyat-i Ishtirāk-i ‘Amal* [one of several titles] (Rawalpindi: Markazī Daftar Jāmi‘at al-Hakīm, 1990), pp. 7–8.
  49. Ibid., *Mukhtasar Ripūrt-i Ishtirāk-i ‘Amal*, p. 5.
  50. Ibid., p. 9.
  51. An article in the *Frontier Post* (13 May 1990) alleged that the whole enterprise was a ploy from Asghar Khan who paid back an obligation to Fazl-i Haqq by distracting the TNFJ from its constant demand to re-arrest the latter. According to that version, Tahir ul-Qadiri was inducted into the alliance only “to camouflage the deal”.
  52. See Akhtar Husain, *Politic of Alliances in Pakistan 1954–1999*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies/Quaid-i-Azam University, 2008), p. 189. Other members of the PDA were Asghar Khan’s *Tahrīk-i Istiqlāl* and a faction of the PML (Qasim group).
  53. *Kārkardagī Ripūrt Māh-i Āgast 1990* (Rawalpindi: Markazī Daftar-i Tahrīk-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i Ja‘fariya Pākistān, 1990), pp. 5–6. Reports on Sajid Ali’s attendance of meetings of PDA leaders on 18 and 19 September idem, *Kārkardagī Ripūrt Māh-i Satambar 1990*, p. 4.
  54. Prominent among them was Ahmad Khan Sial in Jhang, who did not win a seat in 1990, however.
  55. The PDA won only forty-five out of 205 Muslim seats in the National Assembly and sixty-five out of 483 seats in the four Provincial Assemblies (47 of them in Sindh); none of these seats was won by a TNFJ candidate.
  56. *Kārkardagī Ripūrt Māh-i Uktūbar 1990* (Rawalpindi: Markazī Daftar-i Tahrīk-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i Ja‘fariya Pākistān, 1990), p. 10.
  57. Interview in September or October 1990, quoted in T. R. Khān, *Safir-i inqilāb*, pp. 148–9.
  58. See sections 7.2 and 8.1, passim.
  59. A paramilitary organisation of the TNFJ apparently set up in 1986 (see section 6.4, p. 267). TNFJ-members interviewed by the author have been reluctant to give any information about the *Pāsbān-i Islām* and other armed Shia groups. Most Shia mosques, *imāmbārgāh*s and other institutions visited by the author in Pakistan 1998–2001 have been protected by heavily-armed guards, apparently employed by local Shia communities with licences from the government.
  60. [TNFJ] Markazī Daftar Madrasat Āyatullāh al-Hakīm, *Ripūrt-i Ijlās-i Markazī Kaunsil mun‘aqida 11–13 Ma‘ī 1990 bi-maqām-i Faisalābād*, pp. 4–5.
  61. The 18 Dhū al-Hijja is celebrated by Shias as the day when the Prophet Muhammad designated Ali Ibn Ali Talib his successor at a place called Ghadīr Khumm, according to a *hadīth*; see Momen, *Introduction*, pp. 15, 239.
  62. Translation from the pamphlet *Yaum-i Ghadīr ya‘nī jashn-i takmil-i dīn. Khitāb-i Namāyanda-i Walī-i Faqīh, Qā‘id-i Millat-i Ja‘fariya ... Sayyid Sājīd ‘Alī Naqvi* (Ja‘fariya Kaunsil Zila‘ Islamabad, 1990), pp. 9–11.
  63. Translated from *Kārkardagī Ripūrt Māh-i Āgast 1990* (Rawalpindi: Markazī Daftar-i Tahrīk-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i Ja‘fariya Pākistān, 1990), p. 13.
  64. See a facsimile reproduction of Khamenei’s Persian “letter of designation” for Sajid Ali Naqvi and its Urdu translation, *ibid.*, pp. 22–3. (Khamenei had been elected “Supreme Leader” of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 June 1989, one day after the death of Khomeini).
  65. See section 7.2, p. 252.
  66. See section 6.4, p. 236.
  67. Munir D. Ahmed, “Pakistan”, in: Thomas Koszinowski & Hanspeter Mattes (eds.), *Nahost Jahrbuch 1991* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1992), pp. 128–35, here pp. 128–9.

68. *Ibid.*; important sections of legislation, such as the entire realm of economy, were excluded from the purview of the Shariat bill.
69. See a pamphlet *Shari'at bil. Kyâ khôyâ? Kyâ pâyâ?* (Rawalpindi: Tahrîk-i Nifâz-i Fiqh-i Ja'fariya Pâkistân, 1991), pp. 1–4. On Article 227 of the constitution see section 6.2, p. 214.
70. *Newsline*, 3–4/1992, p. 61; Zaman, "Sectarianism", p. 711.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 713; *The Muslim*, 7 March 1992.
72. Maulana Sami' ul-Haqq, who led the JUI fraction known until 1994 as "Darkhwasti group", had criticised the "deformed" Shariat bill, and in November 1991 he resigned from his post as Vice-Chairman of the IJI. The IJI gradually disintegrated in 1992.
73. These were Shaikh Muhammad Yusuf and Intizar Ahmad Ansari; see *The News*, 5 March 1992; *Newsline*, 3–4/1992, p. 61.
74. *Frontier Post*, 30 October 1992; see also section 7.2., p. 250.
75. *Herald*, 3/1995, p. 57. According to his biographer, Dr Naqvi had become somewhat disillusioned about the TNFJ in 1992 and concentrated more on his professional life, possibly because he considered a "sectarian" party outdated; see T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 150.
76. Tahrîk-i Ja'fariya Pâkistân, *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagî Ripûrt*, p. 8.
77. Translation from *ibid.*, p. 85 (back cover).
78. Translation from the pamphlet *Namâyanda-i Wali-i Faqîh Qâ'id-i Millat-i Ja'fariya 'Allâma Sayyid Sâjid 'Ali Naqvi kâ ahamm i'lâmiya*, *Nizam-i khums-o-mâliyyât* (Rawalpindi, 22 Rabî' II 1411H = 12 November 1990), pp. 2–3.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
80. See for example Tahrîk-i Ja'fariya Pâkistân, *Ripûrt Tanzimî Kanwenshan 97 ... Islâmâbâd*, p. 4.
81. Tahrîk-i Ja'fariya Pâkistân, *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagî Ripûrt*, p. 2. Financial help for the relatives of "martyrs" is also mentioned but the amount of rupees is omitted (*ibid.*).
82. *Ibid.*, p. 10, mentions twelve sessions of the Central Cabinet and five of the Supreme Council 1992–4. More costly (but probably financed with Iranian help) were international conferences on *Hajj* (8–9 June 1991), on Iraq (15–16. April 1992) and on Kashmir and Palestine (28–29 July 1992). The latter followed a seminar on "Intifâdas in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Palestine" organised by Murtaza Pooya in Islamabad (*The Muslim*, 11 May 1992).
83. 80,000 posters, 10,000 books and 350,000 pamphlets were printed 1992–4; see *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagî Ripûrt*, p. 9.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 19 states that the TNFJ leader was travelling fifteen days inside Pakistan each month approximately. To this numerous trips of the TNFJ higher echelon to Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan and other foreign countries must be added.
85. Lawyers were needed mainly for the Husaini and Fazl-i Haqq murder trials and related charges against TNFJ/TJP members (see above). Expenses for Shia activists arrested during demonstrations and in connection with sectarian violence were probably included under the entry "prisoners".
86. The TNFJ/TJP central office alone sent 19,487 letters 1992–4 (*Kârkardagî Ripûrt*, p. 8).
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3. The "Long March" was planned to force Nawaz Sharif to resign after a stalemate in his power-struggle with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. It was called off on orders of the Chief of Army Staff, Wahid Kakar, who forced both Sharif and Ishaq Khan to step down on 18 July; see Zaffar Abbas, "Enter the Army", *Herald*, 7/1993, pp. 19–24a.
88. *The News*, 13 September 1993.
89. *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagî Ripûrt*, pp. 24–5.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Another has been the persistent ethnic and factional violence in Karachi. See Sohail Mahmood, *The Sind Report*, (Lahore: Classic, 1989); A. B. S. Jafri, *Behind the killing fields of Karachi. A City refuses to surrender*, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1996). On the new



- wave of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan after the events of 2001 see section 8.1, *passim*.
92. The JUI-F was not a member of the PPP-led government, but its Chairman, Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman, was made Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly in 1993. The alliance dated back to 1983 when the JUI-F had supported the MRD (see section 6.4, p. 232).
  93. See section 7.1, pp. 241–42.
  94. Qâsimi, *Sawânihi-i hayât ... Haqq Nawâz Jhangvî*, pp. 452–5. Two of them were sentenced to death.
  95. Abou Zahab, “Le Sipah-e Sahaba”, pp. 150–51. The four accused had blamed Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal for falsely implicating them (Qâsimi, *op. cit.*, p. 453); see also below, p. 255, and Hasan Mujtaba & Mazhar Zaidi, “A Tale of Two Cities”, *Newsline* 9/1994, pp. 35–9, here p. 38.
  96. See section 7.1, p. 246; on Îsâr ul-Haqq see Zaman, “Sectarianism”, pp. 710–11.
  97. *The Muslim*, 29 April 1991.
  98. I. A. Rehman, “City of Strife”, *Newsline* 7/1992, pp. 55–56; *The Muslim*, 21 November 1991, claimed that already 80 had been killed in Jhang since the murder of Haqq Nawaz in February 1990. See however the lower official figures for the whole of Punjab in Table 3 below, p. 260.
  99. Adnan Adil, “Sects and violence”, *Newsline* 3–4/1992, p. 61. Tariq received 56,000 votes, as compared to 57,000 votes won by Îsâr ul-Haqq Qasimi in 1990 (*The News*, 16 March 1992).
  100. *The News*, 5 May 1992.
  101. *Ibid.* and Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 713.
  102. See below, p. 259.
  103. *The Frontier Post*, 5 May 1992.
  104. Sajaad Ahmed, “Cleaning up their act”, *The Frontier Post*, 31 July 1992.
  105. *Ibid.* and *The Muslim*, 18 and 21 June 1992; *Newsline* 7/1992, p. 55.
  106. *The Nation*, 2 July 1992, reported such a meeting with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The Punjab Chief Minister Ghulam Haidar Wyne received SSP leaders for the same purpose.
  107. Nasim Zehra “The Sectarian Factor”, *Herald* 8/1992, pp. 65–8 (here pp. 65–6). Fifteen people were killed and forty injured in this worst sectarian incident in Peshawar so far.
  108. *The Frontier Post*, 3 August 1992.
  109. *The Frontier Post*, 27 and 28 July 1992.
  110. *The Muslim*, 28 July 1992.
  111. *The Muslim*, 7 November 1992, quoting the Minister of Interior Chaudhry Shuja’at Husain. One week earlier recommendations of his ministry to ban seven organisations had been published in the press, namely the SSP, its military wing *al-Badr*, the *Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat*, the TNFJ, its student wing ‘*Alamdar*, the ISO, and the *Mukhtar Force* of the TNFJ (Musavi group); see *The Frontier Post*, 30 October 1992.
  112. See reports in *Dawn*, 5 February 1993, and following days. Only 2,000 SSP activists participated in the final March from Rawalpindi to Islamabad (*Dawn*, 13 February 1993).
  113. See section 7.1, p. 242.
  114. According to Zaman “Sectarianism”, p. 698, the SMP was founded already in 1991; see also Jalalzai, *Sunni-Shia Conflict*, pp. 271–8.
  115. Mazhar Zaidi, “The Godfather”, *Newsline* 2/1995, pp. 52–3; Zaman, “Sectarianism”, pp. 697–8; interview with Ghulam Riza Naqvi in *Herald* 10/1996, pp. 57–9.
  116. Murid ‘Abbas Yazdani, born in a village of the Pind Dadan Khan Tehsil (Jhelum Dist.) in



- 1961, had studied in Qom; on his relations with S. Ghulam Riza Naqvi, see Zaigham Khan, "Crime and Punishment", *Herald* 12/1996, pp. 55–7.
117. Interview with S. Ghulam Riza Naqvi in *Herald* 10/1996, p. 57. He also dreamt of setting up a joint Shia-Sunni "Quds Force" for the "liberation of Jerusalem" (*Newsline* 2/1995, p. 53).
  118. For example, once he had threatened that whoever used filthy language against Shias would be "shot into the mouth" (*The Muslim*, 2 October 1991).
  119. Aamer Ahmad Khan even considered the SMP the brainchild of Dr Muhammad Ali Naqvi and wrote that Dr Naqvi had jokingly referred to disapproval of the SMP by the TJP as "strategic criticism" (*Herald* 3/1995, p. 58). See however the different attitudes of the TJP and SMP towards the 1995 "Code of Ethics", pp. 256–57 below.
  120. Aftab Alexander Mughal, "A Feast of Violence", *Newsline* 4/1993, p. 54.
  121. According to Abou Zahab, murderous attacks against Shias were more numerous in areas where these were a small minority and had no tradition of taking revenge, like the Bahawalpur Division ("Le Sipah-e Sahaba", pp. 156–7; see also below, p. 260, Table 4).
  122. See below, p. 260, Table 3.
  123. I.A. Rehman, "Rout of the Mullahs", *Newsline* 10/1993; *The News*, 12 October 1993.
  124. Faruq Leghari (PPP) was elected President of Pakistan by the National Assembly and the Senate in November 1993. In the Punjab the PPP struck a coalition with a breakaway faction of the PML headed by Mian Manzur Wattoo until September 1995, when Wattoo was ousted and replaced by Muhammad 'Arif Nakai (also PML). In Sindh the PPP had won an absolute majority, but formed a coalition government with the MQM.
  125. I. A. Rahman, "A Critique of Pakistan's Blasphemy Laws", in: Tarik Jat a.o., *Pakistan between Secularism and Islam* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1989), pp. 196–204.
  126. Aamer Ahmed Khan, "The Blasphemy Law. The Bigot's Charter?", *Herald* 5/1994, pp. 45–6.
  127. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
  128. *The News*, 22 January 1994; Aftab Alexander Mughal, "Day of the Bigot", *Herald* 3/1994, p. 107.
  129. *Herald* 5/1994, p. 46. SMP supporters thereafter approached Sajid Ali Naqvi asking him for a *fatwâ* allowing to kill A'zam Tariq, which he refused (*Newsline* 2/1995, p. 53–4). The SMP leader S. Ghulam Riza Naqvi still upheld his call for murdering Tariq in his interview with *Herald* 10/1996, p. 59. See also Aftâb Husain Jawâdî, *as-Saif al-bâriq fî radd khutbât A'zam Târiq* (Rawalpindi: Markaz-i Mutâla'ât-i Islâmi, 1421H).
  130. "Azam makes history in NA", *The News*, 8 June 1994.
  131. Interview with A'zam Tariq in *Newsline*, 9/1994, pp. 28–9; see also Zaman, "Sectarianism", p. 702.
  132. *The News*, 8 June 1994; *Herald* 6/1994, p. 31.
  133. Aamer Ahmed Kan, "The Wrong End of the Stick", *Herald* 12/1995, pp. 34–8, here p. 36; *idem*, "Playing with Fire", *Herald* 9/1996, pp. 77–8.
  134. Aamer Ahmed Khan, "The Rise of Sectarian Mafias", *Herald* 6/1994, pp. 27–31.
  135. The *Harakat ul-Ansar* had been active mainly in Kashmir since 1990. In 1997 the group changed its name to *Harakat ul-Mujâhidîn* after the U.S. State Department had put it on the black list of terrorist organisations.
  136. Riyaz Basra (1967–2002), a native of Sargodha, had volunteered for the Afghan war in the 1980s and in 1988 contested NA elections in Lahore on a SSP ticket. Before his arrest in 1992 he had killed Sadiq Ganji, the director of the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore (December 1990), and two TNFJ members (*The News*, 6 May 1994). Since 1995 he had a 20 million Rs. reward on his head, but was apparently committing numerous further sectarian murders. See also Rana Jawad, "Fatal Accomplishments", *Newsline* 9/1997, pp. 42–3;

- Amir Mir, "Danger Man", *Newsline* 5/1999, pp. 39–40. On his death in May 2002, see section 8.1., p. 278.
137. Mohammad Hanif, "In the Name of Religion", *Newsline* 9/1994, pp. 24–34, here p. 27.
138. *The News*, 9 June 1994.
139. M. H. Askari, "When it turns violent", *Dawn*, 21 September 1994. The Governor was himself blamed for receiving a proclaimed offender like the SMP leader Ghulam Riza Naqvi; see *Newsline* 2/1995, p. 54.
140. Mazhar Zaidi, "The Shias Strike Back", *Newsline* 2/1995, pp. 50–54, here p. 54; Jalalzai, *Sunni-Shia Conflict*, pp. 274–8.
141. *The Muslim*, 18 and 20 July 1994.
142. Zaffar Abbas "Sects and Violence", *Herald* 12/1994, p. 20; *Newsline* 2/1995, p. 50.
143. *Ibid.*, pp. 51–2, and *Herald* 12/1994, p. 20.
144. Aamer Ahmed Khan, "Striking at the Roots", *Herald* 2/1995, pp. 62–4, here p. 62; Mohammed Hanif, "Young Guns", *Newsline* 2/1995, pp. 34–40.
145. See Babar's interview in *Newsline* 2/1995, pp. 41–2. The *Taleban* had first appeared on the Afghan scene in October 1994, and in March 1995 they controlled most Pashtun provinces of southern Afghanistan. On the alleged role of Pakistani military and intelligence institutions in their creation see Anthony Davis, "How the Taliban became a military force", in: William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998, pp. 43–71; Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban", *ibid.* pp. 72–89; *idem*, *Taliban*, pp. 183–95.
146. Yazdani was arrested under a charge of plotting to kill the SSP leaders Tariq and Faruqi; see *Newsline*, 2/1995, p. 52.
147. *Dawn*, 26 June 1995. On his subsequent release and re-arrest, see below.
148. Aamer Ahmed Khan, "Playing With Fire", *Herald* 3/1995, pp. 56–8, here p. 57. According to that account, Iqbal was not only a political rival and suspect in the murder of Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi and Isār ul-Haqq Qasimi (see above), but also a former SSP member who had exposed many criminal activities of the SSP.
149. *Ibid.*, pp. 57–8; Dr Naqvi was assassinated in Lahore on 7 March 1995; see T. R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, p. 278.
150. Namely the *Masjid Abu'l-Fazl* in Pir Ilahi Bakhsh Colony and the *Mahfil-i Murtaza* in PECHS; see *Dawn*, 26 February 1995; *Herald*, 3/1995, pp. 36a–36b; *Newsline*, 3/1995, pp. 76–7.
151. *Ibid.* and *Dawn*, 11 March 1995.
152. *Dawn*, 8 March 1995. It was also claimed that many of the controversial books which the SSP made a centre-piece of its anti-Shia propaganda were already banned and no longer in print.
153. *Dawn*, 25 March 1995. The JUP leader Ahmad Shah Nurani was elected Chairman of the MYC, and Maulana Sami' ul-Haqq (JUI-S) Secretary-General. The other nine members were Abd us-Sattar Niyazi (heading a rivalling faction of the JUP), Qazi Husain Ahmad (JI), Sajid Mir (JAH), Maulana Ajmal Qadiri (JUI-F), Isfandiyar Khan (*Sawâd-i A'zam*), Zia ul-Qasimi (SSP), Tahir ul-Qadiri (*Pākistân 'Awâmi Tahrîk*), Murtaza Pooya (*Hizb-i Jihâd*) and Sajid Ali Naqvi (TJP).
154. Zaigham Khan, "Faith Healing", *Newsline* 6/1995, pp. 46–50.
155. *Dawn*, 25 March 1995. On the 1951 'ulamâ' conference see section 3.2, p. 69.
156. *Dawn*, 10 April 1995; list of more than 50 participants *ibid.*
157. Zaigham Khan, "Code Comfort", *Herald* 6/1995, p. 49.
158. *Ibid.*; this led to a split within the SMP; see Mazhar Zaidi, "Divided They Stand", *Newsline* 7/1995, p. 73; Zaigham Khan, "Crime and Punishment", *Herald* 12/1996, pp. 55–7. For Ghulam Riza Naqvi's criticism of the MYC Code of Ethics see also his interview in *Herald* 10/1996, p. 59.

159. For example, the MYC observed the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United Nations as a “Black Day” because of the U.N.’s alleged “anti-Islam role” (*Dawn*, 25 October 1995).
160. Translation from Tahrir-i Ja’fariya Pākistān, *Milli Yekjihatī Kaunsil zābita-i akhlāq par ēk nazar*, n.d. [1995], pp. 2–3.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
162. Murid ‘Abbas Yazdani, then in jail, declared the central cabinet of the SMP dissolved in early July and cancelled the membership of Ghulam Riza Naqvi, branding his followers in Thokar Niaz Beg “terrorists who have nothing to do with the SMP”; see Mazhar Zaidi, “Divided They Stand”, *Newsline* 7/1995, p. 73.
163. Mazhar Zaidi, “Warning Signals”, *Newsline* 11/1995, pp. 52–3.
164. *Ibid.* and *Dawn*, 11 September 1995; see also above, Fn 124.
165. Aamer Ahmed Kan, “The Wrong End of the Stick”, *Herald* 12/1995, pp. 34–8, here p. 36.
166. *Ibid.*, p. 34. After the attack on the Egyptian embassy (19 November), which was carried out by the group *Islamic Jihad* on orders of Ayman al-Zawahiri and had claimed 16 lives, the PPP government felt once more the need to confront not only the militant groups of many Muslim countries present in Pakistan as a legacy of the Afghan war, but also their Pakistani allies.
167. *Ibid.*, p. 35; “Sectarianism re-emerging?”, *The Nation*, 16 January 1996.
168. Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Playing with Fire”, *Herald* 9/1996, pp. 77–8.
169. *Ibid.* and *Dawn*, 16 August 1996.
170. *Dawn*, 19 August 1996; *Herald* 9/1996, p. 78.
171. The fighting started after derogatory remarks of a school teacher against the *ahl al-bait*, but had apparently been prepared long before (*The Frontier Post*, 16 September 1996). It was also linked to the preoccupation of the Kurram Militia with anti-smuggling duties since some months, which prevented it from intervening forcefully. For details of the background see Amir Zia, “Tribes and Tribulations”, *Newsline* 10/1996, pp. 71–5, and M. Ilyas Khan, “Land for Peace”, *ibid.*, pp. 76–82; Behroz Khan, “Sectarian Spillover”, *Newsline* 10/1999, pp. 76–9.
172. *Dawn*, 13 September 1996. One Muhammad Mujahid confessed in November 1996 that he had killed Yazdani on the orders of Ghulam Riza Naqvi; see references in Fn 177 below.
173. *The Nation*, 24 September 1996; Zaigham Khan, “The Fanatics Strike Back”, *Herald* 10/1996, pp. 52–7.
174. *The Muslim*, 30 September 1996.
175. *The Nation*, 5 October 1996.
176. See section 7.3, pp. 269–70.
177. Zaigham Khan, “Crime and Punishment”, *Herald* 12/1996, pp. 55–7; *idem*, “Blood on the Mosque Floor”, *Herald* 6/1997, pp. 50–57, here pp. 56–7. Another raid against Thokar Niaz Beg was conducted in April 1997; see Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Moving Targets”, *Herald* 8/1997, pp. 36–8, here p. 38.
178. *Dawn*, 31 December 1996. Out of fear from retaliation of his group, his arrest was recorded in Lahore; see *Herald* 7/1997, p. 57. S. Ghulam Riza Naqvi was still under arrest in October 2012; see <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/5336-thousands-of-shiites-throng-lahore-high-court-on-hearing-of-ghulam-raza-naqvi-case>
179. See his interview in *Herald* 12/1996, p. 56. In fact, the terrorist infrastructure of SMP almost disintegrated after the arrest of S. Ghulam Riza Naqvi.
180. *Dawn*, 19 January 1997; Mazhar Zaidi, “Living with violence”, *Newsline* 3/1997, pp. 77–8. Another 80 people were injured by the blast. One Mehram Ali was caught immediately after and sentenced to death on 15 September that year. His execution on 11 August 1998 was the first such verdict implemented on a sectarian terrorist in the 1990s.
181. See section 7.3, p. 269.

182. *Dawn*, 20 January 1997.
183. *Dawn*, 21 February 1997.
184. The PPP did not win a single seat in the National Assembly from the Punjab and won only three seats in the Punjab Provincial Assembly.
185. See below, Table 3. These are official figures, whereas the actual death toll was probably higher; see Zaman, "Sectarianism", p. 712.
186. *Newsline* 3/1997, p. 78; *Herald* 6/1997, p. 53; Aamer Ahmed Khan, "Moving Targets", *Herald* 8/1997, pp. 36–8; Rana Jawad, "Punjab's Killing Fields", *Newsline* 9/1997, pp. 38–45, here p. 39.
187. *Ibid.*, p. 43; Adnan Adil, "Police scores win against sectarian terrorists", *The Friday Times*, 18–24 July 1997, p. 15; Azmat Abbas, "Punjab's worst year of sectarian violence", *Dawn*, 1 January 1998.
188. Idrees Bakhtiar, "Licence to Kill?", *Herald* 9/1997, pp. 25–7; Aamer Ahmed Khan, "Act of Desperation", *ibid.*, pp. 28–31; Idrees Bakhtiar, "Legal Minefield", *ibid.*, pp. 32–4; Zahid Hussain, "A License to Kill", *Newsline* 9/1997, pp. 24–30; I. A. Rehman, "Act of Terrorism", *ibid.*, pp. 33–5.
189. Rauf Klasra, "Reasons for court's failure to decide sectarian cases", *Dawn*, 19 January 1998; Zaigham Khan, "Courting Trouble", *Herald* 2/1998, p. 48.
190. Abdul Sattar Qamar, "The Great Escape", *Herald* 1/1998, p. 77.
191. Zaigham Khan, "Raising the Stakes", *Herald* 10/1997, pp. 52–3.
192. Faisalabad Division comprises the Jhang District.
193. Rana Jawad, "Bloody Sunday", *Newsline* 2/1998, pp. 52–4; Zaigham Khan, "The Tragedy of Mominpura", *Herald* 2/1998, pp. 46–9.
194. Rizwan Qureshi, "The Road to Destruction", *Herald* 4/1998, pp. 57–8. Behroz Khan, "Havoc at Hangu", *Newsline* 5/1998, pp. 38, 41.
195. *Ibid.*; 50 houses were blown up and looted in the Shakukhel village. More than two dozens of people from both sides died in three days of fighting, which was also considered a revenge for the Parachinar clashes of 1996; see *Newsline* 10/1999, p. 77.
196. Rashid, *Taliban*, pp. 73–4.
197. *Ibid.* pp. 74–77; Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension", p. 123; Andreas Rieck, "Irans Politik im Afghanistankonflikt seit 1992", in: Conrad J. Schetter & Almut Wieland-Karimi (eds.), *Afghanistan in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, (Frankfurt/M.: IKO, 1999), pp. 109–28, here pp. 124–8.
198. Rashid, *Taliban*, p. 134. The missile attack, meant as retaliation for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August, took place on 20 August 1998.
199. The bill proposed to insert a new Article 2 B of the constitution stating: (1) "The Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet ... shall be the supreme law of Pakistan ... (2) The federal government shall be under obligation to make steps to enforce the Shariah, to establish salat [the five obligatory prayers], to administer zakat and to promote *Amr Bil Ma'roof* and *Nahi Anil Munkar* (sic) (to prescribe what is right and forbid what is wrong) ..."; see Zohra Yusuf, "Heil Sharif!", *Newsline* 9/1998, pp. 29–30; I.A. Rehman, "The Divine Right of Nawaz Sharif?", *ibid.*, pp. 19–25; Zafar Abbas, "In Good Faith?", *Herald* 9/1998, pp. 32a–32c.
200. Zaigham Khan, "Fight to the Finish?", *Herald* 11–12 1998, pp. 50–53; Azmat Abbas, "Terror Tactics", *ibid.*, pp. 54–6; Amir Mir, "Death by Design?", *Newsline* 2/1999.
201. Three people died when a bomb exploded under a bridge on Sharif's usual road to his residence; see *Dawn*, 4 January 1999. Allegedly Riyaz Basra had written a letter to the prime minister before, informing him that "there is no room left to pardon you, and we pronounce a death sentence on you" (*Newsline* 5/1999, pp. 39–40). Three members of the *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*, who were allegedly involved in the Raiwind bomb explosion, were

- killed in an “encounter” some weeks later (*Dawn*, 31 January 1999; see also *Newsline* 10/1999, p. 69).
202. *Dawn*, 5 January 1999; Zaigham Khan, “Life after Death”, *Herald* 2/1999, pp. 67–8.
203. *Dawn*, 13 February 1999, reporting such a request from Senator S. ‘Abid Husain; Sajid Ali Naqvi, too, urged TJP activists to purchase licensed arms for themselves (*Dawn*, 15 February 1999).
204. Zaigham Khan, “Peace at Raiwind”, *Herald* 5/1999, pp. 48–9.
205. *Ibid.* and *Dawn*, 2 and 14 April 1999.
206. *Dawn*, 11 June 1999.
207. *Dawn*, 15 June 1999.
208. *Dawn*, 23 August 1999. The ordinance made declaring other Muslims *kâfir* and insulting the *sahâba* or *ahl al-bait* punishable by one to fourteen years.
209. *Dawn*, 10 July 1999. On 4 July Nawaz Sharif had been obliged to announce a call for the withdrawal of Kashmiri *mujâhidîn* from advanced positions on the Kargil frontline, where they had created much trouble for the Indian troops during ten weeks; see “The Great Kargil Debacle” (cover story), *Newsline* 7/1999, pp. 20–40.
210. Amir Mir, “Unholy Crusade”, *Newsline* 10/1999, pp. 64–9. The author linked it to a deadline for the introduction of a stiffer blasphemy law set by Malik Ishaq, a leader of the *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*, which expired on 30 September (*ibid.*, p. 67).
211. *Dawn*, 11 September 1999.
212. *Dawn*, 29 September 1999; he was gunned down along with two other Shias in Dera Ismail Khan.
213. *Dawn*, 2 October 1999; Massoud Ansari, “Dawn of Another Night”, *Newsline* 10/1999, pp. 72–3. The mosque was situated near the *Imâmbârgâh al-Hurr*, Alfalah Colony.
214. *Dawn*, 2 October 1999. He was then Punjab vice-president of the Pakistan Medical Association.
215. *Dawn*, 5 and 12 October 1999.
216. *Dawn*, 8 October 1999; *Newsline* 10/1999, p. 66.
217. Sharif’s sudden tough stance on the *Taleban* and the SSP was allegedly part of his last-ditch attempt to win U.S. backing against a military coup which he anticipated. See Nasim Zehra, “Sharif agreed to US plan”, *Gulf News*, 1 June 2000.
218. The JI had tried to gather them in a *Pakistan Islamic Front*, but had only achieved some limited understanding with the JUP (Nurani group) in Sindh; it won only three seats in the NA and the JUP none. A *Muttahida Dini Mahâz* of the JUI-S and the SSP had won two NA seats, and an *Islâmî Jumhûrî Mahâz* led by the JUI-F had won four NA seats through seat adjustment with the PPP in the NWFP; see I. A. Rehman, “Rout of the Mullahs”, *Newsline* 10/1993, pp. 44–6.
219. See the text of Sajid Ali’s speech in Gilgit (15 December 1993) in *Tahrîk-i Ja’fariya Pākistan, 1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagi Ripûrt*, pp. 61–3.
220. *The News*, 21 December 1993; *The Frontier Post*, 21 December 1993.
221. Translation from *1992 tâ 1994 Kârkardagi Ripûrt*, pp. 15–16. A slightly different version of these five points was presented by Sajid Ali Naqvi during his opening address of a TJP convention in March 1997; see *Tahrîk-i Ja’fariya Pākistân, Ripûrt-i Tanzimî Kanwenshan 97 ... Islâmâbâd*, pp. 2–4.
222. See section 6.3, p. 227.
223. See section 7.1, p. 244.
224. *The News*, 24 December 1993. The CII had been reconstituted with the new chairman Kausar Niyazi (who died on 19 March 1994) and the appointment of S. ‘Irfan Haidar ‘Abidi, S. Afzal Haidar and S. Zakir Husain Shah as Shia members (*The Frontier Post*, 17 December 1993).

225. From 1985 to 1999 the Senate consisted of eighty-seven members elected for a term of six years by the four Provincial Assemblies (nineteen each), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (eight), and from the Federal Capital (three); see Mahmood (ed.), *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 865–6.
226. These were S. Muhammad Jawad Hadi (NWFP) and S. Iftikhar Husain Naqvi (Punjab). S. Muhammad Taqi Naqvi and S. Hafiz Riyaz Husain (Punjab) were not interested, while Haidar Ali Jawadi (Sindh) and Ya'qub Ali Tawassuli failed to obtain registration; see Tahrir-i Ja'fariya Pākistan, *1992 tā 1994 Kārkardagī Ripūrt*, pp. 25–6.
227. He had been a fellow student of S. 'Arif Husain Husaini in Najaf and Qom and was serving as principal of the *Jāmi'at ul-Shahīd 'Arif Husain* in Peshawar since the death of the latter.
228. *1992 tā 1994 Kārkardagī Ripūrt*, p. 26. He was elected for six years and remained Senator until October 1999, when all assemblies were “kept in abeyance” after the military coup. In 1997 S. 'Abid Husain Husaini became the second TJP Senator from Parachinar (see below).
229. The TJP Political Council, formalised since September 1994, comprised the provincial chairmen, two members named by the Central Cabinet, and twenty-one further representatives (Punjab 9; Sindh 5; NWFP 4; Balochistan 2; Northern Areas 2; AJK 1); see *1992 tā 1994 Kārkardagī Ripūrt*, p. 27.
230. See section 7.2, p. 254.
231. *The Muslim*, 9 June 1994; *1992 tā 1994 Kārkardagī Ripūrt*, pp. 70–72.
232. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–45, including the full text of S. Jawad Hadi's speech in the Senate on 14 July 1994.
233. Some of such verses are quoted on the following pages of the pamphlet (see reference in Fn 234).
234. Translation from Markaz-i Mutālā'āt-i Islāmī Pākistān, *Nām-nihād nāmūs-i sahāba bil kā 'ilmī jā'iza*, n.d. [Rawalpindi 1994], p. 4. The author of the pamphlet was Malik Aftab Husain, who three years later edited a large compendium under the pseudonym Abu Mus'ab Jawadi, *Tahqiqi Dastāwiz* (Rawalpindi: Markaz-i Mutālā'āt-i Islāmī Pākistān, 1997). It was compiled in reply to a collection of quotations from Shia writings documenting insults against the *sahāba* which was submitted to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in September 1991 and later published by (Abu Riḥan) Zia ur-Rahman Faruqi, *Ta'rikhi Dastāwiz* (Jhang: Shu'ba-i Nashr-o-Ishā'at-i Sipāh-i Sahāba-i Pākistān, 1995).
235. *1992 tā 1994 Kārkardagī Ripūrt*, pp. 64–70.
236. See section 7.1, pp. 247–48.
237. See sections 3.1, p. p. 56; 5.5., p. 160.
238. Many of the local Sunnis have always demanded the merger of the Northern Areas with AJK or the NWFP instead; see Rieck, “Sectarianism”, p. 440.
239. *Ibid.*, p. 446.
240. *Ibid.*, p. 447; Zaigham Khan, “The Writing on the Wall”, *Herald* 11/1994, pp. 52–4; on the powers and functions of the council see *idem*. “Package Deal”, *ibid.*, p. 56.
241. *1992 tā 1994 Kārkardagī Ripūrt*, p. 80; *Herald* 11/1994, pp. 53–4. When asked why the TJP did not contest other seats as well, Sajid Ali Naqvi said that the TJP wanted to “avoid getting into situations which would create unrest” (interview *ibid.*, p. 57).
242. *Dawn*, 11 November 1994.
243. Zaigham Khan, “Trouble in Paradise”, *Herald* 8/1996, pp. 61–5; see also Martin Sökefeld, “From Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism: Changing Modes of Domination in the Northern Areas of Pakistan”, in: *Journal of Asian Studies* 64(2005)4, pp. 939–74.
244. See above, pp. 263–64.

245. *Dawn*, 21 July 1995. On the TNSM (“Movement for the Enforcement of the *Shari‘a* of Muhammad”), which had started agitation with road blocks on the Malakand pass in May 1994 and became violent in November that year, see Zaffar Abbas, “Showdown in Malakand”, *Herald* 5/1994, pp. 60–61; Tahir Mehdi, “Malakand’s Holy War”, *Newsline* 11/1994 pp. 24–36.
246. See section 7.2, p. 257.
247. *Dawn*, 17 February 1996. On the introduction of the “Jerusalem Day” in Pakistan on orders of Khomeini see section 6.3, p. 223.
248. *Dawn*, 17 March 1996; *Dawn*, 3 July 1996.
249. *Dawn*, 8 July 1996.
250. The first of Muharram had been made a holiday by the provincial government in 1994 on demand of the SSP as a commemorative day for the Caliph ‘Umar.
251. To avoid sacrilege, the preferred way to dispose of worn-out copies of the Koran and other Islamic books in Pakistan is to collect them and have them drowned in the Indian Ocean; see the report “The Holy Task”, *Newsline* 7/1996, pp. 100–4.
252. The Shia *azân* comprises the Shia *kalima*; see sections 5.7, p. 187; 5.8, p. 189.
253. Abbreviated translation from the pamphlet ‘*Allâma Yazdânî kâ khatt Sadr-i Pâkistân kî nâm*’ (Shu‘ba-i Nashr-o-Ishâ‘at-i Sipâh-i Muhammad Pâkistân, n.d.), pp. 9–14.
254. See section 7.2, pp. 257–58.
255. Zaigham Khan, “Divided They Stand”, *Herald* 9/1998, pp. 48a–49, here pp. 48b–49.
256. See section 7.1, p. 247.
257. Arif Jamal, “An ideological metamorphosis”, *The News*, 14 November 1999.
258. *Ibid.* and *Herald* 9/1998, p. 48a.
259. *Tahrîk* 1/1997, p. 32.
260. *Dawn*, 20 November 1996.
261. *Dawn*, 23 December 1996. The JI had meanwhile decided to boycott the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
262. *Dawn*, 27 December 1996.
263. *Dawn*, 5 February 1997; see also quotations from a speech of Amanullah Khan Sial held at a TJP convention six weeks later, *Tahrîk-i Ja‘fariya Pâkistân, Ripûrt-i Tanzîmî Kanwenshan 97 ... Islâmâbad*, pp. 16, 25, 53.
264. See quotations from his address at the same convention *ibid.*, pp. 14, 52.
265. *Dawn*, 17 December 1996; on S. Hamid Ali Musavi see section 6.3, pp. 219–224.
266. Author’s interview with S. Muhammad Taqi Naqvi (Multan, 7 February 2001).
267. S. ‘Abid Husain, born 1945, had been principal of two *dînî madâris* in Parachinar since the 1980s.
268. *Dawn*, 1 April 1997; on his implication in that case see section 7.1, p. 242.
269. *Tahrîk-i Ja‘fariya Pâkistân, Ripûrt-i Tanzîmî Kanwenshan 97*, pp. 32–3, 36.
270. Translation from *ibid.*, pp. 28–9.
271. Translation from *ibid.*, pp. 39–0.
272. *Dawn*, 23 July 1997; Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Moving Targets”, *Herald* 8/1997, pp. 36–8, here p. 38.
273. *The News*, 28 June 1998; *Dawn*, 29 June 1998.
274. *Herald* 9/1998, p. 49; on that bill see section 7.2, p. 262.
275. Arif Jamal, “An ideological metamorphosis”, *The News*, 14 November 1999. The 11 dissidents were Senators S. Jawad Hadi and S. ‘Abid Husain, TJP Senior Vice-President Haidar Ali Jawadi, Ya‘qub Tawassuli and Muhammad Jum‘a Asadi from Quetta, S. Husain al-Asghar from Karachi, and five ‘*ulamâ*’ hailing from the Northern Areas but residing in Islamabad (Muhsin Ali), Lahore (Muhammad Shafi‘, Muhammad Shafa‘, S. Ali al-Musavi) and Karachi (Ali Madad).



276. *The News*, 13 July 1998. Members of the Reconciliation Committee (constituted on Iranian advice) were S. 'Abid Husain, Shaikh Muhsin Ali and Hafiz Riyaz Husain.
277. *The News and Dawn*, 5 August 1998; *Herald* 9/1998, pp. 48a–49.
278. *Ibid.* and *Dawn*, 15 August 1998.
279. The *Imamia Organisation* was formed in the late 1970s. It comprised former ISO members as well as non-academics who shared the aims of the ISO. On later conflicts between the *Imamia Organisation* and the ISO see T.R. Khân, *Safir-i inqilâb*, pp. 180–82.
280. *Herald* 9/1998, p. 48b.
281. *Hizbullah* was founded in 1983 after attempts to bring the Lebanese mainstream Shia organisation *Amal* under Iranian ideological tutelage had failed in 1982. The *Hizb-i Wahdat* was formed at a convention of eight different Afghan Shia groups in Tehran in early 1989.
282. Already during the 1987 visit of Khamenei to Pakistan, the name *Tahrîk-i Wahdat-i Islâmî* had been used as a camouflage for the TNFJ; see Fn 278 to chapter 6 (p. 436). Significantly, another Shia communal organisation under strong Iranian influence founded in Pakistan in 2008 was named *Majlis-i Wahdat-i Muslimin* ("Council of Unity of Muslims"). The latter has quickly eclipsed the TJP (renamed ITP 2002) in recent years; see section 8.3, pp. 311–24.
283. See section 7.2, p. 261.
284. Arif Jamal, "An ideological metamorphosis", *The News*, 14 November 1999.
285. *Dawn*, 3 August 1999. He then argued that Pakistan "could not afford fresh elections". The TJP also remained aloof when a so-called *Grand Democratic Alliance* of 28 opposition parties was formed against Nawaz Sharif in September 1999.
286. *Dawn*, 1 November 1999, reported that "some 1,000 district representatives from all over Pakistan" had gathered in Islamabad. Sources loyal to Sajid Ali claimed that the convention was attended by 250 people only, the majority among them "children from a *madrasa* in Islamabad"; see Asim Hussain, "Sajid Naqvi's ouster splits TJP", *The News*, 2 November 1999.
287. Translation from the pamphlet *Tanzîm-i nau kanwenshan 30–31 Uktûbar 1999*, published by the TJP Central Organising Committee, Islamabad, pp. 2–4.
288. S. Fazil Husain Musavi, born 1950 in Chalt, a village in the former Nager Principality (Gilgit Dist., Northern Areas), had been one of several TNFJ vice-presidents under S. 'Arif Husain al-Husaini. He had not returned to Pakistan after his arrest by Saudi authorities in August 1987, following the clashes in Mecca (see section 6.3, p. 230), and had lived in Los Angeles most of the time.
289. *Dawn*, 22 November 1999.
290. On 19 November 2000 he was replaced by S. Shahid Husain Naqvi, a former teacher at the *Jâmi'at ul-Muntazar* Lahore who had been elected senior vice-president of the TJP dissident faction on 31 October 1999.
291. *Dawn*, 2 and 5 November 1999.
292. "Naqvi still TJP President", *The Nation*, 2 November 1999. Another round of elections for the Northern Areas Council (see above) took place on 2 November. The TJP won only 6 out of twenty-four seats (*Dawn*, 5 November 1999), but its leading office-holders in the Northern Areas remained loyal to Sajid Ali Naqvi.
293. *The Nation*, 2 November 1999. The report specified that three former ISO die-hards, Maqsd Gill, Ali Riza Bhatti and Shauqat Shirazi, had already engineered the formation of the *Shurâ-i Wahdat* in August 1998, "luring the TJP Senators through their agenda of confrontation with sectarian opponents". Maqsd Gill, a former TJP information secretary had been expelled from the TJP Central Council already in December 1996 along with two other dissidents; see Arif Jamal, "An ideological metamorphosis", *The News*, 14 November 1999.



294. Asim Hussain, “Sajid Naqvi’s ouster splits TJP”, *The News*, 2 November 1999.
295. Ibid. and *The Nation*, 2 November 1999 (listing parts of the ISO and a *Ja’fariya Students Organisation* among Sajid Ali’s supporters).
296. See section 8.3, pp. 308–09, 318, 323–24.

#### 8. THE MUSHARRAF AND ZARDARI ERAS, 2000–2013

1. See Murtaza Razvi, *Musharraf: The Years in Power* (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2009), pp. 59ff.
2. See section 7.2, *passim*.
3. *Dawn*, 13 April 2000. A hand grenade had allegedly been thrown on the worshippers from the roof of an adjacent SSP mosque. On the next day, a planned similar attack on an *imâm-bârgâh* in Quetta could be prevented by the police.
4. *Dawn*, 5 May 2000; see section 7.2, p. 262.
5. *Dawn*, 29 November 2000; he was referring to the *Lashkar-i Jhangvi* terrorists and their training in *Taleban*-controlled Afghanistan.
6. *Dawn*, 5 and 6 January 2001. Local tribal elders held the Afghan *Taleban* responsible (*Dawn*, 17 January 2001).
7. *Dawn*, 2 and 3 March 2001; *Dawn*, 11 March 2001; a curfew in Hangu was lifted only seventy-six days later, after an agreement between local Shia and Sunni representatives (*Dawn*, 17 May 2001).
8. *Dawn*, 24, 25, 26, and 27 January 2001; LeJ operative Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi had been sentenced to death for the 1990 murder of Sadiq Ganji, director of the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore (see Fn 136 to chapter 7; p. 447). He was hanged on 28 February 2001.
9. *Dawn*, 5 March and 13 March 2001.
10. *Dawn*, 15 and 17 March 2001.
11. *Dawn*, 15 August 2001.
12. Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, pp. 218–20.
13. I.e. the majority faction of the JUI led by Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman a smaller faction (JUI-S) was led since the 1980s by Maulana Sami‘ ul-Haqq, director of the *Dâr ul-Ulûm Haqqâniya* in Akora Khattak.
14. The MMA was formed on 2 January 2002. Before contesting the elections in October that year, it had organised resistance against attempts of the government to establish greater control over the *dinî madâris*.
15. On *Lashkar-i Taiba* see Stephen Tinkel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai* (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, April/May 2009).
16. *Jaish-i Muhammad* was founded in March 2000 by Mas‘ud Azhar (born 1968 in Bahawalpur), a former leading member of the Jihadi groups *Harakat ul-Ansar* and *Harakat ul-Mujâhidîn* who had been in Indian custody from 1994 to 1999. The group has ever since closely cooperated with *Al-Qâ’ida*.
17. The TNSM was founded in 1992 by Sufi Muhammad, a former member of the *jamâ’at-i Islâmî* who in 1994 led an insurrection in Malakand Division (Districts of Dir, Swat, Bajaur, and Chitral) with the objective of enforcing the implementation of *shari’a* laws there. He was arrested in November 2001 after having mobilised thousands of Pakistani volunteers to fight alongside the *Taleban* in Afghanistan. The group regained prominence in early 2009, when the NWFP government signed a short-lived agreement with the TNSM on the implementation of *shari’a* laws in Malakand in return for an indefinite cease-fire.
18. The ban went into effect on 14 January. It was followed up with a reference filed by the federal government in the Supreme Court under Article 17 of the Constitution and the

- Political Parties Act, blaming both the SSP and the TJP of “working against the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan” (*The News*, 3 February 2002). Both parties filed review petitions challenging their ban (*The News*, 14 April 2002).
19. “Hafiz Hussain Ahmad meets Sajid Naqvi”, *The News*, 14 January 2002; for the consequences of the ban for the TJP see section 8.3, pp. 308–09.
  20. According to Azmat Abbas, 2,200 activists of the five banned groups were arrested in the weeks following January 14, but among them “not a single proclaimed offender accused of sectarian violence”; see “Taming the Militants”, *Herald* 3/2002, pp. 23–7, here p. 24.
  21. “10 die in Pindi mosque firing”, *The News*, 27 February 2002.
  22. “Karachi sees fresh sectarian violence”, *The Friday Times*, 22–28 February 2002; “Shi’ite doctors still in crosshairs”, *The Friday Times*, 15–12 March 2002; Zahra Chughtai, “Innocence Lost”, *Herald* 4/2002, pp. 44–46; Hussain Askari, “Death stalks the lifesaver”, *ibid.*, pp. 47–51.
  23. “Top LJ terrorist killed in encounter”, *The News*, 12 March 2002; “Vehari police kill three LJ terrorists”, *The News*, 15 March 2002.
  24. See section 7.2., p. 254.
  25. “Basra among 4 dead in encounter”, *The News*, 15 May 2002; “Chapter in 20-year old sectarian killings closed”, *ibid.*
  26. “Basra was caught 6 months ago”, *The News*, 15 May 2002; “Basra encounter: a poorly staged drama”, *Dawn*, 17 May 2002; Salman Aslam, “The making and unmaking of Basra”, *The News*, 19 May 2002.
  27. Daniel Pearl was abducted on 23 January 2002 in Karachi. On 21 February a videotape was released, allegedly showing his beheading by his captors. On 15 July 2002 Umar Sa’id Shaikh, an operative of *Jaish-i Muhammad*, was sentenced to death for the murder of Pearl.
  28. Ibne Nasim, “Jaish connection”, *Weekly Independent*, 16–22 May 2002; Suleman Hosain, “The Jaish-Lashkar nexus”, *Weekly Independent*, 23–29 May 2002.
  29. “Sindh IGP announces arrest of Akram Lahori, four comrades”, *Daily Times*, 2 July 2002; “LJ terrorists to be brought to Lahore for probe”, *The News*, 3 July 2002; “Lashkar in the dock”, *Weekly Independent*, 4–10 July 2002; “34 killed by Akram Lahori in 9 attacks”, *The News*, 6 July 2002; “Lahori admits killing 40 people”, *The News*, 20 July 2002.
  30. “Special Report: Trail of Terror”, *Herald* 8/2002, pp. 46–8.
  31. “SSP activist gets death in Qadri murder case”, *Dawn*, 12 April 2003; “Lahori, two others given capital punishment”, *Dawn*, 27 April 2003; “Court uphold death sentence to LJ chief” [Abdul Hayee], *The News*, 3 June 2003; “Two Lashkar men awarded death, chief gets life”, *Dawn*, 20 August 2003; “4 LJ men sentenced to death”, *Dawn*, 16 November 2003.
  32. *The News*, 1 August 2002.
  33. *The News*, 2 October 2002.
  34. “Banned SSP chief Azam Tariq freed”, *The News*, 31 October 2002.
  35. “Disqualification of Azam Tariq sought”, *Dawn*, 19 November 2002; “Punjab asks SC to expel Azam from NA”, *The News*, 9 January 2003.
  36. Hassan Abbas, *Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan*, p. 42.
  37. “Azam Tariq forms new party”, *The News*, 21 April 2003.
  38. “SSP leaders establish Millat Islamia Pakistan”, *The Nation*, 11 September 2003; “Azam announces formation of Millat-e-Islamia party”, *The News*, 1 October 2003; “MIP seeks MMA support for Shariat Bill in NA”, *The Nation*, 2 October 2003.
  39. “Azam Tariq shot dead in Islamabad”, *The News*, 7 October 2003; for obituaries of Tariq see Mohammad Shehzad, “End of a violent chapter”, *The News*, 12 October 2003; Arif Jamal, “Violence never ends”, *ibid.*; Shahwar Faryal, “Who killed Azam Tariq?”, *Weekly Independent*, 9–15 October 2003.
  40. “One killed as mob goes on rampage in Capital”, *The News*, 8 October 2003; Nusrat Javeed, “Madrasa students had a method in choosing targets”, *The News*, 10 October 2003.

41. "Millat-e-Islamia not responsible for sectarian violence: Ludhianvi", *The Nation*, 16 October 2003.
42. "Naqvi, 7 others nominated in Azam's murder FIR", *The Nation*, 10 October 2003; "Naqvi says charges total nonsense", *ibid.*
43. "Sajid Naqvi, others acquitted in Azam Tariq murder case", *The Nation*, 28 November 2004. Another suspect, S. Muhammad Muhsin Shah, had meanwhile been arrested in Gilgit; see *Dawn*, 8 June 2004.
44. *The News*, 23 February 2003; during the funeral of the victims on the following day, enraged Shia youths attacked two fast-food outlets and burned down a gas station (*The News*, 24 February 2003).
45. *The News*, 9 June 2003.
46. *The News*, 5 and 6 July 2003; Minority Support Group, *The Shia Hazara of Pakistan*, p. 17. An angry mob attacked several Sunni *madrasas* on the same day.
47. "Foreign hand behind Quetta attack likely: Jamali", *The News*, 6 July 2003; "Evidence points to foreign hand: PM", *The News*, 7 July 2003.
48. "More suspects arrested in Quetta attack", *The News*, 18 July 2003.
49. Press conference of the I.G.P. Balochistan, Dr Shoaib Suddle, *The News*, 6 September 2003; Badini was arrested in Karachi on 13 June 2004; see "Notorious terrorist arrested", *The News*, 15 June 2004.
50. *Dawn*, 4 October 2003; just like after the 22 February Karachi terrorist attacks, mourners tried to vent their anger against KFC and McDonald's fast-food outlets.
51. See "3 religio-political outfits banned again", *The News*, 16 November 2003; "Banned groups activists arrested", *The News*, 17 November 2003; "60 offices, seminaries sealed in Punjab", *Dawn*, 17 November 2003; Husain Haqqani, "Skepticism over crackdown", *The Nation*, 19 November 2003; Arif Jamal, "Back to ban", *The News*, 30 November 2003.
52. These were *Jāmi'at ul-Ansār*, *Jamā'at ul-Furqān* and *Hizb ul-Tahrir*.
53. 303 of "sectarian" activists enlisted on 4<sup>th</sup> Schedule under Anti-Terrorist Act 1997 were Sunnis (SSP or LeJ) and 74 were Shias (TJP or SMP); see a detailed list in *The News*, 7 February 2004.
54. Prior to the 2002 elections, the PML had formally split into one wing supporting Musharraf which named itself PML-Q in a reference to the *Qā'id-i A'zam* Jinnah, and another wing which remained loyal to Nawaz Sharif and has since been known as PML-N. The PML-N won only nineteen of 342 seats in the National Assembly in 2002 against 118 of the PML-Q, but it became the second largest party with eighty-nine seats in the 2008 elections and won the 2013 elections with 166 seats.
55. International Crisis Group, *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan*, p. 29.
56. The agreement was signed with Nek Muhammad Wazir, who then engaged himself to register foreign militants and stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. He did not abide by the terms of the agreement and was killed by a U.S. drone attack in June 2004.
57. "Suicide bomber dies in Pindi Imambargah blast", *The News*, 29 February 2004.
58. Minority Support Group, *The Shia Hazara of Pakistan*, p. 17; "Inquiry ordered into massacre: 45 deaths confirmed, Quetta under curfew", *Dawn*, 4 March 2004; "Quetta attack death toll 47", *The News*, 4 March 2004; "Preliminary report on Quetta carnage submitted", *The News*, 1 March 2004.
59. See *ibid.* and "Al-Qaeda involved in Quetta attack: Suddle", *The News*, 9 March 2004; "Lashkar-e-Jhangvi prime suspect", *The News*, 5 March 2004. Dawud Badini was again among the alleged masterminds; see "Quetta Ashura attackers identified: Suddle", *The News*, 17 May 2004; "Badini confesses role in killing of 100 Shias", *The News*, 16 September 2004.

60. “33 victims buried amid tension: 32 killed in security men’s firing, alleges Shia leader”, *Dawn*, 5 March 2004; “Police fired at Quetta procession, says minister”, *The News*, 8 March 2004.
61. “Govt rejects charge of ‘police killings’ in Quetta”, *Dawn*, 6 March 2004.
62. “220 claims of property damage sent to Jam”, *Dawn*, 7 March 2004.
63. “14 killed, 200 hurt in Karachi mosque blast”, *The News*, 8 May 2004; “Death toll rises to 15 in mosque blast”, *Dawn*, 12 May 2004.
64. “Mosque blast sparks off widespread violence”, *Dawn*, May 2004; One killed in Karachi gunfire”, *The News*, 9 May 2004.
65. Mufti Shamezai, then *Shaikh ul-Hadith* at the *Jāmi‘at Binoriya*, the largest Deobandi *madrasa* in Karachi, was shot dead along with his son, his nephew, and his driver in front of that *madrasa*, followed by violent protests of his supporters; see “Mufti Shamezai killed in Karachi ambush”, *The News*, 31 May 2004; “Angry mob damages property, 20 vehicles”, *Dawn*, 31 May 2004.
66. “16 dead, 36 injured in Karachi mosque blast”, *The News*, 1 June 2004; Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Fear City”, *Herald* 6/2004, pp. 64–7.
67. “30 die in Sialkot mosque explosion”, *The News*, 2 October 2004; “Sectarian terrorist kills 30 in Sialkot”, *The Nation*, 2 October 2004; “Sialkot blast victims buried amid violent riots”, *The News*, 3 October 2004.
68. Adnan Adil, “Intense endeavours”, *The News*, 10 October 2004.
69. “4 die in Lahore mosque suicide blast”, *The News*, 11 October 2004; “Thousands attend funeral of Lahore blast victims”, *The News*, 12 October 2004.
70. “Multan car bomb kills 41, injures 100”, *The News*, 8 October 2004; “Protests, strike paralyse life in Multan”, *The News*, 9 October 2004. One Amjad Husain Shah from Bhakkar, a member of the banned SMP, was arrested shortly after as the alleged mastermind; see “Multan blast suspect arrested”, *The News*, 20 October 2004; “Shias, Deobandis form new militant group”, *The News*, 22 October 2004.
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72. He had been Friday preacher in Gilgit’s central Shia mosque since 1990. In 2004 he had led a high-profile protest movement against controversial school curricula; see section 8.3, pp. 309–10.
73. “11 killed in Gilgit violence”, *Dawn*, 9 January 2005.
74. “Religious leader shot dead in Lahore”, *The News*, 2 April 2005; Ghulam Husain Najafi, born 1939 in Sargodha, was the author of controversial books and had survived three earlier assassination attempts.
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77. “Six die in Gilgit violence”, *Dawn*, 14 October 2005.
78. “Killer of 130 persons arrested: police”, *The News*, 5 March 2005;
79. “Wanted LJ activist Asif Choto arrested”, *The News*, 29 September 2005.
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81. “37 die in two Hangu blasts, violence”, *Dawn*, 11 February 2006; “Hangu attack, violence toll 40”, *The News*, 11 February 2006; “Ceasefire in Hangu as three more die”, *The News*, 12 February 2006; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “In the extreme north”, *The News*, 19 February 2006.

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265. See section 8.1, p. 277.
266. See Mahsud, *Militancy and Conflict in Kurram*, pp. 4–6, Raheel Khan, *Militancy and Conflict in Orakzai*, p. 3; Abou Zahab, “Sectarianism in Pakistan’s Kurram Tribal Agency”, *passim*.
267. Quoted from Mahsud, *op. cit.*, p. 3 (slightly edited); see also Javed Aziz Khan, “Parachinar under curfew after sectarian clashes”, *The News*, 7 April 2007; *idem.*, “40 die as Parachinar sectarian violence spreads”, *The News*, 8 April 2007; *idem.*, “16 more killed in Kurram clashes”, *The News*, 9 April 2007; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Eight more killed as rivals use heavy weapons in Kurram”, *The News*, 11 April 2007; Ali Afzal Afzaal & Iqbal Hussain, “45 more killed in Kurram violence”, *The News*, 12 April 2007; *idem.*, “Jirga brokers cease-fire in Kurram agency”, *The News*, 13 April 2007.
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271. “Normalcy returns to most of Kurram Agency”, *The News*, 15 April 2007; *Dawn*, 17 November 2007, referred to 150 killed and some 300 injured during the clashes in April.
272. Javed Afridi, “Kurram tribesmen start raising funds to buy arms”, *The News*, 4 May 2007.
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275. “50 dead in fresh Parachinar clashes”, *The News*, 25 November 2007; “Eight killed in Kurram violence”, *The News*, 24 December 2007; “Five more killed as clashes continue in Kurram”, *The News*, 26 December 2007; “32 more killed in Kurram sectarian violence”, *The News*,



- 27 December 2007; “20 killed in fresh Kurram Agency clashes”, *The News*, 31 December 2007; “Eight more killed in Kurram Agency”, *Dawn*, 3 January 2008; “Sporadic fire in Parachinar despite truce”, *Dawn*, 7 January 2008.
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281. “Six killed in Parachinar ambulance ambush”, *The News*, 28 March 2008.
282. “Three die in attack on convoy in Lower Kurram”, *The News*, 6 April 2008; “Attack on convoy sparks clashes in Parachinar”, *Dawn*, 6 April 2008.
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- valley which had been under de facto control of militants since July 2007. The “Operation Right Path” dislodged the TTP permanently from Swat by July 2009; see Daud Khan Khattak, *Militancy and Conflict in the Swat Valley* (Washington D.C.: The New America Foundation, 2010), pp. 10–11.
295. Dressler & Jan, op. cit., p. 6.
  296. “Kurram clashes leave 33 dead”, *Dawn*, 28 June 2009.
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  299. Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Power Rising, Taliban Besiege Pakistani Shiites”, *The New York Times*, 26 July 2008; Farhat Taj “Life in Kurram”, *The News*, 19 October 2009.
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  307. “Kurram travellers suffer second ambush in one week: Convoy attack leaves 18 dead”, *Dawn*, 18 July 2010; “18 killed in Kurram convoy attack”, *The News*, 18 July 2010.
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  310. Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, *Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan* (Washington D.C.: The New America Foundation, 2010), passim; Bill Roggio,

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360. See below, pp. 311–24.
361. For a thorough analysis of Iranian attitudes towards violence against Shias in Pakistan from the 1980s to early 2012 see Vatanka, “The Guardian of Pakistan’s Shia”, *passim*.
362. See section 8.1, pp. 281, 287–88. There were many more attacks on *sūfi* shrines in Pakistan in the years after 2007, and some assassinations of Bareilvi ‘*ulamā*’.
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  383. Stöber, “Religious Identities Provoked”, pp. 389–93; Nosheen Ali, “Outrageous State, Sectarianized Citizens”, para 8 and 9 [no page numbers].
  384. See section 8.1, p. 281.
  385. Stöber, *op. cit.*, pp. 394–5; Nosheen Ali, *op. cit.*, para 9.
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- S. Hasnain Raza Gardezi, Maqsud Domki, S. Shabbir Bukhari, Abdul Khaliq Asadi, S. Hashim Musavi, Hafiz Husain Nuri, Br. Zahid Ali Kachu, Br. Sarfraz Husaini, and Br. S. Nasir ‘Abbas Shirazi.
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  403. “Rally condemns Karachi killings, and demands Chief Justice to take suo motu action on killings of Shia Muslims”, 8 February 2010, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/1090-rally-condemns-karachi-killings-and-demands-chief-justice-to-take-suo-motuaction-on-killings-of-shia-muslims>; “Majlis-e-Wahdate Muslameen stages protest demonstrations in Sindh”, 27 March 2010, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/1210-majlis-e-wahdate-muslameen-stages-protest-demonstrations-in-sindh->; see also section 8.1, p. 287.
  404. “Majlis-e-Wahdate Muslameen to observe countrywide protest on Friday”, 22 April 2010, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/1265-majlis-e-wahdate-muslameen-to-observe-countrywide-protest-on-friday>; “America and Israel involved in genocide of Shia Muslims in Pakistan”, 23 April 2010, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/1266-america-and-israel-involved-in-genocide-of-shia-muslims-in-pakistan>.
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- ecration of Islamic sanctities in Syria”, 16 May 2013, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/6946-friday-to-be-observed-day-of-protest-against-the-desecration-of-islamic-sanctities-in-syria>.
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  429. “MWM & ISO staged countrywide Protest against killing of Pilgrims in Mastung”, 21 September 2011, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/3462-pakistan-mwm-a-iso-staged-countrywide-protest-against-killing-of-pilgrims-in-mastung>.
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- 700-shia-muslims-in-quetta, referring to a joint press conference of T'jaz Beheshti, Asghar 'Askari, Nisar Faizi, and 'Abbas Zaidi in Sukkur.
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  433. These had been suspended after an attack of NATO helicopters and jet fighter on two border check-post in Salala (Mohmand Agency) had killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on 26 November 2011. The NATO supply lines were reopened only in July 2012, after the U.S. had tendered a formal apology.
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  436. "MWM Karachi rally against 18 Shia pilgrim killings", 28 February 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4101-mwm-karachi-rally-against-18-shia-pilgrim-killings>; "Countrywide mourning day against Kohistan Tragedy and Quran-burning in Afghanistan was held on Friday", 2 March 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4122-countrywide-mourning-day-against-kohistan-tragedy-and-quran-burning-in-afghanistan-was-held-on-friday>; "MWM announces civil disobedience if demands not met by March 8", 6 March 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4138-mwm-announces-civil-disobedience-if-demands-not-met-by-march-8>; "Gilgit: Allama Rahat Hussaini announces launching of movement", 9 March 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4153-gilgit-allama-rahata-hussaini-announces-launching-of-movement>.
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  438. "Government machinery against Quran wa Ahl-e-Bait (A.S.) Conference's publicity campaign: Allama Hassan Zafar", 14 March 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4169-govern-ment-machinery-against-quran-wa-ahl-e-bait-as-conferences-publicity-campaign-allama-hassan-zafar>; "Over 200000 to participate in Quran wa Ahl-e-Bait (A.S.) Conference", 24 March 2012; <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4195-over-200000-to-participate-in-quran-wa-ahl-e-bait-as-conference>; "A mammoth public meeting was held under the aegis of Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen", 25 March 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4196-a-mammoth-public-meeting-was-held-under-the-aegis-of-majlis-e-wahdat-e-muslimeen>; "Shia revival: massive participation makes Quran wa Ahl-e-Bait Conference successful", 26 March 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4198-shia-revival-massive-participation-makes-quran-wa-ahl-e-bait-conference-successful>.
  439. "A mammoth public meeting was held...", 25 March 2012 (see above, Fn 438).
  440. Ibid.
  441. Sarah Khan, "While General Kayani looked the other way: Quran-o-Ahleibait Conference in Karachi", 25 March 2012, <http://lubpak.com/archives/74713>.

442. Quoted from Sarah Khan, *ibid.* (slightly edited); for mainstream press reporting on the event see Fasahat Mohiuddin, “US, Israel threat to Pakistan”, *The News*, 26 March 2012; “MWM urges government not to reopen Nato supply routes”, *Business Recorder*, 26 March 2012; “People urged to unite against sectarianism”, *Dawn*, 26 March 2012; “MWM rally sees massive turnout in Karachi”, *Daily Times*, 26 March 2012.
443. The *Difāʾ-i Pākistān Council* (Defence of Pakistan Council) was formed shortly after the November 2011 attack on the Salala checkpoint (see above, Fn 433). It joined together dozens of Islamist parties and groups, including the ASWJ and the *Jamāʿat ud-Daʿwa* (formerly *Lashkar-i Taiba*).
444. Inter-Services Public Relations, i.e. the public relations department of Pakistan’s Armed Forces.
445. Quoted (slightly edited) from “MWM must not act as a Shia version of Difa-e-Pakistan Council”, 26 March 2012, <http://pakistan-blogzine.wordpress.com/2012/03/27/mwm-must-not-act-as-a-shia-version-of-difa-e-pakistan-council/>.
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447. See section 8.1, p. 291.
448. “MWM Karachi demonstration against Shia genocide in Gilgit, Karachi and Quetta”, 4 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4217-mwm-karachi-demonstration-against-shia-genocide-in-gilgit-karachi-and-quetta>; “Countrywide protest against genocide of Shia Muslims continues on Friday”, 6 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4224-countrywide-protest-against-genocide-of-shia-muslims-continues-on-friday>.
449. “MWM sit-in outside Parliament House to protest against Chilas Tragedy”, 6 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4228-mwm-sit-in-outside-parliament-house-to-protest-against-chilas-tragedy>; “Third day: MWM Parliament House Islamabad protest against Chilas & Karachi killings”, 8 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4235-third-day-mwm-parliament-house-islamabad-protest-against-chilas-a-karachi-killings>; “Sit-in outside Parliament House against genocide of Shia Muslims entered 7th day”, 12 April 2012, <http://www.shiite-news.com/index.php/pakistan/4249-sit-in-outside-parliament-house-against-genocide-of-shia-muslims-entered-7th-day>; “Sit-in ends after Govt assure to meet all demands in 15 days”, 14 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4257-sit-in-ends-after-govt-assure-to-meet-all-demands-in-15-days>. The promises of the government included: (1) the formation of a judicial commission to probe into the Chilas murders comprising one judge each from the Supreme Court and from a High Court, a Shia and a Sunni scholar, and a lawyer; (2) a common curriculum acceptable to all sects in Gilgit-Baltistan; (3) lifting of the curfew in Gilgit; (4) the release of local Shias arrested on suspicion of breaching peace.
450. “MWM sit-in at Numaish roundabout against genocide of Shia Muslims”, 10 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4241-mwm-sit-in-at-numaish-roundabout-against-genocide-of-shia-muslims>.
451. See section 8.1, p. 291.
452. “State institutions’ undeclared alliance with terrorists: MWM Chief”, 30 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4310-state-institutions-undeclared-alliance-with-terrorists-mwm-chief>.
453. “Gilgit-Baltistan Govt orders to expel Allama Nasir Abbas Jafri, ban on his entry for 90 days”, 18 July 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4701-gilgit-baltistan-govt-orders-to-expel-allama-nasir-abbas-jafri-ban-on-his-entry-for-90-days>; “MWM’s countrywide protest against arrest warrant of Allama Nasir Abbas Jafri”, 19 July 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4702-mwms-countrywide-protest-against->

- arrest-warrant-of-allama-nasir-abbas-jafri; “Gilgit-Baltistan Govt withdraws ban on Allama Nasir Abbas Jafri’s entry into province”, 19 July 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4705-gilgit-baltistan-govt-withdraws-ban-on-allama-nasir-abbas-jafri-entry-into-province>.
454. “Majlis e Wahdat e Muslimeen to be registered with Election Commission soon: Allama Shaheedi”, 26 April 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4300-majlis-e-wahdat-e-muslimeen-to-be-registered-with-election-commission-soon-allama-shaheedi>.
  455. “Allama Nasir Abbas Jafri says political parties never benefited Shia Muslims”, 28 May 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4421-allama-nasir-abbas-jafri-says-political-parties-never-benefited-shia-muslims>.
  456. “Quran-o-Ahl-e-Bait (AS) Conference held in Bhakkar”, 11 June 2012, <http://www.shiite-news.com/index.php/pakistan/4486-quran-o-ahl-e-bait-as-conference-held-in-bhakkar>.
  457. See section 6.3, pp. 227–28; “Allama Hassan Zafar appeals to Shias to fill Minar-e-Pakistan on July 1”, 25 June 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4560-allama-hassan-zafar-appeals-to-shias-to-fill-minar-e-pakistan-on-july-1>; “MWM will show its mass support and strength on July 1 at Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore”, 26 June 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4570-mwm-will-show-its-mass-support-and-strength-on-july-1-at-minar-e-pakistan-lahore>; “MWM to announce comprehensive roadmap today to rid Pakistan of crisis”, 30 June 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4597-mwm-to-announce-comprehensive-roadmap-today-to-rid-pakistan-of-crisis>.
  458. “Controversy emerges on whether Allama Sajid Naqvi was invited or not”, 20 June 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4539-controversy-emerges-on-whether-allama-sajid-naqvi-was-invited-or-not>.
  459. See above, pp. 315–17; none of the press reports listed in Fn 460 gave estimates of the number of participants, but *The News*, 2 July 2012, termed it “the second largest gathering of Shias at this historic ground after that of 1987”.
  460. “Pakistan’s Shias announce active participation in politics”, 1 July 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4599-pakistans-shias-announce-active-participation-in-politics>; “MWM vows to safeguard Pakistan ideology”, *The Nation*, 2 July 2012; Asim Husain, “New party warns GHQ, Presidency of siege”, *The News*, 2 July 2012; “MWM’s Quran-o-Sunnat conference at Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore. A show of tremendous Shia strength and power”, 2 July 2012, <http://jafrianews.com/2012/07/02/mwm-s-quran-o-sunnat-conference-at-minar-e-pakistan-lahore-a-show-of-tremen-dous-shia-strength-and-power/>.
  461. See above, p. 318.
  462. “Over 100 including Allama Shaheedi booked on false charges of terrorism”, 8 August 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4828-over-100-including-allama-shaheedi-booked-on-false-charges-of-terrorism>; on the release of Malik Ishaq and his re-arrest in 2011 see section 8.1, pp. 290 and 295.
  463. “Countrywide protest against Babusar tragedy and bomb attack on Quds Day rally”, 24 August 2012, <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/4908-countrywide-protest-against-babusar-tragedy-and-bomb-attack-on-quds-day-rally>; see also section 8.1, p. 291.
  464. “MWM establishes camp of protest in Islamabad”, 3 September 2012, <http://www.shiite-news.com/index.php/pakistan/4984-mwm-establishes-camp-of-protest-in-islamabad>; the purpose was condemning the “inaction” of the government and intelligence agencies against anti-Shia terrorists.
  465. “MWM announces All Shia Parties Conference on Sept. 15”, 29 August 2012, <http://www.shiite-news.com/index.php/pakistan/4948-mwm-announces-all-shia-parties-conference-on-sept15>; “All Shia Parties Conference protest against judiciary for acquitting terror-

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  511. See also sections 5.4, pp. 156–57; 7.1, p. 240.
  512. See section 8.1, p. 277. In 2013 the JUI-F got 1,461,371 votes for its NA candidates (3.22 per cent; 11 MNAs excluding reserved seats) and the *Ĵamāʿat-i Islāmī* got 963,909 votes (2.12 per cent; 3 MNAs excluding reserved seats).
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## 9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. *Qaum* (Arabic and Urdu: “people”; “nation”) is the preferred term used by Shias in Pakistan to refer of themselves collectively, rather than “minority”. It is never translated in quotations from Urdu sources in this book.





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