# Politics of Shi'i Identity in South Asia:
# Syed Jawad Naqvi's Concept of *Wilayat-i Fiqh*

**Centre for Modern Indian Studies**

Master of Arts (M.A.) at the Faculty of Social Sciences,

Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

Submitted to Supervisors:

I.   Supervisor              Prof. Rupa Viswanath
II.  Supervisor              Prof. Patrick Eisenlohr

Submission Date: 31, March 2017

By: Wendy Qian

## Abstract

This thesis examines the discourse of a contemporary Pakistani Shi'i cleric, Syed Jawad Naqvi. It focuses on his sermon *The Role of Women towards the System of Wilayat*. Like many prominent Shi'i scholars, he studied in both Iraq and Iran. He also has met Ayatollah Khomeini, a very significant inspiration for some of his ideas.

This thesis links the concept of *wilayat-i fiqh*, governance of Shi'i juridical authority or the Ayatollah, in relation to the heightened debates of political Islam in Pakistan and questions the natural alliance between Islamism and Pakistani nationalism through discussing Navi's concept of *wilayat*.

The thesis starts with a brief account of the significant question of political legitimacy during the Mughal Dynasty and the waxing and waning *ulema* authority. It also introduces the colonial effects on religious publishing and examines how it affected sectarian relations and the political consciousness of certain Muslims in South Asia. The thesis then traces the sectarian contestations and the attempts to construct an overarching Islamic legal framework in modern-era Pakistan. Naqvi is responding to these historical concerns and to contemporary politics, namely, the 1979 Islamic Revolution that took place in Iran. While his rhetoric extends beyond borders at times, Naqvi hesitates to suggest a similar revolution for Pakistan.

This thesis situates Naqvi's writing within the Shi'i tradition both in South Asia and beyond. It examines the rhetoric of the politicians that laid the foundation for Pakistan's state religion—Islam—as well as sermonizing rituals of the Shi'is in South Asia to give context for Naqvi's political style. It explains the fiery rhetoric of Naqvi by providing accounts of violent sectarian conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s in Pakistan. The intense level of violence exhibited by both state and non-state actors questions the nation state's legitimacy and rhetoric of universalism. Finally, this thesis provides gender analysis of Naqvi's sermon within the context of Islamic reform (*tajdid*) since late colonial South Asia. Similar to the writers of the colonial era, Naqvi posits women as potential agents for carrying out the revolution. He suggests pious Shi'i women should adopt certain changes for a better societal foundation that could usher the arrival of the Hidden Imam and a truly just society. At the same time, Naqvi also advises them to fulfill domestic chores and duties. His sermon inherited characteristics from the late colonial era's advice literature genre.


**Keywords**: Gender, Islam, Nationalism, Pakistan, Shiism

## Acknowledgments

**Table of Contents**

## Introduction

The tradition of debating what kind of state is ideal for Muslims has far-reaching roots. Does the ruler have to be Muslim? What privileges should Muslims enjoy under a caliphate? One of recurring problems in the South Asian Islamic tradition has been defining the "relationship between religious and political authority."[1] The ideas of Islamic governance have had a long and heterogeneous legacy in South Asia. Mughal emperors and regional sultans consulted the *ulema* and *sha'ria*, but not always uniformly.[2] While temporal rulers had religious sanction if they followed the *shari'a* law, they could also expand their power through increasing the scope of the law of the sovereign (*qanun-i-shahi*).[3] Satish Chandra pointed out that the Mughals supplement the *shari'a* with the *yassa*, the secret written code law inherited from Chingis Khan. Mughals also issued "royal edicts (*yarligh*) to modify the *sharia* whenever it suited them," and thus contributed to a more liberal Timurid state compared to states before.[4] The *ulema* influence on Mughal reign also ebbed during the seventeenth and eighteenth century.

Anthropologist Brinkley Messick rightly intervenes on the scholarship of *shari'a* and frames it as a "total" discourse, in which religious, legal, moral and economic institutions fit themselves within the discourse of *shari'a* law. "'Political' should be added to this list, for the *shari'a* also provided the basic idiom of prenationalist political expression."[5] The British colonial regime in South Asia, seeing the practice through a purely legalist lens to centralize administrative power, found the *sha'ria* as it was applied inconsistent and blamed the natives in the *ulema* as lacking integrity. They introduced codes based on original legal texts and "denuded" the legal and civil components in the new application of the *sha'ria* as "personal law."[6] Other regions

---

[1] Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago, 2nd edn., 1979), 128-32, 150-2. Cited in Sarah F. D Ansari, *Sufi Saints And State Power* (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5.

[2] Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages Of Political Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5.

[3] Ayesha Jalal, *Self And Sovereignty* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 140.

[4] Satish Chandra, *Medieval India,* vol. 2*,* (Orient BlackSwan, 2007), 14.

[5] Brinkley Morris Messick, *The Calligraphic State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3.

[6] Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages Of Political Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 8.

experienced similar processes: The total discourse that encompassed a wide range of Islamic knowledge "was first modified and displaced, creating something approximating the form and separate status of Western law."[7] This Islamic law that emerged out of the nationalist movements still shape public debates in South Asia, such as debates on the relation between faith and governance. Historian Ayesha Jalal argues that under colonialism, "the Muslim" was more of an abstract legal category "than a social entity whose life was ordered according to the precepts of religious doctrine," yet their social reality was distinct and heterogeneous.[8] Those who sought to create and sustain a nation-state based on a uniform legal category have wrestled with the variety of "Muslims."

But before exploring that subject, one must take a closer look at the concept of *shari'a* in connection with colonial events. The British feared a new challenge from the subjects who supported a revival of the Mughal Empire and exiled the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar to Burma. The Mughal dynasty thus ended conclusively.[9] The British used the Gagging Act in 1878 and prohibited the "publication or dissemination of any newspaper, book or other printed material which could cause a threat to government."[10] Many Urdu newspapers had to shut down.[11] South Asian Muslim intellectuals fled the draconian colonial realm and sought intra-Asian alliances with the Ottomans and envisioned a geographically wide-reaching Caliphate.[12]

The Islamic legitimacy of the Mughal Empire experienced a crisis after the 1857 revolt. The *ulema* of "both the Sunni and Shi'a varieties were unable to agree whether the revolt was a *jihad*" and the *fatwas* issued in response varied.[13] While there is some

Ayesha Jalal, *Self And Sovereignty* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 140.

[7] Brinkley Morris Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* 4.

[8] Ayesha Jalal, *Self And Sovereignty*, 142.

[9] Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages Of Political Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 16.

[10] Heena Ansari, "The Growth Of Urdu Journalism In Lucknow", *Newsd*, last modified 2016, accessed September 25, 2016, https://newsd.in/growth-urdu-journalism-lucknow/.

[11] Ayesha Jalal, *Self And Sovereignty*, 36.

[12] Seema Alavi, *Muslim Cosmopolitanism In The Age Of Empire* (Harvard University Press, 2015).

[13] Ayesha Jalal, *Self And Sovereignty*, 33.

debate regarding whether the *ulema* demised after 1857, scholars agree that "debates about religious reform (as well as about the role of Urdu in education) were defensive attempts by an entrenched Muslim elite to protect their privileges" against others. Employment in the colonial administration was one privilege sought by many communities.[14] After the British annexation of Awadh in 1856, the only "prescribed institution of formalized Shi'a learning" in colonial India was closed down as well.[15] Still, the demise of certain institutions did not prevent the creation of a public sphere concerned with religious identity.

Censors mostly ignored the use of "traditional" expressions of religion, which activists and preachers used to their advantage.[16] After the demise of the Mughal Empire, North Indian *ulema* used two main methods to continue Islamic learning. The first was to institutionalize *madrassas* that reflected structures and requirements of Western academic institutions. The second method was to proselytize (*tabligh*), shun folk practices, and emphasize rational devotion through learning the Islamic scriptures and the *shari'a*.[17] Many members of the Sunni and Shi'a *ulema* strongly supported publication and education in the 1880s for more followers. Some of the Shi'i *ulema* started preaching that Shi'ism should not be restricted to merely those with *sharif* ancestry.[18] As a result, the doors of Shi'ism in South Asia became more open in paper and rhetoric (if not in practice) to non-elite castes.[19] However, cases of Sunni-Shi'a collaboration in education, such as the Farangi Mahal in Lucknow, decreased.[20] *Madrassas* not only taught courses but also published Urdu polemical pamphlets and

---

[14] Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery and Craig Jeffrey, "Islamization, Gentrification and Domestication: 'A Girls' Islamic Course' and Rural Muslims in Western Uttar Pradesh", *Modern Asian Studies*, 38, no. 1 (Feb., 2004): 21.

[15] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 34.

[16] Christopher Pinney, "Iatrogenic Religion and Politics", in *Censorship in South Asia: Cultural Regulation from Sedition to Seduction*, eds. Raminder Kaur and William Mazzarella, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 29-62.

[17] Gail Minault, "Women, Legal Reform And Muslim Identity In South Asia", *Juragentium.Org*, last modified 2005, accessed October 7, 2016, http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rol/en/minault.htm.

[18] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India,* 66.

[19] Razak Khan, "Recovering Minority Pasts: New Writings On Muslims In South Asia", *Südasien-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle* 2 (2012): 378, accessed March 27, 2017, http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/suedasien/band-2/375/PDF/375.pdf.

[20] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 55.

scholarly journals, some published with their own lithographic presses.[21] While decades have passed and technology has improved, Syed Jawad Naqvi founded similar institutions and publishes a monthly titled *Mashrab-i Naab* ("a pure source of water" or "a school of thought or an ideology").[22] He speaks in Urdu in a way that addresses the moral community similar to those generations before him.

The *ulema's* authority diminished when the Indian Penal Code of 1862 ended the "last vestiges of Islamic criminal law."[23] The *shari'a* now addressed mostly issues pertaining marriage, divorce, children, and inheritance for Muslims. Still, the call for a rigid and unified *shari'a* was revived in 1937 and became synonymous with nationalist aspirations for the elite and vocal Muslim community.[24] Islamic intellectuals and politicians examined their religion intently and found that the religious ideal can be used against the British colonial interests. The British and landed interests both supported customary law in the twentieth century, while both the *ulema* and Muslim League at the time supported the *shari'a* for ideological reasons.[25] The latter had a strong point because the *shari'a* would protect women's right to inherit land. What is relevant to our discussion is to understand that many intellectuals conceived of an ancient and unchanging *shari'a* for anticolonial purposes.

Similarly, the idea of communal boundaries was influenced by colonial documents and censuses.[26] In South Asia, identity politics reached its height in the 1920s and many Muslims felt the urge to preserve Islam in the face of Hindu revivalism and purge it from syncretic influences.[27] The Sunni and Shi'a *ulema*

---

[21] Francis Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print", *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (1993): 229-51.

[22] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority And Sovereignty In Contemporary Pakistan" (Ph.D., Duke University, 2014), 250.

[23] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama In Contemporary Islam* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 23.

[24] Gail Minault, "Women, Legal Reform And Muslim Identity In South Asia", *Juragentium.Org*, last modified 2005, accessed October 7, 2016, http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rol/en/minault.htm.

[25] Ibid.

[26] There has been a shared tendency for Muslim intellectuals and colonial officers to stress the unchanging nature and unified system Islamic law. Michael Anderson, 'Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India', in Chibli Mallat and Jane Connors (eds.), *Islamic Family Law* (Boston, 1990), 205-23.

[27] Charu Gupta, *Sexuality, Obscenity, Community*, (Permanent Black, 2005) 22.

examined their respective traditions and laws closer, which heightened Sunni-Shi'a differences.[28] The Deoband School have accused Shi'as as *kafirs* (heretics) since the 1870s. Thus "sectarianism" (or the Urdu equivalent *tafriq*) became "something transcending the individual quarrels and episodes."[29] In this process, the original encompassing nature of the *shari'a* remained to be the narrow colonial framework of Islamic law rather than how the *ulema* used to practice it as "total" discourse. Most of the public was receptive to nationalist propositions that often assumed the role of the *ulema* in declaring what was Islamic or not. Historian David Gilmartin rightly points out that

> The old "moral city" of mosques, courts, schools, and market, to use Faisal Devji's terms, had been displaced by the realm of print and public meetings as a "stage" for the representation of the Muslim "moral collectivity" (Devji 1991, 149). Men with claims to communal leadership in this realm (such as the Ali brothers, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and, ultimately, Jinnah) came to depend far less on established religious credentials than on their ability to successfully deploy the language of moral community in public controversy, as they appealed for the support of autonomous individuals through print and the public platform.[30]

Intellectuals and the *ulema* adopted the new stage to lead their community. Most of them gained more political influence after the 1857 Revolt despite their association with the *ancien régime*.[31]

Gender has been a critical site of reform in both Hindu and Muslim moral communities. Since the 1860s in South Asia, women's sexualities and behaviors demarcated the class and religious boundaries of "us" and "them." Communities also viewed their women as indexes of modernity.[32] Advice literature proscribed limits on women's role and proliferated in many vernacular languages. Reformers of most schools, such as Deoband and the Aligarh Movement, also called for the uplifting and

---

Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery and Craig Jeffrey, "Islamization, Gentrification and Domestication," 25.

[28] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 22, 52, 72. Internal reform occurred through heated religious exchanges with "a supposed 'other'."

[29] Ibid, 55.

[30] David Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative", *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (1998): 1076.

[31] Margrit Pernau, Imtiaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld, *Family And Gender*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 143.

[32] Anshu Malhotra, *Gender, Caste, And Religious Identities*, 1st ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3.

amelioration of Muslim women's condition, mirroring Hindu reformers on this issue.
[33] The patronizing advice was intended for the woman's own benefit; women were passive beneficiaries of men's reforms. For reformers, women were "both the chief perpetrators of wasteful and invidious customs and as the chief victims of such customs… therefore, women needed to be rescued from ignorance and superstition and also from abuse."[34] While some scholars have generalized that Shi'ism had been influenced by modernity later than Sunnism because of their minority status in most Islamic societies,[35] it is not true in the South Asian case. This is evident in Syed Jawad Naqvi's lectures as well, in which he emphasizes the importance of the state, norms of women, and Shi'a codes of conduct.

At the same time, the question of Islamic governance took on a new sense of urgency as previous Islamicate societies transitioned towards nation states. One can say that Pakistan is not special in this regard. Since the birth of Islam, as Brinkley Messick rightly summarizes, there has always been an

> underlying tension was generated in *shari'a* scholarship where an unresolvable gulf opened between divinely constituted truth and humanly constituted versions of that truth. Purists of all eras, including many contemporary 'fundamentalists,' have made a distinction between the divine *shari'a*, defined as God's comprehensive and perfect design for His community, and a humanly produced *shari'a*, or, more precisely, the corpus of knowledge known as *fiqh* (usually translated "jurisprudence"), a necessarily flawed attempt to understand and implement that design.[36]

In particular, the demise in Islamic authority has renewed the vigor of Muslim clerics who claim that shameful demise of Muslims in the nineteenth and twentieth century was God's punishment for straying from true faith. A "powerful puritanism and movement for religious reform and revivalism" emerged as a result in South Asia and beyond.[37] Furthermore, print media and technology furthered this process in the twentieth century. "New media, from the Internet and audiocassettes to Islamic-themed novels and television dramas" added to the growing body of pious literature.

---

[33] Gail Minault, "Women, Legal Reform And Muslim Identity In South Asia".

[34] Ibid.

[35] R. Gleave, "Conceptions Of Authority In Iraqi Shi'ism: Baqir Al-Hakim, Ha'iri And Sistani On Ijtihad, Taqlid And Marja'iyya", *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 59-78.

[36] Brinkley Morris Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* 17.

[37] Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages Of Political Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 16.

Recorded lectures of the *ulema* are available not only on cassettes but also on Youtube.[38] Media technologies have helped Shi'as of South Asian backgrounds intensify preexisting long-distance religious ties.[39]

An urge to implement reform (*tajdid*) and find a solution within Islam, to overcome Muslims' political subjugation and combat Western *jahiliya* (ignorance, barbarity) became known as Islamism.[40] This view was championed by intellectuals of the *ashraf* class such as Sayyid Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, one of the most prominent *ulema* of the Deoband School.[41] He and other Islamists "began to envision 'Muslim' as a social-political category rather than a religious identity, and severely constrained the boundaries of Muslim identity."[42] He also took his ideas to practice through his Jamaat-i-Islami party and targeted the Ahmediyya community regarding their Islamic credentials in 1953.[43] As scholar Vali Nasr has argued, Mawdudi's goal was political and mainstreamed the debates on Islamic identity in relation to the newly formed nation.[44] Despite some of Pakistan's founders' intentions for a secular nation, in 1949, Islamic provisions were included in the Objectives Resolution, which later established the framework for Pakistan's constitution.[45] This was spearheaded by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, another cleric of the Deobandi School. Intellectuals of schools other than Deoband, such as the modernists of the Aligarh school as well as Shi'as such as Syed Jawad Naqvi, continue to use the discourse of Islamism to challenge the nation-state in present-day Pakistan. Some notable exceptions include

---

[38] Dale F Eickelman and Jon W Anderson, *New Media In The Muslim World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), x-xi.

[39] Patrick Eisenlohr, "Media, Urban Aspirations, and Religious Mobilization Among Twelver Shi'ites in Mumbai." In *Handbook Of Religion And The Asian City*, (eds.) Peter van der Veer (University of California Press, 2015): 417.

[40] Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages Of Political Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 18-19.

[41] Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband. 1860-1900,* (Princeton, 1982).

[42] Amina Jamal, "Global Discourses, Situated Traditions, And Muslim Women's Agency In Pakistan", in *South Asian Feminisms*, Ania Loomba and Ritty Lukose (eds.), 1st ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 61.

[43] Hassan Abbas, "The Roots Of Radicalization In Pakistan", *South Asia Journal*, last modified 2013, accessed September 21, 2016, http://southasiajournal.net/the-roots-of-radicalization-in-pakistan/.

[44] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York; Oxford University Press, 1995).

[45] Hassan Abbas, "Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence" (Occasional Paper Series, West Point, 2010).

Maulvi Tufail Ahmad Manglori and Maulana Husain Ahmad Madami. The latter advocated for an independent India consisted of both Muslims and non-Muslims which would enjoy equal rights.[46]

With this historical context, one can see the possible entanglements as well as the relevance of arguments that contest Pakistan's legitimacy as a nation state. The voices of dissent come from secular and religious sources. The intense level of violence exhibited by both state and non-state actors also challenges the nation state's legitimacy. As Naveeda Khan has discovered in her research on Pakistan, many people use this metaphor to describe national affairs: "*Pakistan masjid hai jis par qabza kiya gaya hai* (Pakistan is a mosque that has undergone forcible possession)." The person accused of possessing the "mosque" forcibly can be the bureaucratic state, the religious scholars, the Taliban, or any other group, which is usually decided by the politics of the person using this metaphor.[47]

Scholar Farzana Sheikh notes that a diverse but effective "Islamic language" dominated national debate since Partition.[48] These are some noteworthy incidents indicative of the salience of religious identity in modern Pakistani history: the quick rejection of Muhammad Ali Jinnah's call for religious pluralism through the Objective Resolutions, the war that resulted in the new nation of Bangladesh in 1971, the challenges of Al-Qaeda and Taliban, certain polemical yet popular *ulema*, the proclamation of Ahmediyyas as non-Muslim in 1974, and finally, legal and extralegal attacks on religious minorities. These developments are all the results of public assertion and debates on the question of nationhood, which in turn provoked further assertion by different groups.[49] The people in South Asia were diverse in terms of language, ethnicity, rituals, and socioeconomics since "Muslim identities were almost

---

[46] Barbara D. Metcalf, *Husain Ahmad Madani* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).

Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating A New Medina*, 1st ed. (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[47] Naveeda Ahmed Khan, *Muslim Becoming* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 23.

[48] Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense Of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 127.

[49] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Ali Usman Qasmi, *Ahmadis And The Politics Of Religious Exclusion In Pakistan*, (London/New York: Anthem Press, 2014).

Sadia Badwaj, "Crisis and its Beyond: A Review of Recent Critical Inquiry into Pakistan," *Südasien-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle* 2 (2012), 271-304.

always embedded in a range of particular social and political orders." Even as Islam introduced notions of an overarching legal and political order, in reality the practices were influenced by local networks of power, such as caste.[50] Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his party, the Muslim League, also mobilized these communities according to the caste, tribe and family connections when forming the 1946 candidate lists of Punjab and Sindh which allowed the League to sweep the respective elections.[51] The Pakistani bureaucratic and military institutions sought to unify these configurations by emphasizing a singular Islamic national identity but did not succeed altogether.[52] This was partly due to the *ashraf* dominance over the debate of a modernist Islamic identity. The debates were dominated by Urdu-speaking clerics and their bureaucrat relatives. They belonged to the same *zamindar* class.[53] Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the ideological founder of the Pakistan Movement, for example, was convinced that his social group had the innate predisposition towards "*sharif*" moral qualities inherited through their Arab and Turkish ancestors and that "God had entrusted matter of knowledge and guidance to the higher castes only and thus they were the natural leaders of the community."[54] These elitist notions possibly hindered post-independence social cohesion in Pakistan. In the media, the overarching perception of communal tensions prior to Partition similarly masked the underlying sectarian, class and caste fractures.[55] The uprooted Muhajirs migrating from India into a new land without many possessions also added to the perpetual tension that created difficulties for the self-professed Islamic state.[56]

As the state bureaucracy in Karachi, the capital at the time, centralized, ideological differences emerged and the "ideological edifice" of a unified Muslim

---

[50] David Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative", *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (1998): 1090–1091.

[51] Ibid, 1080.

[52] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[53] Faisal Devji, "India In The Muslim Imagination: Cartography And Landscape In 19th Century Urdu Literature", *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*, no. 10 (2014).

[54] Jamal Malik, *Islam In South Asia*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2012), 306.

[55] Ayesha Jalal, *Self And Sovereignty* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 252.

[56] David Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative", *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (1998): 1090–1091.

community was "gradually cracking."[57] Differences were also institutionalized by the state administration; sectarian disputes over mosque spaces occurred frequently in Pakistan.[58] But as Justin Jones has argued, the sectarian conflicts we see in Pakistan in the late twentieth century started in the late nineteenth century and the "colonial period represents what we might describe as the foundational period of sectarianism in South Asia."[59] This thesis will first trace Shi'ism in the foundational period and provide the colonial context for the post-independence Pakistani thinker Syed Jawad Naqvi.

At times, the Islamic discourse becomes too radical for the state and it may even threaten the nation-state's legitimacy. Thus the state balances between using and controlling the *ulema* discourse. Syed Jawad Naqvi himself was once banned from giving sermons. Many scholars have framed this mode as Pakistan in "crisis," and others have called to move beyond this paradigm.[60] Scholar Saadia Toor argues in her book that ideological uncertainty, rather than seen as pure chaos, may serve as an opportunity and signify potential for change.[61] The clergy and religious political parties sought to define Pakistan's identity and continue to suggest "Islamic" constitutional provisions since independence.[62] Likewise, the left and progressive voices, such as the Progressive Writers Association, have sought to do the same. Shi'i attempts to participate in the state formation have waxed and waned, but some notable attempts have left their mark, which will be later discussed. Scholar Kamran Asdar Ali has summarized that current scholarly works on Pakistan propose a narrative in which Muslim nationalism has a "logical continuation in the late 1940's Objective Resolution for an Islamic State," and culminates "in the Zia era Islamization and the

---

[57] Kamran Asdar Ali, "Communists In A Muslim Land: Cultural Debates In Pakistan's Early Years", *Modern Asian Studies*. 45, no. 03 (2011): 502.

[58] Naveeda Ahmed Khan, *Muslim Becoming* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 23.

[59] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 22.

[60] Naveeda Ahmed Khan, *Beyond Crisis* (London: New York, 2010).

[61] Saadia Toor, *The State Of Islam* (London: Pluto Press, 2011).

[62] Hassan Abbas, "The Roots Of Radicalization In Pakistan", South Asia Journal, last modified 2013, accessed September 21, 2016, http://southasiajournal.net/the-roots-of-radicalization-in-pakistan/.

proliferation of Islamist politics."[63] He calls for a different angle of study towards other ideological questions in Pakistan. This thesis also questions the narrative summarized above by showing the inherent tension between Muslim nationalism and Islamism as expressed by a popular Shi'i cleric.

The main subject examined in this thesis, Syed Jawad Naqvi, is one of the many popular clerics in Pakistan. He is a cleric of the Twelver (Isna Ashari) branch of Shi'ism, which is also the branch of most Pakistani Shi'as. It is important to examine him as part in the context of the increasingly "publicization" of Islam as well as the widespread violence faced by the Twelver Shi'a minority in the 1980s and 1990s.[64] He actively publicizes Islam in Pakistan and participates in debates regarding religious differences.

Writing on a similarly contested terrain of modern day Egypt, anthropologist Charles Hirschkind notes:

> When Muslims argue for the traditional Islamic status of the headscarf, Islamic conceptions of political pluralism, or the idea of an Islamic state, for example, the objective historian unmasks such claims as strategic moves within a modern politics of cultural authenticity, and thus as not really—historically—authentic. … One paradoxical aspect of this argument, it might be noted, is that while cultural authenticity is often criticized as a reactionary form of modern politics, it is assumed that there is an *authentic* relation to the past (not nostalgic, invented, or mythological), and that Islamists are in some sense living falsely not to acknowledge it and adjust to its demands.[65]

Many Islamic actors in Pakistan, such as the *ulema*, also engage with the modern state by citing their ideas of the Islamic state. Scholar Maishal Saif's well-researched thesis explored contemporary Sunni and Shi'a *ulema* and how they "negotiate tradition, authority and sovereignty" in a variety of ways.[66] In another piece, "Notes from the Margins: Shi'a Political Theology in Contemporary Pakistan," Saif devotes special attention to the Shi'i scholars. Both writings discussed the actors in the context of

---

[63] Kamran Asdar Ali, "Communists In A Muslim Land: Cultural Debates In Pakistan's Early Years", *Modern Asian Studies*. 45, no. 03 (2011): 504.

[64] Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman, *Public Islam And The Common* Good (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

[65] Charles Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 19.

[66] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority And Sovereignty In Contemporary Pakistan" (Ph.D., Duke University, 2014).

Pakistani politics and imply that the *ulema* constitute a class of Pakistani society. But what prompts their power and what is the relationship with their audience? Who are their audiences? How do members of the *ulema* draw from different religious sources for their rhetoric? This thesis will attempt to answer these questions by exploring how Naqvi has responded to the Pakistani state, how his ideas correspond within the wider context of Shi'i intellectual tradition, and finally, how the context of South Asian history and Islamic reform affected his statements on gender and governance. The main text engaged with in this thesis is "an English translation of an Urdu Seminar 'Nizam-e Wilayat'" delivered by Syed Jawad Naqvi. It is worth noting that "This seminar was delivered to a group of women in a city in Pakistan, hence the focus of the book in certain areas is very specific to women."[67] While there is a growing amount of ethnographic and sociological research on Shi'i women, less is studied on theological accounts, such as the one Naqvi provides in this text.[68] The last chapter of this thesis hopes to complement the research on the Shi'i theological views on women.

---

[67] "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: Translator's Note", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/translators-notes
It was published by the Bethat Islamic Research Centre (BIRC) Qom, Iran.

[68] Amina Inloes, "Negotiating Shī'ī Identity And Orthodoxy Through Canonizing Ideologies About Women In Twelver Shī'ī Aḥādīth On Pre-Islamic Sacred History In The Qurʾān" (PhD, University of Exeter, n.d.).

# Chapter 1

## Political Identities of Shi'as in South Asia

This chapter will begin with a section providing a short introduction to the Shi'i participation in Pakistani politics and state formation and then explain the specific form of preaching used by Shi'i scholars and laity to advance religious and political claims. Scholar Justin Jones notes that since the colonial era, sectarianism has been "a means by which a Shi'a community was defined, negotiated and presented, an alternative framework for collective modernization."[69] Shi'i responded unfailingly to heightened debates on the definition of Islam in Pakistan, and this section will summarize the most notable moments. In the early 1950s, the practice of Muharram came under scrutiny and Sunnis attempted to restrict flagellation in public spaces. Shi'a clerics' movements were curtailed.[70] In 1963, during the month of Muharram, a sectarian conflict caused around 120 deaths.[71] Still, the Shi'a community was represented among "the dominant landholders, the military, the local and federal bureaucracy as well as in the industrial and entrepreneurial elite."[72] Three early prime ministers and two military leaders were also Shi'a.[73]

Andreas Rieck's close study of intra-Shi'a rivalries showed that the Shi'a community expressed themselves through creating political organizations in the mid-1960s. *'Alim* Muhammad Dihlavi (1899–1971) gathered 250 Shi'i *'ulema* at a Karachi convention and later established Committees voicing Shi'a demands all over the country. The demands included "the full freedom and protection of self-flagellation (*'azadari*), separate religious instruction in public schools and the administration of Shi'i *awqaf* [religious endowments] by Shi'as only."[74] Around 15,000 Shi'as gathered in Rawalpindi three months later to prepare for a civil disobedience campaign; at that

---

[69] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 230.

[70] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 229.

[71] Andreas Rieck "The struggle for equal rights as a minority: Shia communal organizations in Pakistan, 1948–1968", in *The Twelver Shia*, (eds.) R. Brunner and W. Ende (Leiden, 2001), 277.

[72] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid 'Arif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 498.

[73] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 224.

[74] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid 'Arif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 498.

time the Ayub Khan government gave in to these demands. Shiʿa mobilization largely was inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution and was also in reaction to Zia ul-Haq's Sunni-centric religious policies.[75]

Another Shiʿi organization successfully protested against the government's mandatory requirement of *zakat* (obligatory Islamic charity payment). The ordinance was based on Hanafi legal interpretation, which permitted the state to collect mandatory alms from all Muslim citizens by deducting 2.5 percent from bank accounts and redistributing it.[76] Shiʿas, who follow the Jaʿfari legal school, have different legal opinions regarding *zakat* than how it would be practiced under the Pakistani 1980 ordinance.[77] In June 1980, Mufti Jaʿfar Husain confronted the state with the support from the Shiʿi organization to secure Shiʿi rights. On July 5, 1980, Pakistani Shiʿi demonstrators staged a two-day siege of Islamabad's state buildings, defying the martial law ban on public gatherings.[78] Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini warned Zia-ul Haq "if he continued to persecute Pakistani Shiites, he would meet the same fate as the Shah of Iran."[79] An agreement was finally reached on July 6, 1980. Shiʿas were exempt from the deduction of *zakat* from their bank accounts.[80] Violence from Sunni organizations such as Sipah-i Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-i Jhangvi and the Taliban similarly troubled the Pakistani Shiʿas, which will be discussed in detail in the next section.

---

[75] Andreas Rieck "The struggle for equal rights as a minority: Shia communal organizations in Pakistan, 1948–1968", in *The Twelver Shia*, (eds.) R. Brunner and W. Ende (Leiden, 2001), 283. Cited in Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid ʿArif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan."

[76] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 230.

[77] Ibid, 230.

[78] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid ʿArif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 499.

[79] M. Abou Zahab, "The politicization of the Shia community in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s", in *The other Shiites. From the Mediterranean to Central Asia*, (eds.) A. Monsutti, S. Naef and F. Sabahi (Bern, 2007): 103.

Cited in Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State," 231.

[80] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 231.

## Shi'i Identity, the Modern Sermon, and Politicization

With the politics of Islamization in mind, it is necessary to also look closer than the analyses that point to sectarian conflict from a national or international angle. Many have suggested that Shi'i activism is fuelled by the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. For example, scholars often draw the connection between radical Sunni Islam in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia financial aid, which was contributed in order to offset the reverberations of the Iranian revolutionary and any Iranian material support. [81] Saudi-Arabian aid "extended to the financing of virulently anti-Shi'a tracts such as Ihsan Ilahi Zahir's *Al-Shi'a wa-l-Sunna* that claimed Shi'ism to be "the religion of falsehood (*din al-kidhb*), and the religion of deceit and cunning (*din al-khida wa-l-makr*)."[82] These connections are relevant for understanding Pakistan but can be rendered to an extreme where one loses sight of the Pakistani actors, such as Syed Jawad Naqvi. He has strong ties to Iran but also has local power and connections that cannot be dismissed. Without the politicization of Pakistani Shi'is, it is possible that Naqvi would not be as outspoken as he is. Attributing too much influence to outside support also cannot explain why sectarian violence affected some areas in Pakistan more than others.[83] Furthermore, Shi'as in many regions were emboldened by Iran, but unlike Syed Jawad Naqvi, not many proposed or supported a guardianship of the jurists (*wilayat-i fiqh*) modeled on the new Iranian state.[84]

In recent years, there have been many violent affronts on the Pakistani Shi'a community in Pakistan. The assassination of the famous Shi'a singer Amjad Sabri in 2016 and bombings of Shi'a populated areas in Quetta are some of the notable

---

[81] Paul Rollier, "Shias In Pakistan: A View From Lahore", *Live Encounters*, last modified 2014, accessed September 25, 2016, http://liveencounters.net/january-2014/february/dr-paul-rollier-shias-in-pakistan-view-from-lahore/.

According to M. Abou Zahad's article "The politicization of the Shia community in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s," about 4000 Pakistani students received scholarships from the Iranian government soon after the Revolution.

[82] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid 'Arif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 494.

I. I. Zahir, *Al-Shi'a wa-l-Sunna* (Lahore, 2008), 184. The author was assassinated in 1987.

[83] M. Abou Zahad, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict In Jhang (Pakistan)", in *Lived Islam In South Asia*, Imtiaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld (ed.), 1st ed. (Delhi: Social Science Press, 2004), 135-148.

[84] Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak, *The Sunna And Shi'a In History* (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 8.

incidents.[85] There is a long historical process of the Shi'i identity formation and persecution in Pakistan. Scholar Justin Jones points out that Shi'i *muhajirs* in Pakistan have been particularly prominent in activism and political *anjumans* because many of the "*ulama* from north India used new sectarian organizations to find fresh public roles in unfamiliar contexts where they were estranged from local influence and structures of authority."[86] Jones hints that the Shi'i *muhajirs* took on a stake on the issue of Muharram rituals because they wanted to seek local relevance. He differentiates the persecution faced by Shi'is since the formation of Pakistan from the previous articulations of sectarianism, which were mostly battles of the pen. This thesis also concurs with Jones that although there are continuations in forms of sectarianism expressions such as polemics and educational institutions, sectarianism has seen a qualitative shift in postcolonial Pakistan.

From a local point of analysis, regional Shi'i landowners' dominance and competition garnered attention in the Jhang district of Punjab: the leading *biraderi* families, Syed and Sials, affected elections according to their political interests. Inter-Shi'a rivalry was intense and commonplace.[87] Jones proposes that "Shi'a-Sunni arguments… were in fact frequently something of a smokescreen for competition, or even conflict, within Shiism itself" and the sectarian conflicts could facilitate the internal competitions of Shi'is themselves.[88] While this analysis does not always apply, it certainly has some truth for the political rivalry in the Jhang district.

---

[85] "Amjad Sabri Death: Papers Mourn Silencing Of 'The Last Sabri'", BBC News, last modified 2016, accessed October 4, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36607588.

"Terrorist Incidents In Pakistan In 2015", Wikipedia, last modified 2016, accessed October 4, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorist_incidents_in_Pakistan_in_2015.

In Jan. 2013, hundreds of Shi'as were killed in twin bombings in Quetta and many held vigils leaving the bodies unburied as a protest. The central government later dismissed the local officials for failing to protect the Shias.

[86] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 241.

[87] T. Kamran, "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy In Pakistan: A Case Study Of Jhang", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 20, no. 1 (2009): 55-85.

Another example and challenge to T. Kamran would be Nicolas Martin's 2015 rich ethnographic book *Politics, Landlords and Islam in Pakistan* that shows how agnatic rivalries unfolding within *biraderis* of rural Punjab instead of competing *biraderis.*

[88] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 231.

Militant Sunnis from other cities formed the Sunni militant group Sipah-i Sahaba in Jhang in 1985.[89] Among the prominent activists of the Sipah-i Sahaba Pakistan, many began their careers by motioning the state to exclude the Ahmediyya community from the Muslim status. Sipah members later seek to exclude Shi'as.[90] They opened *madrassas* and were active in pro-Sunni, anti-Ahmadi and anti-Shi'a movements in Jhang and Chiniot since the creation of Pakistan. The Sunni Muhajirs were also in the forefront of anti-Shia and anti-feudal activity in the Jhang district.[91] Many targeted killings of Shi'as and indiscriminate shootings at sites of Shi'i worship occurred in the Jhang district. Iranian diplomats and an official cultural center were also attacked by the Sipah.[92] In the form of revenge, Shi'a men also responded with their own militant organizations and many of Sipah-i Sahaba's leaders were also were assassinated. Furthermore, a bomb went off in a Sunni populated bazaar in 1990 despite the agreement of a peace treaty.[93] The violence hardened sectarian boundaries.

The media and legal system at the time were both conducive to inciting and condoning these actions. The state also left many extremists unpunished or even backed their actions at points in time.[94] Despite being from a Shi'a family, Benazir Bhutto backed Deobandi militancy in 1994 to serve her political ends. During this time, the sectarian competition also occurred on the religious education front in Punjab: from the 13 Shi'i *madrassas* in 1971 grew to 100 in 1994. Deobandi *madrassas* "grew from 173 in 1971, to 972 in 1994, and Barelawi *madrasas* from 93 in 1971, to 1216 in 1994."[95]

---

[89] Basharat Peer, "The Shiite Murders: Pakistan's Army Of Jhangvi", *The New Yorker*, last modified 2013, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-shiite-murders-pakistans-army-of-jhangvi.

[90] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama In Contemporary Islam*, 114.

[91] M. Abou Zahad, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict In Jhang (Pakistan)", 139.

[92] T. Kamran, "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy In Pakistan: A Case Study Of Jhang", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 20, no. 1 (2009): 82.

[93] Ibid, 81.

[94] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 234. In 1990s, the Gilgit area experienced riots orchestrated by Sunni militant groups backed by Zia's government.

[95] Figures from Nadhr Ahmad, *Ja'izah-i madaris-i 'arabiyya*, 693; *The News* (March 7, 1995): 11; *Zindagi* (February 17, 1995): 38–39.

Cited in Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama In Contemporary Islam*, 2.

Multiple factors have influenced the Shi'a public sphere, such as the rise of the modern sermon delivered from the *minbar* (pulpit) and the subsequent processes of politicization as a reaction to attacks and Sunni dominance. In Lucknow, this process started as early as 1930s when Sunni migrants came from other parts of India in response to rapid economic development. They joined more politically active *anjumans* that elite Sunnis did not appreciate at the same level.[96] The issue of Shi'i rituals became heatedly contested during the twentieth century and people organized both for and against rituals such as Muharram processions. Jones rightly notes that the "practices of mourning and sermonising have been portrayed as sectarian markers by which the Shi'a have distinguished or even isolated themselves from other communities."[97] Even though Shi'a rituals are porous and Shi'ism is theologically dynamic and in conversation with other schools, the identity interpreted through politics often is more static. For example, the "story of Imam Husain's martyrdom has always carried multiple readings even within Shi'ism itself."[98] If we look beyond institutional and scriptural Islam, there are also folk traditions that practice Hindu rituals and express Shi'a stories in devotional hymns (*ginans*)*,* where they prophesize that a savior will ride a white horse to end miseries of the current dark epoch (*Kaliyug*). This resembles the Shi'a eschatology to some extent. Scholar Dominique Sila Khan has noted that they were influenced by Ismaili preachers active in Sindh.[99] Since this thesis is primarily focused on Twelver Shi'as and the politicization of Shi'i identity in the modern era through *ulema* participation in the public sphere, these stories are not discussed.

After the demise of their Nawabi patrons, the Shi'i *ulema* had to reach out to broader sections of society. Print facilitated the contact between the *ulema* and the larger society: Jones's study of South Asia's most influential *mujtahid* Ali Naqi Naqvi (colloquially known as Naqqan Sahib) shows that Ali Naqi's Imamiya Mission

---

[96] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India,* 203.

[97] Justin Jones, "Shi'ism, Humanity And Revolution In Twentieth-Century India", in *The Shi'a In Modern South Asia*, Justin Jones and Ali Usman Qasmi (ed.), 1st ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 80-104.

[98] Ibid, 81.

[99] Françoise Mallison, "Barmati Panth: A Messianic Sect Established In Sindh, Kutch, And Saurashtra", in *Sindh Through History And Representations*, Michel Boivin (ed.), 1st ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 90-98.

printed and published Shiʻi messages as part of the contemporary late colonial missionary movements (*tabligh*).[100] The message of Husain became more personalized and aimed to address a broader audience with varied caste and religious affiliations, including Christians and Hindus. The overall history of Shiʻi printed materials in South Asia is beyond the scope of this thesis and it suffices to say that the politicization process of Shiʻi identity could not have been as effective without printing technologies.

This section will explore first the sermons and then the politicization process. In his interpretation of text messaging Islamic exhortations among the youth in Pakistan, anthropologist Paul Rollier points out:

> A religious text not only calls for a contextualized analysis of its message and reception, but also for an understanding how the texture and material properties of the medium involves the senses and intellect of its transmitters in ways that impact upon their attitude towards religion.[101]

In this case, the medium would be the Shiʻa sermon and the person delivering it. To understand the audience of Syed Jawad Naqvi, an overview of the form and ritual in which he operates is necessary. In Shiʻi tradition, there were many arguments against Friday congregational prayers during the Great Occultation (*gheybat-e kobre*), i.e., before the Imam comes to lead them. This only changed in the fourteenth to sixteenth century. In South Asia, the Shiʻi Friday congregational prayers started in 1786 and was met with resistance.[102] Still, Shiʻas have less emphasis on Friday congregational prayers than Sunnis; among the Shiʻas usually the congregational prayers have less ritual popularity compared to the *majlis*.[103] Both Shiʻi *majlis* and Sunni sermons are delivered by *khatibs*, although they are more commonly called *zakir* (male) or *zakira* (female) in the Shiʻi tradition.[104]

---

[100] Justin Jones, "Shi'ism, Humanity And Revolution In Twentieth-Century India", 83.

[101] Paul Rollier, "Texting Islam: Text messages and religiosity among young Pakistanis," *Contemporary South Asia* 18, no. 4, (2010): 414.

[102] Toby M Howarth, *The Twelver Shīʻa As A Muslim Minority In India* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 4.

[103] Ibid, 37. He notes that a *majlis* can often follow Friday congregational Prayers with its own discourse.

[104] Ibid, 4

Although somewhat different, Charles Hirschkind's analysis of the sermons in Egypt is also useful for understanding the significance of oratory in the South Asian Shi'i tradition:

> The auditory apparatus [of the sermon] consists of an experienced body in its entirety, one learned in the gestural vocabularies by which the sermon's ethical narratives have been woven into the autonomic and motor responses of this compound. Sermons impart not simply moral lessons but affective energies of ethical potential… The objects of discourse and the emotions are elicited in the context of their discussion are inter-dependent… The *khatib*'s task, in other words, includes not just the modulation of emotional intensities but also the orienting of those emotions to their proper subject.[105]

The crying and sadness often seen in Shi'a *majlis* are not simply an individualistic expressions. Rather, it structures the listeners' ethical compass within a moral order. The audience could likewise range from Shi'as to Sunnis to Hindus.[106]

Still, one can only receive its ethical meaning through affects only when one has cultivated the senses and familiarized oneself with the elemental styles. Most of the *majlis* have the following elements:

> recitation of *marsiya* [elegiac poetry], a sermon (which must include a narration of the Sufferings of one or more of the Karbala martyrs and/or other important Shî'î personalities, but may include other elements as well), *mâtam* [ritualized mourning including breastbeating and sometimes acts of self-wounding] to the accompaniment of *nawha* [rythmic elegy] chanting, a final ritualized ziyârat and the distribution of *tabarruk* [blessed offering, usually of food] to the congregation by the host.[107]

Sometimes jokes also occur, but usually to serve the larger religious and moral message. The age range of the audiences of *majlis* is varied and gender segregation is in place. While the more famous and sought-after *zakirs* are adult men, audiences also listen to female or teenager *zakirs* in South Asian modern day *majlis*. Speaking on Islam, Jones has noted that "technologies of communication and avenues of public participation have all served to erode established structures of leadership and

---

[105] Charles Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape*, 98, 100.

[106] Toby M Howarth, *The Twelver Shī'a As A Muslim Minority In India*, 77.
In one English sermon organized for a non-Shi'a audience, Syed Naqi Mehdi connects Husain with India and the wider non-Muslim population. Husain "came to the field, faced the enemy, and he made two wishes. His one wish was, 'Even now, if you want to absolve yourself, let me go from here and I will go to Hindustan.' That is why, Sir, I am asking you a question now. That is why in India, from Kashmir to Kanyakumari, from Gujarat to the borders of Bangladesh and beyond, to the borders of Burma, irrespective of caste, irrespective of religion, irrespective of language, we call (on) Husayn."

[107] Ibid, 39.

influence" in recent centuries and South Asian Shi'ism is no exception.[108] The focus and location of the *majlis* also depends on the context:

> Many gatherings have contained no sermon at all; the focus has been on poetry recitation. Other gatherings have functioned basically as the platform for a particular preacher's sermon. Still other majâlis have dispensed quickly with other rituals in order to focus on the performance of various forms of mâtam. Majâlis can be held in the context of a wedding, a funeral or a community meeting. They can be held in a tiny dwelling in a narrow Old City street or outside in a children's playground.[109]

Political themes are located in religious and literary forms of expression, such as in the poetic *marsiyas*. Ayesha Jalal notes how "the articulation of territorial identity in the Muslim psyche"—found expression in an Urdu poetry genre called *shahr-i-ashoob* or *ashoobia shairi,* lament for the city. She notices a historical shift after the suppression of the 1857 revolt: "the *shahr-i-ashoob* began taking the form of *marsiyas,* or dirges, drenched in blood and tragedy" and encapsulates the "socio-cultural turbulence" of Mughal cities.[110] The prominence of poetry and prose in the sermon only emerged since the eighteenth century in Awadh.[111] Important gatherings for Shi'as, such as commemorations of martyrs, "were dominated by eulogizers, who specialised in chanting techniques, rather than by the scholars of Islam, who often frowned on the folk practices involved in such assemblies."[112] After the demise of the Awadh ruling elites, funds for those who could compose Arabic or Persian classical recitations and *marsiyas* decreased and Urdu prose that incorporated local heroes became more common.[113] Another reason was the nineteenth century social transformation of North India, in which the "'new religious intellectuals', a motley array of lay or informal writers, preachers, debaters and secular patrons," started using "new public forms of Shi'ism to stake their own claims to worth and respectability at

---

[108] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India,* 228.

[109] Toby M Howarth, *The Twelver Shī'a As A Muslim Minority In India*, 39.

[110] Ayesha Jalal, *Self And Sovereignty* (New York: Routledge, 2002). For example, a famous Shi'a poet Mir Taqi Mir "noted that the wilds of today had been bustling towns of yesterday and spoke patriotically of the spirit of martyrdom stirring his heart to put the oppressor's might to the test."

[111] Toby M Howarth, *The Twelver Shī'a As A Muslim Minority In India* (New York: Routledge, 2005). 14-15.

[112] 'Â'ina-e-Haqq-nama.' Rijâl Shî cah, Persian MS 1, fol. 79a, Nâsiriyya Library, Lucknow, by an anonymous disciple of Dildâr 'Alî, quoted in J.R.I. Cole, *Roots of North Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 56. Cited in *The Twelver Shī'as a Muslim Minority in India*, 14.

[113] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83.

a time of massive social transition."[114] Jones also cites the rise in people who claim *mujtahid* status in South Asia in the twentieth century as an indicator of increased competitions for religious leadership among Shi'a clerics.[115] These *majlis* often featured new religious intellectuals and gradually became public arena performances that strengthened community.[116] Thus even when some *ulema* do not endorse *majlis* due to their difference in style, content, and scholastic rigor, their sermons often employ the same affective qualities as the *majlis*. Syed Naqvi is also no exception and his popularity also owes debt to his affective qualities as a preacher.

Another factor for the rise of the *ulema* such as Syed Jawad Naqvi is the process of politicization of religious identity in Pakistan. Most tradition Shi'i scholars debated "over theology, the status of the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bait*) or reform of customs."[117] These topics were intellectual legacies inherited from the South Asian Shi'i education hubs: Lucknow in northern India and Najaf in Iraq.[118] From 1856 to 1903, most of the South Asian Shi'is relied on a fund established by the Awadh Bequest to study in Najaf.[119] Prior to Partition, the geographical area (which is now Pakistan) had few Shi'i scholars with connections outside of South Asia and only one center of learning in Multan. After Partition, the migrant scholars from Lucknow dominated the Pakistani Shi'i schools. In the 1960s, scholars returning to Pakistan from the Middle East started challenging these views of influenced by Lucknow; different schools of thoughts emerged.[120] The scholars who studied in Qom also gained attention in Pakistan since the Iranian revolution. Pakistan witnessed the "'qomization' of the *'ulama* class…which now focused on the oppression committed by enemies of the

---

[114] Ibid, 19.

[115] Ibid, 111.

[116] Sandria B Freitag, *Culture And Power In Banaras* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

[117] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid 'Arif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 495.

[118] Ibid, 495.

[119] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 34. After the funding ended, fewer Indian students went to Iraq. Religious education also also declined in Iraq for the next 15 years. Many South Asian Shi'i scholars were educated in South Asia until independence.

[120] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism," 500.

Shi'a at home and abroad" since the Iranian revolution.[121] More clerics educated from Qom took the spotlights from the pulpit, including Naqvi.[122] One of Syed Naqvi's predecessor, Syed 'Arif Husain al-Husaini, is an example. Initially educated in Najaf, he later became a student in Qom and was introduced to Ayatollah Khomeini. He encouraged Pakistani students in Iran to engage in activism and also led his community back in Pakistan towards anti-government protests.[123] Similarly, Ayatollah Sayyid Riyaz Husayn Najafi, the president of the Jami'a al-Muntazar seminary, expressed Shi'a frustrations in a public address—

> "All [Pakistani] Shī'as continue to think the only way to escape oppression is to establish their own government. If we rise up, and this thought of establishing our independent government takes root among us (which is only realized in the present moment at the level of aspiration), then we shall hold fast onto the Qur'ān in one hand and the support of the Prophet's family (the *ahl al-bayt*) in the other hand. The beneficence [shade] of the Imām of the Times will cast upon us. If this happens, then no one will be able to block our path. If there will be a government, then it shall only be an Islamic and religious government."[124]

He heads the publication *al-Muntazar*, which had an editorial in June 2005, a month after his speech, which provided two explanations for the violence targeting Shi'as: "Either the government itself fans the fires of sectarian violence … or the government is weak [and unable to prevent sectarian violence]."[125]

Anthropologists Benjamin Soares and Filippo Osella have correctly stated that one has to pay attention to "the genealogies of [Islamic] discourses (academic, state, 'official', global, as well as those of our research subjects and interlocutors)."[126] The literature on Syed Jawad Naqvi's predecessor allows us to connect his discourse to Shi'a *ulema* genealogy. Syed Naqvi is similar to al-Husaini and Najafi in many ways:

---

[121] M. Abou Zahab, "The politicization of the Shia community in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s", in *The other Shiites. From the Mediterranean to Central Asia*, (eds.) A. Monsutti, S. Naef and F. Sabahi (Bern, 2007): 100-1. Cited in Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism."

[122] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority And Sovereignty In Contemporary Pakistan" (Ph.D., Duke University, 2014), 249.

[123] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid 'Arif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 496.

[124] Najafī made this statement at a public address in May 2005 in Lahore. Sayyid Fidā Ḥusayn Shīrazī, "Ṣaf-i Awwal ke do 'Aẓīm Mubāriz wa Mujāhid 'Ulamā' ka Chalam," Mahanāmah al-Muntaẓar (June 2005): 38. Translated and cited by Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State," 215.

[125] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority And Sovereignty In Contemporary Pakistan" (Ph.D., Duke University, 2014), 237.

[126] Benjamin Soares and Filippo Osella, "Islam, politics, anthropology", *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15, (2009): 2.

he preaches universal language but he is also geared towards a specific Pakistani context.[127] Jones also notes that "educated lay Shi'a" turned to Indian rather than Arab or Persian *marjas* for "binding religious and pastoral guidance."[128] Educated lay Shi'a also look up to Naqvi and his organization for guidance specific to South Asian contexts.

Since the 1970s, several debates occurred regarding the Islamic character of the Pakistani government. Mashal Saif pointed out how Naqvi and other members of the *ulema* had a tendency to anthropomorphize the state in debates. Some people such as the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Al Qaeda, rejected the Pakistani state's claim to be Islamic; others admit that the Pakistani state is a Muslim in name, and acknowledges that it fails to live up to all expectations of a Muslim, but is nonetheless a Muslim.[129] Thus there are two common critical stances among the Shi'a *ulema* that accepts the Islamic claims of the state: the first stance is that the state is too weak to protect Shi'a lives and/or complicit in the carnage. Another stance is that the *ulema* holds "the state culpable for Shī'a deaths, not simply despite the state's claim to an Islamic identity, but in some instances, because of Pakistan's claim to be an Islamic Republic."[130] In a column, Naqvi alludes that powerful allies engaged in sectarian violence against Shi'as:

> These terrorisms [sic] did not drop from sky [sic] or grew from earth, they are the children of Saudi wealth, American planning and Pakistan's secret agencies [sic] efforts… It is an established fact that the Pakistani Agencies are involved in all these terrorist operations and are guiding these activists groups [sic] either directly or indirectly.[131]

In the same magazine, columns published under a pseudonym also accuse some Sunni *madrassas* as sites used for training militants and promoting violence.[132] It can be

---

[127] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid 'Arif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 509.

[128] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India*, 227.

[129] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority And Sovereignty In Contemporary Pakistan" (Ph.D., Duke University, 2014), 175-7.

[130] Ibid, 220.

[131] Ibid, 250.

[132] Ibid, 252.

deduced that Naqvi agrees with the columns even though he did not claim credit of writing them. Naqvi, although very different from Zawahiri in other respects, also rejects the Pakistani state's Islamic nature like Zawahiri. In contrast to Ayat Allah Najafi, Syed Jawad Naqvi does not write his views from the standpoint of a minority seeking state protection.[133] His aim is not only targeting a particular Sunni-leaning government that persecutes Shi'as; for Naqvi, any system other than the rightly guided *wilayat* is false and doomed. Appealing to the Pakistani state for protection would be a form of debasement.[134] It has been "the same arrogant system of the past... First it was imperialism, dictatorship, feudalism and now also it is the same but I have changed its dress to democracy."[135] Syed Naqvi calls for Muslims of all statuses, including descendants of the Prophet (*Sayyids*), to understand the problems of a faulty government since "the importance of living a life in an Islamic government has been very clearly and explicitly emphasized in the teachings of Quran and Infallibles."[136] He does not reserve the political necessity of an Islamic revolution to Shi'as alone; Sunnis also desire the revolution. "Pakistan is populated by supporters of the revolution. Sunnīs are supporters of the revolution and Shī'as are supporters of the revolution."[137] He has strong hopes for seeing an Islamic governing system in Pakistan and terms it as the *wilayat*.

This chapter has begun by outlining the contested politics that created a distinctly political and vigilant Shi'i community in Pakistan. Then it discussed *majlis* sermons, which is a unique and popular form of public engagement used by Shi'i preachers. These two trends created the conditions for Syed Jawad Naqvi's platform: he could

[133] Ibid, 237.

[134] Ibid, 254.

[135] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The First Characteristic of the Fironic System", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/first-characteristic-fironic-system

"Where are these worldly systems moving towards, these systems of Yazidiat and why did Imam Hussain (as) start an uprising to eradicate this system? This was because though the people living under this governance of Yazid were religious, they were offering their prayers, fasting and performing their Hajj rituals, but this system was going towards hell."

[136] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: Dua of Arafah and the System of Wilayat", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/dua-arafah-and-system-wilayat

[137] "Inqilab e Islami,Itmaam e Hujjat e Ilahi (11th February 2012 - LAHORE) Ustad Agha Syed Jawad Naqvi," Youtube, accessed Oct 24, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3IXSM7eHsw. Translated and cited by Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 319.

not only comment on religion given his authority of a cleric, he could also change public discourse and engage with political opinions of the listeners through delivering sermons and editing magazines. The next chapter will situate the theological concept of *wilayat* within the Shi'i context and discuss Naqvi in comparison with other commentators of the *wilayat*.

**Chapter 2**

*Wilayat*: **A Theological Overview**

After introducing the political context, my thesis will now shift towards providing
background for the theological aspect of Syed Naqvi's discourse. Most scholars of
Islam define the difference between Sunnism and Shi'ism based on the issue their
opinion regarding who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad: Shi'is believe that the
Prophet Muhammad had appointed Ali as his successor, while Sunnis believe that the
issue was open for the *ummah* to decide.[138] In the preface to Islamic scholar Allamah
Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai's writings on Shi'ism, scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr
has suggested that it is inappropriate to frame the Sunni-Shi'a dispute as one
concerning the political question regarding who is right successor. Rather, Nasr
argues that it is about the qualities of the successor, particularly the ability to read
esoteric qualities of the Divine Nature.[139] Twelver Shi'as believe that Ali is the
successor because he has the qualities of "administering a Divine Law and in the other
of also revealing and interpreting its inner mysteries," which not even the three rightly
guided caliphs possessed.[140] Furthermore, Ali and the other Imams who succeeded
him have served as the spiritual successor of the Prophet in the exoteric sense, with
their sayings and actions supplementing the Prophet's sayings and actions (*sunnah*
and *hadith*).[141] They had complete knowledge of the *sharia* and thus their actions had
revelatory status.[142] Finally, Ali and the Imams have access to Divine Wisdom, "a
'theosophy' or *hikmah* which made possible the vast development of later Islamic
philosophy and the intellectual sciences from the beginning."[143] These are three
qualities needed for an ideal community leader. Scholar Abdolkarim Soroush holds
similar opinions: the main point of divide between Sunni and Shi'a is not the
historical event of conflict over succession; rather it is a theological difference: Since

---

[138] Abdolkarim Soroush, "The evolution of Shi'ism and its imperatives", 2011.

[139] Hossein Nasr, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī. *Shi'ite Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 12.

[140] Ibid, 12.

[141] Ibid, 14.

[142] R. Gleave, *Inevitable Doubt* (Leiden: Brill, 2000),1.

[143] Hossein Nasr, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī. *Shi'ite Islam*, 16.

Shi'as believe that their Imams are infallible and also have divine revelatory knowledge, they regard the Imams with the same status as Prophets. In this sense Shi'as ignore the *khatamiya* (tenet of Muhammad being the last prophet). Soroush also cites that some Shi'i scholars have argued that the Quran has been edited and does not give due authority to the Imams.[144]

Yet due to intense suspicion from the caliphal authorities and political turmoil, accessing the Imams became more difficult for the believers. Deputies (*niyaba*) were assigned to represent the Imams for deciding religious matters in Kufa, Rayy and Qom.[145] Certain Shi'as also believe that the Twelfth Imam had to go into hiding due to persecution. The believers thus could practice dissimulation (*taqqiya*) in his absence, obeying Sunni law outwardly but inwardly aware of the issues. But the question of political leadership continued to concern Shi'i jurisprudence—"who is to lead the community in the absence of the Imam?"[146] At first Shi'as did not want to exercise *ijtihad* because no jurist had the knowledge of *shari'a* equivalent to the Imam.[147] This view was challenged by jurists in the thirteenth and fourteenth century. From then on, qualified jurist, the *mujtahid*, could rule based on their own *ijtihad*. The non-scholarly majority community (*muqallid*) had to imitate (*taqlid*) and accept their opinions.[148] Differences of opinions can occur among the jurists who possess the same level of knowledge; others who do not have the same level of interpretative authority would not be taken seriously. This situation changed in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, when the emergence of the Akhbari School challenged the role of *ijtihad*.[149] The effectiveness of practice also varied in Iraq, Iran and South Asia

---

[144] Abdolkarim Soroush, "The evolution of Shi'ism and its imperatives", 2011. He further paraphrases the writing of theologian Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid: All Imams are prophets. But since we have been prohibited from calling them prophets, we don't call them prophets. But in our hearts we consider them as prophets. Because they received revelation and they were infallible.

[145] Abdulaziz Sachedina, *The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 38.

[146] R. Gleave, *Inevitable Doubt* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 2.

[147] Ibid, 5.

[148] R. Gleave, "Conceptions Of Authority In Iraqi Shi'ism: Baqir Al-Hakim, Ha'iri And Sistani On Ijtihad, Taqlid And Marja'iyya", *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 66.

[149] R. Gleave, *Inevitable Doubt* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 5.

since other authorities could collide with the *ulema*. Still, the theory of *mujtahid* exercising *ijtihad* has dominated among the *ulema* to legitimize their position.[150]

During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the sociological and theological foundations for *wilayat-i fiqh* emerged, especially in shrine cities (*'atabat*) of Iraq.[151] Although Nasr did not delve into the historical background of the concept in his introduction, he provided a thorough explanation to the key concept—

> The whole ethos of Shi'ism revolves around the basic notion of *walayat*, which is intimately connected with the notion of sanctity (*wilayah*) in Sufism. At the same time *walayat* contains certain implications on the level of the Shari'ah inasmuch as the Imam, or he who administers the function of *walayat*, is also the interpreter of religion for the religious community and its guide and legitimate ruler.[152]

According to Nasr, Ali thus can be respected a political successor (caliph) by later Sunnis and as an interpreter of the divine law and mysteries (Imam) by later Shi'as. Allamah Tabatabai similarly points out that the Prophet chose Ali to the "general guardianship" (*walayat-i 'ammah*) of the people and made Ali, like himself, their "guardian" (*wali*).

The concept of the Imam has experienced historical changes both in South Asia and Iran.[153] From the 1940s to the early 1970s, the general consensus was that "jurists could not assume any political leadership, especially in the modern context."[154] The most influential contemporary thinker that contributed to a new understanding of the Imam and its role in politics would be Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini. His work *Wilayat-I Faqih* proposed that the Jurist (*faqih*) should be responsible for interpreting and implementing injunctions of the Quran.[155] He argued through sermons in the early

---

[150] R. Gleave, "Conceptions Of Authority In Iraqi Shi'ism", 66.

[151] Rainer Brunner, review of *Shi'i Scholars of the Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The 'Ulama of Najaf and Karbala,* by Meir Latvik, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 63, no.1. (2000), 113-114.

[152] Hossein Nasr, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī. *Shi'ite Islam*, 12.

[153] Mary Hegland, "Two images of Husain: accommodation and revolution in an Iranian village", in *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution*, (ed.) Nikki Kedie (New Haven, 1983), 218-237.

[154] Abdulaziz Sachedina, *The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 24.

[155] Katajun Amirpur, "A Doctrine in the Making? *Velayat-e faqih* in Post Revolutionary Iran," in *Speaking for Islam*," (eds.) Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 221.

1970s that it was wrong for the Shi'i scholars to think that the jurists were the "deputies" of the hidden imam only "in matters of faith and practice but not in politics." Rather, the jurists should take charge of the interim governing institution before anticipated takeover by the Twelfth Imam (*mahdi*).[156] The deputy of the Twelfth Imam and his representative should be jurisconsults capable for leading both Sunnis and Shi'as.[157] Many supporters have thus conferred the title of "Imam" to Khomeini, whereas he instead refers to himself as the deputy of the Imam.[158] Debates occurred in Iran "concerning the nature of clerical leadership after [Khomeini's] dead in 1989," which also informed Shi'i debates in Lebanon, Iraq and Pakistan.[159] Some Shi'a clerics in Iran rejected or disputed the theory that a jurisconsult can represent the Imam.[160] Historian Muzaffar Alam, referring to *wilayat-i fiqh,* has commented that the "power accorded to theologians" in this text of Islamic political theory "has no precedent in the history of premodern political Islam."[161]

   This proposition was met with challenges, and many clerics in Qom opposed the idea of the rule of jurisconsult. A South Asian cleric similarly suggested: "Except for Imam Ali and Imam Hasan, and until the Mahdi comes, the Imams did not have the power to govern."[162] When the Mahdi comes, the current form of governments in many countries would no longer exist. This South Asian Shi'i cleric compared the West and Islamic form of governments: the former has "the parliament, the judiciary and the administration. Yet, in Islam, these three are combined in one person."[163] While he was referring to Ali, it is also accepted among most Sunnis for the Prophet

---

[156] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama In Contemporary Islam*, 105.

[157] Botschaft der Islamischen Republik Iran (ed.), *Verfassung der Islamischen Republik Iran*, Bonn 1980, 27. Cited in Katajun Amirpur, "A Doctrine in the Making? *Velayat-e faqih* in Post Revolutionary Iran."

[158] Katajun Amirpur, "A Doctrine in the Making? *Velayat-e faqih* in Post Revolutionary Iran," in *Speaking for Islam*," (eds.) Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 223.

Naveeda Ahmed Khan, *Muslim Becoming* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 30.

[159] R. Gleave, "Conceptions Of Authority In Iraqi Shi'ism", 63.

[160] Hooman Majd, *The Ayatollah Begs to Differ* (Doubleday, 2008). Kindle Location: 788.

[161] Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages Of Political Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 15.

[162] Muharram sermon by Syed Husn al-Hasan Nayar Razvi Quararvi. Preached in Hyderabad, India, May 9th 1998. Translated and cited by Toby M Howarth, *The Twelver Shī'a As A Muslim Minority In India* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 83.

[163] Ibid, 83.

Muhammad to have served this all-encompassing role; Medina under the Prophet Muhammad's guidance has often been cited as the ideal Islamic system.

It is thus no surprise that in post-revolutionary Iran, the rule of succession became a problem. Ayatollah Khomeini dismissed Ayatollah Hoseyn Ali Montazeri, the designated successor in the position of supreme jurisconsult leader, from public office.[164] According to the 1979 Constitution of Iran, the "Supreme Leader was supposed to be the most learned and righteous *faqih*."[165] But people who befitted to be "sources of emulation" (*marja*) were not willing to succeed the position.[166] Many scholars resented the idea or distanced themselves from politics. The rules were accommodated as such: Article 5 and 107 of the constitution allowed that any *faqih* with "scholastic qualifications for issuing religious decrees" could assume the position of Supreme Leader. Many Shi'as, including those in South Asia, continue to follow the preeminent source of emulation (*marja-e taqlid*), a system that existed since the nineteenth century, instead of the political leader in Iran.[167] There are many disagreements among the Shi'a *ulema* in Pakistan as well and Iran's *wilayat* has no clear implication for Shi'as in Pakistan.[168] But Syed Jawad Naqvi has taken up the responsibility to make it known a possibility in Pakistan, without crossing the boundary of his current role as a member of the *ulema*.

**Syed Jawad Naqvi's Political Theology of the *Wilayat* and Pakistan**

[164] Katajun Amirpur, "A Doctrine in the Making? *Velayat-e faqih* in Post Revolutionary Iran," in *Speaking for Islam*," (eds.) Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 222.

[165] David Menashri, "Ayatollah Khomeini And The Velayat-E-Faqih", in *Militancy And Political Violence In Shiism*, Assaf Moghadamed (ed.), 1st ed. (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]: Routledge, 2012).

[166] Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," *The Middle East Journal* 41 ii (1987), 190.

[167] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama In Contemporary Islam*, 105.

Toby M Howarth, *The Twelver Shī'a As A Muslim Minority In India*, 35.

"In the twentieth century the majority of the Indian Shi'a gave their allegiance to the Iraqi based Ayatollah al-Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khu'i (1899–1992) as the *marja-e taqlid*."

[168] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "The West Is A Career: Pakistan's Shi'i Islam Between The Local And The Transnational", 2016.

Syed Jawad Naqvi is in conversation with these thinkers and is not a mere receiver of knowledge. Jones has shown how South Asian Shi'as developed a more systematic understanding of Shi'ism beyond the category of a sect or school since the 1930s.[169] Naqvi's audience is more receptive to the message due to this historical condition. Naqvi has his own definition of the *wilayat*, which in a Shi'i fashion, mirrors the Quran's attempt to address both actions and how they shape human nature:

> This system of society or governance in Islam is known as the system of Imamat and Ummat (Leadership and Nation), or also called as System of Wilayat (Guardianship). This is the system made for the social development of human beings, not just for an individual, but in a collective form moving the society towards perfection.[170]

He exhorts his listeners not to just be content with the usual rituals and to critique any system that is not one of the above:

> Even though you get relieved from these corrupt systems, but whatever time you spend in these corrupt systems it leaves a highly significant damaging effect on our character. We are not concerned about such things. We always say what have we to do with this governance system, our duties are to earn our living, take care of our children, go to Hussainiah for Azadari, do some mandatory worship, why should we be worried or concerned whether this system is good or bad?[171]

Personal piety cannot save the Shi'as in any case—

> This system of government which is governing our lives could be taking us towards the fire of hell. At times the people sailing in a boat would be very religious and pious, but the boat is sailing towards a storm. Now all of them will end up into this storm in spite of their piety and worships. Irrespective of whether you are good or bad, if the system itself is moving towards destruction, your end will be the same as that of the system. [172]

These corrupt systems have a special term: they are all types of the "Fironic" system, which derives from the Pharaoh's governance from which Moses (Moosa) saved the

---

[169] Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam In Colonial India,* 58, 226.

[170] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The Islamic System and Other Systems of Society", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/islamic-system-and-other-systems-society

[171] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The First Characteristic of the Fironic System", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/first-characteristic-fironic-system

[172] Ibid.

believers in both the Quran and the Old Testament. The system has two characteristics: First, he warns that it is headed for destruction and no praying or ritual will provide salvation from this doomed system. Second, it preserves and upholds women in order for vulgar purposes. Pakistan, in his opinion, is also a Fironic system:

> In our country (Pakistan), from the time it came into existence it has a Fironic system. But within this Fironic system many times in the shape of Saamri's calf we have seen idols of democracy, idols of dictatorship, idols of military power and all these at times turned the complete system into Military Fironic system.[173]

He does give credit to Iran's system, albeit through an allusion, for living up to the ideal:

> You see that in the entire world there is only one nation which is not willing to accept this Fironic system and hence they (enemies of Islam) have surrounded this country from all sides. Every day they threaten this country. Unfortunately the entire globe is under the shadow of the Fironic system and our country is on the frontline in promoting this Fironic system.[174]

Still, Syed Naqvi does not discredit nationalism entirely and supports the Pakistani identity. After his sermon, one of the female audiences asked whether one should leave Pakistan. He responded,

> I did not say that you should leave the country. This country was created in the name of Islam, but it was never handed over to Islam and Islam was never implemented in this country. In fact, today they are talking and discussing that the biggest danger and threat which this nation has is from Islam. Hence they want to achieve freedom from Islam in this country. I am not saying that you should leave the country and go. What I am saying is that the foundations on which this country was created were correct and we need to return it back to those foundation principles. We should not sit careless and unconcerned. …
> If Imam Hussain (as) wanted to save his life he could have gone anywhere else, but then who would have destroyed Yazidiat? To demolish Yazidiat you have to stay there.[175]

In another speech, he has declared a similar message,

> We are Pakistani. Pakistan has a right over us. Iranians have to save Iran, the Lebanese have to save Lebanon, and the Pakistanis have to save Pakistan. Khumaynī has taught us loyalty.

[173] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The Fundamental Problem of the Ummah that Helps Saamris", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016,

https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/fundamental-problem-ummah-helps-saamris

[174] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: Questions And Answers", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/questions-and-answers.

[175] Ibid.

Khumaynī has taught us to be devoted to our nation. Khumaynī has taught us to love our community ... We have to free Pakistan from these lackeys ... you can do it ... And believe me, Khumaynī's path is such that if people comprehend it, they would all become its supporters.[176]

Syed Naqvi conveniently elides the political challenges experienced by Ayatollah Khomeini and the historical evolution of the *wilayat* idea in his call for the *wilayat*. While in other writings he emphasizes cross-regional alliances with Iran, in this text he cautions those who see leaving Pakistan as a solution. Instead, he focuses on the self-improvement; in particular, he suggests changes that pious Shi'i women should adopt certain changes for a better societal foundation that could usher the arrival of the Hidden Imam and a truly just society.

We should not end up in such a situation that we start to rise against dictatorship and democracy, and quote that these systems are not religious and are the Idols of Saamri, but when someone questions us about its replacement, we feel aggrieved that we don't know about the system of Imamat. First, you try to understand yourself about this system. The method is like this you have done by organizing a seminar. Imamat should be a part of our syllabus and we have to spend some time daily to understand the system of Imamat. Decide on this fact first that Imamat is not just a belief, but instead it is the name of a system of governance which needs to be implemented in the society.[177]

Mashal Saif has noted that for Naqvi, the *wilayat* is "(1) religiously correct and binding, (2) a remedy for the nation's problems, and implicitly a solution for sectarian violence."[178] While Naqvi condemns any collaboration with the Fironic system as sinful, he also does not offer a practical guide in action for the average person.[179] He also conveniently glosses over pertinent political issues of *waqf* (religious endowment) and class tensions discussed in Chapter 2. These issues have caused

---

[176] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "Afkar-e-Khomeni, Fakher-o-Sharam and current pakistan [sic] by Agha Syed Jawad Naqvi", Youtube, accessed Oct 24 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtPh3yWYxeY.
Translated and Cited by Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 321.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 321.

[179] In contrast to some other writings, he does indeed call for Shi'i assertion and self-defense in the combat sense rather than relying on the state:

"The only way for the salvation of Shia's [sic] in Pakistan is regional resistance. We should leave this expectancy hope [sic] that someone will come to resolve all our issues overnight." Syed Jawad Naqvi, *The Oppressions of Shi'as*. Cited in Mashal Saif, "The 'Ulamā' And The State", 256-7.

disagreements within the Shi'i community since the colonial era.[180] But Shi'a women, according to Naqvi, have specific guidelines for what they should or should not do. This chapter has explored the theological underpinnings for the *wilayat* and suggested the challenges that it has faced in Iran. Politically, the successors' legitimacy relies on the erudition of the representative of the Imam as well as some support from the *ulema*. Many among of the Iranian *ulema* do not agree with this approach and the debates surrounding the Iranian Constitution reflected this disagreement. Naqvi proposes a similar system in Pakistan yet has not addressed the existing criticisms directly in this particular sermon. Still, Naqvi exhorts the listeners to prepare for rejecting any unjust system and ushering in a new one that gives due credit to Shi'i knowledge and identity. Implications on gender relations and norms within Naqvi's sermon will be the subject matter of the next chapter.

---

[180] Razak Khan, "Recovering Minority Pasts: New Writings On Muslims In South Asia", *Südasien-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle* 2 (2012): 380, accessed March 27, 2017, http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/suedasien/band-2/375/PDF/375.pdf.

## Chapter 3

## Gender and Advice Literature

Scholars have noted that women's roles usually attract attention whenever social life is reorganized in South Asia. However, during the British rule, women served as symbols of modernity for the first time.[181] The Muslim community in South Asia was no exception. In the pursuit for a postcolonial independence in South Asia, some women and men considered that the education of women's rights was linked to the moral realization of the community. Still, the issue divided the Muslim community and continues to be a matter of debate, such as the *Hudud* Ordinances in Pakistan and controversial applications of Muslim Personal Law in India.[182] The call for women's education and family reform before and during the time of Partition challenged local elites: "by appealing to a larger moral order, reformist writers promised to expand the scope of individual autonomy" even while sacrificing local interests. The reformers also relied on "the idealized Muslim family as a critical site for the production of Muslim identity."[183] On issues such as material inheritance, women's status was contingent to her Islamic faith and negotiations occurred within the institution of the family.[184] In contrast, ethnographies have shown how Shi'i women could emulate revolutionary female roles and transgress the household boundaries during Muharram in Iraq, Iran and South Asia.[185] Historical women figures such as Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, and Zaynab, the eldest daughter of the Ali, carry a significant weight in Shi'i historical narratives and cultural assertion.[186] The nonclerical Islamic thinker and strong proponent of the Iranian revolution, Ali

---

[181] Anshu Malhotra, *Gender, Caste, And Religious Identities*, 4.

[182] Jyoti Punwani, "Muslim Women: Historic Demand For Change", *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 42 (2016): 7-8, accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/42/commentary/muslim-women.html.

Anita Anantharam, "Engendering the Nation: Women, Islam, and Poetry in Pakistan", *Journal of International Women's Studies* 11, no. 1. (2009): 208-224.

[183] David Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History", 1077.

[184] Gail Minault, "Women, Legal Reform And Muslim Identity In South Asia", *Juragentium.Org*, last modified 2005, accessed October 7, 2016, http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rol/en/minault.htm.

[185] Kamran Scot Aghaie. *The Women Of Karbala*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005.

[186] Mary Elaine Hegland, "Flagellation And Fundamentalism: (Trans)Forming Meaning, Identity, And Gender Through Pakistani Women's Rituals Of Mourning", *American Ethnologist* 25, no. 2 (1998): 240-266.

Shariati, tried to establish Fatima as the model for Iranian women through his writings.[187] Yet how are Muslim women in South Asia specifically advised?

Under the advent of colonialism, Islamic laws lost some of its former enforcement mechanisms and existed primarily in South Asia as personal laws reigning over marriage and inheritance. Religious scholars were tasked with the mission of "teaching Muslims the law and advising them to live up to it of their own accord."[188] The audience would voluntarily follow what the scholars sourced from the texts and presented as the right path.[189] Advice literature ranged from women's rights to other aspects of daily life, such as family relations and treatment of the girl-child. Many of the early Urdu advice literature targeted at Muslim women were written by men: "Didactic dialogues and fictional stories portrayed 'good' and 'bad' women as stark contrasts, often in a markedly misogynist tone."[190] Scholar Margrit Pernau notes that

> This Islam, seemingly universal, but in reality broken by the prism of male gender and *sharif* class, increasingly became the ideology for the constitution of the Muslim bourgeoisie and provided the vehicle of dissociation both from the menial classes as well as from the old aristocracy.[191]

The elite men often spoke for both the lower classes and their own women when establishing a moral norm. Pernau notes that the reformist men gave their wives education at the cost of them losing access to a female support group and undercutting the authority of the most senior female of the household.[192] Thus much of the colonial era advice literature served the class interests of an Urdu-speaking elite cultural segment of South Asian society.[193] Some of the textbooks specified for creating ideal

---

[187] Adele K. Ferdows, "Women And The Islamic Revolution", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15, no. 02 (1983): 289-290.

[188] Margrit Pernau, "Male Anger And Female Malice: Emotions In Indo-Muslim Advice Literature", *History Compass* 10, no. 2 (2012): 119-128.

[189] Ibid, 125.

[190] Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery and Craig Jeffrey, "Islamization, Gentrification and Domestication: 'A Girls' Islamic Course' and Rural Muslims in Western Uttar Pradesh", *Modern Asian Studies*, 38, no. 1 (Feb., 2004): 23.

[191] Margrit Pernau, Imtiaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld, *Family And Gender*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 152.

[192] Ibid, 152.

[193] There were notable exceptions such as the landlord Chaudhary Muhammad Ali Rudaulvi, who wrote an accessible advice pamphlet *Parde ki Baat*, on sex education for women, as well as *Salahkaar*, an advice book sex

domestic environments are still used in South Asia for the religious education of women.[194] While the political conditions have changed and Pakistan now institutes many Islamic injunctions as a state, one would also notice similarities between the colonial era advice literature and Jawad Naqvi's sermon.

When women successfully make themselves heard in the colonial debates, it was usually through an elite organization or through individual acts of apostasy.[195] Advice literature serves as a key medium in understanding Islamic debates since the colonial era, yet scholars who use the texts should also note the prevalence of statements that support patriarchy. This study does not suggest that Islam in South Asia is exceptionally patriarchal, since Hindu texts of the similar era would most likely carry similar biases against women.[196] As historian Jamal Malik has noted, women in South Asia are controlled by the family rather than state or religion. The family is the main source of financial and social support, and individual changes are often only possible with consent from the family.[197] Thus the when reading advice literature, one should also realize that Islamic advice literature in South Asia is not only shaping the surrounding social norms, but also is informed by them.

Syed Jawad Naqvi's sermon delivered to women shares issues with some of the sexist advice literature examples. He comments on theology, history and gender. In his view, women can play both positive and negative roles in terms of the future of Shiʿism. Women can overthrow "the system of Firon" (iron was the Pharaoh during the time of Moses and the metaphor for all corrupt systems) or strengthen "the evil mission of Saamri," who was the person who guided Moses' people to worship the

---

education for men.

M. Raisur Rahman, "Beyond Centre-Periphery: Qasbahs And Muslim Life In South Asia", *South Asian History and Culture* 5, no. 2 (2014): 172.

[194] Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery and Craig Jeffrey, "Islamization, Gentrification and Domestication: 'A Girls' Islamic Course' and Rural Muslims in Western Uttar Pradesh", *Modern Asian Studies*, 38, no. 1 (Feb., 2004): 27.

[195] Gail Minault, "Women, Legal Reform And Muslim Identity In South Asia", *Juragentium.Org*, last modified 2005, accessed October 7, 2016, http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rol/en/minault.htm.

[196] Manjula Narayan, "Interview: A Book On How Gita Press Helped Shape Hindu Right", *The Hindustan times*, last modified 2016, accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/books/interview-a-book-on-how-gita-press-helped-shape-hindu-right/story-ukC4K0hIdA11KFjlVBCPxL.html.

[197] Jamal Malik, *Islam In South Asia*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2012).

golden calf.[198] Naqvi stresses that the golden calf could not have been made without the donations of the women's gold jewelry:

> [This] idol calf was created with the cooperation of women. The women should concentrate on this point that during the period of occultation the duties of women is not to assist, support and cooperate with Saamris. Their responsibility is to support Haroon and not Saamri. We need to be careful of the Saamri of our age, since Saamri's talent is to use us only to make idols which stand against the true God of Moosa, the way Saamri used the women to make the calf.[199]

For Naqvi, the Pakistan government is not only unacceptable because it does not effectively halt violence against Shi'as. It is also because of its social policies, such as allowing women to run marathons. For Naqvi, the Pharaoh's society valued women because of their sexual properties:

> Today also it is the same, in the name of women freedom and women rights, marathon races are organized. They are making idols for the sake of women and using these idols to deviate people away from religion.[200]

Like the evil rulers who would be "killing your children and sparing your women" (Surah al-Baqarah, 2:49), Naqvi forebodes that Fironic systems similarly would do the same. "This means he was assassinating your children and kept alive your women. Why was he keeping alive the women? It was for nudity and vulgarity."[201] He continues to compare Pakistan with the Fironic system that attracted divine intervention:

> …if Firon was present today he would be doing the same thing what is happening today in our society. Today they make organizations for women support, media specially works for women support, and statements are issued in favour of women.[202]

---

[198] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The Primary Responsibility of Saamri and his Idol Calf", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/saamri-and-his-idol-calf

[199] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The Primary Responsibility of Women during Occultation", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/primary-responsibility-women-during-occultation

[200] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The Fundamental Problem of the Ummah that Helps Saamris", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/fundamental-problem-ummah-helps-saamris

[201] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The Second Characteristic of the Fironic System", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/second-characteristic-fironic-system

[202] Ibid.

And thus, according to his logic, advocates for women's rights are using liberation as a ploy to transform women into sexual objects. In efforts to describe the ideal society, Syed Jawad Naqvi makes his version of the virgin-whore binary very clear—

> It is obligatory on every one of us to do propagation and specifically women of our society. Unfortunately our society has made such an environment that there are very limited opportunities for the women to do propagation. I am talking about religious women, not about those others who are even ready for Marathon. The religious women should not be sitting idle, waiting for someone to come and relieve them from the clutches of evils.[203]

Instead of adhering to women's rights promoted for ulterior motives to access their sexuality, women should promote the *wilayat.* He expects that the women to "become defenders of *Wilayat* like Lady Zainab (s.a), who should come out to the world and… invoke the people to not accept living under this system of *Yazidiat* and invite them towards the system of Imamat."[204]

Thus the scope of action that Shiʻi women should partake in has expanded in Naqvi's view. He shortly addressed the obstacles women faced in the family. In his view, women should both make dinners for their husbands and try to be revolutionary:

> These women who went to Karbala and delivered the message of Karbala afterwards also had homes with kitchen. They could have also made excuses and done kitchen work, cleaning the house and other things throughout their lives, but they decided to go shoulder to shoulder with the men in Karbala.
>
> Religion has not prohibited women at any place. In fact, women have a very specific role which can be only delivered by them. [205]

This comment opens more questions than it answers. It brings to mind the acute observation made by anthropologist Jessica Winegar on the participants of the Egyptian Revolution: "To be the iconic revolutionary in Tahrir, one either had to be poor, without anything to lose, or privileged in certain ways. One usually did not have children to provide for (an older male role) or was

[203] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: Questions And Answers", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/questions-and-answers

[204] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/

[205] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: Women and Current Affairs ", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/women-and-current-affairs

not tasked with caring for them in the home (a female role, usually filled by mothers and older sisters)."[206] Although Naqvi often speaks about a revolution allegorically, a common trope when one links the Battle of Karbala with the present, Naqvi does call for "revolution" literally at times. With the understanding that participating in revolution requires certain privilege, one does question the possibility of an active role for women in a revolution for the *wilayat*.

Naqvi takes it for granted that in the public realm, women can and should function as religious actors performing pious labor. Marathons and other non-religious activities in the public are criticized. In the private realm, they will continue to fulfill their roles as wives and be responsible for their domestic labor.

> The duty of our chaste and religious women is not just to participate in Majalis (religious mourning gatherings) for the sake of earning divine rewards or to read the Quran. These acts do not relieve us from our responsibilities. The responsibility and the duties of these chaste women are to support and assist Moosa (as). Which Moosa? One who has come to demolish this corrupt system and replace it with a divine system of governance.[207]

In conclusion, this chapter has discussed how colonial advice literature was a product of elite men in an attempt to mold a particular image of Islam. The legacy of advice literature influenced Syed Jawad Naqvi's sermon on women, which is more specific on what women should not do rather than their potential to contribute to society. His suggestions for women are to perform chores, but not be content with merely attending *majlis* or Muharram activities. Women are equally responsible for ushering the *wilayat*, but many questions regarding the specifics of the revolution are still left unanswered. While he aspires for the *wilayat* as established by Ayatollah Khomeini, he did not compare the differences in the treatment of women in Iran and Pakistan. He also did not engage with the Iranian Shiʿi clerics who have commented on the rights and positions of women.[208]

---

[206] Jessica Winegar, "The Privilege Of Revolution: Gender, Class, Space, And Affect In Egypt", *American Ethnologist* 39, no. 1 (2012): 67-70.

[207] Syed Jawad Naqvi, "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat: The Second Characteristic of the Fironic System", *Al-Islam.Org*, last modified 2016, accessed September 12, 2016, https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/second-characteristic-fironic-system

[208] Ziba Mir-Hosseini, *Islam And Gender*, 1st ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).

Naqvi also critiques the Pakistani state for using women's liberation as a ploy for exposing their sexuality. He questions the legitimacy of the "Fironic" state and its relation with religious subjects. Yet given this implication that some public activities are unacceptable, it prompts one to ask, what is the scope permissible for women to participate in Shi'i religious activism? When transitioning towards the ideal system of the *wilayat*, would society briefly experience a liminal phase like Muharram, which allows women to transcend certain boundaries? Naqvi's Shi'ism seems to open possibilities for the state of exception, yet the norms and expectations set for women seem to persist and would experience little interruption regardless of the governing state's nature.

---

Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohsen Sa'idzadeh, for example, is the Iranian cleric most vocal in advocating for gender equality.

**Conclusion**

Reform and governance were questions throughout the tumultuous modern history of Islam. The lack of an Islamic government became clear after the British Empire annexed Awadh and the 1857 uprising was crushed. During the late nineteenth century, the Muslim intellectuals and *ulema* shaped a new public space and competed through making speeches and cultivating followers. The Shiʻi ulema attempted to reach out to non-elite castes through publishing and creating welfare associations. The targeted audience expanded beyond the *sharif* and *sayyid* castes. Urdu became used more commonly in print and speech than Persian for a wider audience. This was not the first time Shiʻism appealed to lower castes, since Ismailis converted many to lower castes through *dawa* in the thirteenth and fourteenth century.[209] But this time the Shiʻi methods appealed more to an emerging public sphere and they were also more conscious of the Sunni rivalry. A distinct North Indian Shiʻi identity took shape and provided new platforms, associations and leaders that were more outspoken than previous generations on political matters. Differences between the Sunni and Shiʻa religion became topics of debate and the divide was sharpened during the late nineteenth century.

This thesis has explored a particular Shiʻi theological understanding of the Imam and the importance of guardianship by the Imam for Islamic governance. Through debates on theology and politics and missionary activities (*tabligh*), members of the *ulema* and Shiʻi associations contributed to the formation of a South Asian Shiʻi political identity. The format and content of *majlis* and the projected symbolic value of women in the process of cultural reform accompanied this process.

Three additional processes shaped the Shiʻi political identity in Pakistan after partition: Sunni militant antagonism towards Shiʻi rural landlords, emboldened awareness of religious identity after the infectious Iranian revolution, and sectarian violence in the 1980s and 1990s. These contexts allowed for a discourse analysis of Shiʻi preacher and member of the *ulema*—Syed Jawad Naqvi. Much of the styles of

---

[209] Dominique-Sila Khan, *Conversions And Shifting Identities*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2003).
In South India, ethnomusicologist Richard Wolf has noted how Dalits have developed certain rhythms and dances to commemorate Muharram.

43

his sermons have been affected by the South Asian Shiʻi milieu that celebrates *majlis* and influential preachers. While many Urdu debates stressed the importance of "personal restraint for men and women alike, overcoming *nafs* [undisciplined impulses] through the cultivation of *'aql* [intelligence, sense], and the inherent spiritual equality of men and women,"[210] Naqvi's particular sermon examined in this thesis addressed gender issues with a superficial understanding of women's potential. He does not engage with how his ideal *wilayat* in Iran and other Shiʻi clerics have grappled with the role of women in Islam. His ideas also highlight the inherent tension between Muslim nationalism and Islamism and disrupt the narrative of a cohesive and continuous Islamic nationalism stemming from the 1940s up to the twenty-first century. Naqvi is responding to concerns stemming from the colonial era as well as the 1979 Islamic Revolution that took place in Iran. While his rhetoric extends beyond borders at times, Naqvi hesitates to suggest a similar revolution for Pakistan. Future research should incorporate his other Urdu Youtube speeches for discourse analysis to bring light to the relation between Shiʻi identity and the contested Pakistani state.

---

[210] Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery and Craig Jeffrey, "Islamization, Gentrification and Domestication," 28.

# References

Abbas, Hassan. "The Roots Of Radicalization In Pakistan". *South Asia Journal*. Last modified 2013. Accessed September 21, 2016. http://southasiajournal.net/the-roots-of-radicalization-in-pakistan/.

Abou Zahad, M. "The politicization of the Shia community in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s", in *The other Shiites*, (eds.) A. Monsutti, S. Naef and F. Sabahi, Bern, 2007.

Abou Zahad, M. "The Sunni-Shia Conflict In Jhang (Pakistan)". In *Lived Islam In South Asia*, (eds.) Imtiaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld, 135-148. 1st ed. Delhi: Social Science Press, 2004.

Aghaie, Kamran Scot. *The Women Of Karbala*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005.

Ahmed, Mumtaz. "Shi'i political activism in Pakistan", *Studies in Contemporary Islam* 5, 1–2 (2003), 57-71.

Akhavi, Shahrough. "Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran", *The Middle East Journal* 41 ii (1987), 190.

Alam, Muzaffar. *The Languages Of Political Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Alavi, Seema. *Muslim Cosmopolitanism In The Age Of Empire*. Harvard University Press, 2015.

Ali, Kamran Asdar. "Communists In A Muslim Land: Cultural Debates In Pakistan's Early Years". *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no. 03 (2011): 501-534.

Amirpur, Katajun. "A Doctrine in the Making? *Velayat-e faqih* in Post Revolutionary Iran," in *Speaking for Islam*," (eds.) Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 219-240.

Anantharam, Anita. "Engendering the Nation: Women, Islam, and Poetry in Pakistan", *Journal of International Women's Studies* 11, no. 1. (2009), 208-224.

Anderson, Michael. 'Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India', in Chibli Mallat and Jane Connors (eds.), *Islamic Family Law* (Boston, 1990). 205-23.

Ansari, Heena. "The Growth Of Urdu Journalism In Lucknow". *Newsd*. Last modified 2016. Accessed September 25, 2016. https://newsd.in/growth-urdu-journalism-lucknow/.

Ansari, Sarah F. D. *Sufi Saints And State Power*. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Brunner, Rainer. Review of *Shiʻi Scholars of the Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The ʻUlama of Najaf and Karbala,* by Meir Latvik, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 63, no.1. (2000), 113-114.

Bengio, Ofra and Meir Litvak. *The Sunna And Shi'a In History*. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Chandra, Satish. *Medieval India,* vol. 2. Orient BlackSwan, 2007.

Devji, Faisal. "India In The Muslim Imagination: Cartography And Landscape In 19th Century Urdu Literature". *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*, no. 10 (2014).

Dhulipala, Venkat. *Creating A New Medina*. 1st ed. Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Eisenlohr, Patrick. "Media, Urban Aspirations, and Religious Mobilization Among Twelver Shi'ites in Mumbai," in *Handbook Of Religion And The Asian City*, (eds.) Peter van der Veer, 415-431. University of California Press, 2015.

Faruqi, Shamsur Rahman. *The Secret Mirror: Essays on Urdu Poetry*. Delhi, 1981.

Ferdows, Adele K. "Women And The Islamic Revolution". *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15, no. 02 (1983): 283-298.

Freitag, Sandria B. *Culture And Power In Banaras*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Fuchs, Simon Wolfgang. "Third Wave Shiism: Sayyid 'Arif Husain Al-Husaini And The Islamic Revolution In Pakistan". *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24, no. 3 (2016): 493-510.

Fuchs, Simon Wolfgang. "The West Is A Career: Pakistan's Shi'i Islam Between The Local And The Transnational". Presentation, The Berkeley Pakistan Initiative, 2016.

Gilmartin, David. "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative." *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (1998): 1090–1091.

Gleave, R. "Conceptions Of Authority In Iraqi Shi'ism: Baqir Al-Hakim, Ha'iri And Sistani On Ijtihad, Taqlid And Marja'iyya". *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 59-78.

Gleave, R. *Inevitable Doubt*. Leiden: Brill, 2000.

Hegland, Mary. "Two images of Husain: accommodation and revolution in an Iranian village", in *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution,* (ed.) Nikki Kedie, 218-237. New Haven, 1983.

Hegland, Mary Elaine. "Flagellation And Fundamentalism: (Trans)Forming Meaning, Identity, And Gender Through Pakistani Women's Rituals Of Mourning". *American Ethnologist* 25, no. 2 (1998): 240-266.

Hirschkind, Charles. *The Ethical Soundscape*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Inloes, Amina. "Negotiating Shīʿī Identity And Orthodoxy Through Canonizing Ideologies About Women In Twelver Shīʿī Aḥādīth On Pre-Islamic Sacred History In The Qurʾān" (PhD, University of Exeter, n.d.).

Jalal, Ayesha. *The Sole Spokesman*. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Jalal, Ayesha. *Self And Sovereignty*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Jamal, Amina. "Global Discourses, Situated Traditions, And Muslim Women's Agency In Pakistan". In *South Asian Feminisms*, Ania Loomba and Ritty Lukose ed., 61. 1st ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012.

Jeffery, Patricia, Roger Jeffery and Craig Jeffrey. "Islamization, Gentrification and Domestication: 'A Girls' Islamic Course' and Rural Muslims in Western Uttar Pradesh". *Modern Asian Studies* 38, no. 1 (Feb., 2004): 21.

Jones, Justin. *Shiʿa Islam In Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Jones, Justin. "Shi'ism, Humanity And Revolution In Twentieth-Century India". In *The Shiʿa In Modern South Asia*, Justin Jones and Ali Usman Qasmi (ed.), 80-104. 1st ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Kamran, T. "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy In Pakistan: A Case Study Of Jhang". *Journal of Islamic Studies* 20, no. 1 (2009): 55-85.

Khan, Dominique-Sila. *Conversions And Shifting Identities*. 1st ed. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2003.

Khan, Naveeda Ahmed. *Beyond Crisis*. London: New York, 2010.

Khan, Naveeda Ahmed. *Muslim Becoming*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012.

Khan, Razak. "Recovering Minority Pasts: New Writings On Muslims In South Asia". Südasien-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle 2 (2012): 375-397. Accessed March 27, 2017. http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/suedasien/band-2/375/PDF/375.pdf.

Majd, Hooman. *The Ayatollah Begs to Differ*. Doubleday, 2008.

Malhotra, Anshu. *Gender, Caste, And Religious Identities*. 1st ed. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Malik, Jamal. *Islam In South Asia*. 1st ed. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2012.

Mallison, Françoise. "Barmati Panth: A Messianic Sect Established In Sindh, Kutch, And Saurashtra". In *Sindh Through History And Representations*, Michel Boivin ed., 90-98. 1st ed. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Menashri, David. "Ayatollah Khomeini And The Velayat-E-Faqih". In *Militancy And Political Violence In Shiism*, (ed.) Assaf Moghadamed. 1st ed. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]: Routledge, 2012.

Messick, Brinkley Morris. *The Calligraphic State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Metcalf, Barbara D. *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*. Princeton, 1982.

Metcalf, Barbara D. *Husain Ahmad Madani*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009.

Minault, Gail. "Women, Legal Reform And Muslim Identity In South Asia", Juragentium.Org. Last modified 2005. Accessed October 7, 2016. http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rol/en/minault.htm.

Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. *Islam And Gender*. 1st ed. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.

Naqvi, Syed Jawad. "The Role Of Women Towards The System Of Wilayat". Al-Islam.Org. Last modified 2016. Accessed September 12, 2016. https://www.al-islam.org/role-women-towards-system-wilayat-syed-jawad-naqvi/.

"Afkar-e-Khomeni, Fakher-o-Sharam and current pakistan [sic] by Agha Syed Jawad Naqvi". Youtube .Accessed Oct 24 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtPh3yWYxeY.

"Inqilab e Islami,Itmaam e Hujjat e Ilahi (11th February 2012 - LAHORE) Ustad Agha Syed
Jawad Naqvi". Youtube. Accessed Oct 24, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3IXSM7eHsw.

Narayan, Manjula. "Interview: A Book On How Gita Press Helped Shape Hindu Right". The Hindustan Times. Last modified 2016. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://www.hindustantimes.com/books/interview-a-book-on-how-gita-press-helped-shape-hindu-right/story-ukC4K0hIdA11KFjlVBCPxL.html.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Peer, Basharat. "The Shiite Murders: Pakistan's Army Of Jhangvi". *The New Yorker*. Last modified 2013. Accessed October 16, 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-shiite-murders-pakistans-army-of-jhangvi.

Pernau, Margrit. "Male Anger And Female Malice: Emotions In Indo-Muslim Advice Literature". *History Compass* 10, no. 2 (2012): 119-128.

Pernau, Margrit, Imtiaz Ahmad, and Helmut Reifeld. Family And Gender. 1st ed. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003.

Pinney, Christopher. "Iatrogenic Religion and Politics", in *Censorship in South Asia: Cultural Regulation from Sedition to Seduction*, eds. Raminder Kaur and William Mazzarella. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, 29-62.

Punwani, Jyoti. "Muslim Women: Historic Demand For Change". *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 42 (2016): 7-8. Accessed October 16, 2016. http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/42/commentary/muslim-women.html.

Qasmi, Ali Usman. *Ahmadis And The Politics Of Religious Exclusion In Pakistan.* London/New York: Anthem Press, 2014.

Rahman, M. Raisur. "Beyond Centre-Periphery: Qasbahs And Muslim Life In South Asia". *South Asian History and Culture* 5, no. 2 (2014): 163-178.

Rieck, Andreas. "The struggle for equal rights as a minority: Shia communal organizations in Pakistan, 1948–1968," in *The Twelver Shia*, (eds.) R. Brunner and W. Ende, Leiden, 2001.

Robinson, Francis. "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print", *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (1993): 229-51.

Rollier, Paul. "Shias In Pakistan: A View From Lahore". *Live Encounters*. Last modified 2014. Accessed September 25, 2016. http://liveencounters.net/january-2014/february/dr-paul-rollier-shias-in-pakistan-view-from-lahore/.

Rollier, Paul. "Texting Islam: Text messages and religiosity among young Pakistanis," *Contemporary South Asia* 18, no. 4, (2010): 413–426.

Sachedina, Abdulaziz. *The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Saif, Mashal. "The 'Ulamā' And The State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority And Sovereignty In Contemporary Pakistan". Ph.D., Duke University, 2014.

Salvatore, Armando and Dale Eickelman. *Public Islam And The Common Good.* Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Shaikh, Farzana. *Making Sense Of Pakistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Soares, Benjamin, and Filippo Osella. "Islam, Politics, Anthropology." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15 (2009): 1-23.

Soroush, Abdolkarim. "The evolution of Shi'ism and its imperatives". Presentation, Iranian Student Alliance in America, 2011.

Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn and Hossein Nasr, *Shiʿite Islam*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975.

Toor, Saadia. *The State Of Islam*. London: Pluto Press, 2011.

Winegar, Jessica. "The Privilege Of Revolution: Gender, Class, Space, And Affect In Egypt". American Ethnologist 39, no. 1 (2012): 67-70.

Wolf , Richard K. "Embodiment and Ambivalence: Emotion in South Asian Muharram Drumming," *The Yearbook for Traditional Music* 32 (2000): 81-116 .

Zahir, I. I., *Al-Shiʿa wa-l-Sunna*. Lahore, 2008.

# Affidavit

I hereby confirm that this master thesis has been written independently by the undersigned and without any assistance of third parties, and that no other sources and aids have been used than those indicated in this thesis.

[Passages that have been taken word for word or by analogy from publisher or unpublished sources have been marked with reference to these sources.

This thesis has not been received—neither in this nor in a similar form—by any examination board before.]

Date and Place:                                    Signature: